


THE ASSAULT ON THE WEST

by IAN GREIG



Foreword
by The Rt Hon Sir Alec Douglas-Home KT MP

Mr. Greig has made a special study of Communist political warfare techniques. His aim in this work is to present a general survey of the strategy and tactics employed by International Communism in its bid for world domination during the last 20 years. In *THE ASSAULT ON THE WEST* he gives many new facts about the global nature of Communist bloc propaganda activities, foreign broadcasts, news agencies, international front organisations, espionage, subversion, Communist Parties and their methods and finally Communist terrorism and guerilla warfare. The information presented is thoroughly documented and has been drawn from Communist policy statements, official reports of Western Governments and the statements of defectors who actually took part in the events described.

The author believes that despite the occurrence of the Sino-Soviet split and other changes which have taken place in the Communist world in recent years, the threat posed by the Communist assault on the West is increasing in scope and intensity rather than decreasing. Rejecting the view that the Cold War is over or as one national newspaper put it that "the world conspiracy of Communism is dying its natural death", the author points out that the main thrust of the Communist offensive is now being centered upon attempts to gain control or influence over the developing countries of Asia, Africa and South America in which areas of the world the West's vital sources of raw materials lie.

Mr. Greig considers that the Western nations need urgently to re-appraise the seriousness of the danger inherent in the offensive being carried out against them under the cloak of the deceitful propaganda slogan "peaceful co-existence". He urges that the West should unite to take new measures to defend itself and its freedoms from the threat posed by the contemporary totalitarian tyranny of the extreme left.

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THE ASSAULT ON THE WEST

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BY

IAN GREIG

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FOREWORD

THIS book is a closely documented work of reference on all the Communist organisations in the world and a careful and detailed analysis of the multifarious ways in which they deal in subversion.

Until at the end of the book the author allows himself to draw some conclusions, he relies absolutely on fact to illustrate the methods by which the Soviet Union and China direct a campaign which to them is in the nature of a religious crusade.

The reader will find revealed the whole alarming and sordid story with its infinite ramifications, and the way in which every medium of publicity and propaganda is exploited. He will appreciate such a gem as that written by Mr. Palgunov, the Director General of TASS, "Information is agitation by facts".

Mr. Greig has been wise to illustrate with chapter and verse, for otherwise the length to which the Communist will go to subvert and to destroy the morale of organisations and individuals would be incredible to anyone brought up on a tradition of tolerance.

The take-over of the World Federation of Trade Unions is an eye-opener, while the single-minded purpose with which an agent will build up a dossier on an individual, so as to exploit his weakness and trap him into becoming an accomplice, is devilish.

The revelations which were made at the time of the Canadian Royal Commission is a reminder that no country is immune from attack and that not even the most advanced democracy can afford to be complacent. The most recent targets of Russia and China are the newly independent countries of Africa and Asia and the money spent and the personnel employed to stir the pot of revolution should alert these countries as to who are their foes and who their friends.

Happily Communists do not always succeed. In Africa the Soviet Union has suffered some set-backs while in Indonesia the cruder methods of the Chinese led to a crushing debacle and defeat.

But the lesson of this book is crystal clear. It is that the price of liberty is eternal vigilance.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home, K.T., M.P.

January 1968

PART 1

THE ATTACK FROM WITHOUT

CHAPTER I

The Character of The Assault

THE late President Kennedy is said to have once remarked that the most serious danger facing the West was that of being nibbled to death under conditions of nuclear stalemate.

The truth of these words has never been more clearly perceptible than today. Despite "peaceful co-existence", the Communist Parties of the world seek by all means short of involvement in a major war to widen their spheres of influence, and to undermine the strategic and economic position of the West and its allies. Whilst Vietnam is at present the focal point of the East-West confrontation, new threats can be expected to erupt in many forms all over the world in the future.

With the United States under mounting pressure in Vietnam ; Britain seemingly determined to abrogate her world responsibilities and neutralist policies on the increase in Europe, the opportunities for the Communist countries to step up their nibbling strategy have greatly increased. In the summer of 1967 there appeared a serious possibility that the commanding position built up by the Soviet Union in the Middle East might well be used, not only as one from which threats could be mounted against the West's vital oil resources in the Persian Gulf and in order to obtain bases on the Red Sea (both for decades major objectives of Soviet foreign policy), but also ultimately to threaten NATO's communications and Western Europe's trade routes to Asia.

In Africa both the Soviet bloc and Communist China continue to do their utmost to exploit racial tensions and the manifold problems of that continent's developing nations. Across the Atlantic, Cuba, despite serious setbacks, continues to call for half a dozen Vietnams in order to bleed the West to death.

The problems with which the West is faced, however, include many far more insidious threats than overt military aggression. Chief amongst them being the incessant campaign of political warfare, propaganda and subversion waged on a global scale. It is a campaign the aim of which is not so much to win converts for the Communist cause

outright but to weaken the will of the peoples of the Free World to resist the spread of Communism and to confuse Western public opinion as to the true aims of the Communist states. It is a campaign in which a whole arsenal of non-military weapons are used such as broadcasting services, literature, news agencies, intelligence services, Communist Parties, fronts, economic aid, culture, trade, and a number of other methods.

I propose to examine the available evidence describing this multi-faceted assault on the West in greater detail later.

This offensive is one which goes far outside the bounds of propaganda, as that word is generally understood. It encompasses the planting of false information, the use of bribery, blackmail, industrial disruption and the infiltration of governments and political parties. It attacks the morale of non-Communist countries by attempting to bring their values and institutions into disrepute. It is a campaign which poses particularly difficult problems for the Western democratic governments who are its principal targets, for the Communists and their collaborators have no hesitation in invoking the principles of liberty in defence of their seditious activities which are aimed at destroying the democratic system of argument itself and its substitution by a one-party dictatorship.

The Communist countries back this campaign by presenting themselves as the peace-loving members of the world community and their opponents as the "threat to peace". This is a line which their sympathisers in non-Communist countries often appear only too eager to take up and to echo, despite the fact that there is good reason to believe that the Communist bid for world domination has already cost between 80—100 million lives since 1917.

Even in the days of Stalin, the Soviet Union continuously stressed its desire for peace in order to remove any suspicion from its policies. Since his death, the theme of "peaceful co-existence" has of course become central to the propaganda line of the entire Soviet bloc. Yet years of experience have shown clearly that under the cloak of "peaceful co-existence" the Soviet Union and its allies feel as free as before to carry on their campaign of attrition and subversion against the West. Despite their declared desire for better relations with the West, there is no evidence to show that it is anything more than a propaganda trick.

To realise the extent to which they openly regard 'peaceful co-existence' as merely a device with which to cloak their continuing drive for world domination it is only necessary to examine some of the sayings of the Communist leaders themselves during the last few years. The principle may be said to have been laid down in a particularly forthright statement by the leading apostle of the theory of co-existence, Khrushchev himself. He said in the course of a speech on 19 July, 1963:

"Today the Imperialists pretend to be brave, but only in words ; in reality they tremble before the Socialist world which is growing and gaining in strength. And let them tremble. So much the better for us.

"A fight is in progress between these two systems, a life and death combat. But we Communists want to win this struggle with the least losses, and there is no doubt whatsoever that we shall win. That is why we are striving for victory, for the triumph of Communism, without unleashing a world thermo-nuclear war."

That these were no isolated remarks produced for propaganda reasons at some special occasion and to be regarded as of little moment, is proved by the fact that the same theme is found to be repeated again and again, in pamphlet after pamphlet and speech after speech by the leaders of International Communism. The Communist ultimate aim remains the same. Co-existence provides the setting in which it may be achieved with the least possible risk to the Communist countries themselves.

A somewhat typical extract from a pamphlet entitled *Peace, Freedom and You*, produced by the journal *World Marxist Review* reads:

"Peaceful co-existence creates the most favourable conditions for the fight of the oppressed nations against their imperialist oppressors. It is simply not true, as is maintained by the Chinese leaders, that peaceful co-existence is used by Communists as a pretext to liquidate the anti-imperialist struggle and to disclaim the international duty of supporting the revolutionary struggle of the people of various countries. Peaceful co-existence means the maximum support to the oppressed nations including arms. And peaceful co-existence is strengthened by the revolutionary struggles of the people."¹

Throughout the series of booklets produced by the Soviet news agency, *Novosti*, dealing with the various facets of the policy of peaceful co-existence runs the theme that Soviet policy has undergone no fundamental change. The aim remains the same, to secure the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat throughout the world. Peaceful co-existence it is carefully explained is merely a tactical means towards this end; a means which does not preclude the use of force when necessary, as for example in 'wars of liberation'. A convenient term which can be used to cover practically any contingency in which it seems likely that the Communist cause can be advanced by the use of limited military operations.

In as much as the roots of the Sino-Soviet split do not lie in a rivalry for the leadership of the Communist world they lie in the matter of choice of method, not of objective. Both wish to see Communism as the world's dominating force. Both, largely for reasons of self-preservation, wish to see this end achieved by means short of a world nuclear war. Both, however, are willing to indulge in the use of violence when necessary, either directly or by the manipulation of some third party, whenever there seems little chance of such action leading to an open clash with the West. The argument between Moscow and Peking centres round the tactics to be engaged in and the extent to which risks should be run in the quest for world domination.

¹*Peace, Freedom, and You. World Marxist Review*, Prague, 1963, p. 15.

The Chinese approach might be compared to that of a brash adventurer willing to run great risks, and, in the words of a Chinese Government statement to: "despise the enemy, dare to struggle against him and dare to seize victory . . ."¹

The Soviet attitude could be compared with that of a mature chess player, prepared to bide his time, and mindful of a passage from the writings of Lenin, which reads:

"To carry on a war for the overthrow of the international bourgeois, a war which is a hundred times more difficult, prolonged and complicated than the most stubborn of ordinary wars between states, and to refuse beforehand to manoeuvre, to utilise the conflict of interests (even though temporary) among one's enemies, to refuse to temporise and to compromise with possible (even though transient, unstable, and conditional) allies—is not this ridiculous in the extreme? Is it not as though, in the difficult ascent of an unexplored and hitherto inaccessible mountain, we were to renounce beforehand the idea that sometimes we might have to zig-zag, sometimes retracing our steps, sometimes giving up the course once selected and trying various others?"²

The threat represented by the Communist onslaught on the West in the shape of subversive war is now a multi-headed one, but it is none the less dangerous for that. Indeed in some respects the danger may be said to have been heightened by the fact that the eye-catching tactics frequently employed by Peking tend to detract attention from the less sensational but often more effective tactics employed by Moscow. Nor would it be wise to forget the remarks of Khrushchev, made less than a year before his downfall, when he said in November 1963:

"Yes, we do have disputes and differences with the Chinese comrades. But our main difference is that with capitalism. Although there are differences between us and our Chinese brothers, we stand together on the main issue. We are against capitalism, against landlordism; we are for Socialism and Communism.

"I am sure that we shall reach agreement with the Chinese comrades; I do not know whether this will happen sooner or later, but we shall reach agreement. We have one path, that of our common struggle against capitalism, for the victory of Communism throughout the World!"

Much the same sentiments have since been echoed by his successors.

In pursuit of this openly sought victory the Communist powers have, despite their rivalry, built up international political warfare machines of unsurpassed magnitude. It is the purpose of this study to examine these and to consider how the Free World can protect its liberties in the face of this global threat.

¹Statement by the spokesman of the Chinese Government. *Peking Review*, 6 September, 1963, pp. 7-16.

²Lenin. *Selected Works*, International Publishers, New York, 1943, Vol. X, p. 111.

CHAPTER II

The Propaganda Barrage

Foreign language publishing activities and organisation in the Communist Bloc—Dissemination of foreign language periodicals—Book and pamphlet production—Additional ways and means of propaganda dissemination—Specialist publications.

THE size and scope of the world-wide Communist propaganda effort can be gauged by the fact that an American Government Sub-Committee after detailed research has estimated that the propaganda output of the USSR alone is approximately one hundred times greater than the rest of the world put together.

A French authority has estimated that in 1960 the Communist bloc was spending £170 million a year on propaganda directed to non-Communist countries. This sum did not include the propaganda expenditure of the various international front organisations which it was thought probably amounted to at least a further £500,000 and gave employment to about 350,000 people. There is no doubt that both the scope of this propaganda effort and the amount of money expended upon it has been greatly increased in the seven years since that estimate was made.

The mammoth campaign to propagate the gospel of Communism is carried on by the dissemination of printed material on an unsurpassed scale, an ever increasing use of radio broadcasting and an energetic cultural offensive involving the adroit use of films, cultural missions and exchanges and exhibitions. An additional facet of the campaign is the selective use of economic aid and the provision of educational facilities for students from the developing countries.

Foreign Language Publishing Activities and Organisation in the Communist Bloc

In addition to the main Communist printing and publishing centres located in the USSR and China, several of the East European Communist countries are active in producing literature in the languages of the non-Communist world. East Germany producing the largest quantity of material, outside the Soviet Union and China, but important foreign language publishing industries also exist in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania and Hungary. In addition large quantities

of literature intended principally for distribution in the countries of South America are now produced in Cuba, and a large printing works has been constructed in North Vietnam with the assistance of technicians from East Germany. Publications of the Foreign Languages Printing House in Hanoi have been on sale in Europe since 1964. North Korea also maintains a printing centre of some significance.

All types of literature in Communist countries, without exception, are subject to censorship by agencies representing the Party's Central Committee which also exercises censorship over radio and television programmes. In the case of the Soviet Union, these include the Chief Administration for Literary and Publishing Affairs (Glavit). The Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) and the Central Committee's Section for Propaganda and Agitation formerly known as Agitprop and now restyled Propagit, also ensure that only the Party line is allowed to be expressed in the USSR.

Propagit is directly under the control of the Party Presidium, and another of its functions is to plan and supervise the entire Soviet foreign propaganda programme.

The overall censoring function was formerly performed by Glavit which had the last say in approving films and radio broadcasts, lectures, exhibitions, and photographs intended for reproduction. Ideological censorship is now exercised by the State Committee for the Press of the USSR, set up in 1963.

The Foreign Languages Publishing House in Moscow is responsible for the production of all literature intended for readers outside the Soviet Union, including those in the other countries of the Communist bloc; except for periodicals which are produced by a number of specialist bodies in foreign languages as a part of their routine activities.

The actual arrangements for the export of publications printed in the Soviet Union are handled by a branch of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. This operates under the title of The International Book Company or 'Mezhkniga', founded in 1923. In general only publications listed in the company's catalogue are allowed out of the country. There has been a steady rise in the number of publications passed for export since the days of Stalin. The 1955 list for instance carried the names of only 500 publications, whereas the 1962 list included over 2,000. Mezhkniga also exports records and is responsible for the import of foreign books and their subsequent distribution within the Soviet Union. In addition to the flow of publications authorised under the control of Mezhkniga, the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and some other similar institutions and libraries such as the Lenin Library in Moscow are permitted to handle the export of some specialist Soviet publications.

By 1958 Mezhkniga had reportedly completed contracts with 840 firms in 65 foreign countries and was despatching more than a thousand different newspapers and magazines and 16,000 titles of books for distribution through such firms. It was believed that over 200 Soviet publishing houses were engaged in supplying Mezhkniga with material

for export. By 1965 the Soviet Union was responsible for publishing one quarter of the world's total book and pamphlet production.

The publishing output of a Communist country is always an integral part of overall state planning. Under the Soviet seven year plan that ended in 1965 an expansion in the printing and publishing industry to the equivalent of about £120 million was achieved.

The preparation of Chinese Communist propaganda for use abroad is the responsibility of a number of government bodies and organisations including the Ministry of Culture ; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs which has a special responsibility in preparing propaganda intended for the 13 million or more Chinese living abroad.

In general the organisation of the publishing industry of Communist China would seem to parallel that of the Soviet Union and other European Communist countries ; with the Foreign Languages Publishing House in Peking being the main source of material destined for consumption abroad. The expansion of the publishing industry has been extremely rapid. Some of the regime's first foreign language propaganda pamphlets that began to appear in Asian countries in 1949 were printed outside China, many of them in India. Later some of these same pamphlets were re-published in more elaborate style from Peking and by 1960 Communist China was publishing 12 million books a year in foreign languages plus a large number of periodicals and pamphlets.

Foreign Language Periodicals from the Communist Bloc

At the present time the countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc together publish a total of over 90 regular periodicals in languages of the non-Communist world. This total does not include publications devoted to attracting Western tourists nor does it include the periodicals of the international Communist front organisations or those published by Communist embassies. The frequency of these publications varies from weekly to half yearly (most are monthly) and their quality varies from that of the newsheet variety to elaborate 'prestige' glossy magazines devoted to culture and the arts.

Soviet Publications

The principal Soviet periodicals available in the languages of the non-Communist World including English, are :

Soviet Union: A lavishly produced illustrated monthly magazine published in 17 languages including Arabic, Hindi, Urdu, and Vietnamese.

International Affairs: A monthly magazine which seeks to explain the foreign policy of the USSR. Published in Russian, English and French.

Culture and Life: An illustrated monthly, officially described as dealing with "the participation of Soviet people in public life and national economy". Published in five languages.

Soviet Woman: Two Soviet 'Public bodies', the Committee of Soviet Women and The All Union Central Council of Trade Unions combine to produce this illustrated monthly which is published in eight languages.

New Times: A weekly journal concentrating upon international affairs. Mezhnkiga's catalogue describes it as "throwing light on the key problems of our time". It is published by the trade union newspaper *Trud* in English, German, Spanish and Polish.

Moscow News: A weekly newspaper published in English, French and Spanish and devoted mainly to life in the Soviet Union.

Soviet Military Review: Described as "an illustrated military-political monthly" published in English and French.

Soviet Literature: Published monthly in English, Spanish, Polish and German.

Soviet Film: Devoted to providing information about Soviet films and film industry and published in Russian, English, French, Spanish, German, and Arabic.

Sport in the USSR: A 'prestige' monthly magazine in six languages.

Two other illustrated monthly publications *Oeuvres et Opinions* dealing with Soviet cultural life and *Femme de nos Jours* devoted to describing the life of women in the USSR are published only in French. A new monthly magazine *Russian Digest* started publication in January 1967 and it is based on the same layout as *Reader's Digest*.

The prices and subscription rates of these periodicals, like those of all Communist bloc produced material intended for distribution in non-Communist countries, are uniformly low. In fact so low as to point to a heavy subsidy. The annual subscription rate for the monthly *Soviet Union* including direct postage from Moscow to Britain is only ten shillings a year. If an order is placed through the British Communist Party's bookshop a two years' subscription can be had for only 16s. The 16 page weekly *Moscow News* can be obtained for an annual subscription of 12s., including postage for which the subscriber also receives a number of supplements telling him of "the participation of the Soviet Union in international life" and giving him details of "the Statements and Notes of the Soviet Government and other materials".¹ Although Communist periodicals carry much material devoted to matters of general interest the propaganda content of all of them is high.

While only a small minority of countries in the non-Communist world bar the entry of periodicals from the Communist bloc the entry of literature from the non-Communist countries for free circulation within the Communist bloc is still very restricted. Conferences are sometimes sponsored by Soviet periodicals such as the one held in Delhi in July 1966 under the auspices of *Soviet Union* to discuss "Indian-Soviet co-operation in the educational field".

¹*Soviet Magazines Published in Foreign Languages*. Mezhnkiga Catalogue for 1967.

Eastern European Periodicals

The most prolific producer of foreign language periodicals of the lesser Communist countries is East Germany which produces no less than 17 in a variety of languages ranging from Finnish to Arabic. A point of special interest regarding these periodicals is that a number of them are produced only for circulation in certain areas with an official ban on their distribution elsewhere. *Jena Review* published every two months in German, English and Russian, is not intended for circulation in West Germany, West Berlin, or Austria. *News* published monthly in English and French is intended only for circulation in Africa. *Review* published monthly in Spanish is only for circulation in Latin America. *Picture News* published monthly in English is intended only for Asian countries. East Germany also publishes a monthly magazine in French intended for Africa *Voix de L'Amitie* and two magazines in Arabic *Al Majallah* and *Saut as-Sadaka*.

The number of major foreign language periodicals produced by the remaining Communist countries of Eastern Europe are: Albania, 1; Bulgaria, 6; Czechoslovakia, 10; Hungary, 9; Poland, 15 and Rumania, 9. Of the smaller Communist countries outside Europe, North Korea produces three foreign language periodicals and Cuba two.

Periodicals of Communist China

The first Chinese Communist periodical intended for foreign readers appeared in 1950 and was published fortnightly in English. Today China publishes 10 foreign language periodicals, the most important of which is the elaborately produced *China Pictorial* published monthly in 17 languages, including English, French, Japanese, Spanish, German, Hindi, Arabic, and Swedish.

Other Chinese publications are *Peking Review*, *Chinese Literature*, *Chinese Photography*, *Women of China*, *China Reconstructs*, *China's Screen*, and *Foreign Trade of The People's Republic of China*. There is also a monthly magazine in Esperanto, *Elpopole Cinio* (People's monthly) and a special magazine intended for young people and students, *Evergreen*.

The low prices of Chinese publications again indicate a heavy subsidy. The weekly *Peking Review* can for instance be obtained by subscribers in Europe by air mail direct from China for as little as 24s. a year including postage. In 1964 when quantities of the French edition of the paper were being despatched by post from Hong Kong to the subscribers in the African state of Burundi, the subscription rate was so low that it was calculated that it would be necessary for the publishers to sell 15 annual subscriptions merely to cover the cost of postage on each individual copy despatched.

Communist China was also responsible for the sponsoring of the monthly magazine *Revolution*. This well produced and profusely illustrated anti-colonial publication was first mainly concerned with

Africa but later spread its interest to cover both Latin America and Asia, and to some degree Europe and North America. First published in Algiers it moved to Switzerland where its European head office was located until the end of 1963. Then following the French recognition of the Peking Government this office moved to Paris. It also had local offices in Britain, Cuba, China, Tanganyika, the USA and Brazil. Its editorial board included Mohammed Babu, formerly Foreign Minister of the revolutionary Zanzibar Government, and now Minister of State for Planning in the Tanzanian Government, whose affiliations with both Moscow and Peking are well known and the Angolan nationalist leader, Castro da Silva. *Revolution* is published in English and French and it is thought that about 40,000 copies were produced a month in 1964, some 10,000 of which were regularly flown to Guinea for distribution throughout West Africa. In the summer of 1964 the Swiss Government placed a ban on the printing of this magazine on the grounds that its production in that country was compromising Switzerland's traditional neutrality. Since then *Revolution* has been printed in France as a quarterly.

Outlets for the sale of foreign language periodicals from Communist countries in countries outside the bloc are provided through the existence of Party owned or 'left wing' bookshops and typified by the Four Continents Book Store in New York, Collet Holdings Ltd. and Central Books in London, the Maison du Livre Etranger in Paris, and the network of shops owned by The People's Publishing House in India. The English Edition of *New Times* carries on its back page a list of nearly 70 such shops or private addresses from which the publication can be obtained in 34 non-Communist countries.

Other outlets through which periodicals and other literature may reach the public in non-Communist countries are through embassy information departments. In addition, many of these issue their own periodicals and regular bulletins available by subscription. The Soviet Embassy in London for instance, publishes a periodical entitled *Soviet Weekly* many copies being despatched by the embassy to subscribers in British colonies and ex-colonies. In the Far East a fortnightly publication *Soviet Land* is circulated on a large scale through Soviet embassies in India, Burma and Cambodia. Aleksandr Kaznacheev, a defector from the Staff of the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon, has described how the Soviet Information Bureau in the Burmese capital published and distributed two such periodicals. One *News Bulletin* was published twice weekly in editions of 10,000 copies, 8,000 of them in Burmese and 2,000 in English. Material for the bulletin was received daily from Moscow, being then translated into Burmese by one of the Burmese staff. The other publication *Soviet Union* was a monthly magazine, material for which was received from Moscow by airline. Cases have been reported from other Afro-Asian countries of 'news bulletins' and other literature being sent to individuals and schools through the post by Communist embassies.

A number of periodic publications which do not appear on the usual list of publications available by subscription are also despatched direct from their countries of origin to persons in non-Communist countries by the 'mass organisations' of Communist states such as trade unions, youth organisations, etc., who use specially prepared lists of potential sympathisers for the purpose.

One could not leave the subject of Communist bloc originated periodicals without mentioning *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, published each month from Prague in all the major languages of non-Communist Europe (in addition to Russian) and also in Japanese, Mongolian and Vietnamese. Strictly speaking this is not a propaganda publication at all, but the 'house journal' of the International Communist Movement and the successor to the pre-war Comintern journal and subsequent Cominform journal. *Problems of Peace and Socialism* first appeared in mid-1958 following on a statement made sometime previously by Khrushchev that it was intended to produce a new publication whose purpose would be to form a "forum of discussion between fraternal parties". Its contents consist principally of articles of topical interest to Communists both from the practical and theoretical point of view, and surveys of the activities of individual Communist parties, both those within and outside the Communist 'bloc'. The Editor in Chief of this journal is a former editor of the Soviet Communist Party's monthly theoretical publication *Kommunist*, which concentrates upon ideological matters.

The English edition of *Problems of Peace and Socialism* appears under the title of *World Marxist Review* and is published from the British Communist Party's headquarters in London. An English edition is also published in Canada.

Book Production, Pamphlets and other Printed Material

There is no more striking example of the greatly increased capacity of the publishing and printing industry of the Sino-Soviet bloc than the immense rise that has taken place since the mid-1950's in the number of books of all types that have been exported to the developing nations.

In 1956 the Soviet Union exported 27,371,900 copies of books in foreign languages. In 1960, 40,113,400 books were exported in 24 foreign languages. These included publications in Bengali, (125,000), Hindi (185,400), Urdu (60,000), Arabic (211,600), Persian (48,500) and Tamil (10,900). Books were also exported in Tagalog, Amaharic, Burmese, Punjabi, Farsi, Indonesian and Japanese, as well as all the principal European languages. The number of titles of books in foreign languages produced by the Soviet Union increased from 613 in 1956 to 1,075 in 1960.

India, where the Communist Party actually receives large quantities of free Soviet books which it then puts on sale at cut prices in its own bookshops, has been a major target of this mass export drive. As early as 1958 the editor of the weekly newspaper *Current* complained in a

letter to *The Washington Post* that the Soviet Union was deliberately taking advantage of the desire of the newly literate classes of the country to flood it with cheap literature and stated that "soon a whole generation through no fault of its own will grow up believing there are virtues in Communism".¹ A similar 'saturation' book export drive also appears to be being directed towards the countries of Latin America.

An extensive programme for the Soviet publication of textbooks for developing countries began in 1960. Thirty such textbooks were published in English alone in 1961. It was stated that books produced under this programme were intended mainly for secondary school and University students in developing countries. Whereas some of these textbooks consist of objective studies of scientific subjects others contain much political indoctrination.

An advertisement appearing in the magazine *Mainstream* which is published by the British Communist Party and intended primarily for students gave an interesting description of one type of book now being produced by Communist bloc countries. It invited enquiries regarding a book published by the East German publishing house of Urania-Verlag of Leipzig. The book, published in English was entitled *Sixty Years of World History* and was described as including nearly 500 pages, with 320 pictures, 63 coloured statistical tables and 14 multi-coloured maps, cloth bound and was offered for sale for £1 10s. The advertisement stated that "Facts speak a clear and unmistakable language; you cannot ignore them, nor can they be refuted. The authors of this book have shown conclusively that in the course of history the new better and forward looking ideas are destined to win".²

A concern known as 'The Seven Seas Publishing House' was set up by the East German Government primarily for the export of books in English in 1957. A catalogue from this publishing house issued in 1964, listed the titles of 52 books published in English. From a synopsis of the plot of these books contained in the catalogue it would seem that the majority had a strong political slant with stories dealing with racial discrimination and "the liberation struggle" occupying a prominent place.

Large numbers of books by Communist authors are also published outside the Communist bloc each year by pro-Communist publishers that have contracts with Mezhnkiga or the Chinese International Bookstore of Peking. By 1958 it was reported that Mezhnkiga had concluded contracts with 840 such firms in 68 foreign countries.

It also appears that on occasions, the Soviet Union sponsors the formation of special publishing companies in non-Communist countries whose purpose is to publish literature in support of Soviet policies without the fact that the contents of such material are pro-Communist being too obvious. The existence of one such company, Crosscurrents

¹F. C. Barghoorn. *Soviet Foreign Propaganda*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1964, p. 289.

²*Mainstream*, February 1964.

Press Inc. of New York, has been reported by Professor Baarghoorn. This company operates from the same address as the Four Continents Book Company, the main agency for the publication and distribution of Communist literature in the United States, and publishes a series entitled *Current Soviet Documents* which Professor Baarghoorn states is apparently intended to be confused with the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, published since 1949 by a group of leading American scholars in order to supply American students with accurate translations of important items from Soviet newspapers. In 1962, a Congressional Sub-Committee heard evidence that the Soviet Government had paid Cross Current Press more than £80,000 in subsidies since 1959. This particular propaganda operation appears to have met with some success in misleading sections of public opinion in both America and India. Copies of *Current Soviet Documents* were exported to other countries and many readers believed that the publications were produced by genuinely impartial scholars.

Apart from those publications produced by the international fronts, others are issued by the Communist press agencies such as TASS, Novosti, and the New China News Agency. In the latter case the pamphlets are generally published in the country of distribution through some concern set up for the purpose by a Communist embassy. Such is the case with most of the pamphlets appearing in England prepared by *Novosti* which are published through 'Soviet Booklets' in Kensington.

Large quantities of pamphlets and other material are despatched from Communist countries each year to individuals and organisations in non-Communist countries by means of the normal postal service. The United States has been one of the biggest targets for literature despatched in this way, amounts of which have been constantly increasing ever since 1954. In 1958 the total number of packages of Communist propaganda handled by the Restricted Merchandise units of the US Customs was 4,897,765. In 1960 this total reached the figure of 14,170,529 packages. Not all this propaganda material was despatched from European Communist countries or Communist China. During March and February 1960 for instance a total of 152,000,007 packages of magazines and a total of 11,000 packages of newspapers from Cuba were despatched to various parts of the United States for distribution. A considerable proportion of this material was in fact in transit through the United States to its ultimate destination in South American countries such as Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Colombia. Propaganda material is also sent to South American countries in large quantities via the United States from Mexico. Some 400 mailbags of propaganda material a month are delivered to the Soviet Embassy in Montevideo. From here it is despatched to Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay.

'Redefection propaganda' is addressed to refugees from Communist countries with the aim of persuading them to return to their homeland or at least of adopting a sympathetic attitude towards its present regime. Three Soviet organisations are involved in the issue of this

propaganda, 'The Committee for the Return to the Homeland'; 'The Committee for the Development of Cultural Relations with Compatriots', and 'The Society for Cultural Relations with Ukrainians abroad'. It has been estimated that 1,500,000 propaganda letters from these organisations are despatched to the United States each year.

The campaign itself is directed from a special headquarters in East Berlin with sub-headquarters in each of the Eastern European capitals. Letters sent to individuals are usually posted from East Germany, West Germany, Belgium or Holland. They are normally despatched from the larger cities so that they merge with the largest possible flow of mail and are consequently less easy to detect. The type of envelope used is also frequently changed in order to help prevent detection.

Large quantities of propaganda material are sent through the mails each year from East Germany to West Germany, mainly by organisations which have their headquarters in East Berlin. There have also been reports of Chinese propaganda material being sent to individuals and organisations in India through the post via Hong Kong. More recently there have been reports of propaganda being sent to addresses in Africa through the mails from China in large and increasing quantities.

A number of Chinese Communist pamphlets and booklets are seditious and highly inflammatory in content and include instructions on guerrilla warfare tactics, intended primarily for the inhabitants of Africa and Latin America and other developing countries. Communist China is constantly advising certain elements in these countries to instigate risings against the "colonialist or reactionary regimes" now said to be ruling them.

An article which appeared in the Peking *People's Daily* of 10 December, 1961 stated that "all oppressed nations and people will sooner or later rise in revolution and that is precisely why revolutionary experience and theories will naturally gain currency among those nations and people, and go deep to their hearts. That is why pamphlets introducing guerilla warfare in China have such a wide circulation in Africa, Latin America and Asia, and are looked upon as precious things even after they are worn and come apart and the print has become illegible through rubbing. The influence of ideas knows no state boundaries. No one can prevent the dissemination among the people of what they need."

According to one report 500 copies of Mao Tse-tung's works were first distributed in three African countries as early as 1953. In 1956 20,000 copies were distributed in Africa in a total of six countries. Six years later in 1961 the books were available in 35 different countries and total distribution had reached 100,000 copies. The largest number distributed being copies of a French edition of *The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* described by Chinese Communist authorities as a "scientific description of tactical and strategical matters of the revolutionary war". Cairo and Algiers act as the main distribution centres

for Chinese publications in North Africa with Dar-Es-Salaam as the distribution centre for Eastern areas of the continent.

The Chinese publication centre "Guozi Shuddan" operates a mail order service through which its many publications may be obtained in a number of languages. Publications available through this service include pocket editions of the writings of Mao Tse-tung and pamphlets on such subjects as 'Railway Guerillas' or the need to 'Resolutely Struggle Against Imperialism and Neo-Colonialism and for The Economic Emancipation of the Afro-Asian Peoples', Guozi Shuddan utilises a number of area agents. 'The Peace Book Company' in the Bank of China Building in Hong Kong being one of the most important of these.

The Cuban National Printing House operates in effect as a branch of the Soviet Foreign Language Printing House and publishes quantities of standard Communist textbooks and propaganda for distribution throughout Latin America. Copies of Mao Tse-tung's writings are also published in Cuba for export to other countries in the area, as is "Che" Guevara's manual on guerilla tactics.

Cuba also distributes quantities of Soviet propaganda printed in Spanish in addition to its own material. Much of the propaganda material is despatched to the mainland by clandestine means. Prior to the breaking of diplomatic relations with Cuba by most South American countries, Cuban Embassies acted as the principal dissemination points for such material, some of it being smuggled in through the diplomatic bag. The Mexican police confiscated four tons of such material originating from Moscow and Havana and brought into the country through diplomatic channels that was destined for the Cuban Embassy in 1962.

CHAPTER III

Foreign Language Broadcasting Services

Foreign language broadcasting services of the Soviet Union, the East European States, Communist China, North Korea, North Vietnam and Cuba—The clandestine stations—Contents of programmes—Audience gathering methods.

ALTHOUGH the increase in output of propaganda literature by the countries of the Communist bloc since the end of the war has been very marked, the Communist effort in the field of radio broadcasting has been even more impressive. The full extent of this effort can best be demonstrated by the following table:

In hours per week

Country	1950	1955	1960	March 1965
USSR	533	649	994	1,375
Eastern Europe	412	820	1,073	1,215
Communist China	66	159	687	1,027
North Korea	—	53	159	403

To these totals must be added the figures provided by Cuba which began broadcasting to foreign countries in 1961 with a total of 105 hours per week rising to 235 hours per week by March 1965, and those of North Vietnam's *Radio Hanoi* which in 1964 was broadcasting for over 60 hours a week to South East Asia and the Far East in addition to operating a 24 hour service directed to South Vietnam. Nor does the above table include the number of hours broadcast by about a dozen so-called clandestine stations whose specific purpose is to stir up disaffection in selected countries or areas of the non-Communist world.

The scale of the Communist effort can be realised more vividly if figures are set beside those of the two principal Western broadcasting services, the Voice of America and the BBC. In 1950 broadcasts in the BBC's external broadcasting services totalled 643 hours per week, giving them a lead of 110 hours per week over the Soviet Union and 477 hours per week over Communist China. In March 1965 however the BBC was being outbroadcast to the extent of 708 hours per week by the Soviet Union and 360 hours per week by China. The Soviet Union had already had a lead of 36 hours per week over the Voice of America in 1950 and by March 1965 this had been converted into a lead of 485 hours per week. By the same date an American lead over China of 431 hours per week in

1950 had been transformed into a Chinese lead over America of 141 hours per week.

By the spring of 1965, the Soviet Union was broadcasting in 53 foreign languages and Communist China in 31, as compared with the 40 used by the BBC. At that time the Soviet Union and Communist China were between them using a total of nearly 80 broadcasting stations for originating or relaying programmes intended for listeners outside their borders as against the nine stations used by the BBC and 17 used by the Voice of America. A year later the total number of hours per week broadcast by Soviet external services had risen to 1,381.

The Soviet Broadcasting Services

The Soviet Union did not commence to operate a foreign language broadcasting service until 1933, and then only on a small scale in German. By 1942, however, programmes totalling about 400 hours per week in 17 different foreign languages were being put out by *Radio Moscow* and the Kuibshev short wave station. Both these stations were badly damaged during the war, but priority was given to their reconstruction, and by 1948 they had almost reached the same number of broadcasting hours per week as they had achieved prior to the German attack, whilst the number of languages broadcast over them had risen to 31.

At that time the main target of Soviet broadcasting was Western Europe, to which 40 per cent of the broadcasts were directed. By 1957 the Soviet Union's broadcasts in foreign languages were totalling 889 hours per week, and the Soviet had achieved first place among the 68 countries taking part in international broadcasting. From 1952 onwards less priority had been given to broadcasting to Europe whilst the number of hours devoted to broadcasting to areas outside it rose steadily.

Soviet broadcasting to Africa did not begin until April 1958, and then its services to the area only consisted of a programme in English and French broadcast for 15 minutes each day. This service was increased to 5½ hours per week in November of the same year. A year later, in November 1959, programmes, still mainly in English and French, but including occasional Swahili programmes, were stepped up to 31½ hours per week.

By December 1964 this output had been more than doubled reaching approximately 120 hours per week, whilst the number of languages covered amounted to 12 in addition to those previously broadcast and now included Hausa, Lingala, Malagasy, Somali, Zulu, Bambara and Italian. During 1965 a new medium wave Soviet transmitting station came into operation beamed to East Africa. By mid-1966 Soviet broadcasts to Africa were exceeding 130 hours per week. Some idea of the magnitude of the scale of the Soviet broadcasting services to Africa may be gained from a comparison with the broadcasting services of Britain, the non-Communist European power most directly involved on that continent, whose broadcasts beamed to Africa early in 1966 totalled 57 hours per

week. These were in only five languages, English, French, Hausa, Somali and Swahili.

A marked increase in Soviet broadcasting to the Latin American area was first noticed in 1961 when the number of hours per week devoted to the area rose from 56 to 63. By the end of 1963 Soviet programmes for that continent included a special programme in Portuguese directed to Brazil and totalling $17\frac{1}{2}$ hours per week; other programmes in Spanish amounted to 21 hours per week and a further 28 hours per week were devoted to special programmes for Cuba. A transmitter in the Soviet Far East in addition to *Radio Moscow* was brought into service in 1964 to help effect this increase.

A further increase in Soviet broadcasting to the area was foreshadowed by the announcement by TASS in July 1964 of the establishment of a special new radio station in the USSR which would concentrate solely upon broadcasting to Latin America. This station is named *Radio Peace and Progress* and is under the direction of the former editor of the Soviet illustrated weekly *Ogonyok*. The *Novosti* news agency, the Soviet Peace Committee, the Soviet Union of Journalists and the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with foreign countries, are all closely connected with the new station. It is apparently intended that in addition to normal direct broadcasts, this radio station should provide relay programmes for local South American radio and television stations. These programmes are to cover such subjects as international affairs, Soviet foreign policy, the Soviet economy, public life, culture and scientific developments. In 1965 *Radio Peace and Progress* was broadcasting for seven hours per week in Spanish and three-and-a-half hours per week in Portuguese. A special programme in French is broadcast twice a week for the West Indian Islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe.

By the end of 1964 South-East Asia had become a major target for Soviet broadcasting, receiving some 180 hours of programmes per week in Vietnamese, Bengali, Burmese, English, French, Hindi, Indonesian, Cambodian, Laotian, Malaysian, Nepalese, Pushtu, Sinhalese, Tamil, Thai and Urdu. It is of some interest to note that by December 1964 the USSR was broadcasting more hours per week to South-East Asia than was Communist China despite its closer proximity and ties with the area. By June 1966 Soviet broadcasting to the area had been stepped up to over 200 hours per week.

The Moscow-Peking split has been reflected within the last few years in Soviet broadcasts to China in standard Chinese. During the year from March 1963 to March 1964 such broadcasts increased by ten hours per week. During 1965 a further increase of 28 hours per week occurred. Soviet broadcasts for Europe are headed in hours per week by programmes in German which total 36 hours. English broadcasts provide the next highest weekly total, followed by French and Italian.

The major proportion of programmes for foreign consumption are broadcast from the External Services Department of *Radio Moscow*, which also broadcasts a fifth programme or general service principally

in Russian intended for Russian citizens working abroad, emigres of Russian birth, and other Russian-speaking listeners. This is a 24-hour service and includes six broadcasts each of one hour's duration daily entitled, 'The Voice of the Soviet Homeland'. These programmes are originated by the Soviet Committee for Cultural Relations with Com-patriots Abroad, which is one of the organisations charged with spreading propaganda amongst Russian emigres with the aim of persuading as many of them as possible to return home.

In addition to *Radio Moscow* a number of Soviet regional stations are employed for the purpose of broadcasting to specific areas abroad. These include notably *Radio Baku*, which broadcasts programmes totalling $7\frac{3}{4}$ hours a day for the Middle East in Arabic, Azerbaijani, Persian and Turkish; *Radio Erevan*, which broadcasts programmes in Armenian and French to Europe once a week, and in Arabic, Armenian, Azerbaijani and Kurdish to the Middle East for four hours 25 minutes each day. This station also broadcasts to America in Armenian and English for short periods at weekends. *Radio Tashkent*, broadcasts programmes in English, Hindi and Urdu beamed to South-East Asia and in Persian and Uzbek to the Middle East.

Amongst other Soviet stations concerned in originating programmes for foreign consumption are, Riga (Latvian and Swedish), Tallin (Estonian, Finnish and Swedish), Vilnius (in Lithuanian for Europe and North America), Dushanbe (in Persian and Tadzhik) and Kiev which broadcasts programmes in English and Ukrainian for both Europe and North America. The Ukrainian broadcasts are intended for the large Ukrainian emigre population.

The greater number of Soviet wireless programmes for foreign listeners consist of programmes of half-an-hour's duration. The largest number of Soviet broadcasts in a foreign language in any one day according to *Radio Moscow's* 1966 summer schedule were those in standard Chinese which totalled 20. The largest number of broadcasts per day in the language of a non-Communist country being those in French for Africa which numbered 10. By the beginning of 1966 the Soviet Union was broadcasting in a total of 53 foreign languages.

Wavelengths used by *Radio Moscow* for transmitting foreign language broadcasts to non-Communist countries vary between three, used to carry one programme in Danish and 23, used to carry a programme in English beamed to the East Coast of North America. The majority of programmes are transmitted on between five and ten wavelengths.

The East European Broadcasting Services

Originally many of the programmes broadcast by the Eastern European Communist countries intended for foreign listeners consisted of relays of the foreign language programmes of *Radio Moscow*, but now these countries concentrate almost exclusively on foreign language programmes of their own. However the broadcasting services of these countries and the Soviet Union are still closely interwoven; a decrease

in broadcasting in a certain country being normally met by an increase in the amount of time devoted to that language by the foreign broadcasting services of another.

The greater number of Eastern European foreign broadcasts are directed to Western Europe with English receiving a high place amongst the languages used. In addition to Europe, Bulgaria broadcasts in Arabic and Turkish for the Middle East, English and French for Africa, Bulgarian and English for North America and Spanish for South America. Broadcasts to Europe include two programmes per week in Esperanto.

Czechoslovakia broadcasts in Arabic, Czech and Slovak for the Middle East ; English, French and Swahili for Africa ; English for the Far East ; Czech, Slovak and English for North America ; and Spanish for South America, with two special daily programmes in Portuguese for Brazil.

East Germany broadcasts a lower number of hours to West Europe in non-Communist bloc languages, $8\frac{1}{2}$ hours daily as compared with an average of approximately 15 hours daily, but this deficiency is more than made up for by the scale of its broadcasting to other areas. These services include programmes in Arabic for the Middle East ; Arabic, English, French and German for North Africa ; English, French, German and Swahili for Central, East and West Africa ; English and German for North America ; and German, Portuguese and Spanish for South America. East Germany is also the only East European country to provide a service specially for South-East Asia. This consists of programmes in English, German and Indonesian, averaging a total of $4\frac{1}{2}$ hours per day.

Hungary broadcasts to the Middle East in Arabic, Turkish and Hungarian ; to North Africa in Hungarian ; to North America in English and Hungarian ; and to south America in Spanish. Programmes for Europe include half an hour per week in Esperanto.

Poland which broadcasts extensively to Europe also provides programmes for Africa in English and French and for South America in Polish and Spanish.

Rumania broadcasts to the Middle East in English, Persian, Turkish and Arabic ; to Africa in English, French and Portuguese ; to North America in English and Yiddish ; and to South America in Portuguese and Spanish ; and to India in English. Early in 1966 work started on the installation of a high-capacity long-range radio transmitter in the Braslov area. This transmitter went into full operation during 1967. It was to have a power of 1,500 k.w. making it one of the most powerful transmitters in Europe and it was believed that as well as being used for domestic broadcasting it was to be used to increase Rumania's ability to broadcast to North Africa and the Middle East.

A number of Soviet and Eastern European programmes are simultaneously broadcast to two different areas, for instance the Rumanian programme directed to India in English is simultaneously broadcast for Africa. All foreign language broadcasts transmitted by Albania to

Europe are simultaneously transmitted to the Middle East, although Albania owing to its whole-hearted support of the Chinese line in the Moscow-Peking dispute cannot be considered as being in the same category as the other countries whose broadcasting activities have been outlined in this section.

Broadcasting to Africa by the Communist countries of Eastern Europe began in the autumn of 1959 and by the end of August 1961 already totalled 58 hours a week. By the summer of 1966 it had been more than doubled and had reached approximately 120 hours per week.

Like Soviet foreign language programmes, Eastern European programmes for foreign listeners tend in general to consist of 30-minute broadcasts. The largest number of programmes in any one non-Communist bloc language being those from East Germany in French directed to Africa which total eight a day. Numbers of wavelengths used by these stations for transmitting foreign language broadcasts vary from one used for some programmes intended for Europe to 13 used to carry some programmes to the Americas.

Broadcasting Services of China

Chinese Communist broadcasts for overseas consumption commenced with broadcasts from Mao Tse-tung's operational base in Yenan in 1948. Ten years later Communist China was transmitting broadcasts intended for foreign listeners at the rate of 438 hours per week, rising to 690 in 1961, to 808 in 1963 and to 897 hours per week by March 1964.

As in the case of the Soviet Union, one of the areas to which expansion of Chinese broadcasts has been most remarkable, has been the African continent. They started with a one-hour daily service in morse code which began towards the end of 1956. This service seems to have been primarily an exploratory one intended to test operating and transmitting techniques. Two years later in November 1958 a programme in Cantonese was started in a daily service directed to the Chinese minorities in South and South-East Africa and Madagascar. This was followed in September 1959 by a two-hour programme in English for Africans. From that time on Chinese radio programmes beamed to Africa rapidly increased and by August 1961 had more than caught up with the Soviet effort at that date, and were totalling 35 hours a week in English, seven in Portuguese and seven hours a week in Swahili. Another seven hours were devoted to programmes in English and French, which although not entirely intended for African audiences could be received on that continent. By the end of 1964 Chinese broadcasts to Africa were totalling 77 hours per week, in Chinese, French, Portuguese, Swahili and Hausa. By June 1966 the total had increased to 91 hours per week.

Latin America has also been an area to which there has been a rapid expansion of broadcasting on the part of Communist China. Chinese programmes directed to the area had reached 35 hours a week by the beginning of 1964 and 38½ hours a week by the end of that year.

Communist China broadcasts to Europe in English, French, German,

Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and Serbo-Croat. The service in these languages consisted in December 1964 of two broadcasts every day each normally of one hour's duration except for the Spanish programme to which only one broadcast of an hour was devoted. The Chinese broadcasting service to Europe also includes 91 hours a week of broadcasting in Russian and a half-hour weekly programme in Esperanto.

106½ hours of broadcasts a week were being devoted to South-East Asia in June 1966 in 13 different languages with a further 49 hours for South Asia in Hindi, Tamil, Haka, English and standard Chinese. Japanese programmes broadcast by China totalled 31 hours a week and there is a special service in Cantonese and English for Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines. Broadcasts directed to North America include programmes in standard Chinese, Cantonese and English ; programmes for South America being in Spanish and Portuguese.

Chinese foreign service programmes tend to consist of hour-long broadcasts. The largest number of programmes in a non-Communist bloc language in any one day being those in Vietnamese which in 1966 totalled six hours per day. The foreign language programme transmitted on the largest number of wavelengths was one in Russian transmitted on 19 different frequencies. The majority of foreign language programmes were transmitted on between six and 12 wavelengths.

North Korea and North Vietnam

Despite its comparatively lowly status within the Communist bloc, North Korea broadcasts extensively in foreign languages. Programmes beamed to Europe are in English and French with an additional hour in Korean which is intended for Korean emigres. Other broadcasts are those for South-East Asia in English and French and Korean, in the same languages for the Middle East and Africa and in English and Korean to South America. Programmes are also broadcast to all these areas in Korean for emigres. In addition North Korea broadcasts to Japan and for almost 24 hours a day to South Korea.

As might be expected the wireless services of North Vietnam operating from the capital Hanoi, have as their chief task a 'round the clock' service of transmissions directed at South Vietnam. These include two news bulletins read at dictation speed, and three special daily programmes in the dialects spoken by the inhabitants of the mountain areas of the South. *Radio Hanoi's* growing number of programmes beamed at other countries in South-East Asia go out in Chinese, English, French, Cambodian, Laotian and Thai.

Cuban Broadcasting

By the end of 1964 Cuba was broadcasting to overseas listeners at the rate of 213 hours a week. The majority of these programmes were transmitted in Spanish and Portuguese by the external services of *Radio Havana* and were intended for listeners in the countries of South America. A smaller number of hours were allotted to broadcasts in the

South American Indian languages of Guarani, Aymari and Creole. The Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Peru, Honduras, Venezuela and Brazil have all been particular targets of *Radio Havana*. A number of the programmes it broadcasts are originated by various 'Revolutionary Committees' composed of Communist and other extreme left-wing opponents of existing South American regimes. One such committee is the *Comite Guatemalteco de Informacion* which has been responsible for broadcasts in which appeals have been made to Guatemalan peasants and workers to rise "allied in a single battle front" to overthrow the present Government of the country. Ex-President Arbenz Gusman who headed the neo-Communist Government of Guatemala before its overthrow and who now lives in exile in Cuba often takes part in these broadcasts.

According to a report in a Mexican newspaper¹ much of the radio propaganda directed from Cuba in Spanish is supervised by Spanish Communists who fled to the Soviet Union after the victory of the Franco forces in the Spanish Civil War. After Castro came to power in Cuba they were sent to that island to work in helping to establish the Cuban external broadcasting service.

Cuban broadcasting is not confined to Latin America and the Caribbean. Cuba was broadcasting in mid 1966 for 31½ hours per week to Africa in Spanish, English, French and Portuguese and for about 63 hours per week in Spanish, French and Arabic to the Mediterranean area. There are also other programmes in French and English for Europe and programmes for North America including one in French for Canada.

The Clandestine Stations

In addition to the normal and official foreign service broadcasting stations of the Communist bloc, a number of clandestine stations have been used against specific targets. These stations operate from undisclosed locations in Communist countries, and have the task of fomenting sedition and even encouraging revolt in the target state. Sometimes attempts are made to give the impression that a station is operating from within the country to whose population the broadcasts are addressed. These are often referred to as "black" stations.

The first clandestine station to come into existence was *Radio Espana Independiente* (REI) which commenced operating from Soviet territory in 1941 and continues to broadcast to Spain at the present time, doing its best to exploit industrial unrest and strikes.

In 1950, two clandestine stations started broadcasting to France with programmes entitled *Ce Soir en France* and *Ce Matin en France*. These stations which continued operating for five years concentrated largely upon reporting speeches by leading French Communists. In 1955 and again in 1958 the Italian Government protested to the Soviet Govern-

¹*Ultimas Noticias*, September 1962.

ment regarding interference in Italian elections by a station named *Oggi in Italia*, but this station was still transmitting broadcasts in 1960.

The Greek Communist Party in exile operated *Radio Free Greece* for nine years from 1947 to 1956 from its headquarters on Bulgarian territory. Immediately after the German Federal Government proscribed the West German Communist Party for unconstitutional activity in 1956 a station calling itself *German Freedom Station* 904 came on the air operating from Communist-controlled territory. Subsequently in the autumn of 1960 another station broadcasting to West Germany was heard for the first time. This station is called *German Soldiers Station* and devotes its efforts to inciting disaffection, desertion and mutiny amongst members of the West German forces.

Several clandestine stations broadcast to the Middle East. One of these broadcasts to Turkey six times a day. Called *Bizim Radyo* (Our Radio). Although a pretence is made that the station is in Turkey itself it is in fact located in East Germany. Two clandestine stations broadcast to Iran, *Sada-e-Milli-e-Iran* (National Voice of Iran) which broadcasts twice a day from Soviet Azerbaijan, and *Radio Peyke-e-Iran* (Radio Iran Courier) which broadcasts four times a day from East Germany. Clandestine stations sometimes continue to attack the Government of the country which is their target even when the Soviet Government is officially making friendly advances towards it. One such example being provided by the two stations broadcasting to Iran which continued to call on their listeners to "liberate the country from the evils of the Shah and his associates", even while the then Soviet President, Mr. Brezhnev was making an official visit to the country in 1963 and lavishly praising the Shah's "progressive policies". During the racial troubles in Cyprus in 1964 another clandestine station, *The Voice of Truth* which broadcasts in both Greek and Turkish blamed the Turks for causing the bloodshed whilst *Bizim Radyo* said that the Greeks were to blame.

A new clandestine station began broadcasting to Portugal in the early 1960's, this station use the title of *Radio Free Portugal* and one of its tasks has been to relay the call of the Portuguese Communist Party to Portuguese youth to rise up against the war in Angola. In 1962 broadcasts were heard for the first time from a station with the name of *Liberation Broadcasting Station* located in North Vietnam, its programmes being devoted to attempting to arouse support for the Viet-Cong guerillas amongst the population of South Vietnam. Later another clandestine station began operating from the North, this time addressing its programmes to Thailand and called *Voice of the People of Thailand*. Three clandestine stations operating in Laos have also been identified.

There have also been reports of clandestine stations broadcasting from North Korea to Japan and South Korea; from the Chinese mainland to Formosa and from Hanoi to South-East Asia. One such station, *Radio Return to the Homeland*, broadcasting from Eastern Europe has taken part in the campaign to induce the return of emigres.

Content of Programmes

Content of programmes broadcast by the external services of Communist countries consist largely of news bulletins and feature programmes concerned with international events, presented in such a way as to give the maximum possible backing to the foreign policy of the Communist country concerned. These are supported by programmes giving details of life and developments in the country originating the broadcast designed to portray the attraction and advantages of life under a Communist regime.

Programmes often include lengthy descriptions of the technical achievements of Communist countries particularly in the field of space research, and they are sometimes devoted to giving a detailed account of political conferences including those of some of the international front organisations. On occasion they also include descriptions of the activities or problems of Communist parties outside the Communist bloc.

Not infrequently programmes include broadcasts by students from developing countries studying in the Communist countries. Such broadcasts are directed to the students' home countries and consist of favourable comments by the students concerned on living conditions under Communism and on the facilities given them to pursue their studies.

Much is also made of the visits of delegations from Afro-Asian countries to those of the Communist bloc. In June 1966, for instance, *Radio Peking* included in its programme in English and French for Africa a long despatch released by the New China News Agency giving an account of the welcome given by Li Hsien-nien, Vice-Premier of the Chinese State Council, to Paul Bomani, Tanzanian Minister for Economic Affairs and the economic mission he led to Peking. Li Hsien-nien was reported as saying that the anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle of the African people was now developing in scope and depth. President Nyerere was perfectly right in saying that Africa was ripe for revolution, that the African people must carry on the revolution in Africa and that Africa must not be frightened because of the emergence of an adverse current.

Attacks are made on virtually all aspects of Western foreign policy. In the last two years the policy of the USA in Vietnam together with that of the other Western countries which support its attitude has been probably the major target but attacks on Western colonialism and neo-colonialism in many other parts of the world are a constant feature. Western economic aid to developing countries is a favourite target, the impression being made that it is given purely for reasons of self-interest, in order to keep the receiving countries in "economic slavery" and to prevent them from "building socialism". Conversely the advantage of "disinterested" aid from the Communist countries is frequently stressed.

Sometimes the external broadcasting services of a Communist country will make use of a Communist sympathiser living in the West,

who is invited to contribute his opinions on some matter of current interest or contributes to a particular programme on a regular basis.

It sometimes appears that broadcasts from Communist countries are quite openly designed to influence the results of elections, particularly in the emerging countries where many of the voters may be voting for the first time. At the time of the General Election in Nigeria in December 1964 a Moscow broadcast to Africa in English stated:

"The election campaign is ending, but the political situation in Nigeria is deteriorating more and more. It is clear that the disorder is taking place not because of the rank and file voters. Political leaders representing the reactionary classes of feudalists stand behind all the clashes and artificially provoke incidents. They are ready to sacrifice the country's vital interests to their class interests and to the interests of foreign monopolies which back them.

"In these conditions the Nigerian Socialist Party of Workers and Peasants is having a hard time in the election campaign. Nevertheless it is courageously fighting for the Nigerian people's economic and social rights . . . Despite the great difficulties it encounters the Socialist Party of Workers and Peasants struggles to implement the best ideas of the Nigerian working people."

Encouragement is also given to big strike movements in non-Communist countries as it was in the English language programmes of *Radio Moscow's* European service during the British seaman's strike of 1966. During 1966 and early 1967 *Radio Moscow* programmes beamed to the Middle East included a vigorous campaign for the removal of the American Sixth Fleet from the area and attacks on Western "Oil Monopolies".

Audience Gathering Methods

Various gimmicks have been used both by Communist countries originating broadcasts and by Communist Parties in non-Communist countries to increase the size of the audiences listening to programmes from the Communist bloc. In one early Russian programme to Africa it was stated that the text of Russian lessons included in the programmes, educational books and other literature would be sent free to anyone who asked for it. A pen-friend club was started by the Russian African Service in a special effort to attract young people as listeners. Offers of prizes for the winners of radio quizzes about the Soviet Union have also been made to African listeners; the answers to questions in these quizzes being sometimes provided in special programmes beforehand.

In Japan, the Communist Party has organised special Listeners Clubs to encourage bigger audiences for the Russian and Chinese programmes in Japanese. Reports from South America have spoken of transistor radios only capable of receiving *Radio Havana* being

¹*Summary of World Broadcasts. Part I, The USSR, Monitoring Service of the BBC, Second Series, No. 1746, 31 December, 1964.*

distributed to the population of remote country districts through Cuban embassies and consulates.

Advertisements of the times and programmes of radio broadcasts from the Communist bloc often appear in the Communist Party and extreme left-wing Press of Western European countries. Sometimes these are accompanied by announcements holding out special enticements to potential listeners by advertising attractive prizes to be won by taking part in competitions included in these programmes.

An advertisement in the British Communist Party's publication for students, *Mainstream* for instance, was headed 'Win a Free Trip to Poland' and went on to state that the Polish broadcasting service was organising a competition for listeners in Britain as part of the celebration of the Twentieth Anniversary of the Polish People's Republic. The prizes included free ten-day trips to Poland, complete sets of long playing records of Chopin's works, Polish made mopeds, folk art gifts, sets of Polish stamps and recordings of Polish folk music. The advertisement ended with the words "Remember—Warsaw is calling you Tonight and Every Night".

CHAPTER IV

Agitation by Facts:

The Rôle of the Communist News Agencies

TASS—The Novosti Press Agency—The New China News Agency—The East European agencies.

THE principal Soviet news agency, TASS (Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union) is descended from the *Russian Telegraph Agency* (ROSTA) which was formed in the spring of 1918 as the result of the merging of the pre-revolutionary *Petrograd Telegraph Agency* and The Press Bureau of the all-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Council of Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers' Deputies.

TASS took over all the functions of ROSTA in 1935 when under a re-organisation act, it was given the exclusive right to distribute foreign news within the USSR, it having been given the right to function as the Soviet Union's sole news gathering agency abroad a few years previously. At the present time it has correspondents in most of the major capitals of the world. TASS operates a world news service through its network of overseas offices, and also transmits special short wave broadcasts in morse code and a form of teletype from Moscow for the information and use of Communist newspapers and periodicals all over the world. These thus receive a first hand and hour by hour summary of Party views on all matters of importance. Altogether TASS transmits almost a quarter of a million words a day to the papers subscribing to its service.

TASS also has an overall responsibility for the gathering and dissemination of domestic news within the Soviet Union. This function is performed by its internal service with its head office in Moscow. The directors of the news agencies of the various Socialist Soviet Republics such as RATAU, the Ukrainian Agency and ELTA the Lithuanian Agency are appointed by the Director General of TASS, which exercises a general control over their policies and operation. These agencies' names seldom appear on the international scene.

TASS is controlled by its Presidium, consisting of its Director General and his three deputies. The headquarters organisation is divided into two divisions. RSI handles domestic news and INOTASS, the foreign news division puts out both news from abroad and news released for use in the agency's world service and broadcast services.

TASS also has under its control three supplementary services: *Photochronicle*, which operates teams of photographers within the

Soviet Union to provide illustrations for TASS articles and despatches, *Pressblock*, which produces plastic stereotype mats for all illustrations used by the TASS services, and *Press bureau* which provides feature articles both of a political and technical nature, several thousand being used by the TASS services each year.

The TASS view of its information-gathering rôle has been summed up by its former Director General N. G. Palgunov, in a book based upon a lecture he had delivered to the Moscow School of Journalism entitled 'The Principles of Newspaper Information: TASS and its rôle. He has written :

"Information is agitation by facts. The author of an information report, in choosing the object of information, must, above all, dispel the notion that just any events and just any facts must be reported in the pages of the newspaper. The object of information must be selected facts and events which serve to make easier the realisation by the Soviet people of the assignments of the formation of Communism which lie before them . . . By its very character and content Soviet information differs radically from information disseminated by the bourgeois press. In the capitalist world the press is used by the bourgeoisie in order that, by deluding the simple people, the capitalists may be able to thrust their will upon the workers."¹

Palgunov has also outlined his views on the rôle TASS has to play as a distributor of international news as follows :

"We proceed from the assumption that the purpose of world news must be to help strengthen peace among nations, consolidate universal security, develop friendly contacts between states, mutual understanding between peoples and their reproachment, ensure the sovereignty and national independence of the peoples. Our world news also aims at refuting fascist propaganda, counteracting the propaganda of racialism, national exclusiveness and superiority. Thus, in our approach to news we proceed from the assumption that by its content and nature it must not just resemble a photo, a cold indifferent record of world affairs, but must analyse events, give the reader insight into their substance."²

The first TASS correspondents serving overseas were frequently members of the Soviet Foreign Service or trade missions, who acted for TASS only in a part-time capacity. Even in more recent years there was a considerable degree of interchangeability between the personnel of the Soviet Foreign Service and TASS. Nowadays however, the bulk of young Soviet citizens intending to make a career as TASS correspondents are trained at a special journalistic school in the 'Moscow Order of Lenin and Order of the Red Badge of Labour State

¹N. G. Palgunov. *The Principles of Newspaper Information: TASS and its Rôle*, p. 25.

²Letter from N. G. Palgunov to Theodore E. Kruglack. *The Two Faces of TASS*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1962, p. 88.

University in the name of M. V. Lumonov'. Those who pass the strict entrance examination are accepted for a five year course, during which they receive free instruction and their living expenses on condition that they agree to serve anywhere in the world once their training is completed.

Palgunov's lectures to the students have included far reaching instructions as to their behaviour and methods of work should they be posted abroad, especially to non-Communist countries. He has stated that TASS correspondents should arm themselves with a 'coup file' immediately they arrive in a foreign country in order to see what takes place at demonstrations without being "subjected to manifestations of temperament of the police". Future foreign correspondents are also advised that they must "follow the governmental life, the municipal life, the economic life, and the class struggle". They should also "study and become familiar with the broad movements within the country"; they should know those who take part in mass meetings, mass movements and political demonstrations. They should study local papers and explore all the facts regarding their political leanings, ownership and finances. They should attempt to inquire into the backgrounds of correspondents writing for the more important papers of the country in which they work and the facts regarding "their actual and probable futures". TASS correspondents, the Director General states, must ensure that a bulletin reaches the appropriate foreign desk in the TASS Moscow office within 30 minutes of any important event occurring within a foreign country.

Few products of Soviet journalistic schools have yet reached the higher ranks of the staff of INOTASS most of whose senior directors and correspondents are university graduates with degrees in international affairs, law, political science or languages. Those who wish to enter INOTASS from university are usually required to provide a thesis on the country or area which they have studied. Several ambassadors and many Foreign Service officials have in the past been recruited from the staff of INOTASS. INOTASS correspondents normally serve periods of two to eight years abroad, usually in the country in which they have specialised at university or whilst working as an 'apprentice' in the Moscow INOTASS office. On completing their tour of foreign service, correspondents usually return to INOTASS as editors or specialists.

The INOTASS office in Moscow is divided into a number of separate departments. These cover, Western Europe, Central Europe, Eastern Europe, Germany and the Scandinavian Countries, the Middle East, Africa, the Far East, and North and South America. All incoming foreign news whether from TASS's own correspondents or foreign news agencies is first examined by a special section. This department compiles a summary of important events which is immediately transmitted over a closed teleprinter circuit to leading government departments and Party organisations and to the editors of the Moscow Press. The section follows up the despatch of this preliminary survey by compiling a special mimeographed bulletin containing detailed reports of news items which for one reason or another are regarded as not being suitable for

general release ; but which are essential reading for senior government and Party officials.

This bulletin is presented in the form of a news digest, dealing with the latest developments in all important questions of the day and in sections covering events in detail in different geographical areas. It includes reports from the Western Press and news agencies and monitored reports of foreign broadcasts. It is circulated each morning to a list of officials provided for INOTASS by the Party Secretariat. News agencies of other Communist countries provide a similarly important service for their respective government and Party officials.

News which is considered as being suitable for general release is passed to the appropriate department of INOTASS which decides how best each story should be presented for publication. After checking at an editing department the draft releases are then passed to proof-readers and finally, to set the seal of official approval fully upon them before transmission, to the censors.

The impressive programme of expansion carried out by TASS as regards its foreign services and the opening of offices in non-Communist countries would seem to have been divided into several stages. From the end of the war up to the early 1950's expansion was most noticeable in South-East Asia, then in Latin America, the Middle East, and, commencing about 1958 in Africa. By 1956 TASS was operating through its own offices in 40 foreign countries. By 1962, 20 more foreign offices had been opened, whilst in 1964 a TASS statement claimed that the agency had 100 of its own correspondents operating from a total of 79 foreign offices, these correspondents being aided by about 200 locally recruited journalists. It was also stated that 2,000 people were then employed in TASS's central headquarters in Moscow, to rehouse which a new 20 storey office block was to be built.

TASS has been quick to follow up the opportunities presented by the rapid de-colonisation of Africa. Although prior to 1958 the agency was virtually unrepresented on the African continent, it had by May 1966 opened a total of 23 offices in African capitals, the most southerly of which was situated in Lusaka. These offices were providing a news coverage for 27 African countries, to which TASS was transmitting between 10-12,000 words a day by teleprinter in English and French. Three-quarters of all reports relayed to TASS from Moscow came from the agency's own reporters and direct telex links existed between six African countries and the TASS central office in Moscow. In May 1967 Dmitry Goryunov, who had held the post of Director General of TASS for the past six years, was appointed as Soviet Ambassador to Kenya.

An important aspect of the work of TASS offices in non-Communist countries, particularly in areas outside Europe, is the issue and distribution of free daily news bulletins, copies of which are sent both to newspapers and in some cases to individuals. These news bulletins are also smuggled across frontiers for use in the press of adjoining countries, as used to be the case with the news bulletin issued by the TASS office in

Beirut which as well as being distributed to many local newspapers regularly was smuggled into neighbouring Syria in which TASS had no office. The TASS office in Cairo supplies much material for use in the Egyptian press. An Egyptian journalist commenting upon the growing free service provided by TASS has said that whereas formerly the French-speaking countries of Africa used to rely largely on the French agency, *Agence France Presse* (AFP) which had successfully undercut both the American agencies and Reuters with its low charges, today AFP had lost much of its position because "there is a new competitor, TASS, and the AFP cut-rate is being met by a better price—free distribution. You can't beat that".¹

In addition to news bulletins TASS offices also periodically issue booklets and pamphlets either for free distribution or sale at only a nominal price.

The largest expansion in TASS news coverage since the end of the war has occurred in the Latin American area where TASS news agency facilities are now almost on a par with those of the United States.

Summing up the activities of TASS as far as its rôle as a Soviet Union "image projecting" organisation is concerned, Theodore E. Kruglack, author of *The Two Faces of TASS* has stated:

"The image of the USSR projected by TASS is scarcely an objective one. The USSR may be doing all the things TASS reports, but what it does not report is equally important. One tends to come to the immediate conclusion that TASS is not acting as a news agency in its reports from the USSR but as a sort of USIA news service determined to impress the world with the accomplishments of the nation, rather than compete with other international news agencies in reporting all the news."²

Novosti Press Agency

The Novosti Press Agency, the second of the Soviet Union's international press agencies, was formed in 1961, being sponsored by the Soviet Union of Friendship Societies as well as by the Union of Soviet Writers and the Union of Soviet Journalists. *Novosti* is therefore not a 'state body' like TASS but a 'public body' without any special privileges or the diplomatic immunity enjoyed by TASS. Its material however is copyrighted abroad while that of TASS is not. Presumably this is to prevent any embarrassing direct quotation being made from its publications.

The idea for the formation of *Novosti* has been credited to A. Adxhubei, Khrushchev's son-in-law and former editor of *Izvestia*. It has its own network of offices and correspondents in foreign countries,

¹Interview with Egyptian correspondent by T. E. Kruglack at U.N. Headquarters, March 1961. Quoted in *The Two Faces of TASS*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1962, p. 218.

²Theodore E. Kruglack. *The Two Faces of TASS*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1962, p. 186.

but concentrates mainly on issuing background material and articles by prominent Soviet personalities such as writers and scientists. It also designs material for use by the international fronts, particularly their local affiliates in former colonial and developing countries. It would seem that the general intention is that *Novosti* concentrates on propaganda leaving TASS free to concentrate on the presentation of news as such. In 1962 this agency sent over 50,000 items of copy to 90 foreign countries in addition to the many thousand articles supplied for the use of the Soviet Press. In the same year it issued 387,000 photographs. By 1965 its number of press clients outside the Communist bloc had risen to nearly 4,000 and it was responsible for the publication of 35 periodicals.

The London office of *Novosti*, as has been stated previously, issues a number of publications through 'Soviet Booklets'. These have included "a special series based on the six themes mentioned in the programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union:—Peace, Labour, Freedom, Equality, Fraternity and Happiness".

Titles in this series have included *Communism Creates Brotherhood*, *Communism Brings Happiness*, *Communism—A Triumph of Labour* and *Communism Means Peace*. Another series is "based on the main themes of the open letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU dealing with the points of difference with the Communist Party of China". It is stated that new 'Soviet Booklets' are published at the rate of one or two each month. Under the subscription scheme readers can receive each new booklet as soon as it is published for ten shillings a year. One of a 'Get to know the USSR Series' of *Novosti* booklets is entitled *The Soviet Union is the Friend of the African Peoples*, and consists of an account, with illustrations, of Soviet aid to African countries.

Booklets published by *Novosti* in English during 1966 included *The Ideology of Hatred* in which a strong attack is made on the theory of the value of Western civilisation and the blame for all racial friction in the world placed on Western 'imperialism' and colonialism. *True Ally in Anti-Imperialist Struggle* in which it is stated that the Soviet Union and the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America have one common enemy—imperialism, and which stresses Soviet willingness to supply all forms of aid for the 'liberation struggle' is heavily stressed. *Neutralism and The National Liberation Movement* is an attack on Western 'neo-colonialism'.

Novosti's position as a 'public' and, therefore to a certain extent, unofficial body when compared with the 'state body', TASS, would make it easier for the Soviet Government to repudiate any statements made by *Novosti*, should it ever wish to do so; and in this context it is interesting to note that the agency seems to have been charged with issuing most of the Soviet booklets that have appeared in Britain attacking the attitude of the Chinese Communist Government.

Boris Burkov, Chairman of the Board of *Novosti* and Secretary of the Union of Soviet Journalists, claimed in July 1965 that the agency had its own representatives in 56 countries. He said that in 1964 *Novosti* had

sent out about 50,000 news items as well as nearly half a million photographs. The publishing house which operated under its control had issued 80 different titles in books and pamphlets in 25 languages which had had an estimated readership of 10 million.

Novosti has been making a particular effort to increase its influence in Latin American countries. In June and July its Chairman and the Editor in Chief of its Latin American Department toured Cuba, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Peru. The aims of the tour were to publicise *Novosti* and its services and to try to bring about an increase in the number of its agencies in the Americas. By the date of this tour *Novosti* was already maintaining representatives in Chile, Cuba, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay. Since September 1964 it has been publishing a weekly press bulletin, styled *Soviet Panorama* which is sent direct to newspapers, periodicals and broadcasting stations in some 16 Latin American countries.

Cases have already occurred in which *Novosti* correspondents have been expelled for indulging in espionage or subversion. One being expelled from the Congo in 1963 and another, the head of the agency's Washington office from the USA at the beginning of 1965.

Of late there has been a tendency to discard a certain amount of the 'unofficial status' camouflage surrounding *Novosti*. In 1964 it was referred to by an official Soviet source, as "the younger brother of TASS" and a number of Soviet embassies are now distributing *Novosti* material direct. It has also been admitted that *Novosti* devotes much of its material to supporting Soviet Foreign Policy.

In addition to its publishing activities *Novosti* has also been preparing material for television programmes and has produced about 100 programmes and 20 short films. Outside the Soviet Union *Novosti* sometimes operates under the initials of its Russian title, these being APN.

The New China News Agency

The New China News Agency, or *Sin Hua* as it is known in Chinese, was established by Mao Tse-Tung's revolutionary headquarters early in 1944 for the purpose of competing with the Central News Agency under the control of the Nationalist Government. It replaced an earlier agency, 'The Red China News Agency' which had operated since 1932 as part of the Chinese Communist Party's Press and Propaganda Department.

Since 1952 the New China News Agency has been an independent body; until that date it operated under the general supervision of the Information Department of the State Council. The Agency's head office is situated in Peking and it is presided over by a director who in the present case is also Editor-in-Chief of the *People's Daily*. Apart from which he holds the position of Chairman of the State Council's Foreign Cultural Liaison Commission.

Departments included in the NCNA's head office include the City Desk, the Overseas Business Department, which selects NCNA correspondents for assignments abroad, the Radio Communications Depart-

ment, and the international, industrial, agricultural, photographic, and publications sections. In addition there is a data and reference section and a proof reading section. The head office controls a whole range of subsidiary offices from regional ones down to individual correspondents in small towns and villages. Altogether there are more than 2,000 such offices. The agency was employing about 70,000 people by 1956, and at that time it had at least one correspondent in each city, town, commune co-operative, industrial establishment, army headquarters, civic body and government department in mainland China.

By 1962 the agency had 21 foreign offices and was broadcasting a daily news service which averaged 10,000 words in English alone. In some countries it maintained a considerably larger staff than did TASS. In Iraq, for instance, its office is reported to have a staff of 40 whilst the TASS office was staffed by no more than three or four journalists. The NCNA has been paying great attention to increasing its coverage of the Middle East and now maintains a large Cairo office. In the last four years its rate of expansion has been particularly marked. By June 1965 it had offices in 20 African countries. Its offices in Paris, Bonn, London, Mexico City and Tokyo are considered to be particularly important.

An average of 8,000-10,000 words per day are transmitted to the NCNA's Moscow office, and there is also a news photo service which was distributing photographs to nearly 90 countries by 1957. A new teletype service in Arabic was introduced in 1965.

Some 62,000 words per day are sent out by the agency's internal news distribution service to national newspapers and radio stations all over mainland China, together with a further 10,000 words to provincial and local newspapers. As in the case of TASS much of the information gathered by correspondents abroad is not used for release to the Press or broadcasting services at home but for the composition of special 'information reports' published six times a week for circulation only to key personnel in the government and Party machine.

NCNA correspondents abroad are often assigned a number of 'extra-mural duties' which include handling visas for foreigners anxious to visit China ; making travelling arrangements for delegations from abroad and organising the visits of Chinese cultural exhibitions and film shows in foreign countries. Sometimes they are called upon to maintain liaison with Chinese Friendship Societies and to transmit funds to pro-Peking Communist splinter parties.

As in the case of TASS, the NCNA has not infrequently been accused of acting as a cover for agents engaged in espionage and subversion. There is, in fact, ample evidence to show that both agencies have been used for this purpose on a number of occasions by their respective countries' intelligence services. One of the most serious cases in the instance of the NCNA occurred in Brazil in the summer of 1966 when its representatives in that country were amongst a number of Chinese arrested on a charge of espionage and of holding clandestine meetings with local Communists.

The Eastern European Agencies

Each of the European Communist states maintains its own Government controlled news agency, usually under the operational control of a Director General and a Presidium responsible to the Council of Ministers on the same general lines as TASS.

The titles of these agencies and the initials of their titles under which they are generally known are:

Albania	... <i>Albanian Telegraph Agency</i>	ATS
Bulgaria	... <i>Bulgarian Telegraph Agency</i>	BTA
Czechoslovakia	<i>Czechoslovak Press Bureau</i>	... CTK or CETEKA	
East Germany	<i>General German News Service</i>	ADN
Hungary	... <i>Hungarian Telegraph Bureau</i>	MTI
Poland	... <i>Polish Press Agency</i>	PAP
Rumania	... <i>Telegraph Information Agency</i>	AGER PRESS
Yugoslavia	... <i>Telegraph Agency New Yugoslavia</i>	TANYUG

Many of these agencies originated from the efforts of the Communist orientated resistance movements of Eastern Europe to combat German propaganda campaigns during the days of the war time occupation. Like TASS they have been engaged in steadily increasing the number of offices they maintain abroad and like TASS also have been much involved in the Communist drive to obtain influence amongst the newly-independent countries. In general Communist news agencies follow similar tactics in initiating contacts with such countries. First comes an approach to the target country's own news agency (if it exists) with an offer for the exchange of news and the provision of technical aid including free equipment. This will probably be followed by an offer to provide training for journalists and technicians in Communist countries, and if negotiations proceed satisfactorily by the opening of a Communist news agency office in the country concerned. Most East European countries now maintain considerably more offices abroad than could appear to be justified from the purely news gathering point of view.

The East German news agency, ADN, has been particularly active in Africa and journalists from the Zanzibar news agency *Zananews* were amongst those engaged in studying under its training courses in East Berlin during 1964. By that year ADN had its own correspondents in 26 countries and was transmitting news releases to South-East Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. In July 1964 it was announced that a new East German Press agency had been created called '*Panorama*' which has the status of a private limited company. Its task is to provide illustrated articles and commentaries for use in the foreign press, for the purposes of portraying "an overall and true" picture of life in, and the policies of, East Germany.

CETEKA is financed by funds provided under the Czechoslovak state budget, and ranks as an organisation attached to the office of the Prime Minister. A former London correspondent of the agency¹ has

¹Antony Buzek. *How the Communist Press Works*, Pall Mall Press, London, 1964.

given some interesting details as to how its confidential news digest for government officials and Party leaders is compiled. This daily bulletin is issued in three editions, the first and largest being distributed to all officials on the confidential news list—about 200. It consists of news reports on events in Western and other non-Communist countries. The second edition is sent to officials whose names appear on a very much smaller distribution list and consists of reports, including those from Western news sources, on problems and difficulties arising in Communist countries except in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia itself. The third section which contains similar information but this time dealing with events in Czechoslovakia and also in the Soviet Union, together with confidential items of news concerning events elsewhere considered to be of particular importance, is sent to only about 30 senior government and party officials who are the only persons in the country to receive wholly uncensored news.

CETEKKA has been one of the most active of the Eastern European news agencies as regards activities in the non-Communist world. By the end of 1962 it had opened offices in London, Paris, Rome, Vienna, Geneva, Stockholm, Bonn, New York, New Delhi, Tokio, Algiers, Accra, Bamako, Conakry, Rabat, and Bagdad. During the next two years it also opened offices in Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, and The Congo (Brazzaville). The agency's annual report for 1964 mentioned that it had been active in assisting in the creation of "national agencies and centres" in a number of African countries, training being given to the staff of such agencies by CETEKKA personnel in Africa and it was claimed that the Algerian news agency was operating under CETEKKA guidance even before Algeria became independent.

CETEKKA has given important assistance to the establishment of news agencies in Kenya and Zanzibar. In March 1965 an agreement was signed between it and the Zanzibar news agency providing for exchange of news, and under which CETEKKA undertook to provide technical assistance and to make available a number of scholarships for the training of journalists and technicians from Zanzibar at the school for journalists in Prague. Such activities have not been confined to Africa. CETEKKA sponsored a two month seminar for journalists in Kabul, Afghanistan, commencing in June 1966.

The normal work of the agency abroad has been supplemented by the establishment of a special feature service, '*Pragopress*', which carries out very much the same rôle for Czechoslovakia as the *Novosti* agency does for the Soviet Union. *Pragopress* provides large numbers of articles, copies of which are available in ten different languages together with quantities of photographs. Both articles and photographs are distributed free for use in the Press of foreign countries. Distribution is carried out through the press sections of Czechoslovakian embassies and legations as well as by the agency's correspondents and offices.

In addition to the agencies mentioned above, four other Communist states maintain their own news agencies, these are Mongolia

(Montsane), North Vietnam (VNA), North Korea (KCNA) and Cuba (*Prensa Latina*). Of these *Prensa Latina*, established by Castro as the official Cuban news agency in 1959, has been by far the most active outside the Communist bloc, setting up offices in many Latin American countries and a considerable number in Africa, one of the most important being in Algiers.

CHAPTER V

International Communist Fronts

The front system—The international fronts, structure and organisation—The World Peace Council—The World Federation of Trade Unions—Trade Union Internationals—The International Organisation of Journalists—International Radio and Television Organisation—The World Federation of Democratic Youth—The International Union of Students—Women's International Democratic Federation—The World Federation of Scientific Workers—The International Federation of Resistance Fighters—The International Association of Democratic Lawyers—International fronts and UNESCO Status bid.

THE idea of front organisations is not a new one, as early as 1920 an organisation, the International Worker's Aid, was functioning under the direction of a German Communist, Willi Muenzenberg, later to become one of the main architects of the front system. This organisation passed under Communist control and was in effect the first Communist international front organisation, dispensing propaganda in Germany, Britain and Japan.

The necessity of attracting support from outside the Party by means of such bodies, in fact, dates back to the earliest days of the Communist International.

One of that organisation's founder members, Clara Zetkin, emphasised the importance of forming such fronts which whilst not openly calling themselves Communist organisations would none the less be firmly under the Party's control. Every effort was made to get people of all shades of opinion into such bodies. Once in, the policy and programme of the organisation could be dictated to them by the Communist Party without their realising it.

At a meeting of the Comintern Executive in 1926 Otto Kuusinen, a veteran Finnish Communist leader who subsequently became a member of the CPSU defined the rôle of front organisations more exactly. The aim should be he said, "to create a whole solar system of organisations and smaller committees around the Communist Party—smaller organisations working actually under the influence of the Party, although not under its mechanical leadership".¹

In 1928, Willi Muenzenberg outlined the purpose of such organisations in a programme drawn up by the Comintern as follows:

¹*International Press Correspondence*, Vol. VI, No. 28, April 1926.

"To arouse the interest of apathetic and indifferent workers, who were not interested in Communist propaganda and have to be attracted in new ways.

"To act as bridges for those who sympathise with Communism but have not taken the final step and joined the Party.

"By means of mass organisation to extend the Communist sphere of influence in itself.

To provide an organisational link with those sympathising with the Soviet Union and with the Communists.

"To counteract the work of non-Communist unions.

"By means of such sympathetic and mass organisations to provide training for cadres of militants and officials of the Communist Party possessing organisational skill."

It was not until 1931 however that the theories of Willi Muenzenberg, German publisher and Comintern agent, really began to be put into effect. During the 1930's, Muenzenberg in his rôle of Comintern agent was responsible for the formation of large numbers of what he described as 'Innocents clubs' and protest leagues. Invariably these organisations had harmless sounding titles and ostensibly had harmless or even praise-worthy purposes, but each one was, in fact, firmly under the control of the Communist Party and was used to further the policies of the Comintern. Trading on the increasing fear of democrats of the dangers of Fascism, many of these pre-war fronts that sprang up under Muenzenberg's direction throughout Europe and America were styled Anti-Fascist Leagues' but others were styled 'Friends of the Soviet Union Committees', 'Anti-Imperialist Leagues', etc. They were the instruments by which Muenzenberg began to put into practice his earlier words:

"That we must penetrate every conceivable milieu, get hold of artists and professors, make use of theatres and cinemas, and spread abroad the doctrine that Russia is prepared to sacrifice everything to keep the world at peace".¹

These 'Innocents clubs' of the 1930's were the forerunners of the literally thousands of Communist front organisations which exist throughout the world today. Their number continues to increase year by year.

Just how extensively the ideas of Willi Muenzenberg and others have been followed up by their successors and the Communist Parties of all countries is shown by the fact that at the present time, to name but a few of the major non-Communist nations of the world, there exist some 140 Communist front organisations in France; nearly 50 in Britain; 30 major organisations in Italy and many smaller regional ones; around 80 in West Germany; 48 in India and a vast network of

¹*Labour Magazine*, December 1924.

organisations in Japan. The United States Government's official guide to subversive organisations lists over 1,000 organisations in America as being under Communist control. Areas in which there has been a particularly marked increase in the number of front organisations in recent years have been Africa, and Latin America. In the latter there are known to be over 600 such bodies. The advent of China into the field of international Communist operations has also led to a substantial increase in the number of front organisations, particularly in Asia ; whilst Cuba has had a substantial hand in the spread of front organisations in the Caribbean and Latin America.

The membership of Communist front organisations is largely non-Communist and their members and sponsors often include people of liberal views of considerable distinction in their various walks of life. Policy is however strictly controlled by a few Communists, both open and concealed Party members or perhaps fellow travellers.

The post of secretary of a front organisation, which is usually a full time paid position is often one occupied by a Communist or a reliable fellow traveller. The secretary is responsible for the day to day running of the organisation and so is in an excellent position to ensure that the 'correct' policy is maintained over any important issues that crop up. It has been estimated that the membership of an average Communist front consists of one quarter hard core open Communists, one quarter fellow travellers or concealed Party members, one quarter opportunists in search of publicity, and political innocents or do-gooders who may genuinely believe in the ostensible objects of the organisation and be unaware of or close their eyes to its true purpose.

Front organisations are of three types: the international front organisations, such as the World Peace Council. Most of these have their headquarters behind the Iron Curtain and usually administered by full time Communist officials. The have member or affiliated bodies in most non-Communist countries as well as in the Communist bloc itself. Secondly there are bi-lateral fronts or friendship associations. This category includes numerous bodies whose ostensible purpose is to promote friendship between Communist and non-Communist countries. The third category of front organisations consists of organisations formed to carry on campaigns regarding some issue of special concern in non-Communist countries. These co-operate closely, though not openly, with the Communist Party in their respective countries.

These three categories of fronts are to a large extent interlocking and taken as a whole can be pictured as a formidable web of organisations using many different tactics but with a single common strategic aim.

There are at present 12 major international Communist fronts, each having their own national affiliates in all countries of the Communist bloc and in many non-Communist countries. With the exception of the World Peace Council the appeal they make is specialised and directed in each case towards some special section of society in the countries of the non-Communist world. These 12 front organisations comprise:

The World Council of Peace

The origins of the World Peace Council derive from the 'Congress of Intellectuals for Peace', which was held in Wroclaw, Poland, in August 1948. The following year the 'International Liaison Committee of Intellectuals' which had been set up at this conference was responsible for organising the First World Peace Congress, held in Paris in April 1949. This Congress resulted in the formation of a new organisation first known as the 'World Committee of Partisans of Peace' which in 1950 changed its name to the 'World Peace Council' and subsequently to the 'World Council of Peace'.

For the first few years of its existence the headquarters of this organisation were in Paris. In 1951, however, the French Government stated that it was no longer able to tolerate the presence of this headquarters in its capital city on account of the organisation's fifth column activities. The World Council of Peace or WCP as it was soon to become generally known then moved its headquarters to the Soviet-occupied sector of Vienna. Vienna remained its principal base until after the re-establishment of Austrian independence and the withdrawal of all occupation forces. In February 1957, however, the Austrian Government announced that it had decided to ban the WCP and to close down its offices because it had engaged in activities directed against the Austrian state, and also interfered in the internal affairs of other countries with which Austria maintained friendly relations. Since then the headquarters of the WCP have been officially in Prague, but, in fact, its activities are principally directed from the offices of its Presidential Committee situated in Brussels and through the offices of the 'International Institute for Peace', an organisation which was set up in 1957 following the closing down of the WCP offices in Vienna. This was designed to allow the WCP to retain a presence in that city under another name. WCP statements and texts of resolutions are also sometimes issued from such Communist centres as Budapest and East Berlin.

The WCP has a somewhat cumbersome organisational structure surmounted by 'The Congress'. This is, in fact, largely a propaganda body. Its meetings which are infrequent are always carefully staged and attended by a large number of selected delegates. It has the power to appoint committees and sub-committees to study specialised subjects, and passes numerous resolutions and recommendations concerning the conduct of WCP activities and events in the field of international affairs.

The Council of the WCP which ranks next to the Congress in seniority amongst its controlling organs is composed of 550 councillors. These are chosen from the lists supplied by the WCP's national affiliates; the selection being made by the Executive Bureau, the governing organ immediately below the Council. About one quarter of the members of the Council come from countries of the Communist bloc, whilst most of the remainder are composed of members of Communist Parties or fellow travellers from non-Communist countries.

Since 1959 the seat of real power and control in the WCP has been vested in the 'Presidential Committee' which was set up in that year and in the full-time Secretariat. The Presidential Committee, which meets on an average of at least twice a year usually in Communist-controlled capitals, consists of 22 members elected or re-elected at each meeting of the Council.

The Secretariat of the WCP consists of six full-time officials nominated by the Presidential Committee, consisting of Prof. Nikolai Matkovsky from the Soviet Union, Yves Choliere, France, Walter Diehl, West Germany, Om Prakash Paliwal, an Indian responsible for WCP activities in Asia, Mohamed Ali Omar Babikr (alias Babicar Bob) a Sudanese responsible for activities in Africa and Professor Olga Poblete de Espinosa, responsible for activities in Latin America. The Secretariat works from the offices of the International Institute for Peace in Vienna.

Whilst officially the WCP exists to mobilise the people of the world in defence of peace and to expose 'warmongers', throughout its entire existence its activities have been concentrated on obtaining support for Soviet policies by—to use Willi Munsenberg's words—spreading abroad "the doctrine that Russia is prepared to sacrifice everything to keep the world at peace" whilst at the same time trying to turn public opinion in non-Communist countries against any moves that the governments of the Free World may make, especially if to meet actual or threatened Communist aggression and subversion by denouncing such moves as the action of 'warmongers'. The long-term aim of WCP policies would, in effect, seem to produce a climate of public opinion in the non-Communist world which accepts Communist designs and aims as the only way to avoid a nuclear holocaust. In its propaganda the WCP has consistently shown a contempt and even outright opposition to any form of genuine non-partisan pacifism. Some Western pacifist leaders have expressed their disillusionment with WCP policies in strong terms. In 1955, for instance, the leader of the British Methodist Church, Dr. (now Lord) Donald Soper, well known for his pacifist views, said:

"I am quite satisfied that the World Peace Council and the British Peace Committee, which is its typical representative, are primarily organs of Russian propaganda. I would want to discourage peace-lovers in England from allowing themselves to become the well-meaning but inevitable pawns of the Russian Party line, with its insistence that war is the original sin of the Western Powers and that peace is the immaculate conception of the Soviet bloc."¹

In pursuit of its policies the WCP has organised a very large number of international conferences and meetings, varying greatly as to size and type. The largest being the various 'Peace Congresses', six of which had been held up to 1965, each attended by about 2,000 delegates and held in Paris, Prague, Warsaw, Vienna, Moscow and Helsinki. The most recent was held in Helsinki in 1965. The greatest efforts are made to get delegates from non-aligned pacifist bodies, such as movement for

¹Dr. Donald Soper. *Tribune*, 4 February, 1955.

nuclear disarmament, to attend these gatherings. The 1962 Congress in Moscow, for instance, was preceded by an immense propaganda build-up on the part of the Communist bloc press and radio, whilst massive publicity campaigns were launched to attract attention to the event in many non-Communist countries.

The syllabus of each congress usually includes a number of special meetings for members of various professions present as delegates or observers. For example, writers, doctors, film workers, painters, sculptors, musicians and composers. At such meetings the best method of obtaining support for WCP policies amongst members of such professions in the delegates' home countries is usually discussed. Often peace congresses are used too as a starting point for the formation of new bodies to control or co-ordinate WCP activities in particular spheres. At the 1962 Moscow Congress, for instance, it was decided to establish: a Political Commission for Disarmament and Related Problems, a Commission for Disarmament and National Independence, a Commission to Study the Economic Effects of Disarmament, and a Commission for Disarmament and Problems Involving Law, Culture and Morality.

The WCP also organises a large number of area conferences and 'round table' conferences such as the Latin American Peace Conference held in Mexico City in 1961, "The World Without the Atom Bomb" Conference held in Accra in 1962, and the East-West Round Table Conference held in Brussels the same year which launched a campaign for the admission of Red China to the United Nations. In addition the WCP gives assistance to activities sponsored by the Nordic Peace Conference based in Stockholm, the European Community of Writers based in Florence, the Christian Peace Conference with its headquarters in Prague, and the World Conferences against A- and H-bombs held in Tokyo.

Other WCP activities include the organisation of signature appeals in which large scale efforts are made to obtain signatures from hundreds of thousands of persons all over the world to WCP-drafted appeals in favour of the banning of nuclear weapons, negotiations between East and West on topical questions or in favour of Communist bloc proposals for general disarmament. Three International Peace Prizes are awarded each year to writers, artists, film producers or scientific workers who have in the WCP view made notable contributions to the cause of peace. A number of gold and silver peace medals are also issued each year. Each year, 1 September is celebrated by the WCP and its national affiliates as a 'Day of struggle against the Danger of a New War'.

The WCP publishes the *Bulletin of The World Council of Peace* each month from the Vienna offices of the International Peace Institute in English, French, German, Spanish and Russian. From time to time 'information letters' and press statements are also issued by the Secretariat. About 80 National Peace Committees are affiliated to the WCP, virtually all of them being under the control of Communists or Communist sympathisers. Many of these national committees have

smaller subordinate front organisations under their control or affiliated to them. In recent years a number of new peace organisations in African and Asian countries have become affiliated. Since 1962 WCP meetings have often been the scene of open wrangling and quarrelling between Chinese and Soviet delegates. This was particularly marked during 1963 after the signing of the Test Ban Treaty.

The principal subsidiary organisation of the WCP is the International Institute for Peace. As well as providing a convenient cover for the WCP Secretariat, the Institute has a Department of Reference and Research which issues a number of publications dealing with various aspects of international affairs. These include *Series 1, Current Documents and Papers, Series 2, Current Articles, Interviews and Statements*, and *Series 3, Nuclear Energy—Documentation on its Military or Peaceful Uses*. The fact that the Institute is not as generally known to be under Communist control as its parent body makes it useful to the WCP in a number of ways; and for this reason it is not infrequently through the Institute that invitations to conferences sponsored by the WCP are issued in the hope of attracting support from non-aligned pacifist bodies.

Two other subsidiary bodies are the 'World Congress of Doctors for the Study of Present-day living Conditions' set up in 1953 which now functions only on a limited scale, and 'The Committee for International Trade' which was established as the nucleus of a new international front by the WCP in 1952. This venture seems to have failed and the Committee headquarters were subsequently closed down though a number of affiliated bodies had been set up in non-Communist countries. The British Council for the Promotion of International Trade continued to 1967. A WCP Cultural Commission was established in 1951. The main function of this Commission is to encourage national peace committees, affiliated to the WCP, to set up special peace organisations for writers, artists and musicians.

A 'Peace Liaison Committee of The Asian and Pacific Regions' was established in Peking in 1952. Its rôle being to co-ordinate WCP activities in the Far East under the control of Chinese Communists. Dormant for a number of years it was announced from Peking in 1961 that it had been re-activated. This is the body which some observers believe it may be the intention of the Chinese Government to turn into a separate pro-Peking propaganda peace organisation.

The World Federation of Trade Unions

The World Federation of Trade Unions, the largest and probably the most effective weapon in all the Communist armoury of front organisations, came into being in October 1945 at a Paris Conference. It was founded as a genuine non-party organisation designed to foster international co-operation and friendship amongst trade unionists regardless of political differences amongst nations. The concept for the formation had grown from plans of the British Trades Union Council

to try and improve relations between British and Soviet trade unions during the war in a bid to help the two countries' mutual war effort.

Delegates from 56 countries attended the founding conference in Paris, and as a token of gratitude for the preparatory work done by British trade union officials, Sir Walter Citrine, then secretary of the TUC, was appointed as its first President. The USSR, however, insisted on Louis Sallant, an able French fellow-traveller, being appointed as Secretary General as its price for taking part in the conference at all. Louis Sallant, who still occupies the same post in the WFTU's organisation, immediately appointed two Communists, a Russian and a Pole, as his assistants. With the most important salaried posts in their hands the Communist delegates turned their attention to seizing control of the elected offices. This they did by manipulating and artificially inflating the membership figures of Communist controlled trade unions, particularly those in countries behind the Iron Curtain. Their tactics succeeded so well that with the help of the spurious extra votes they were able to claim that they had by 1948 obtained control of 14 out of the 22 seats on the Executive Bureau and had also captured control of the General Council. Early in 1949, recognising that the federation had fallen completely under Communist control, the non-Communist unions withdrew from the WFTU and set up the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

The headquarters of the WFTU were originally in Paris, but it was forced to move to Vienna in 1951 when the French Government expelled it for subversive activities. In February 1956, the Austrian Government having laid similar charges against it, it was compelled to move to Prague from which city it continues to operate.

The organisational structure of the WFTU is headed by 'The World Trade Union Congress', which meets on an average of every four years, each affiliated union being entitled to send fixed numbers of delegates to such meetings. They are also often attended by large numbers of specially invited guests and observers, nearly half those attending the Congress meeting held in Moscow in 1961 for instance came from African and Asian unions and organisations not affiliated to the Federation. The purpose of Congress meetings is not to take executive decisions regarding WFTU policy but to act as a large scale propaganda forum. Beneath the Congress comes the General Council which is supposed to be the Governing body of the WFTU when the Congress is not in session. In fact, however, the responsibilities of this body are here again largely propagandist, its main function appearing to be to pass resolutions dealing with international affairs and to issue appeals.

Actual control of WFTU policy and activities would seem to be vested principally in the Executive Bureau, consisting of the President, Renato Bitossi, an Italian Communist Senator, the Secretary General, and twelve Vice-Presidents all of whom are Communists, six from countries inside the Communist bloc and six from those outside it. The main function of the larger 79 strong Executive Committee being apparently merely to confirm decisions already taken by the Bureau.

The Secretariat is presided over by the Secretary General and ten assistant secretaries, who are chosen from amongst leading figures in the Communist controlled trade unions. It is divided into eight departments and is responsible for all matters of administration and the day to day management of WFTU affairs. The eight departments are:—

Economic and Social Affairs Department which is also concerned with WFTU activities at the UN.

Department for Liaison with Unions and National Centres.

Press and Propaganda Department.

Trade Union International Department (The trade union internationals being all-important subsidiary bodies of WFTU).

Women's Affairs Department.

Administration Department.

Finance Department.

Department for Colonial and Semi-Colonial Countries. This department is sub-divided into agricultural, industrial and other sub-departments and is under the direct control of the Secretary General.

The Constitution of WFTU states that the organisation exists to "improve the living and working conditions of the people of all lands" to combat fascism and to "combat war and the causes of war".¹ In practice, however, since it passed under Communist control its policies have been concentrated upon arousing sentiments of unrest amongst trade unionists in non-Communist countries regarding their conditions of work and life, encouraging the use of strikes and industrial agitation and acting as a propaganda agency to obtain support from amongst trade unionists for all aspects of Soviet foreign policy.

The WFTU has over the years either sponsored or collaborated with other international front organisations in the following propaganda campaigns: a campaign against the Marshal Plan, against the Atlantic Pact, against the European Defence Community and German Rearmament, in favour of a Charter of Trade Union Rights, in favour of Women's Rights, in favour of a 40 hour week, a campaign against 'monopolies'. In addition it has been extremely active in assisting the World Council of Peace's various activities. Yet another field in which the WFTU has expended much energy has been that of anti-colonialism. Much of the money distributed through the 'Solidarity Fund' administered by WFTU has been directed to the assistance of 'liberation movements' and work among trade unionists in colonial and newly independent countries. A WFTU report for the period January 1962 to June 1965 said that 60 per cent of the payments made through the fund during these three and a half years had been to further such objects.

Virtually all the various colonial 'liberation movements' and nationalist movements have received enthusiastic verbal support from the WFTU and many of them support of a more tangible kind. Writing

¹WFTU Constitution quoted from Phelps-Fetherston, *Soviet International Front Organisations*, Praeger, New York, 1965, p. 46.

in the May 1964 edition of *World Marxist Review* Louis Sallant spoke of "the support we are giving to the just anti-imperialist struggle of the people of Panama, Angola, Aden, Cyprus, Zanzibar and North Kallimantan."¹

The promotion of strikes in the Free World only, whether on an industrial or political pretext, has throughout been a major interest of the WFTU. There is reason to believe that contributions have been paid for the financing of strikes from the Solidarity Fund and WFTU publications carry many reports on strike action throughout the non-Communist world. The WFTU's principal publication *World Trade Union Movement* not infrequently carries a 'Chronicle of the Strike Movement' in which the numbers of working days lost as the result of recent strikes in Western countries are listed with evident satisfaction.

In recent years a main theme of the WFTU's policies and activity has been "unity of action" in defence of workers' rights between Communist-controlled and non-Communist unions. In 1963 a 'World TU Committee for Consultation and United Action Against Monopolies' was set up under WFTU sponsorship in Leipzig. It is through this Committee that the theme of unity of action has since largely been pushed. WFTU publications make no secret of the fact that the main purpose of consultations between Communist and non-Communist trade unionists under the auspices of this Committee is to stimulate industrial disruption in capitalist countries both at a national and international level.

Other special WFTU commissions known to be active include 'The International TU and Legal Commission for the Defence and Extension of TU Rights', 'The Protection of Victims of Repression against Trade Unions' established in 1961, 'The 40 Hour Week Committee' 1961, 'The International Commission of Action for Social Security' 1961, 'The International TU Committee for Solidarity with the Workers and People of South Africa' 1961, 'The International TU Commission of Study and Inquiry on East and West Germany' 1963, 'The International TU Committee for Solidarity with Spanish workers and People' 1963, and the 'Committee for Solidarity with Workers and People of Vietnam' which was also established in 1963.

The WFTU organises a great number of meetings for trade unionists, varying from large scale international conferences to much smaller and more numerous seminars for particular categories of workers. It has been noticed that increased industrial agitation and unrest often follows the return of delegations from non-Communist countries from WFTU-sponsored meetings at which the methods and tactics to be used in promoting strike action are often on the agenda. As with other of the international fronts elaborate efforts are sometimes made to disguise the fact that WFTU is the sponsor of particular conferences in the hope of attracting the maximum possible degree of non-Communist support. A large number of invitations are issued through WFTU to trade unionists

¹Louis Sallant. *World Marxist Review*, May 1964, pp. 2-9.

from the non-Communist world to visit Communist countries. WFTU delegations also make frequent visits to non-Communist countries, particularly those in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

There are two main WFTU publications: *World Trade Union Movement* an illustrated monthly magazine published in German, Russian, French, English, Spanish, Portuguese, Swedish, Finnish, Rumanian, Japanese, Arabic and Chinese. The second publication *Trade Union Press* (International Bulletin of the Trade Union and Working Class Press) is published twice a month in six languages. WFTU also produces large numbers of pamphlets. WFTU literature is disseminated from special publication offices in Moscow, Peking, Bucharest, Berlin, Paris, London, Mexico City, Montevideo, Rio de Janeiro, Stockholm and Tokyo, in addition to its headquarters in Prague.

The WFTU is allotted a considerable amount of time for broadcasting its own propaganda programmes over such radio stations as Moscow, Prague, East Berlin and Warsaw. A special Radio Editor is employed by WFTU to compile these programmes which are broadcast in many different languages. At great expense a long documentary film 'The Song of The Rivers' has been produced by WFTU. Shot in five different continents it is designed to illustrate the exploitation of workers the world over, save those fortunate enough to live in Communist countries.

An advantage enjoyed by WFTU alone of the international fronts is its possession of Category A consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council, and also with the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation, The International Labour Organisation and the Food and Agricultural Organisation, and with a number of UN regional organisations. This advantage, obtained before it had passed under Communist control, enables WFTU to retain four permanent representatives in the UN organisations concerned. These are stationed in New York, Geneva, Paris and Bangkok respectively.

Membership of the WFTU is officially open only to national trade unions, but in fact many Communist-controlled break-away union groups have been permitted to join from countries outside the Communist bloc. The largest trade union federations affiliated to it in the non-Communist world are those of Italy and France. The great bulk of its claimed membership of over 100 million is made up by the affiliations of unions within Communist countries. It is the only international trade union organisation to which they are allowed to belong.

The Trade Union Internationals

Although officially independent organisations the 11 Communist-controlled bodies known as 'Trade Union Internationals' are, in fact, subordinate bodies of WFTU and play a vital part in its activities. The Trade Union Internationals or TUI's came into being as Communist rivals to the International Trade Secretariat organisations designed to

act as an international forum and meeting ground for workers engaged in particular crafts set up by the non-Communist International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

The 11 Trade Union Internationals were established in 1949 or 1950, and each one of them is devoted to obtaining support for Communist policies from amongst workers in particular trades or professions. Although each has its own President, Secretary General and Headquarters Staff overall control of all their activities is exercised by the Trade Union International Department of the WFTU Secretariat. They consist of:

<i>Designation</i>	<i>Headquarters</i>
The Agricultural and Forestry Workers' TUI ...	Prague
Building, Wood and Building Materials Industry's TUI	Helsinki
Chemical, Oil and Allied Workers' TUI ...	Budapest
Commercial, Office and Bank Workers' TUI ...	Prague
Food, Tobacco and Beverage Industry and Hotel, Cafe and Restaurant Workers' TUI ...	Sofia
Metal and Engineering Industry's TUI ...	Prague
Miners' TUI ...	Prague
Public and Allied Employees' TUI ...	E. Berlin
World Federation of Teachers' Unions (FISE)	Prague
Textile, Clothing, Leather and Fur Workers' TUI ...	Prague
Transport, Port and Fishery Workers' TUI ...	Prague

Each TUI organises a programme of conferences and seminars for the categories of workers with which it is concerned and issues its own publications. The main rôle of the TUI's is to make contact with unions outside the Communist bloc which are not affiliated to WFTU. They have been known to approach unofficial groups inside individual unions without reference to the union leadership. The TUI's also assist the work of WFTU by operating a special courier service.

The most active of the TUI's are those concerned with dock, transport and fishery workers, metal and engineering trades, miners and teachers. Recently proposals have been made that the TUI's set up their own regional organisation in Africa, South America and Asia, in addition to the WFTU-sponsored or affiliated bodies already operating in those regions. The TUI's are particularly active in developing countries and also in Italy and France. The TUI exerting most influence in Britain is that concerned with metal and engineering workers. Working through such bodies as the 'International Automobile Worker's Liaison Committee' its influence has become important amongst some sections of the British motor industry in recent years.

The TUI concerned with teachers, the World Federation of Teachers' Unions, claims a membership of over six millions and the scale of its activities has led some authorities to consider it as being a minor international front in its own right. Founded in 1946 it has ranked as one of WFTU's Trade Union Internationals since 1949. Its headquarters were at first in Paris until it was expelled together with the WFTU headquarters in 1951. It then moved first to Vienna and subsequently to

Prague, its present location. An office in Paris is still used, however, for liaison purposes. The organisation is still known as FISE from the initials of its French name, *Federation Internationale Syndicale de L'Enseignement*. It is controlled by an Administrative Committee elected by the 'World Conference of Teachers' which meets infrequently. According to reports from Eastern European sources FISE was operating in a total of 46 countries in 1960 and had about 100 centres in Africa.

FISE has consistently sought to portray education in Communist countries as an example to the rest of the world. It has launched a campaign in favour of the adoption of a 'Teachers' Charter', and it has been extremely active in various anti-colonial campaigns. In his report to the Administrative Committee at a meeting in East Berlin in March 1962 its Secretary-General said:

"The Imperialists seek to maintain their influence in the young states by abusing the popular desire for education. FISE must investigate how to aid nations exposed to colonialist and neo-colonialist influences, particularly in Africa."¹

Representatives of FISE attended a conference of Arab teachers in Damascus in July 1966 organised by the extremist 'Palestine Liberation Organisation'.

One of the main aims of FISE propaganda has been to try and cure teachers of their allegedly 'bourgeois' outlook and to persuade them to become integrated with the working class whose "progressive ideas" they should forward in the course of their work.

WFTU Schools

The WFTU maintains or assists in maintaining a number of special schools for the training of trade unionists. The syllabus at these schools includes both instruction in the method of forming and managing unions and a considerable degree of political indoctrination and instruction in the Principles of 'Socialism'.

The oldest established of these schools is the Budapest Trade Union School which opened in 1953. 157 students from Asian, African and Latin American countries underwent courses at this school during the first two years of its existence and it appears that most of the students who have attended it subsequently have also come from areas outside Europe. The school is under the direction of Jean Marillier, a member of the WFTU General Council and a number of the staff are also WFTU officials.

The 'Fritz Heckert Trade Union College' at Bernau, East Germany, was opened in 1959 especially for the purpose of providing training in trade union work for students from developing countries. It is under the direction of the East German Trade Union Federation assisted by

¹Report of Administrative Committee Meeting, Phelps-Fetherston, *Soviet International Front Organisations*, Praeger, New York, 1965, p. 124.

WFTU. Courses last 18 months, it has been claimed that 250 students attended the first three courses. Most of these now occupy positions of importance in their own countries.

Another important School for Trade Unionists is 'The Leipzig Trade Union Institute'. This was opened in September 1960 and many African trade unionists have since received training at it. In 1963 it was announced that it was planned to increase its capacity so that 300 students could attend each course. Courses are usually of 11 months duration and include both instruction in trade union work and also in the principles of Marxist-Leninism.

The Moscow International Trade Union College was established in 1961 under the direction of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. It runs courses of nine or ten months duration for students from Africa, Latin America and Asia and about 90 students attend each course.

The WFTU sponsored and assisted the 'African Workers University' at Bamako in Guinea which was opened at the end of 1960. Over 500 African and Arab students had attended courses at it by the middle of 1965. Since 1963 it has been officially under the direction of the National Confederation of Workers of Guinea, but the terms of a three year agreement ensured that the WFTU retained a large share in the direction of its activities from behind the scenes and continued to provide the teaching staff. It is under the direction of a WFTU former Vice-President, Abdoule Diallo. Some of the more promising students from this school are sometimes sent on to Moscow for further training. It is believed that in addition to the financial assistance provided by WFTU, grants have also been made direct by the Trade Union organisations of Communist China.

Regional Organisations

A number of WFTU regional offices and organisations have existed in the past but most of these have been merely paper organisations achieving little in the field of practical action. An exception being that covering Latin America, the *Confederacion de Trabajadores de American Latina* (CTAL) with its headquarters in Mexico City. Under the direction of a Chilean Vice-President of WFTU it carried on an active campaign in pursuit of obtaining the allegiance of trade unions in South America and the Caribbean until the beginning of 1964 when it was announced that it was to be disbanded, presumably because its activities had led to it becoming too well known as an instrument of Communist propaganda. Unions which had become affiliated to it were asked to join a new organisation ostensibly completely non-aligned to be known as the 'United Latin American Trade Union Confederation', CUTAL, but at the time of writing little progress seems to have been made with the formation of this body.

In Africa, WFTU activities have been largely concentrated upon fostering the formation of a Pan-African Trade Union Federation,

the original idea for such an organisation being launched through the Ghana Trade Council, with which WFTU had close ties. In the spring of 1961 the 'All-African Trade Union Federation', AATUF, was founded as the result of a conference held at Casablanca at which Communist manipulation was so obvious that a number of delegations withdrew in disgust. Since the formation of AATUF, WFTU officials in Africa have been carrying on an extensive campaign designed to persuade African trade union organisations to transfer their allegiance from the non-Communist Confederation of Free Trade Unions to this new WFTU supported body. AATUF has established offices in Accra, Cairo, Nairobi, Bamako and Conakry, and is under the Presidency of a Moroccan trade union leader, Mahjoub Ben Seddik.

The International Organisation of Journalists

In view of the proven importance attached by Communist countries to the use of news media as a means of propaganda and political indoctrination, two other international front organisations are of particular interest. These are The International Organisation of Journalists and The International Radio and Television Organisation.

The International Organisation of Journalists was formed in June 1946 at a Conference in Copenhagen. Originally its headquarters were in London but moved to Prague in 1947. At first affiliations to the organisation included several journalists' unions from non-Communist countries, including the British National Union of Journalists. Key posts were, however, captured by the Communists in the very early days of its existence. By 1950 all non-Communist journalist organisations had withdrawn their affiliations. Its former President, Mr. A. Kenyon stating that it had in practice become a branch office of the Cominform.

The International Organisation of Journalists (IOJ) is headed by a Congress which has only met five times since 1946. There is an Executive Committee and a 'Bureau' or Presidium consisting of the President, Jean-Maurice Herman of France, General Secretary of The French National Journalists' Trade Union, nine Vice-Presidents including P. A. Satyukov, President of the Soviet Union of Journalists and Ching Chung-Hua, Vice-President of the All-Chinese Union of Journalists, and the Secretary-General, Jiri Meisner of Czechoslovakia. This body is responsible for management of IOJ affairs except when the Congress is in session. Administrative functions are carried out by the Secretariat working under the orders of the Bureau.

The IOJ describes itself as "a union of progressive and anti-Fascist journalists", dedicated to the maintenance of peace and international friendship and the protection of journalists rights. In fact IOJ policies have been mainly concerned in supporting all aspects of Soviet foreign policy; with a campaign of denigration of Western news sources, and an attempt to persuade journalists of developing countries to rely exclusively on Communist sources. It has also been involved to a considerable extent in the Communist programme of technical aid for

papers and news agencies in developing countries and with the training of journalists from them.

The largest conferences held by the IOJ are the so-called 'World Meetings of Journalists'. Its Third World Meeting of Journalists held in 1963, took a more original form than most such meetings. The venue was on board the Soviet passenger liner *Litvia* cruising in the Mediterranean. Invitations were issued not directly by the IOJ, but by the 'International Committee for the Co-operation of Journalists', an ostensibly independent organisation but, in fact, a subsidiary of the IOJ which was set up in 1956 and now has its headquarters in Rome. Invitations which were sent to 300 journalists all over the world omitted mentioning any items on the agenda which might have disclosed the exact nature of the sponsors' political views, and instead stressed the tourist attractions of the cruise.

The cruise started from Naples and included calls at Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli and Alexandria, and ended at Beirut. Arrangements were made for those attending the conference to meet selected journalists and political figures at the various ports of call and a printing press was installed in the *Litvia* for the printing of information bulletins to be distributed at the ports on arrival. A feature of the cruise was the Plenary Session of the conference held in Cairo on 1 October which President Nasser attended, and at which he afterwards gave the first press conference for foreign correspondents that he had given for over six years.

In 1960 as the result of an international conference sponsored by the IOJ and held in Baden which had been attended by some African journalists, it was decided to form an 'African Committee' to co-operate with the IOJ. The Chairman of this committee, Doudo Gueye, a native of Senegal and a former member of the French Communist Party toured the Soviet bloc countries at the invitation of the IOJ and was reportedly asked to create an All-African Journalists Union. The following year such a union was formed at a conference in Bamako, and given the name of 'The Pan-African Union of Journalists'. Delegates from Communist countries at this conference outnumbered those from African countries by more than two to one. The objects of this new organisation were stated to be to help in the fight for the freedom of Africa and the struggle against neo-colonialism: to oppose nuclear tests; to work for African unity, and to support other progressive organisations such as the 'All African People's Congress' and the 'All African Trade Union Federation'.

Speaking at a meeting of the Steering Committee of the Pan-African Union of Journalists in April 1965 the Secretary of the IOJ said that it had organised or taken part in no less than 80 campaigns to aid African causes since November the previous year. He also claimed that the IOJ had distributed sums amounting to the equivalent of £3,300 during the first quarter of 1965 to journalists and their dependants suffering persecution from 'reactionaries' and that a large number of African journalists were undergoing training in schools

under IOJ control in the Soviet bloc. It was planned to send four teachers from such schools to Accra during 1965 and to inaugurate a number of special courses for African journalists in Africa itself during the year.

The principal journalistic training establishments which the IOJ sponsors or assists in running are the international training centre in Budapest, and the 'School of Solidarity for Journalists from the Developing Countries' which was opened at Buckow, East Germany, in November 1963. Here students undergo seven month courses followed by three months of practical training at various East German newspaper offices. In co-operation with the Czechoslovak Union of Journalists the IOJ has been responsible for the establishment of a school for journalists in Guinea and another in Mali, and it has assisted in the establishment of another such school in Algeria which opened in 1964. Plans are believed to exist for the opening of IOJ sponsored training centres in East Africa and also in South America.

Acting on the suggestion of the IOJ the Association of German Journalists (the Government-controlled professional organisation for journalists in East Germany) and one of the IOJ affiliates organised an 'International Seminar on Problems Occurring in the Training of Journalists from the Emerging Nations' in the summer of 1965. This was attended by representatives of a number of European and African journalistic organisations.

Since 1962, the IOJ has operated in the Southern half of the American continent and the Caribbean through the 'Commission for Information and Co-operation among Latin American Journalists' (CICPLA). This organisation, set up as the result of a conference in Havana, has its headquarters in Montevideo. An 'Arab Federation of the IOJ' was founded as long ago as 1956 but does not seem to have been very active. Increased activity on the part of the IOJ in Arabia and the Middle East would seem to have been foreshadowed however by a speech made by its Secretary-General when attending the 'First Conference of Arab Journalists' held in Kuwait in February 1965, when he called for the closer co-operation of Arab journalists with "democratic organisations" all over the world in pursuit of the struggle against imperialism. The IOJ gave its support to the holding of a Conference for Afro-Asian journalists in Bandung in 1963, but this function came completely under the domination of Communist China and the Indonesian Communist Party and resulted in the formation of a new organisation, the 'Afro-Asian Journalists' Association' which could become a pro-Peking rival to the IOJ.

The Secretariat of the IOJ publishes a journal *The Democratic Journalist* in English, French, Russian and Spanish each month, and an *Information Bulletin* each fortnight. In addition to the 'World Conferences of Journalists' of which the next is scheduled to be held in 1967 in Latin America, a number of conferences of a specialist nature are also sometimes arranged. These have included a 'Conference of Agricultural Journalists', an 'International Conference of Sports Editors'

and an 'International Conference of Foreign Affairs Editors'. An 'International Solidarity Fund' was established in 1953, and in 1960 this was supplemented by the establishment of the 'International Journalists' Friendship Fund' the object of which is to finance exchange visits of journalists and scholarships for journalistic training in the Communist bloc. These are usually awarded to young journalists from developing countries. In 1962 an 'International Photographic Section' of the IOJ was established with its own headquarters. This appears to concentrate mainly on the holding of photographic exhibitions.

An International Recreation Centre for Journalists is maintained by the IOJ on the Black Sea, at Varna, Bulgaria. Early in 1965 it was announced that more than 8,000 guests from more than 35 different countries had visited this centre since 1959. The rôle of the centre has been defined as being to act as a centre for the meeting and making of friendships and contacts between journalists fighting for "peace and democracy".

Although few journalists' organisations from non-Communist countries in Europe are affiliated to the IOJ, in recent years it has been strengthened by the affiliation of a number of organisations from Africa, Asia and Latin America. At the beginning of 1965 journalist organisations from the following non-Communist countries were amongst those affiliated to the IOJ. Iraq, Mali, Columbia, Bolivia, Peru, Mexico, South Vietnam, Ecuador, Argentina, Ghana, Algeria, Cameroon, Uganda, Chile, Ceylon, Indonesia, Malagassy, the United Arab Republic, and Finland. Altogether the IOJ then had affiliated to it 16 organisations in Africa, 7 in Asia, 6 in the Middle East, 13 in Latin America and 11 in non-Communist Europe.

The International Radio and Television Organisations

This organisation was founded as the result of a conference held in Brussels in 1946. As is the case with several of the international fronts or their subsidiaries it is often known from the initials of its French title *Organization Internationale Radiodiffusion et Television* (OIRT). Many non-Communist countries at first belonged to the organisation but within four years it had passed under Communist control, and all leading non-Communist European organisations concerned subsequently withdrew and joined the European Broadcasting Union or EBU, the formation of which was sponsored by the British Broadcasting Corporation in 1950.

All member organisations of OIRT are represented on the General Assembly, which meets once or twice a year. Officially the next most senior governing body is the Administrative Council. Real power is, however, vested in the Presidium or Bureau which is composed of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, the Secretary-General, and the Director of the organisation's technical centre. General control and administration are also directed through a series of committees which include the

'Programme Committee', the 'Television Committee' and the 'Permanent Committee for Regional Areas'.

An important function of OIRT is the co-ordination of the television programmes of Eastern Europe and this it accomplished through the 'Intervision Council' set up under its auspices in 1958. This council has also been active in attempting to embark upon co-operation with television organisations outside the Communist bloc, and it is under the chairmanship of the East German television service. The headquarters of OIRT are in Prague.

Since the late 1950's the amount of time devoted by OIRT to countries outside the Communist bloc has increased steadily and has included giving professional training to the staff of the radio and television services of Asian and African countries with special regard to the presentation of news. In this respect OIRT's views on the rôle to be assigned to television news services as defined in an article appearing in its principal publication *Radio and Television No. 2* of 1963 are as follows:

"Television news is part of the political broadcasts of the propaganda department. It is not, however, the only medium of propagation of the policy of the Party and Government . . . They present events of home and foreign policy, at the same time stimulating viewers to the fulfilment of tasks set by the building-up of Socialism . . . In accordance with the theme treated, newscasts use direct and indirect methods of propaganda . . . The artiste must submit humbly to the aims of propaganda, to political aims, and do his best to find the most suitable form"¹

OIRT has also been active in offering aid for the setting up of television and radio stations in developing countries, including the proposed 'Voice of Africa' broadcasting station. OIRT has sponsored a number of political propaganda programmes in conjunction with various other international fronts, notably the World Council of Peace and the World Federation of Scientific Workers.

Broadcasting and television organisations affiliated to OIRT include those of the Communist countries and those of Finland, Mali, Iraq and Egypt. It publishes *Radio and Television* twice a year and a monthly bulletin *OIRT Information* together with lists of programmes suggested as being suitable for exchange with non-Communist countries each quarter. There are OIRT technical centres in Prague and Shanghai. OIRT has category C status with UNESCO and is represented on various other bodies such as the International Telecommunications Union and the International Film and Television Council. It sometimes negotiates programme exchanges with Western countries through the European Broadcasting Union.

¹Phelps-Fetherston. *Soviet International Front Organisations*, Praeger, New York, 1965, pp. 169-170.

The Other International Front Organisations

The remaining international front organisations are:

The World Federation of Democratic Youth formed in 1945 and under Communist control since 1949, with headquarters in Budapest.

The International Union of Students formed in 1946 and under Communist domination since 1950, with headquarters in Prague.

The Women's International Federation formed in 1945, as the result of an initiative by the Communist controlled *Union des Femmes Française*. Its headquarters are now in East Berlin.

The World Federation of Scientific Workers, which has been under Communist control virtually ever since its inception in 1946 and the headquarters of which are in London.

The International Federation of Resistance Fighters founded in 1951 and consisting largely of Communist-controlled organisations. Its headquarters are in Vienna.

The International Association of Democratic Lawyers founded in 1946 and under Communist control since 1949. Its headquarters are in Brussels.

In each case control of these organisations is in theory vested in a Congress and subordinate Executive Committees, but in each case real power lies in the hands of the smaller 'Bureau' working in conjunction with the professional Secretariat.

The two organisations concerned with youth, The World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students work very much in conjunction. In the past the major events staged by these two fronts have been the 'World Youth Festivals' run by WFDY with IUS assistance, every two years. Up to 1965 eight such festivals had been held, all except two of them on Communist-controlled territory. They are usually organised on a mammoth scale with no expense spared. The Moscow festival of 1957 which had a record attendance of around 35,000 delegates was financed, according to official Soviet statements, by means of a special lottery which raised 40,000 roubles or about £3 million, but it is known that in addition the other Communist countries of Eastern Europe raised large sums to help pay for the travelling expenses of delegates, Czechoslovakia alone contributing the equivalent of £1 million for this purpose. Each festival is preceded by a massive propaganda build up designed to attract support and when they are held in Communist countries delegates who attend are often offered free tours round the countries of the Communist bloc on the completion of the proceedings.

Ill luck has dogged the efforts made to hold the ninth World Youth Congress scheduled to have been held in 1965 in Africa. The main theme of this Conference was to have been a study of the problems of the 'liberation movements'. It was first to have been held in Algiers and delegates had already started to arrive when the anti-Bella coup put paid to the proceedings. It was then arranged that the festival would be held in Ghana the following year, but this plan was wrecked by the subsequent overthrow of Nkrumah.

In addition to the world youth festivals, the WFDY, usually acting in co-operation with the IUS, has organised a large number of specialist conferences for young people, including conferences on 'Rural Youth problems', 'Youth Tourism', 'Young Workers Conferences', etc., and seminars on such subjects as 'Youth in the Struggle against Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism' in addition to area conferences in such centres as Havana, Calcutta, Casablanca and Santiago.

WFDY carries out a considerable amount of research designed to find the best line of approach to use to enable it to obtain support for Communist policies from amongst particular categories of young people. Its Secretariat is for instance divided into the following specialist departments:

- Department for Protection of The Rights of Youth ;
- Cultural Activities Department ;
- Sport and Gymnastic Department ;
- Department for Children and Adolescents ;
- Department for Rural Youth ;
- Department for Worker Youth ;
- Department for Young Girls ;
- Department for Co-operation with Colonial Countries ;
- Press and Information Department.

There are six separate departments each supervising the details of WFDY activities in different areas of the world.

WFDY has a number of subsidiary bodies, chief among which are the 'International Committee of Children's and Adolescent's Movements' (ICCAM) established in 1958. The running of international children's camps and film festivals are amongst its activities. 'The International Bureau of Tourism and Exchanges of Youth' (IBTEY) was established in 1960, 'The International Sports Committee for Youth' in 1960, and the 'International Committee of Solidarity with South Vietnam' was created in 1963.

The IUS set up an 'International Student Committee of Solidarity with the Struggle of the People and Students of South Vietnam' in May 1963. The IUS Secretariat also contains within it as one of its departments a 'Bureau of Students Against Colonialism' which sometimes organises functions on its own. Other departments of the Secretariat which has a large full time staff include a 'Student Needs and Welfare Department' a 'travel bureau, and a Department of Faculty and Cultural Activities. 'Solidarity Funds' are administered by both WFDY and the IUS. These are used mainly to provide scholarships to enable young people from developing countries to go to study centres in the Communist bloc. The care of such students during their period of training being a particular duty of the IUS. In the case of the WFDY funds are also sometimes provided for the assistance of youth movements in other countries or used for the purchase of equipment for them as a gift from the Federation. In recent years the majority of scholarships awarded by the IUS, averaging more than 300 a year, have been awarded to Africans.

As a result of resolutions passed at the Seventh Congress of the IUS in Leningrad in 1962 it was decided to form regional bureaux of the IUS as follows: 'A Black African Bureau' in Conakry, Guinea, 'An Arab Regional Bureau' in Baghdad, 'A South-East Asian Regional Bureau' in Djakarta and a 'West European Regional Bureau' in Prague. Since 1959 IUS headquarters in Prague have administered a 'Student Sports Council of the IUS' which has its own constitution and officers and organises various sports fixtures and conferences on sport and publishes a special bulletin. The IUS publishes a monthly *Journal World Student News* in five languages including Arabic, and *IUS News Service*. There is also an elaborately produced quarterly WFDY journal, *World Youth* and a monthly news sheet, *WFDY News*. A WFDY radio programme is broadcast in seven languages over *Radio Bucharest* each week. An unusual aspect of WFDY activities is the maintenance of a Pen-Friend service.

WFDY and IUS policies may be said to have been concentrated upon supporting the campaigns of the World Council of Peace and on anti-colonial themes. Although few non-Communist organisations in Europe are affiliated to either, both have achieved some success in recruiting support from non-Communist countries outside it. In 1965 these two organisations had between them 44 affiliated bodies in Africa, 14 in non-Communist Asia, 55 in Latin America and 23 in non-Communist Europe.

Peace campaigns and anti-colonial campaigns have also been at the centre of the work of the Women's International Democratic Federation. It has been very active in the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa and also in Latin America. In Africa and Asia it has worked closely in co-operation with the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Committee which in 1960 decided to establish an 'All-African Women's Union' and 'All-Asian Women's Union'.

There are three main subsidiary bodies of the WIDF, these are the 'Permanent International Committee of Mothers' set up in 1955 and active in carrying out campaigns against nuclear weapons. The Commission for Problems of the Child and The Family' established in 1964, and the 'International Solidarity Committee with South Vietnam' which came into being in the same year. The WIDF has been devoting considerable efforts to forming links with non-Communist women's organisations and an 'International Liaison Bureau' charged especially with this task was set up in 1960. WIDF publishes four regular publications, the most important of which is *Women of the Whole World* published monthly in six languages. It has also published large numbers of pamphlets including some profusely illustrated and especially produced for distribution amongst African women. In general its propaganda tends to be less obviously slanted than that of most of the other fronts, and it not infrequently seems to seek to give the impression that it is a 'bourgeois' women's organisation exclusively concerned with humanitarian problems.

The activities of the World Federation of Scientific Workers have

again been very largely concentrated upon assisting the campaigns of the World Council of Peace, in particular the campaigns of that organisation in favour of the abolition of nuclear and atomic weapons. Its main rôle would in fact seem to be to enrol the support of scientists from the non-Communist countries for such campaigns and others designed to prove that the armed forces of the Western powers use 'germ warfare' and other inhuman weapons.

Activities of the WFSW have included the organisation of a series of 'International symposia' devoted to subjects such as the training of students in science and technology, higher scientific and technological education. These symposia have often succeeded in attracting a considerable degree of non-Communist support. The scientific needs of emerging countries has been a particular theme of several of them. A 'Special Committee on Scientific and Technological Assistance to newly-established States' was established in 1962. Regional centres of the WFSW exist in Paris, Prague, Peking and New Delhi. Since September 1963 the Peking centre has functioned virtually as an autonomous body organising functions and issuing statements without reference to the WFSW headquarters in London or the Secretary General's office in Paris.

A 'Nuclear Hazards Committee', in effect, a subsidiary body of the WFSW, has been functioning since 1957 in close co-operation with the Vienna headquarters of The International Institute For Peace. Organisations affiliated to the WFSW come mainly from within the Communist bloc but include organisations from Britain, France, West Germany, Denmark, India, Japan, Portugal, the USA, Madagascar, and the Cameroons. The WFSW claims in addition to have individual members in 17 countries and runs a rest home for scientific workers at Varna in Bulgaria on the Black Sea. The main publication of the WFSW is *Scientific World* published quarterly in six languages.

Membership of the International Federation of Resistance Movements, often known from the initials of its French title, *Federation Internationale des Resistants* (FIR) is confined to ex-members of the wartime resistance movements and those persons who suffered imprisonment or internment under Fascist or Nazi regimes. In practice membership is confined almost exclusively to organisations and individuals sympathetic to Communism. Associations of ex-members of wartime resistance movements which were not under Communist control have not, in the main, given FIR their support.

The activities of FIR have been devoted to supporting Soviet foreign policy and in particular in carrying on a campaign of defamation against the West German Government and individuals in it. The dangers of German 'militarism' are constantly stressed and charges regarding the allegedly 'Nazi' past of West German officials frequently made.

A number of Communist-controlled international associations for ex-inmates of concentration camps are amongst the organisations affiliated to FIR and in some cases these have subsidiary organisations under their control. Each year FIR organise rallies which are held on the

sites of wartime concentration camps in Germany such as those at Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Mauthausen, Dachau, and Ravensbruck. These rallies are each organised by special standing committees. There is also a special committee devoted to organising functions for Jewish ex-prisoners. FIR has also been responsible for organising a number of rallies for ex-resistance fighters, these having been held in Western European countries. FIR's 'Historical Commission' has organised various conferences on the history of wartime resistance movements, always striving to emphasise the importance of the part played by those which were under Communist control. A 'Medical Commission' and a 'Legal and Social Commission' have also been set up under FIR's auspices.

The main activities of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers have been concerned with voicing protests over the alleged breaches of international law contrary to the interests of Communist countries. It took a leading part in the atrocity campaign in which the armed forces of the United States were charged with using germ warfare during the Korean war. The Association, generally known by its initials as IADL has also played a big part in campaigns aimed at damaging the reputation of the West German Government. It is also used to issue statements intended to give 'legal' approval to Communist activities, in particular those of the other front organisations.

A number of special commissions have been set up by IADL from time to time, the most recent of which have been the 'Commission on the Rôle of Former Nazi Judges in Western Germany' established in 1961, the 'International Commission of Lawyers to Study the South Vietnam Situation' 1963, the 'Commission to Investigate arrests in Iraq' 1963 and the 'Commission for Investigation of the Re-employment of Nazis in the West German Legal System' which was also established in 1963.

The IADL has also played an active part in anti-colonial campaigns, and it organised an 'Afro-Asian Lawyers Conference' which was held in Conakry, Guinea, in 1962. At its 8th Congress held in Budapest in 1964 it passed a resolution calling on its members to support "The fight against imperialism and colonialism", particularly in South Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea, Rhodesia, Panama, Laos and Cyprus.

International Fronts and UNESCO

There were indications during 1966 that the Soviet Union intended to try and obtain greater prestige and scope for action for some of the international fronts by launching a campaign aimed at obtaining category 'B' consultative status at UNESCO for at least five of them. It was thought that this campaign would be centred upon pressing the candidature of the IOJ, the WIDF, the IADL, and that of the IUS and WFDY, and that with the decline of Western voting power in the United Nations Organisation as a whole it might well stand a good chance of eventual success.

CHAPTER VI

Bi-lateral Fronts

History and general description—Cultural societies—Friendship Associations—Other bi-lateral fronts.

ALTHOUGH they were early in the field the pre-war bi-lateral fronts were not regarded as very effective instruments by the organisers of the Comintern. This was largely because it was considered that they had allowed themselves to become too openly connected with the Communist Parties in the countries in which they operated. A special co-ordinating committee was set up in Moscow in 1927 with its own secretariat and was known as the 'International Association of Friends of The Soviet Union'. It controlled the activities of the friendship associations operating abroad but was later dissolved. By the late 1930's many of the friendship associations which had been established in various countries had been wound up or were in a state of suspended animation.

However, with the increased popularity and international standing of the Soviet Union in the non-Communist world in the closing years of the Second World War, it was evidently thought that the time was ripe for another attempt to try and establish a network of such organisations which could perform useful duties in the post-war world. New cultural associations with the USSR began to appear from 1944 onwards in a number of countries including some Latin American states, Mexico, Colombia and Cuba amongst them. 'The Cuban Soviet Cultural Exchange Institute' established at this time was later to play an important supporting rôle in the growth of the Cuban Communist Party, and a number of its officers subsequently obtained high office in the educational and cultural departments of Castro's Government.

In the immediate post war years, cultural and friendship societies or associations linking Communist and non-Communist countries blossomed forth on all sides and today there is an immense and ever increasing number of them. They exist in most countries of the non-Communist world. *Radio Moscow* claimed that even by 1946 such organisations were operating in 60 different countries. By 1965 there were 122 branches of Soviet or Chinese cultural societies in Latin America alone.

The activities of bi-lateral fronts connected with a Communist country are co-ordinated by special bodies established for that purpose, and in the case of the cultural associations also by the Ministry of

Culture or equivalent Ministry of each respective Communist state. Until 1958 the activities of the various friendship associations linking the USSR with non-Communist countries were co-ordinated by an organisation known as the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. After a number of non-Communist governments had complained, however, that this organisation, generally known from its initials as VOKS, was carrying on negotiations with unofficial and unrepresentative organisations in their countries, it was dissolved in 1958. Its place being taken by a new body 'The Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries' which took over the VOKS offices together with its magazine *Culture and Life* and some of its staff including its Chairman. This Union is organised into a number of smaller bodies each controlling the work of bi-lateral fronts in a particular area.

In February 1962 a spokesman of the new organisation reported that it had contact with the public in 118 foreign countries, including 44 with which the Soviet Union had no diplomatic relations. It was also claimed that it was in contact with over 2,000 organisations abroad and that in addition it was in touch with many thousands of public figures outside the USSR. An important part of its work consists of arranging receptions and programmes for visiting delegations from non-Communist countries.

The activities of bi-lateral fronts linking Communist China with non-Communist countries are co-ordinated by The Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations of friendship with foreign countries. As a result of a meeting held in Peking in the summer of 1966 it was decided to re-organise this association in order to enable it to give increased support to Chinese friendship associations abroad. Originally founded in 1954, it was at first known as 'The Chinese People's Committee for Peace and Against American Imperialism'. It was founded by a number of Chinese 'public bodies' such as the All-China Federation of Literature and Arts Circles; the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, and The All-China Federation of Democratic Youth. Other Communist countries have similar organisations to those of the Soviet Union and China the duties of which consist of co-ordinating the activities of the particular friendship societies active on their behalf. In 1961 for instance the East German Government set up a special organisation called The International Friendship League to control the activities of over a dozen friendship societies and other front organisations active abroad, these include The German African Society; The German Arab Society, The German Latin American Society and the Indonesia-German Democratic Republic Society.

Cultural Societies

Societies for cultural relations with the USSR have in many cases been in existence for periods of anything up to 40 years. All bi-lateral front organisations devote a considerable proportion of their

activities to attempting to win the sympathy and, if possible, active support of intellectual circles in the countries in which they operate, but this is particularly so in the case of the societies for cultural relations. They are divided into varying numbers of different departments according to the opportunities open to them in each country. Each department covers some specific field in the arts, professions, or learning, and each tries to attract as many adherents as possible from amongst persons prominent in its field or in national life. Often they operate with a 'Cultural Centre' as their headquarters, which includes libraries and in which letters and free film shows are given.

The British Society for Cultural Relations with the USSR was formed in 1924 by a small number of British Communist sympathisers connected with the Soviet trade delegation in London to mark the opening of diplomatic relations between Britain and the USSR. The Society has twelve departments under the control of the Executive Committee. These include departments devoted to such subjects as architecture, chess, medicine, law, music, the cinema, social sciences, literature and the theatre. There are a number of provincial branches mainly in university towns.

Cultural Society's activities include organising tours of the Soviet Union. Sometimes these include special tours for school teachers, tours for architects, child welfare students, and Russian language students, etc. They have also issued appeals to education authorities to send children to the Soviet Union for their holidays. Many of the Society's leading members are also members of other fronts and the societies give support to the formation of friendship associations and to their activities. They take a leading part in organising receptions and tours of important visitors from the Soviet Union whether they are from the world of ballet or the theatre or such celebrities as the late astronaut Gagarin.

Societies for cultural relations give the Soviet Union an invaluable auxiliary channel of communication with countries outside the Communist orbit and enable it to maintain close contact with sympathetic intellectual circles even in those countries in which it has no diplomatic representation. Moreover because their activities are mainly of a non-political character they often escape the disadvantages suffered by some other kinds of bi-lateral fronts. The British Society for Cultural Relations with the USSR for instance does not appear on the Labour Party's list of proscribed organisations although the various friendship societies mostly do.

Although operating on a less extensive scale than their Soviet counterparts Chinese cultural societies are becoming steadily more active.

The Friendship Associations

Friendship associations are usually formed by groups of Communists or Communist sympathisers in a non-Communist country working in close association with the embassy of a Communist country, or, if it has no diplomatic relations, with a trade or other delegation

from one. The activities of the friendship associations themselves include the publication of propaganda in support of the particular Communist regime with which they are associated. They include sponsoring film shows and lectures with the same purpose and organising rallies, signature campaigns, poster campaigns and cultural and musical exhibitions. They also organise tours of the Communist country with which they are linked.

Other activities may include initiating pressure campaigns in countries that do not recognise certain Communist regimes to persuade the Government to change their mind. In the autumn of 1964 for instance the Japanese-China Friendship Society launched a nation-wide campaign aimed at securing improvement in relations between the two countries and obtaining the recognition of the Peking Government by Japan. A campaign to demand "Normalisation of Relations between France and East Germany" was opened at the 2nd Congress of the French-East German Society early in 1966. Similarly the Britain-China Friendship Society has been campaigning for the admittance of Communist China to the United Nations. Pressure campaigns may also be mounted by friendship societies when the Communist country with which they are linked is engaged in a dispute with non-Communist countries or is engaged in hostilities or in Communist eyes threatened with attack by 'imperialist' forces. An example of this type of campaign is the one currently being carried on by the British-Vietnam Committee. This organisation was founded in 1952 during the Indo-China war. Subsequent to the armistice of 1954 which ended that war little was heard of its activities for a number of years. However, with the renewed crisis in South East Asia that commenced in the early 1960's its efforts were again stepped up and by the beginning of 1965 it was issuing bulletins and press releases accusing the British Foreign Office of making "slandorous attacks on the patriotic, freedom-loving people of Vietnam", charging the United States and South Vietnamese forces with atrocities, and calling for the British Government to disassociate itself from "the barbarous acts of aggression undertaken by the US forces".

An interesting example of how the fortunes of a friendship society can fluctuate according to the course of events on the international scene is provided by the history of the British-Hungarian Friendship Society. Formed in 1951 it was very active until the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 caused it to become discredited and its membership fell almost to vanishing point. One of its leading figures said at that time on resigning from the Society and from the Communist party: "In recent years, I have visited Hungary twice, I feel I have been responsible for propagating and advancing policies which have produced this latest tragedy".¹

Yet, by the end of 1963 this organisation appeared to have recovered all the ground it had lost seven years earlier. Its membership was

¹*Manchester Guardian*, 14 November, 1956.

again up to around its pre-Hungarian Revolution figure of about 2,000. In addition, as well as having a central headquarters in London it had set up a Midlands Regional Council and a Scottish Regional Council. Members of its Executive include university lecturers, trade unionists, school teachers, and members of the Clergy, together with known and active members of the British Communist Party.

One of the most active Friendship Societies in Britain is the British-Soviet Friendship Society, descended from an organisation formed in 1927 to mark the return of a British delegation from the Soviet Union, the Friends of Soviet Russia Committee, the secretary of which was editor of a Communist weekly paper. In the course of its history this organisation has undergone various changes of name, its present title dating from 1950. The society has a large number of local branches throughout the country. In 1950 there were 123 of them each on average consisting of about 30 members; half these branches were in the London areas. In 1953 an individual membership of nearly 12,000 was claimed with a further affiliated, mostly trade unionist, membership of approximately 50,000. The activities of the Society include a number of public meetings usually held to support some current point of Soviet policy.

The British-Soviet Friendship Society frequently joins with the Society for Cultural Relations with the USSR in celebrating the month of November as British-Soviet Friendship Month to mark the anniversary of the Bolshevik coup of October 1917. Sometimes these celebrations have included a tour of Britain by a Soviet Cultural delegation escorted by officials of the British-Soviet Friendship Society. There is a great amount of interchange of usually Communist-led delegations from the Society and delegations from various Soviet organisations. There is a separate Scottish-USSR Friendship Society and a separate Northern Ireland-USSR Friendship Society, Wales being covered by a subsidiary of the English society.

In the nations of the West, it would seem that it is general to find one friendship society for each of the East European countries in addition to a Society for Cultural Relations with the USSR. In some cases these societies have subsidiary organisations operating under their control. Attempts are often made to give them an entirely non-political guise. An example of this type of subsidiary front is the 'Lidice Shall Live Committee', an offshoot of the British-Czechoslovak Friendship League, or the Rumanian Democratic Club which is linked to the British-Rumanian Friendship Association.

In Japan, the Japan Soviet Association, one of the leading friendship associations in the country has no less than seven affiliated groups consisting of:

- The Japan-Soviet Library,
- The Japan-Soviet Academy,
- The Japan-Soviet Scientific Library Centre,
- The Japan-Soviet Translation Publication Coterie,

The Soviet Students' Association,
The Japan Soviet-News Agency,
The Friends of the Russian Language Association.

The Japanese-Czechoslovak Friendship Society has branches in nine Japanese towns.

An additional function of friendship societies is the organising of crowds to meet leaders from Communist countries. The France-USSR Society arranged a special rally to welcome Khrushchev when he arrived in Paris for the abortive summit conference of 1960. Receptions and publicity for visiting delegations from Communist countries are also arranged.

Because the ostensible purpose of the friendship societies, like the cultural ones, may well appeal to persons genuinely interested in improving international relations who have no idea of the political purpose that lies behind the formation of these organisations, they often succeed in attracting large numbers of people from outside the ranks of the Communist Party or the usual body of fellow travellers. The size of the membership of the friendship societies varies and is to a considerable extent dependent on the current climate of the international situation, as we have seen in the case of the British-Hungarian Friendship Society. In general their highest membership figures seem to have been reached in the immediate post war years and then to have gone into a decline as the Cold War developed. Recently, however, with the new emphasis on co-existence and *détente* in East-West relations membership of the friendly associations would seem to be on the increase again.

Since 1960 there has been a large increase in the number of friendship societies in Africa, and Latin America, a considerable number of them being linked to Communist China. Chinese friendship societies in non-Communist countries began to appear from 1950 onwards. Ten years later it was known that such organisations existed in 25 non-Communist countries and there was reason to believe that they had been or were being formed in another 19 countries. Possibly the friendship society with the most unlikely sounding title is the Bolivian-North Korean Friendship Society which has been active in sponsoring visits of its Latin American members to the North Korean capital, Pyongyang.

A number of friendship associations or society-type fronts also exist under a variety of different titles. An example being 'The Co-ordinating Committee on Germany', which links Britain and East Germany. It absorbed the 'British Council for Democratic Germany', which had been formed some time before as the nucleus of a friendship society and also includes amongst its components 'The British Committee for the Peaceful Solution of the German Question', which is a subsidiary of the World Peace Council. A newer organisation linking Britain with East Germany is the 'Britain Democratic German Exchange' or 'Bridge' which started in May 1965.

Since the coming to power of the Communist Government of Castro,

a whole series of friendship society-type front organisations have sprung up, principally in Latin America, linking non-Communist countries with Cuba. Typical of these are 'The Argentine Committee for Solidarity with the Cuban Revolution' and 'The Chilean Committee for the Defence of the Cuban Revolution'.

Other Bi-Lateral Fronts

A number of 'solidarity' committees, friendship associations and councils exist which are, in fact, bi-lateral fronts linking a country of the Communist bloc not with a single country but with a whole group of states or an entire area. Their rôle includes sponsoring, and fostering the activities of new friendship associations and other front organisations in the developing nations. One of the first of these to be formed was the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee which was founded in 1956. This Committee has three departments, one of which concerns itself with relations with the countries of Asia and Africa, one with problems of culture and co-operation in that field and one which specialises entirely in African problems. After 1959 a considerable increase in this Committee's activities was reported and in the years that have intervened since that date it has launched a number of campaigns, in support of 'the national liberation struggle', for the ban on nuclear weapons and in defence of 'victims of imperialist oppression', etc. In China an 'Asian Solidarity Committee of China' was formed early in 1956, its name being changed the following year to the 'Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee of China'.

Both the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee and the Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity became affiliated members of 'The All-African Peoples Solidarity Council' which was established with its headquarters in Cairo in 1957. The Council consists mainly of representatives from Communist countries or extremist African political parties and movements.

Another bi-lateral area front is 'The Chinese African People's Friendship Association' which was launched by Communist China in April 1960. Favourable responses to the formation of the new organisation were received, according to *Radio Peking*, from "people's organisations" in the Cameroons, Algeria, Zanzibar, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Tunisia, Cairo, Ghana, and Liberia. Soon after its formation it despatched a friendship delegation on a four month tour of West Africa. Subsequently the delegation's thorough report on their activities was broadcast over *Radio Peking* foreign service in Swahili in ten instalments.

CHAPTER VII

Espionage and Subversion

Introduction—The Intelligence Services of the Soviet Union—The KGB—The GRU—The Intelligence Services of the Eastern European States, Communist China, and North Vietnam—Cover organisations and auxiliaries—Training of agents—Operating techniques.

MR. ALLEN DULLES, former Director of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, has written :

“From my own experience I have the impression that the Soviet intelligence officer represents the species *homo Sovieticus* in its unalloyed and most successful form. This strikes me as much the most important thing about him, more important than his characteristic as a practitioner of the intelligence craft itself. It is as if the Soviet intelligence officer were a kind of final and extreme produce of the Soviet system, an example of the Soviet mentality pitched to the nth degree.

“He is blindly and unquestionably dedicated to the cause, at least at the outset. He has been fully indoctrinated in the political and philosophical beliefs of Communism and in the basic motivation which proceeds from these beliefs, which is that the ends alone count and means which achieve them are justified. Since the ingrained Soviet approach to the problems of life and politics is conspiratorial, it is no surprise that this approach finds its ultimate fulfilment in intelligence work.”¹

The size of the Communist bloc intelligence effort was well understood during the severest years of the Cold War by the recurring arrest and trial of numerous Communist agents in the countries of the Western alliance and also in those outside it. This fact is particularly well illustrated in the case of the German Federal Republic for between 30 August, 1951 and 31 December, 1960 a total of 19,043 cases of espionage or other illegal activity against the West German State were reported. By the early 1960's the number of arrests of suspected Communist bloc agents in West Germany was exceeding 2,000 a year. Today it is estimated that out of a total of approximately 5,200 Soviet officials serving in embassies in the non-Communist world, no less than

¹Allen Dulles. *The Craft of Intelligence*, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, 1963, p. 98.

3,000 are intelligence officers. In 1964 it was estimated that the Soviet Intelligence Services alone probably employed about 100,000 persons in the form of agents and technical and administrative personnel on a regular basis while utilising the services of several hundred thousand part-time agents throughout the world. In addition to being efficient information gathering machines, the intelligence services of the Communist bloc are also potent weapons of political subversion, and could perhaps be said to play the key rôle in the Communist political warfare offensive against the West.

The purpose of this chapter is to give an outline of the organisation and training of these services, based upon information that has become available from a number of sources, including defectors, during the last 20 years.

Intelligence Services of the Soviet Union

The two basic arms of the Soviet Intelligence Services are the Chief Military Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of the Armed Forces, more generally known from the initials of its Russian title (Glavnoe Razvedyvatelnoe Upravlenie) as the GRU and the Foreign Intelligence Administration of the Committee of State Security, more generally known as the KGB.

The GRU is, in fact, the fourth Directorate of the Soviet Army's General Staff and it was created by Trotsky in 1918. In theory the GRU concentrates upon obtaining military information from foreign countries, whilst the KGB concentrates upon obtaining political/economic information, and subversion. In practice there would appear to be a considerable degree of overlapping in the work of the two organisations, agents of one being not infrequently found to be engaged upon tasks that might appear to fall much more within the province of the other. Although Trotsky intended that the GRU should be the Soviet Union's senior intelligence service, in fact, its position has always been junior to that of the KGB which not only has the right to vet new recruits for the GRU but also maintains a watch over it by placing its own agents in the ranks of the military.

In foreign countries the GRU and the KGB networks both work entirely independently of each other, and although on occasions they may share the services of the same coding officer or wireless operator they are largely kept in ignorance of each other's activities as a security measure. It would appear that a considerable degree of rivalry has developed between the two services and that they often vie with each other in being first in providing Moscow with important information.

Up to the end of 1962 these two intelligence services were both under the ultimate control of The Administrative Organs Department of the CPSU. This is a Department which also supervises the workings of the Soviet courts, the Procurators Office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The head of The Department of Administrative Organs at that time was himself a former senior member of the KGB and was

responsible for passing on to the Presidium information gathered by the intelligence bodies.

The KGB

As well as directing the political foreign intelligence services of the Soviet Union, the Committee of State Security, which is attached to the Council of Ministers, also has charge of the internal Security Services or the political police, the present day successor to the dreaded OGPU, then NKVD and later MGB. This is an unusual position for in most countries the internal security service and external intelligence services are controlled by separate ministries. In the Soviet Union the position leads to a considerable degree of inter-changeability of personnel between the two services.

The actual headquarters of the foreign intelligence service of the Committee of State Security are divided firstly into two directorates, the Directors of which both have deputy-ministerial rank, and secondly into a number of divisions within these directorates. Operational control of agents and networks is largely exercised through the first directorate, whilst the second directorate specialises in subversion, checking the loyalty of the East European and Soviet personnel working abroad, and controlling special units whose rôle includes kidnapping and murder.

The divisions included within the first directorate are:

The Foreign Division: This allots tasks to agents being sent abroad ; assesses information collected by all sources and directs intelligence research.

The Operational Division: This has the task of selecting agents for the service abroad and of controlling their operations and networks. This division also has the responsibility of supervising the establishment for communication between networks.

The Communications Division: This has the dual rôle of maintaining communications between agents and networks in the field and 'The Centre' as the Headquarters of the KGB is known, and of making the necessary arrangements for the escape of agents who have been compromised.

The so-called *Secret Division* is, in fact, an administrative department responsible for supplying agents with all the types of documents that they might need for operations in foreign countries, uniforms and badges, codes and secret inks, and microdot, wireless and audio surveillance equipment.

The Information Division is responsible for gathering all available information from every source about foreign countries in which Soviet agents operate.

The last Division of the First Directorate is the *Recruiting and Training Division* whose duties are described by its title.

A section of the information division has charge of 'The Index', an enormous, unique collection of biographies and records concerning persons throughout the world who for one reason or another are,

or could be, of interest to Soviet intelligence. Information contained in the files of 'The Index', which it is believed is kept up to date by a staff of about 250, includes notes on the political views, activities, financial, position, standard of living, and any possible weaknesses of those listed. Not only names and particulars of persons thought to be sympathetic to Communism are included but also those of all persons prominent in public life in other countries and those of active anti-Communists.

The staff of another section of this division carry out a minute examination of all foreign newspapers and periodicals including technical journals. A library of books and periodicals from non-Communist countries is maintained, one of the very few of its type in the Soviet Union.

The second directorate of the KGB comprises:

The Propaganda Division: the duties of this division being concerned not with propaganda in the normal sense but with subversion. One of its particular rôles is to attempt to disrupt the security and police forces of non-Communist countries. It also has the task of maintaining contact with Communist parties, particularly those which are illegal, and of forming special groups for the purposes of subversion and political intelligence.

The Individual Division: This carries out checks on Soviet personnel working abroad including members of embassy staffs and delegations. Members of this division are also sometimes used to carry out checks on the staff of the other divisions and departments within the KGB.

The Allied Division: It is through this division that KGB control the security and intelligence services of some of the East European states. KGB 'advisers' are attached to most of the important departments of these services. There is reason to believe that for a number of years part of the duties of the Allied Division have consisted of keeping a careful watch over the activities of the Chinese Intelligence Services which since the start of the Moscow-Peking split have dispensed with their Soviet advisers.

The fourth Division of the second directorate has the nearest resemblance amongst the departments comprising the present day Soviet Intelligence Services to the notorious 'Smersh'. Named *The Special Division* it is the direct successor of an organisation set up to liquidate "enemies of the revolution" in the early days of the Soviet regime. Used by Stalin for ridding himself of opponents during the pre-war purges it has also been used as an instrument for the murder or kidnapping of a number of persons outside the boundaries of the Soviet bloc. Most of these have been defectors or emigres. Such tasks are handled by a section of the department which operates as a separate unit, under the title of 'Section Nine', or 'Section for Terror and Diversion'.

Also contained within the headquarters of the KGB is a special department with the task of conducting operations aimed at causing

confusion and demoralisation among the Soviet Union's foreign opponents. This it seeks to do by the planting of misleading stories and reports in the press of non-Communist countries. It uses forged documents aimed at compromising and discrediting non-Communist governments or political leaders. At least 32 such false press reports or forged documents are known to have been successfully placed by this department between 1957-1960. This department is known under the title of 'Disinformation Bureau'.

Between the KGB headquarters, or 'The Centre' and the agents and networks operating in the field come 'Foreign Operational Centres'. These are, in effect, area headquarters controlling and co-ordinating the work of agents in a group of countries or one particular country. They are normally not located in a country in which the networks they supervise operate but in one adjacent to it. One such centre is located in Harbin and supervises networks operating in Communist China, Formosa and Japan.

Another major centre exists in East Berlin. This headquarters, based upon the St. Antonius Hospital, in the Karlhorst district of East Berlin has a staff of approximately 900 and was divided into a number of departments in the early 1960s including:

The Department of Foreign Countries: The rôle of which consisted of the control of espionage networks principally in West Germany but also in other Western European countries and the disruption of anti-Communist groups in the same area.

Counter-Intelligence Department: This has both security tasks in East Germany and also an "offensive rôle" sending agents into West Germany and other countries. It also had a certain degree of control over the intelligence services of the East European countries operating from bases in East Germany.

Co-ordination Department: This was purely a liaison department charged with maintaining co-operation between the Soviet and East German intelligence services.

Emigration Department: This department concentrated upon obtaining information about and attempts to disrupt the activities of Russian emigre organisations.

SK Department: Through this department Soviet intelligence kept a check on the reliability of Soviet officials working in East Germany, including members of diplomatic and trade missions but excluding members of the armed forces.

Illegal Activity Department: The rôle of this department was to provide support for Communist Parties operating underground in Western Europe concentrating principally on aid to the West German Communist Party. In addition its activities included the training of East Germans in methods of sabotage and terrorism. This centre also includes a number of technical and administrative departments.

The GRU

The GRU is part of the Soviet General Staff, but its work also comes under the supervision of the CPSU.

The work of the GRU is divided into three main categories. These are strategic intelligence, operational intelligence and battle intelligence. Its operations are controlled by a number of departments or directorates numbering six in all. They comprise:

- 1st Directorate:* This has charge of illegal agents.
- 2nd Directorate:* Controls strategic intelligence work in European countries.
- 3rd Directorate:* Controls strategic intelligence work in Britain, the British Commonwealth, and Central and South America.
- 4th Directorate:* Controls strategic intelligence work in the Middle and Far East.
- 5th Directorate:* Responsible for diversion, sabotage operations, for drawing up lists of targets for sabotage.
- 6th Directorate:* Also known as the Operations Directorate, controls intelligence posts in areas bordering foreign countries.
- Information Directorate:* This directorate has the task of processing, evaluating and passing on information received from centres and agents abroad.

Below the directorates come a number of 'operational sections' which include: the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Section; Communications Section and the Section for Foreign Relations with Democracies. Included within the Communications Section is a special group trained in the handling of diplomatic mail for espionage purposes. The Section for the People's Democracies used to cover China and North Korea in addition to the Eastern European areas, but these two countries have been transferred to the Far Eastern Directorate. A special section has been set up recently to control strategic intelligence work in Africa.

The GRU is supported by a number of administrative sections. These are: Communications, Radio Intelligence Section, Organisational Section, Archives Section, Administrative Section, Supply Sections, and Personnel Section. Amongst the duties of the Organisational Section is the choice of suitable forms of cover for agents operating abroad. A Training School Section has charge of a number of special intelligence schools where GRU agents undergo comprehensive courses.

Like the KGB, the GRU maintains a number of stations near the borders or coasts of Communist-controlled territory for the purposes of controlling the work of espionage networks in neighbouring countries. A number of these 'intelligence posts' are situated in the Black Sea area, including the four towns of Batumi, Sukhumi, Leninakan, and Sevastapol.

From these posts intelligence activities are carried out against such countries as Turkey, for long a particular target of Soviet espionage. GRU activities against West Germany and other European NATO countries are carried on from a number of posts in East Germany notably those in Wuensdorf, Leipzig, Erfurt, Magdeburg, and Schwerin.

The East European States

All important departments of the Intelligence and Security Services of the Eastern European Communist States, except for Albania and Yugoslavia, have Soviet advisers attached to them, and these services are to all intents and purposes mere copies of the Soviet model. The advisers in addition to giving advice have far reaching executive powers and their word holds sway in any dispute over matters of policy or tactics. In addition the East European intelligence services have their main tasks allotted to them by the Soviet intelligence headquarters. If an agent from one of them turns out to be particularly promising or is in contact with a source from which he obviously stands a good chance of obtaining information of prime importance it is quite possible that Soviet intelligence will take charge both of him and of the operation upon which he is engaged. In general the only initiative permitted the indigenous services is of a local nature, such as that of attempting to penetrate Western intelligence services conducting operations against them. The Soviet advisers are supposed to be given all relevant details regarding the work being carried out by the departments to which they are attached and their consent has to be obtained before any important operation can be undertaken.

Despite the greater freedom from Soviet control now enjoyed by the countries of Eastern Europe in some respects there seems to be no sign of the Soviet grip on their intelligence services relaxing. Major Laszlo Szabo, an officer of the Hungarian political intelligence service, the AVH, who held the position of Second Secretary for Economic Affairs at the Hungarian Legation in London as a cover for his espionage activities and who defected in October 1965 has stated "Hungary has no secrets from the Soviet Union . . . officials of the AVH run to the Soviet advisers with any information they think important. They are happy to be of service to the KGB."¹

Soviet control of these intelligence services is simplified by the fact that many of the ablest and most experienced officers in these services either worked as Soviet agents before the war or received training in intelligence work whilst in exile in the Soviet Union during it. This applied particularly to the Polish intelligence services whose higher ranks include many pre-war Communists who took refuge in the Soviet Union after 1939 and returned in the wake of the Red Army's advance in 1944-45. It is known, however, that the KGB does not rely entirely upon its system of advisers, or the past affiliations of local intelligence officers to ensure its hold over the intelligence services

¹*East-West Digest*, September 1966.

of its allies, but that it also recruits individual members of these services to provide information about their colleagues which might not otherwise reach it.

As a great part of the intelligence effort of the Soviet bloc is focused upon West Germany, it is only natural that one of the most active of these intelligence services should be that of East Germany, about which a considerable amount of information has come to light.

The Political Intelligence Service of East Germany comes under the control of the Ministry for State Security (MFS), the headquarters of which are located in Berlin-Lichtenberg. It is headed by Lieutenant General Erich Mielke, a veteran German Communist who fled to the USSR in the early 1930's after having allegedly shot two Berlin police officers. As with the case in the Soviet Union, the Ministry for State Security is also responsible for control of the East German internal security (or political) police service. The Department of the MFS chiefly responsible for directing intelligence activities is the 'Main Intelligence Administration' (HVA). As well as directing espionage activities it is charged with directing subversion against countries of the Western Alliance and with attempting to disrupt relations between them. The major part of the activities of the HVA are directed against West Germany and NATO forces and installations in that country but its agents have also been active in many other countries.

A number of other departments of the MFS also take part in intelligence operations outside the boundaries of the so-called 'German Democratic Republic'. Department 11 whose main rôle is that of counter-espionage within East Germany devotes a part of its efforts to attempting to penetrate the intelligence system of Western countries. For this purpose it has a number of sub-departments each one concentrating upon attempting to penetrate the intelligence services of a particular NATO country. In addition one such sub-department concentrates upon operating against emigre organisations. Department 8 of the MFS is responsible for "surveillance and arrests". These activities it carries out at the request of the other departments not only on East German territory but also in West Berlin, where it operates through special units known as 'U' groups. These units have been responsible for a number of kidnappings and also for several actual and attempted murders.

Two other MFS departments engaged upon activities outside the borders of East Germany are the 'Information Department', 'Department F', which is responsible for radio communications and 'The Department for Conspiratorial Surveillance', 'Department O'. The MFS's 'Technical Department' or 'Department K' is responsible for supplying the other departments with the equipment they need including that used for espionage operations in West Germany and beyond. This equipment is largely manufactured in the MFS's own special workshops near Berlin which is staffed partly by convicts with specialist knowledge selected from prisons all over East Germany. The existence of a special MFS department, 'Department R' the duties of which consist of

maintaining surveillance over all allied missions in East Germany has also been reported.

In addition to the Foreign Intelligence Service of the MFS and in conformity with the pattern in the USSR, East Germany also maintains a military intelligence service. This is a branch of 'the National People's Army and known under the name of Administration for Co-ordination' (VKF). This service is divided into three departments:

Department A: Tactical intelligence department, which has five sections having responsibility for espionage activities directed against the West German armed forces, West German police, Allied forces in West Germany, military installations and supply depots.

Department C: Strategic Intelligence department, the chief rôle of this department is to acquire information regarding the military forces of Western European countries in general, and its activities include penetrating targets in Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Denmark, Norway, Italy, and Spain.

Department T: This department is responsible for obtaining information regarding the production of arms and military equipment in Western Europe.

A special department is responsible for the evaluation of all the information obtained. The VKF is closely controlled by a large number of Soviet advisers attached to it from the GRU and from whom it receives most of its orders. A special section of the VKF known to collaborate particularly closely with the Soviet intelligence services is 'The Independent Section of the Political Administration of the National People's Army' whose task it is to conduct subversive activities against the West German armed forces.

According to a United States, State Department's estimate of November 1961, the MFS had at that time a total of approximately 16,000 agents operating in Western Germany, of these 5,000 were estimated to be living permanently in West Germany whilst the remainder lived in East Germany crossing into the West as necessary.

All the intelligence services of the People's Democracies, with the exception of the Albanian and Yugoslav intelligence services, maintain bases in East Germany. The Czechoslovak and Polish services operate on a particularly large scale from East German territory. Many of these bases are centred upon their respective embassies in East Berlin and on secret apartments controlled by their intelligence services in the same city and which are used by their agents returning or preparing for missions in the West. The Hungarian intelligence service works in close co-operation with the East Berlin office of 'The Committee for the Promotion of the Return of Hungarians', which itself has been described as little more than a branch of the Hungarian intelligence service. Similarly, the Rumanian intelligence service has close ties with the Rumanian Repatriation Committee in Pankow. The activities of the Polish and Czechoslovak intelligence services are particularly closely co-ordinated with those of East Germany and the Soviet Union. The

information collected by these three services does not in the first place go to their respective governments, but straight to the Moscow 'Centre' and is afterwards passed on to their own governments if the Soviet authorities so wish.

There seems to be a degree of specialisation as to targets between the various Eastern European intelligence services. The Hungarian defector Laszlo Szabo stated that as the result of an agreement between them the Hungarian political intelligence service, the HVO, has been given the special task of obtaining information about the diplomatic services of non-Communist countries. Szabo summed up the general instructions given to the foreign section of the HVO as being to "get inside the government agencies in the enemy's capital, get inside his embassy in your own capital. Use technical means or agents, but get inside somehow".

Intelligence Services of Communist China

Extremely little information has so far become available about the organisation of the intelligence services of Communist China, partly no doubt due to the fact that so far the number of defectors from these services has been extremely small. It is known, however, that prior to the development of the split with the USSR, Soviet advisers were attached to them, although these never had a supervisory position. From the known general tendency of China to copy Soviet organisational methods it would seem surprising if they are found to differ much in their composition and manner of administration from those of the Soviet Union.

News agency reports have spoken of the Chinese Embassy in Berne as being the main centre for Chinese intelligence operations in Europe, with subsidiary centres in Paris, Brussels, Rome, London, and Vienna.

Other reports have spoken of the existence of a Chinese intelligence training school located at the summer resort of Mokanshan in the Province of Chekiang. The school is said to operate under the title of 'Institute for Co-operation in the National Liberation Front', and the students, many of whom are women, are said to include Europeans as well as Asiatics. These potential Chinese agents under training are reported to come from India, Vietnam, Burma, Siam, Japan, the Philippines, Laos, Latin America and the United States; the majority of the latter being American negroes. Over a thousand students receive training at the school.

Early in 1964 it was reported that some 500 agents who had received training in this school were active in Hong Kong, upon which a great deal of Chinese intelligence activity is focused. Communist China is believed to keep in contact with agents and pro-Chinese Communist Parties and splinter groups in Europe by a system of couriers, who receive training at a special school on the Shantung peninsula in northern China, and are then sent to Hong Kong to obtain employment

on board European freighters travelling between there and European ports.

Intelligence Services of North Vietnam

If little information has so far become available about the organisation of the intelligence services of Communist China, interesting details of the organisation of the intelligence service of North Vietnam, in which Chinese influence is strong, have been issued by American sources.

The North Vietnamese intelligence service hides itself under the name of 'The Central Research Agency' (CRA). This service reportedly operates under the general supervision of the Ho Chi Minh himself, and its directing committee is believed to include the Deputy Prime Minister, Pham Van Dong, and Vo Nguyen Giap, now North Vietnam's Defence Minister and previously commander of the Viet-Minh forces in the Indo-China war.

The headquarters of the CRA situated in Hanoi, is divided into six main departments, and a specialist department responsible for handling codes. Each of the six departments is responsible for a special section of intelligence work, divided as follows: administration, cadres, communications, espionage, research, and training. Although much of the CRA's work, as might be expected, is concentrated upon South Vietnam, it also operates on a wide scale in other areas and maintains a number of centres which specialise in directing operations overseas, one of which has a special responsibility for maintaining communications with agents and networks operating outside Vietnam.

The departments of CRA's headquarters are divided into specialist sections, as shown by the Research Department which specialises in political, economic, and military affairs. An area headquarters controls operations in Laos and Cambodia and another controls operations along the border with South Vietnam. The extensive CRA network operating in South Vietnam is controlled through a number of local centres, and is responsible for carrying out acts of sabotage and assassinations as well as espionage. Some CRA agents have as their main task the clandestine spreading of propaganda and the encouragement of disaffection.

Cover Organisations and Auxiliaries

The intelligence services of the Soviet Union and other Communist countries have for a long time been notorious for making use of state controlled bodies operating abroad such as trade and cultural missions, and information bureaux for the purpose of mounting espionage operations. Prior to the war for instance, the Soviet permanent trade missions in Berlin, London and New York were all in turn discovered to be acting as cover for extensive intelligence networks. Since 1945 a whole host of seemingly innocuous Communist missions and organisations have been involved in espionage cases of one type or another.

Agents of the KGB or GRU often hold positions on the staff of

Soviet ministries and government departments, both at home and abroad. In particular in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Culture, Soviet Export Film, Soviet Import Film, and such institutions as the Lumumba University, the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church, The Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship with Foreign Countries, The All-Union International Book Association, and the agency providing domestic and administrative staff for foreign embassies in Moscow. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Foreign Trade each have their own separate intelligence departments. Members of the KGB and GRU are often to be found holding important posts in the foreign relations sections of other ministries.

In 1953, the West German intelligence service arrested over 30 East German agents. These had been operating under the cover of an organisation that had been set up in Berlin allegedly to study opportunities for East-West trade. This organisation which took the form of an economic research institute had subsequently established a branch in Frankfurt-on-Main headed by a leading official of the East German Ministry of Trade. An associated but supposedly private-enterprise trading company *Ost-West Handelsgesellschaft* being set up at the same time. It subsequently transpired that the main rôle of the network which had operated under this cover was to gather information about West German re-armament.

Other organisations from the Soviet bloc countries concerned to a greater or lesser degree in providing cover for espionage networks in West Germany have been: the Polish News Agency, PAP, the Polish Orbis Travel Agency, the Polish Air Line, LOT, and the Hungarian, Rumanian and Bulgarian Trade missions in Frankfurt-on-Main.

The diplomatic immunity enjoyed by TASS correspondents makes the Soviet news agency a particularly valuable cover for intelligence operations, and TASS correspondents have figured in a number of sensational cases, notably in Australia, Denmark and Sweden. The use made by Soviet intelligence of TASS, however, would not seem to be on anything like such a large scale as the use made by Communist Chinese Intelligence Service of the New China News Agency, which has been involved in cases of espionage and attempted subversion in countries as far apart as West Germany, Central Africa and Brazil. A defector from the Chinese embassy in Burundi has stated that the NCNA comprises the spear head of the Peking Government's drive to subvert the African and Latin American countries.

Evidence of the use of Soviet Economic Missions for intelligence work has come from Aleksandr Kaznacheev who defected from the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon in 1959. He has stated that a special 'economic intelligence group' controlled by the KGB operated in Burma during his period of service at the Embassy (1957-59) under the cover of the Soviet Trade Mission. According to Kaznacheev the main rôle of the economic intelligence group was "penetration and subversion of the

Burmese economic government offices".¹ A subsidiary rôle of the group was to obtain information about foreign firms and persons active in business circles in Burma. Kaznacheev observed:

"Undoubtedly the group also concentrated in its hands all the most important economic information on Burma which provided the basis for the Soviet Government's long-range economic planning. Definitely, the economic intelligence people did not neglect Burmese politics either but recruited agents and gathered political information whenever the opportunity presented itself."²

Other Soviet missions in Burma were also used for intelligence purposes. Kaznacheev stated that:

"It was often impossible to draw a line dividing the official functions assigned to an agency from its unofficial intelligence operations."³

One agency particularly active in the field of political intelligence operations was the Cultural Commission, headed by the cultural attache and directed from Moscow by the then Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, leading members of the staff of this Commission were also members of the KGB. Its official cultural task provided an excellent opportunity for contact with all types of Burmese organisations and influential intellectual circles. The Commission's offices located in a quiet road close to a Buddhist Monastery "served as a convenient meeting place for various Soviet agents and informers".⁴ Another body providing cover for KGB agents was the Burmese Branch of Soviet Film Export, a subsidiary of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade.

The question of the exact number of intelligence officers included in each mission going or stationed abroad is decided by representatives of the KGB, the GRU and of the Central Committee of the CPSU. In cases where it is not possible for one reason or another to insert regular intelligence officers into the ranks of a mission one or more members of it will probably be co-opted into the temporary service of the KGB or GRU for the period of its visit or tour of duty. All Soviet delegations visiting foreign countries however small or unpolitical in character include at least one regular or co-opted member of the KGB or GRU.

One additional facet of Communist bloc intelligence is the large scale use of trawlers and occasional use of submarines, principally by the Soviet Union to keep a watch on the naval units and coasts of NATO countries and those of other non-Communist countries. An article in the *Sunday Telegraph* of 18 December, 1963, revealed that about 30 per cent of the RAF's coastal command Shackleton anti-submarine aircraft were employed upon keeping track of the movements of increasing numbers of Soviet trawlers equipped with extensive radar

¹Aleksandr Kaznacheev. *Inside a Soviet Embassy*, Robert Hale, 1963, p. 135.

²*Ibid.*

³Aleksandr Kaznacheev. *Inside a Soviet Embassy*. Robert Hale, London, 1963, p. 73.

⁴*Ibid.* p. 73.

and other electronic equipment engaged upon continuous patrols off various parts of the British coast, particularly in the vicinity of naval experimental stations. The same paper on 21 February, 1965, stated that in addition to trawlers, Soviet submarines were now maintaining a permanent watch on the joint Naval-RAF anti-submarine tactical training school at Londonderry, Northern Ireland, and that a combined force of Soviet minesweepers and trawlers were engaged upon constant patrols of the Firth of Forth where there is a mine clearing experimental establishment. Soviet trawlers in the Atlantic have also been used as relay stations for the transmission of messages from Soviet and satellite agents operating in America.

The trawlers employed on this duty have been specially fitted out to enable them to spend long periods continuously at sea. A high ranking Royal Navy spokesman has been quoted as saying that in one case a Soviet trawler remained on patrol off an American Naval base on the Atlantic coast for a period of six months without a break. It is thought that in some cases the electronic equipment with which the trawlers are equipped is intended not only for observation and monitoring and communication purposes but also for interfering with early warning missile systems.

Training of Agents

There are probably between 15 and 30 special schools for the training of intelligence agents in the Soviet Union. In the case of the KGB, trainee agents commence their period of instruction at special physical training schools at which they undergo a tough course intended to bring them up to the highest possible state of physical fitness, and which includes instruction in unarmed combat, the use of firearms and in driving various types of motor vehicles. The course the trainee then takes will depend upon the rôle allotted to each individual by the training division of the KGB headquarter's first directorate. Those trainees selected for training to fill the higher posts in intelligence networks abroad receiving "advance training" and those selected for technical and administrative or less important jobs receive "intermediate training".

All trainees, however, have to undergo basic courses apart from specialised training. These are a language course, a general course in espionage techniques, a course of political indoctrination and in the methods of subversion and the techniques of revolution.

Trainees whom it is intended to employ as agents in one particular country are then sent to a special school in which training is devoted to teaching them as much as possible about every aspect of life in that country.

According to the testimony of a Swedish army officer who visited the Soviet Union on an official visit, and was, presumably as the result of some unexplained mistake on the part of his hosts, taken round an intelligence training centre, such schools include special mock-ups of

typical villages and sections of towns of non-Communist countries. Each potential agent has to go through a course during which he lives in these replica towns or villages and in which every detail of the day to day life in the country to which he is to be sent has been faithfully copied. Often defectors from the particular non-Communist country concerned are used to play the part of 'local inhabitants', shopkeepers, and barmen, etc. Trainees are expected to pick up all the manners and customs of the country to which they are to be sent whilst on these courses, and are not passed out until their behaviour and manner is devoid of any characteristics that might betray them once they are in the field. Those who have been selected to specialise not on one country but on a particular subject such as economic or technical intelligence, are then sent to a school specialising in that subject. Future radio operators and code experts are sent to schools where instruction is given in those subjects only.

Potential KGB agents are selected for training in the first place by local political commissars in youth organisations and workers' organisations who are encouraged to keep their eyes open for suitable recruits. If the record of the person they recommend is considered satisfactory he is then unknowingly kept under observation for a month by a KGB agent. At the end of this period the agent submits a report to his superiors which determines whether the candidate is to be seriously considered for intelligence training. If the report is a negative one the subject will be dropped without ever being told that he had been considered for the KGB. If the report is in the subject's favour he will be called before a special board.

At his interview before this board he will be told that he has been selected for work in one of the KGB's departments, but he is not yet told that he has in fact been selected as a potential spy. Failure to show enthusiasm at being drafted into KGB service will not only result in instant rejection but will have the most serious effects on the person's attempts to enter upon any other sort of career.

The majority of trainee agents are recruited from amongst university students, students at military academies, training schools for non-commissioned officers, technical schools, night schools, and other educational institutions who have specialised in wireless or photography.

After a recruit to one of the KGB's foreign sections has completed his period of training he is appointed as a probationer to a security police unit in the Soviet Union. There his work will probably include maintaining observation of foreign diplomatic personnel or possibly acting as an Intourist guide. His probationary period may also include some time spent in the frontier service. After completing his probation and before leaving for his first assignment abroad he will have to appear before another board. At this interview he is asked to sign an oath to observe the terms of his service after these have been read to him.

Training of GRU agents is carried out mainly at the Military Diplomatic Academy, but there is also a special school for 'illegals' and an intelligence school for junior officers. Members of the armed forces

selected for training as agents and intelligence officers also undergo courses at the Military Institute of Foreign Languages and the Institute of Communications. In addition the 5th Directorate of the GRU, the Directorate in charge of Terror and Sabotage maintains a special school, at which, according to the late Colonel Oleg Penkovsky who held an important post in the GRU, "about 200 inveterate cut-throats" undergo periodic training.

The intelligence services of the East European states sometimes send personnel to the Soviet Union for special training but they also maintain their own training schools. One such school is that of the East German Intelligence service located on the outskirts of Berlin and known as 'The School of Administration'. Courses for trainee agents last a year and are divided into two parts, theoretical and practical. The first six months of the course consist of political indoctrination, the study of foreign countries, dialectical materialism and lectures on the history of the CPSU, the class structure of foreign countries and the strength of their respective Communist Parties.

The second part of this East German intelligence course is devoted to practical subjects such as the use of secret microphones and other audio surveillance equipment and such subjects as lock picking and key copying. There are also lectures on etiquette, literature, architecture and religion. The object of these is to enable the agents to move and talk freely amongst any strata of society. During the course the students receive regular English lessons, instruction in military tactics, the use of firearms, unarmed combat, driving, and photography.

Not all Communist agents operating abroad are the products of such intelligence schools as those mentioned above. Some of them start by being members of diplomatic or commercial services and gradually become drawn into intelligence work. Such was the case with Aleksandr Kaznacheev, who was trained for the diplomatic service at the Moscow Institute of International Relations and only recruited as a KGB agent whilst on leave from the Embassy in Burma. An interesting sketch of the background and training given to this type of agent co-opted into intelligence work is provided by a letter sent from the Moscow KGB Centre to the Director of the KGB network in Australia in 1952, regarding a new agent who was being sent to him:

"Nicolai Grigorievich Kovaliev has departed for No. 1 (a code reference, probably standing for Australia or Canberra) to you to work in the capacity of commercial attache, recruited before departure to our work under the code name Grigoriev.

"Kovaliev has a higher education, knows the English language. He has had experience of work abroad, and in 1949-51 he worked as senior economist in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade in Denmark, and is described favourably.

"He entered into collaboration with us willingly, declaring that he would be very glad and satisfied if he could render us assistance.

"Kovaliev was thoroughly instructed as regards studying foreigners and acquisition of information of interest to the Soviet

intelligence, as regards the observance of secrecy in work, and also as regards the conduct of Soviet citizens abroad.

"In view of the fact that Kovaliev has had no experience of intelligence work, it is essential that you should hold discussions with him for the purpose of teaching him ways and means of conducting intelligence work and that you should render him timely assistance in the purposeful study of the acquired contacts.

"In three months time after the arrival of Kovaliev in the country, we request you to send us information as to how he is engaging in our work."¹

Other Soviet citizens are co-opted into intelligence work or given temporary assignments through the special Commission on Foreign Travel, before boards of which all persons wishing to go abroad either to take up official positions or for holiday purposes have to appear. All members of the commission are members of the KGB.

On occasion it seems that it is the policy of Communist bloc intelligence services to attempt to flood a particular target country with a very large number of 'low grade' agents whether recruited in Communist countries or locally. Such agents receive little or no training and are not highly regarded by the trained officers and agents of the KGB who are in the habit of referring to them as *shavki*, the name given in Russia to small stray mongrel dogs which sniff about and pick up anything they find. The main purpose in employing such agents would be to confuse opposing security services, and to weigh them down by forcing them to investigate a large number of minor cases of espionage so that they have less time to concentrate upon really important tasks.

Operating Techniques

It was stated earlier in this chapter that the Soviet Intelligence Services operate in foreign countries through two parallel systems, one directed by the KGB and one by the GRU. Each system is directed by a senior agent or intelligence officer who is known as 'The Resident' and who is in constant contact with the Moscow centre and the appropriate foreign operating centre.

These two parallel systems are further broken down into 'legal' and 'illegal' networks. These two words used in this context have none of their usual meaning. The Resident in charge of a so-called 'legal network' will invariably hold an official position on the staff of a Soviet Embassy or Soviet mission and so have diplomatic immunity; a position that will probably also apply to several of his leading agents. Residents and agents of 'illegal networks' on the other hand will not hold official positions nor probably openly state either their country of origin or Communist sympathies, but will operate from some inconspicuous 'cover' position, ostensibly following a normal occupation in the country in which they operate.

The Residents presiding over 'legal' GRU networks have often been Soviet military attaches. It was through the defection of Igor Gouzenko,

¹*Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage*. Sydney, 1955, pp. 207-208.

a cipher clerk in the Soviet Embassy of Ottawa, in 1945, that the world learnt of the extensive GRU network that had been established in Canada, the Resident in charge of which was the Soviet military attache, Colonel Zabotin. Since that date a number of Soviet military attaches in various countries have been declared *personae non grata* after it has been discovered that they have been directing or taking part in espionage activities.

At the same time as Colonel Zabotin was acting as Resident of the GRU network in Canada, the Second Secretary at the Soviet Embassy was acting as Resident in charge of the 'legal' KGB network. It is an illustration of the strict isolation in which the Soviet military and political intelligence services work, despite the fact that the head of the political intelligence service in Canada was a colleague at the embassy, it was necessary for Zabotin to send a message to the Moscow Centre enquiring whether an Englishman working in Canada whom he was considering recruiting as an agent had in fact already been approached by 'the neighbour'. The neighbour being a code name for the KGB network working under the Second Secretary.

Altogether 16 members of the staff of the Ottawa Embassy were shown to be involved in espionage networks of either the KGB or GRU. These included the military attache, two assistant military attaches, the First and Second Secretaries, the Commercial Counsellor and his assistant, the TASS correspondent in Ottawa, an interpreter, two door guards, two clerks, a chauffeur, and two members of the staff of the military attache's office. The wife of Major Sokolov, a member of the staff of the Commercial Attache, was also involved in espionage activities.

In 1959 it was estimated that more than two thirds of the 36 diplomats and technicians comprising the staff of the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon were members of one or other of the Soviet intelligence services. The average proportion of KGB officers to the remainder of an embassy staff is usually two out of five, the normal proportion of GRU officers being one out of five. It is probable that in most embassies 60 per cent of the staff are in the full or part time service of one or other of the two intelligence services. In consulates the proportion is believed to be often even higher, in their case quite frequently all members of the staff hold intelligence posts, principally in the KGB.

In virtually all the major spy cases that have occurred in Britain since the end of the Second World War evidence has been unveiled implicating various members of the staff of the Soviet Embassy in London as having played a major part. To take two of the recent of these cases, first contact between the Soviet intelligence services and the Admiralty civil servant, Harry Houghton, working at the highly secret underwater experimental establishment at Portland who was arrested on espionage charges in 1960, was proved to have been made by Nikolai B. Korovin, an experienced intelligence officer who had previously served in America and who then occupied the position of First Councillor at the Soviet Embassy in London. Korovin was also the original controller of the Admiralty clerk, John Vassal, arrested two

years later. Vassal's controller for the latter part of his activities being another member of the embassy staff, Nikolai Karpekov, who then held the position of First Secretary.

In the United States too, a whole series of Soviet or Eastern European 'diplomats' have been requested to leave the country after their part in espionage activities had been discovered. In July 1966 the Federal Bureau of Investigation accused Major-General Sergei Edemski, Soviet Military Attache in Washington until 1962 and subsequently Military Attache at the Soviet Embassy in London, of having, whilst he was in Washington, paid, together with another member of the embassy staff, £1,900 to a US Colonel working in the office of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in return for information.

In addition to the evidence provided by Gouzenko much valuable information regarding the detailed workings of Soviet embassies as centres for intelligence activities has been provided by the defection of other former members of KGB networks. One of these was Vladimir Mikhailovitch Petrov, Resident in charge of the KGB network in Australia, and a Lieutenant-Colonel in that service, holding the cover position of Third Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Sydney who defected in 1954; and the other Aleksandr Kaznacheev a member of the staff of the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon who was co-opted into KGB work and who defected in 1959 as previously mentioned.

The Resident of a 'legal' network operating from an embassy directs operations and maintains communications with the Centre from the *Refentura* section of the embassy. The layout of this section of the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon has been described by Aleksandr Kaznacheev. In that embassy the *Refentura* section was divided into three sub-sections which occupied the complete second floor of the Chancellory. The outer sub-section consisted of three small rooms for the use of embassy staff employed upon drafting or studying confidential documents. Then came a section allotted for the use of intelligence officers with cover positions on the embassy or mission staffs, the Ambassador, and the officials in charge of the various specialist missions. Finally came a sub-section in which secret documents were filed, and where messages were encoded and decoded. Three persons only worked in this section on a regular basis. Of these one worked on behalf of the intelligence services, one on behalf of the cultural mission and the SIB (Soviet Information Bureau attached to the embassy) and one on behalf of the economic and trade missions. Entrance to this section was barred to all other members of the embassy staff including the Ambassador except for the Residents of the intelligence networks and cipher experts. The *Refentura* included special rooms set apart for the use of the GRU Resident and his assistants.

The existence of similar intelligence bases have from time to time been reported by defectors from Eastern European embassies. Pawel Monat for instance described how during the mid-1950s the 'legal' Polish military network in the United States was directed by the military attache from the second and third floors of the annex to the Polish

Embassy in Washington. The whole of the third floor was reserved for the use of intelligence personnel, and an elaborate system of warning signals and alarms was installed to guard against intruders. Equipment on this floor included a short wave radio which although diplomatic regulations disallowed its use for transmitting in normal times was kept in reserve as an emergency means of communication with Warsaw from which transmissions were received two or three times a week.

It would seem that in some cases Soviet ambassadors are kept in ignorance of the extent to which their embassies are used as a base for intelligence operations, but in other cases ambassadors have themselves been known to have been former intelligence officers.

Residents keep in touch with their networks of agents through intermediaries known as 'cut-outs' who pass on orders to agents and transmit information obtained by them to the Resident. KGB networks consist of two or more cells normally made up of three or four agents, each one of whom has some specialist task. Contact between Residents and the Moscow Centre is by radio, cable, or microfilmed messages. In the case of communications between Residents in charge of legal networks and the Centre microfilmed letters and documents are often sent by the diplomatic bag.

Communication between the Centre and Petrov when he was Resident controlling the KGB network in Australia was maintained principally by this latter method. Instructions to Petrov being drafted at the Centre and then photographed on 35 mm film. The film was sent undeveloped in a special container amongst the routine diplomatic mail. The container was of a type that the courier could open easily in case of need and so fog the film to prevent the Centre's instructions falling into Western hands.

The packet containing the film bore special markings which indicated to the clerks who opened the diplomatic bag on arrival at the Canberra Embassy that it should be delivered straight to Petrov. The film was then developed and the instructions deciphered by Mrs. Petrov who acted as his secretary and cipher clerk, being herself a captain in the KGB. A similar system in reverse operated in relation to despatches from Petrov to the Centre.

A radio operator working for an 'illegal' network will in normal times probably make contact with the Centre on average twice a month. Nowadays an automatic keying device will often be attached to the set which reduces transmission time to a few minutes and so makes detection of the source of the transmission difficult. 'Illegal' networks also use microdot procedure as a means of communication. Communications between an illegal Resident and the Centre are also sometimes maintained through cells of intelligence agents working as members of the crews of Soviet merchant vessels. Most Soviet ships having cells consisting of three or four members of the KGB or GRU amongst the crew.

Headquarters of 'illegal' networks are when possible located in premises which are visited by many persons each day, so that the

comings and goings of agents are likely to pass unnoticed. Such premises include those used by doctors and dentists as surgeries, cafes, shops, photographic studios, and small offices, etc. Although 'legal' and 'illegal' networks normally operate entirely separately from each other, 'illegal' networks may sometimes operate under the general control of a 'legal' Resident and such Residents are not infrequently called upon to assist in setting up an 'illegal' network.

Amongst the many papers brought by Gouzenko from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa was a directive from the GRU Resident Colonel Zabotin to one of his Canadian agents instructing him to supply information on the following points in order to assist in the introduction of 'illegal' agents into Canada: Documents which an 'illegal' must possess; "more expedient methods to slip into the country"; "conditions of adaptation and living in the country", methods of providing "secure living quarters" and financial means during the period when the 'illegal' gets acquainted with the local conditions, and procedure for "joining a business firm as a partner . . . joining as a member of any office, joining the army as a volunteer", or "accepting employment".¹

Two attempts are known to have been made to set up 'illegal' networks in Australia, one being frustrated by Petrov's defection and another in 1959 came to nothing when Petrov's successor Skryprov attempted to recruit as an agent, a woman who was in fact a member of the Australian Security Service.

There is evidence that the Soviet Union has been stepping up training of agents intended to work in both KGB and GRU 'illegal' networks in recent years. The most elaborate steps are taken to provide such agents with convincing backgrounds before they are sent on missions. One of the most outstanding examples being the much publicised instance of Gordon Lonsdale who headed the network responsible for obtaining much valuable information from the Portland Naval base. Although in reality a Russian, he was provided by the Centre with the identity of a Canadian citizen, the son of a Canadian lumberman and his Russian wife. This son it is believed had died in Russia whilst still in his twenties.

A particularly well equipped base for an 'illegal' network was that found in the bungalow belonging to the two Krogers who played an important part in the Portland spy ring directed by Lonsdale. Situated in Ruislip, North London, it was found to contain a wireless transmitter, a radio receiver coupled to a tape recorder for receiving messages at fixed times from Moscow, a family Bible, used as a hiding place for photographic paper used for printing messages on microdots, a micro-dot reading instrument camouflaged as a tin of talcum powder. Various sums of money in British and American currency were hidden in the fibre glass insulation of the roof, in a specially constructed leather belt, and in decorative hangings. Articles of photographic equipment and equipment concerned with the coding and preparation of messages for

¹*The Report of the Royal Commission, Ottawa, 1946, p. 94.*

transmission were also found in specially constructed cigarette lighters, torches and a brandy flask. The high speed radio transmitter was found in a cavity beneath the kitchen floor underneath the refrigerator. Equipped with an automatic keying device it was capable of transmitting at a rate of more than 240 words per minute.

Morris Kroger and his wife were both born in the USA. He had been a member of the International Brigade in Spain and both of them had been engaged in the Soviet espionage network in the United States since soon after the war. They came to Britain in 1954 and carried on their espionage activities under cover of a second hand book business. It is a measure of the thoroughness with which the centre equips its agents with necessary documents that this couple who had travelled widely were found to be in possession of no less than seven forged passports, as well as two genuine Canadian ones.

During the late 1950's the GRU was actively engaged in work connected with setting up illegal networks in Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The task of establishing such networks in Spain has been made easier for both the GRU and the KGB by the fact that many Spanish Communists took refuge in the USSR at the end of the Spanish civil war and were subsequently willing to return to their homeland with faked identities to act as illegal agents.

In May 1965 evidence was produced before hearings of a Commission of enquiry in Canada to show that a Canadian Post Office Clerk had been recruited into a Soviet espionage network based on Ottawa. One of his allotted tasks had been to take notes of names and details on headstones in Vancouver cemeteries. It was thought that these were to be used to provide authentic material for use in forged passports and other documents for issue to illegal agents. He was also told to make enquiries about the possible purchase of various farms near the United States border. The probable intention being that these should be used as bases for an illegal network in America.

There would appear to be two basic reasons behind the Soviet system of operating both legal and illegal networks in the same country. The first is to guard against the possibility of a sudden worsening of the international situation which may cause a rupture of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the non-Communist country concerned ; involving the closing down of the Soviet Embassy and the departure of its staff including the legal Resident and probably a number of his leading agents. In such a case the existence of an illegal network not connected with the embassy will ensure that Soviet intelligence can continue to operate in the country concerned. The second reason is principally a security precaution, the existence of two separate networks making it so much the less likely that the whole intelligence system in a particular country will be penetrated and brought to a halt by the enemy's security service.

Security is, of course, also the reason for the strict segregation enforced between the parallel networks, legal and illegal, of the KGB and GRU which operate in the same country simultaneously, and for

that enforced separation even between different cells in the same network.

That this security system of parallel networks does, in fact, work in practice would seem to be borne out by the fact that although the defection of Gouzenko led to the uncovering of the GRU network in Canada, the Canadian authorities and Royal Commission who investigated the case were able to discover nothing about the parallel KGB network beyond the fact that such a network existed. Similarly although the defection of Petrov in Australia provided ample evidence of the activities of the KGB network in Australia the Royal Commission which investigated this case were forced to admit that in regard to the GRU network "We have been able to discover little more than the fact that a GRU 'Legal Apparatus' was functioning in Australia."¹

A third and perhaps not unimportant reason for the existence of the parallel network system is that it enables members of one network to be used to check up on the loyalty and reliability of members of another.

The approval of the Central Committee of the CPSU has to be obtained for the appointment of all Residents in charge of networks, whether those of the KGB or GRU. Once a year all residents are called to a meeting of the Central Committee at which they receive a special briefing.

The available evidence suggests that although Soviet control of East European intelligence services operating outside the Soviet bloc may be exercised more discreetly than over those within it, it is none the less as thorough. Pawel Monat, former Resident of the Polish military intelligence network in Washington, a post he held under the cover of that of the Polish military attache, has written:

"The Russians were never content just to sit and wait for the material I was gathering, after all they worked hard to keep us stirred up and were eager to co-ordinate and guide our efforts to their own ends. The Russians always wanted more details included in our reports than we would normally provide for our own headquarters."²

The same type of bureaucratic close control over intelligence networks operating abroad which is typical of the Soviet system is exercised by the headquarters of the individual Eastern European intelligence services. Monat has recorded that each year he received an 'agenda' in the form of a questionnaire from Warsaw. This totalled as much as 85 typewritten pages and required answers to dozens of questions ranging from the US forces to points concerning the ability and personal characteristics of political leaders.

Other Communist intelligence services operate the same two pronged system as does the Soviet Union, with both legal and illegal networks operating in the same country at the same time. They can display just as

¹*Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage*, Sydney, 1955, p. 70.

²Pawel Monat. *Spy in the US*, Frederick Muller, London, 1964.

much painstaking ingenuity in introducing an illegal into a country as can their Soviet counterparts.

In one instance the Polish military intelligence service, the 'Z2', decided to train and use as an illegal an employee of the Polish Ministry of Trade who had volunteered his services and who had been born in France and had a French wife. As a former member of the International Brigade he had also acquired a good knowledge of Spanish. An elaborate plan was devised under which it was decided to try and introduce him into Mexico with the object of making contacts with Mexican intellectuals with the ultimate aim of recruiting those he considered most suitable for espionage. First, however, he had to be given a new background and identity, and it was decided that he should assume the identity of a wealthy and somewhat eccentric scholar engaged upon research for a book on the subject of US-Mexican relations in the 19th Century. In order that there should be the least possible chance of suspicion it was decided to conceal his Eastern European origins and for him to act the part of a Frenchman.

All necessary papers to give credence to the agent's new identity were then forged by the technical branch of 'Z2', including a passport for both him and his wife, birth certificates, marriage licence. Although he had really been born the son of Polish working class parents living in Northern France he was given a new background and family history according to which his parents had been members of a wealthy family living in the South of France. The technical departments provided supporting items such as a photograph album containing pictures of this supposed family. These photographs were expertly faked by a montage process and the paper on which they were printed had been specially treated to give the appearance of age.

To give further support to this agent's story and supposed background and to make it easier for him to gain admittance to those intellectual circles amongst which it was intended he should work, it was decided that a pretence should be made that before his visit to Mexico he had been studying Aztec culture and had written a treatise on the subject. This treatise was actually written, not however by the 'Professor' as he became known to 'Z2' but by a panel of experts on the subject, who also briefed the 'Professor' on it. Faked newspaper cuttings were then produced which proclaimed the treatise to be a masterpiece in anthropology. Finally the 'Professor' had to read a large number of books on the Aztecs and Mexican history until he was indeed something of an expert on these subjects. These preparations occupied a period of two years.

All preparations completed the 'Professor' and his wife embarked on a Polish ship for the Middle East, but disembarked at Marseilles and for a few months then 'disappeared'. During this period he and his wife were, in fact, employed upon giving themselves an authentic and up to date French background. They then travelled by air to Mexico.

Once in Mexico the 'Professor' began work on his book. 'Z2' was of the opinion that many Mexican intellectuals were extremely anti-

American and so he made a point of allowing it to become known he was writing from a Mexican point of view and so his book would be bound to have a degree of anti-American bias. By this means he was able without much difficulty to sort out persons with anti-American feelings from amongst his contacts. Before he had completed his second year in Mexico the 'Professor' had 'on the hook' a young student with anti-American sentiments who was studying at the University of Mexico. He obtained the help of this student in the first place by hinting that he was working for French intelligence which was interested in knowing more about the United States in case relations between the two countries deteriorated. Ultimately the student obtained employment in the United States together with a 5,000 dollar "starter" fee from the 'Professor'. Later the Washington 'Z2' office took over this agent from the 'Professor'.

The 'Professor' himself made a number of trips to Texas to make contact with an aircraft factory worker from whom he obtained information, and he also used to visit Central America on recruiting missions. His 'cover' for these absences from Mexico were supposed visits to France to arrange for publication of his book. He actually wrote a few chapters of this book, but then announced that he was dropping it as he had decided to devote himself to studying Aztec law, a subject which gave him a plausible cover for widespread travels in Central America.

Recent activities by the intelligence services of Eastern Europe have included operations in both the United States and France. Members of the Czechoslovakian intelligence network operating in the USA it was revealed in 1966 figured in an ambitious plan to place a listening device inside the State Department in Washington. This plan was to be carried out with the co-operation of a State Department employee with whom two Czechoslovakian agents, one an attache at the embassy and the other a member of the Czechoslovakian mission to the United Nations had been in contact for some four years. The State Department employee had, however, been reporting their approaches to the FBI throughout this period and the plan came to nothing.

Both a Czechoslovakian and East German agents were uncovered as the result of investigations by the French security service during 1966. The East German agents, two married couples, were said to have been working with "disturbing efficiency" in Paris since 1964. One of the women involved was a secretary in the NATO Press Service and passed classified information to her husband, a NATO chauffeur, who in turn handed it to the other couple involved for forwarding to East German Intelligence headquarters in Pankow. This they did by means of wireless transmissions and through messages hidden in dolls.

CHAPTER VIII

“Not Just One Method”:

A Survey of the Tactics and Methods of Communist Bloc Intelligence Services

*The use of Communist Parties as a base for intelligence activities—
Recruitment of non-Communists—Types of information sought and
methods of obtaining information.*

THE three main activities of the intelligence services of the Communist bloc operating in non-Communist countries are: firstly, the recruitment of agents from amongst the citizens of the country in which they are operating in order to expand their networks and increase their activities; secondly, the obtaining of military, political and industrial information and thirdly, political operations or subversion designed to lead to the collapse of morale in existing non-Communist states. The methods used are wide ranging and Igor Gouzenko reported that: “They would not use just one method; they use a combination of all methods. They are always saying never to put all your aspirations and hopes on one method. Combine methods. They say that life is very complicated, so use everything possible”.

The use of Communist Parties

There is ample evidence to show that in the past some Communist Parties in non-Communist countries have provided an invaluable base and a substantial number of collaborators to assist the operations of the intelligence services of the Soviet Union and its allies, but there is also reason to believe that in more recent years such co-operation has become less common.

In the early days of Soviet intelligence in the 1920s and '30s, its agents were often heavily reliant on the help given them by local Communist Parties, not only as regards gathering information but also for technical services. It is known for instance that the Communist Party of the USA gladly supplied the services of photographers and radio experts to Soviet networks in the early inter-war years, and that in at least one instance a Party member acted as an interpreter for a Soviet agent. Party members also assisted by setting up seemingly genuine business concerns which were, in fact, a cover for espionage. One of these was the firm called ‘World Tourists’ established in New York in 1927 by

Jacob Gollos, an American Communist who acted as a contact man between the Party and Soviet intelligence.

The Canadian Royal Commission on the Gouzenko case found the Canadian Communist Party was in the habit of operating a secret cell system which had been used for espionage purposes as long ago as 1935. In France, Jean Cremet, a member of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party, was instrumental in establishing a networks of agents and informers which provided information on munition production and military installations all over France during the mid-1920s.

In Germany about half the Communist Party branch secretaries in Berlin were believed to be involved in the network operating under cover of the 'Handelsvertretung' the Soviet trade mission in Berlin in the early 1930s. In one network concentrating upon attempting to obtain information from the IG Farben chemical works, 24 members of the German Communist party were known to be involved.

To come nearer the present day, a high proportion of the British and American citizens concerned in providing Soviet intelligence with the details of work on the atomic bomb and other nuclear projects during the war and immediate post-war years were or had been members of Communist Parties. Perhaps the best known of them, Dr. Allan Nunn May, had joined the British Communist Party during the early 1930s. Klaus Fuchs had originally been a member of an underground Communist group in Germany made up of members of the professions, and on coming to London had established contact with the Soviet military attache. Of the Americans active in the field of atomic espionage, the two Rosenbergs, Harry Gold, David Greenglass and Clarence Hiskey were all old members of the Communist Party of the United States, whilst a network composed of secret members and groups of the same Party was organised in the Californian Radiation Laboratory, controlled by two officials of the Soviet Consulate.

The Canadian Royal Commission on espionage produced interesting evidence on the manner in which members of the Canadian Communist Party were gradually drawn into espionage work. Most of the Canadian citizens who took part in this work were members of secret cells or study groups, the mechanics and activities of which are described in detail in Chapter XI. These were used primarily as a means of recruiting persons into the Party who for one reason or another would have been unlikely to respond to a direct approach.

It appears that the organisers of these study groups, Party officials such as Sam Carr, its national organiser, compiled reports on the more promising members unknown to them. Some high ranking Party official acting as an intermediary between the Party and the Soviet military attache, Colonel Zabotin, would then suggest the names of selected group or cell members to him for possible use for espionage purposes. Colonel Zabotin would check with the Centre in Moscow to see if anything was known about the persons concerned and ask permission to

use them as agents if the Centre considered their record satisfactory or had nothing against them on its files.

A number of the members of the Canadian study groups and cells held responsible positions in government departments and institutions and a number of them had been sworn to the Official Secrets Act, however, the Royal Commission found that:

"The curriculum of the study groups was designed to develop in the student a critical attitude towards Western democratic society . . . The result of these courses over a period of time on some of the students was found to have weakened their natural loyalty towards Canada and to have created a new sense of loyalty first to 'Internationalism' and then to Communism as an international ideal. Gradually this loyalty to an international ideal was transferred by repeated submission to propaganda to acceptance of the fact that the international ideal was inseparably linked to the national policy of the Soviet Union. Once this state of mind had been reached it was but a simple step to convince the student that if he wished to serve the international ideal it was his duty to help further the policy of the Soviet Union by any means open to him regardless of any other consideration, and a suggestion to supply confidential information was almost always accepted."¹

The Australian Royal Commission on espionage found that although the Australian Communist Party had probably not been involved as a Party in the Soviet espionage network in Australia that:

"all the persons whose acts were directly or indirectly connected with espionage were either members of the Communist Party or ex-members or pretending ex-members or sympathisers with Communism".²

Despite these facts, however, it would seem that the Soviet bloc intelligence services have been making considerable efforts to reduce their dependence upon local Communist Parties as a source of agents and collaborators. Even by August 1945 for instance the Moscow Centre had sent a message to Colonel Zabolotin in Ottawa warning him against using a certain person as an agent because he was for various reasons considered unsuitable, "the more so because many already call him a Red".³

Petrov was the recipient of a message from the Centre in 1952 regarding an Australian Communist he was considering making use of:

"Taking into consideration the fact that Severianian is a prominent member of the Communist Party, he cannot be used in our work. Discontinue study of him."⁴

It would seem likely, however, that selected Communist Party members or sympathisers will continue to act as talent spotters and

¹*The Report of the Royal Commission*, Ottawa, 1946, pp. 72-73.

²*The Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage*, Sydney, 1955, p. 100.

³*The Report of the Royal Commission*, Ottawa, 1946, p. 507.

⁴*The Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage*, Sydney, 1955, p. 319.

contact men for Soviet bloc intelligence officers amongst the members of the extreme left wing circles in which they move. The reasons behind the reluctance of Soviet intelligence to use Communist Party members as actual agents when other alternative contacts exist is, of course, obvious. The detection of a member of a Communist Party in a non-Communist country as a Soviet agent would do little to enhance that Party's reputation and might well lead to its proscription. Equally known members of Communist Parties may well already be under some form of surveillance—if not actually planted—by the security services and their presence in a network consequently constitutes a serious danger to it.

The Chinese intelligence services are not yet thought to have begun to operate on an extensive scale in Europe or North America. If and when they do it would seem obvious that for ethnical reasons alone they will need to recruit large numbers of agents of European or North American origin. In attempting to do so it would not be surprising were they to try and make use of the pro-Chinese wings or splinter groups of local Communist Parties which have sprung up in recent years. This they already seem to be doing to some extent in areas to which their activities have already extended on a substantial scale. In May 1964, for instance, the Government of Brazil published a letter that had been intercepted containing instructions from a Chinese agent in Berne to agents in Brazil, the letter read in part:

"In our common struggle and fundamental work, the most important tasks are to hold our real comrades in Brazil and keep close contact with the genuine (or pro-Chinese) Communist Party in Brazil".

It then referred to three Brazilians, and said:

"The three are important people because they can help promote Brazil's revolution, they do not raise any particular terms or demands but are willing to obey our orders. Because of their contributions to our task, we have made suggestions to our organisation to take them to our country to receive training in basic knowledge and technique to become intelligence agents".¹

Recruitment Methods

The means used by Communist bloc intelligence services to recruit or entrap non-Communist citizens of countries outside the bloc into their service are so many and varied that it is impossible to do anything more than to give a general account of some of the more common tactics used in this never ceasing activity.

Recruitment or entrapment is usually accomplished only after a prolonged study of the potential recruit—or "prospect" to use the term of the KGB by an experienced agent or agents. This period of study may continue over several years before any approach is made to the

¹*Free China Weekly*, 17 May, 1964.

"prospect" to engage in acts of espionage. All the time, however, information about every aspect of his life and past record, together with his views on politics and current affairs, are being carefully noted and relevant information filed for future use not only in the records of the Resident of the network concerned with attempting to recruit him but also in the index in Moscow.

Persons made the object of such study are chiefly those whose work or position gives them access to information of importance either of a military or political nature; or whose position gives them ready access to other persons possessing such information. Persons whose occupation gives them a particular priority as targets include: civil servants, members of armed forces, workers in armament and technical industries, scientists, diplomats, politicians and journalists.

Considerable information has come to light regarding the procedure used in the study of "prospects" and of the type of information collected about them. An agent of Colonel Zabotin's GRU network in Canada for instance was given the following advice on how to commence his "study" of two senior civil servants:

"both the first as well as the second, work in responsible positions, consequently they gave their signatures not to divulge military secrets. Therefore the character of the work must be the usual one—a personal touch in conversations on various subjects, beginning with oneself, one's own biography, work and daily life, at times asking them, as if for comparison of this or that situation, etc."¹

This agent was also provided with a list of points about which he should try and obtain information regarding the two men. These included: their prospect of remaining in the service, their relations with their immediate superiors, details about their parents and family conditions, their education and financial position, their attitude towards the Soviet Union and its policies, and plans of "establishing material security for their families including intentions to engage in business, to own a car, a home of his own and what hinders the fulfillment of this plan."²

Under the heading of "personal positive and negative sides", the following points were listed as requiring elucidation. Did either have an inclination to drink and were they good family men? Were they "lovers of good times" or did they have an "inclination for solitude and quietness"? What influence did the wife of each have on his actions and was he independent in making decisions?³

Petrov received a large number of directives from the Moscow Centre to study certain Australians with a view to using them for espionage purposes. Contact was sometimes made with the persons selected for study by asking them to receptions at the Soviet Embassy in Canberra with a view to enabling the Resident or one of his assistants to sound

¹*The Report of the Royal Commission*, Ottawa, 1955, p. 105.

²*Ibid.*, p. 50.

³*The Report of the Royal Commission*, Ottawa, 1955, p. 51.

them out tactfully on their views and general outlook so as to ascertain if they might be of possible use. Another approach was used by offering to give Russian language lessons to a government official or his wife or members of his family. On other occasions Petrov or one of his assistants would attend social parties outside the Embassy or perhaps join some shooting or fishing expedition in order to get closer acquainted with some person who quite without their knowledge had been selected for study.

Part of Petrov's duties included supplying the Centre with all available lists of members of the staff of Australian government departments. These lists were then perused at the Centre to see if they contained the names of any persons who according to the records in its possession might be of use. He was also supposed to try and make enquiries to ascertain the reasons for any change of personnel in a government department, in the hope that such enquiries might bring to light some disgruntled government employee who having been demoted or transferred from one department to another might be willing to supply information.

Members of the Soviet Embassy staff in Canberra who in addition to their normal duties acted as part time assistants to Petrov were used to undertake a study of persons in particular occupations as appropriate. For example, the TASS representative was normally used to make contact with journalists, a KGB agent whose cover position was that of a commercial attache was used to study persons in business circles and an agent with a diplomatic cover would be used to approach persons in diplomatic or political circles. To assist him in his task of finding Australians who seemed worth studying, Petrov made use of "talent spotters" such as Walter Clayton, a leading member of the Australian Communist Party. There would seem no doubt that at a much later date Captain Ivanov made use of Stephen Ward in London, either with his knowledge or under the pretext of friendship to effect introductions to British personalities of interest from an intelligence point of view. On occasion a KGB or GRU officer, expert in spotting likely agent material, may be loaned to a Resident in a particular country from the Centre for the purpose of helping to establish or extend a network. KGB and GRU officers travelling as members of delegations visiting foreign countries also act as spotters, reporting suitable contacts to the local Resident.

In some cases a long period of study may elapse before the agent feels that the psychological moment has come to make the first approach to the person concerned for the purpose of obtaining information. One such case concerned an electronics engineer working at a British aircraft factory engaged upon government work, and the Czechoslovakian military attaché Colonel Pribyn. In 1955 this engineer, Brian Frederick, was introduced to Colonel Pribyn at a party. Colonel Pribyn invited him to a concert and subsequently struck up a close friendship with both Frederick and his wife. This friendship continued for two years without Colonel Pribyn ever trying to attempt to obtain information from

Frederick about his work, despite the fact that the Colonel headed the Czechoslovakian military intelligence network in Britain and had clearly made contact with Frederick for the purpose of getting him to agree to supply information when the time seemed ripe. In Colonel Pribyn's opinion this time evidently came in April 1957. It was then that Mrs. Frederick left her husband and Frederick was faced with the prospect of having to pay her an allowance in addition to settling debts incurred over the purchase of a new house. His attentive friend the colonel was at once at hand the moment these financial difficulties began to present themselves to suggest that Frederick should ease them by selling him plans and documents concerning secret work upon which the factory in which he was employed was engaged. Frederick agreed to this proposition.

That the greatest care must always be taken in the method of approach to a "prospect" and in handling a newly recruited agent was emphasised in the course of a lecture given during the early 1960s to students at the Moscow Military Diplomatic Academy, the principal training school of the GRU. The lecturer was Lieutenant-Colonel Ivan E. Prikhodko, an experienced GRU officer who between 1952 and 1955 was a member of the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations in New York. His subject was 'Characteristics of Agent Communications and Agent Handling in the USA'. Discussing methods of recruiting and handling American citizens he pointed out that:

"Americans, just as other people, are patriots of their country. They are proud of their achievements; they like their national heroes and value their cultural monuments. Therefore, the intelligence officer must not indiscriminately criticise everything American, but must remember that an unfortunate statement, for example about the person of some popular US President (George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Thomas Jefferson) might offend the agent. A negative result might also come from an officer underrating American culture . . . He must not assign tasks rudely but must skilfully direct the agent's work and praise his intelligent initiative. He must not give orders to the agent. An officious tone of voice on the part of the officer will only serve to antagonise the agent.

"An officer, especially a beginner who does not know English too well, must be very careful of what he says and not use such unfortunate expressions as: 'I order. You must, etc.' As a rule such expressions evoke a negative reaction."

In some cases during the period when a 'prospect' is under study, he is persuaded to accept small gifts. The aim of this being not so much bribery or reward as an attempt to break down his morale, the whole process of "study" being in the words of the Australian Royal Commission on Espionage's report: "a species of slow seduction".

The usual procedure would seem to be that after the "prospect" has

¹Lieutenant-Colonel Prikhodko, 'Characteristics of Agent Communications and of Agent Handling in the USA', Appendix I, *The Penkovsky Papers*, Collins, London, 1965, pp. 330.

been under observation for some time he will be asked to carry out some small task by way of a favour which although of little practical importance in itself is sufficiently of an "illegal" nature as to compromise him. If he agrees to carry out such a task he is from then on what Mrs. Petrov described as: "on the small hook" and will be cautiously developed under the direction of the Resident in charge of the particular network which has made contact with him until it is felt that a stage has been reached at which his reliability can be guaranteed.

In the case of the Canadian GRU network "prospects" who had been developed to a satisfactory degree were often indicated in Colonel Zabotin's records by the Russian word "Nash" meaning "ours", or "he is ours".

It would appear that even the most innocent contacts between citizens of non-Communist countries and the representatives of Communist states can sometimes result in the names of the former being placed on the Centre's records as being worthwhile subjects for study. The papers Petrov brought with him at the time of his defection for instance revealed that the name of one Australian MP with a distinguished and most patriotic record had been placed on these files. The Centre describing him to Petrov as being "of unquestionable interest to us", for no other reason than that the MP concerned had happened to learn a little Russian whilst a prisoner of war and at a Soviet Embassy reception had spoken a few words of thanks in that language to a member of the staff; a fact which had apparently been carefully noted.

A particular target for attempted recruitment by Soviet bloc intelligence services in addition to persons in government service or engaged upon scientific research work would appear to be journalists, particularly parliamentary or lobby correspondents. The fact that such correspondents are constantly in touch with Members of Parliament and Ministers and that they often receive off the record or background information obviously makes them a particularly valuable potential source of information. A more sinister reason being that such correspondents are also sometimes in possession of "interesting" information about the private lives of political personalities which could be used for the purposes of blackmail. An illustration of the importance given to activity amongst journalists in Soviet intelligence circles is provided by the fact that no less than three successive TASS representatives in Australia were all also active KGB agents.

Petrov received instructions from the Centre which strongly emphasised the importance of the "study and recruitment of persons" . . . "occupying leading posts in political parties and organisations capable of supplying us with valuable information", and also of the importance of selecting suitable Members of Parliament for study. Another category of persons to whom particular attention was paid as being a possible source of recruitment were those engaged in trade with the Soviet Union. In one case Petrov was informed that a Russian-born Australian member of a Melbourne trading firm had been recruited as an agent by the KGB at the Leningrad Fur Auctions. The

uses to which such persons might be put obviously extend not only to the supply of information but also to providing a respectable commercial cover for the transmission of funds for a variety of purposes including the establishment of "illegal" espionage networks.

Three other groups of persons who have been given special attention as a source of agent recruitment are members of delegations visiting Communist bloc countries, particularly those attending festivals and conferences organised by the international fronts, members of the staff of the Embassies and consulates and other missions of non-Communist countries serving within the Communist bloc, and refugees from Communist countries.

Amongst a party of Australians who attended an 'International Conference for the Protection of Children' organised by the Women's International Democratic Federation and held in Vienna were a certain Mr. Les Flood, a member of the Australian Communist Party, and a Mrs. Dorothy Lewis, a member of the Australian-Soviet Friendship Society. After the conference ended these two delegates took advantage of the offer habitually made to many of those who attend such events for a free tour of the Soviet Union and later went on to visit China.

A letter subsequently sent to Petrov by the Centre proved clearly that these two persons had been under careful observation, the aim of which was to ascertain their possible suitability as agents during their stay in the USSR. The letter read in part:

"As enclosure No. 1 we send you particulars concerning two members of the Australian delegation which was in Russia for the First of May festivities—Flood and Lewis. Both of them, in our opinion, could be used for the fulfillment of tasks which are provided for in the plan of work of the Australian KGB section. Instruct Antonov to make acquaintance of Flood and Lewis for the purpose of using them along our lines. Inform us the results."¹

A yet more striking example of the manner in which delegates to international front conferences have been kept under close surveillance by the Soviet Intelligence Service on the look out for possible recruits is provided by the case of three young members of the 'Eureka Youth League' who attended a 'World Festival of Youth and Students for Peace' organised by the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students and held in East Berlin. The Centre despatched a report on these three to Petrov which contained details of their school and political careers, mentioning them by code names. About one the report read:

"Cook understands the Russian language well, but speaks it with difficulty. In all he creates a favourable impression. He likes music, knows many Russian youth songs, and shows great interest in Russian literature. Cook at all times spoke sincerely and well of everything he saw in Russia, and he assisted the other members of the delegation to understand correctly the reality of life in Russia.

¹*Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage, Sydney, 1955, p. 80.*

Cook agreed to an exchange, not through the post, of information and literature between the Youth organisation of Russia and Australia and he gave several addresses at which a contact could be established with him. We request you to commission Pakhomov to establish cautiously an official contact with Cook for the purpose of using him for receiving enquiries in student circles of the universities in Sydney and Canberra".¹

Numerous attempts have been made to recruit agents from amongst members of the staff of embassies of non-Communist countries in the Communist bloc. The assiduous way in which attempts are conducted is illustrated by the record of Sigmund Mikhailski, a KGB agent responsible for making the initial contact with a view to recruitment of the Admiralty clerk Vassal in 1954. Mikhailski was supplied to the British Embassy through the Burobin Agency which is under the control of the Soviet Foreign Office to fill a vacancy in the administrative section of the Embassy. The report of the Tribunal set up to enquire into the Vassal case said of him and his activities:

"Mikhailski was evidently a man of insinuating and attractive manners. He was, or said he was, a Pole and in conversation with people at the Embassy he would indicate a lack of sympathy with the Soviet regime. He made himself very useful to several of them with small but appreciated services. There is no doubt that he quickly made a number of friends and before long was received as a guest at parties given by members of the Embassy staff and accompanied some of them when dining out at Moscow restaurants. The kind of services he performed, securing theatre and travel tickets, buying food in the market, made it natural that he should have free access to the flats of staff members, and once admitted, hospitality very easily followed".²

Mikhailski made a special point of befriending the homosexual Vassal and it was he who introduced Vassal to Soviet friends who were, in fact, officers of the KGB and who arranged for his compromise and subsequent entrapment into the services of Soviet intelligence.

It later transpired that Mikhailski had been involved earlier in a case in which a British Embassy wireless maintenance engineer had at his instigation taken part in black market offences and subsequently been approached by the KGB who tried to recruit him as an agent by blackmail. Mikhailski whilst at the British Embassy also involved a clerk to the air attache in black market deals. The KGB again immediately trying to use blackmail as a means of recruiting the clerk, who on reporting the matter to the British authorities supplied information that Mikhailski had tried to compromise another member of the staff in the same manner some time previously. Other members of the staff noticed that as well as being attentive to Vassal, Mikhailski appeared to be trying to strike up friendships with members of the embassy

¹*Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage*, Sydney, 1955, pp. 76-77.

²*Report of the Tribunal Appointed to Inquire into the Vassal Case and Related Matters*, Cmd 2009, 1963, para. 139, pp. 42-43.

staff in the military attache's office, the engineers department, and the wireless department. Subsequent enquiries showed that Mikhailski had been involved in attempts to recruit agents from amongst the staff of at least two other embassies in Moscow by means of homosexual compromise.

The fact that foreign embassies are not allowed to recruit local staff except through the Burobin Agency and have no means of checking references except through such other embassies as are prepared to co-operate with them, obviously simplifies the task of the KGB in attempting to place agents and contact men on embassy staffs.

Harry Houghton, whose activities as a member of the Portland base spy ring under the super spy Gordon Lonsdale was also recruited or entrapped into becoming a spy whilst a member of the staff of the British Embassy in Warsaw. Houghton, a former Petty Officer in the Royal Navy and Admiralty Clerk, was posted to Warsaw as a confidential clerk to the British naval attache. Given to heavy drinking and of a talkative nature he commenced to mix in somewhat dubious Polish circles. Before long, some of his new Polish friends approached him and asked him if he would be willing to supply penicillin and other medical supplies which were very hard to come by in Poland at that time, from the British Embassy's store. Under the impression that his contacts were a gang of black marketeers Houghton agreed to do so, only to find that his friends were, in fact, Polish intelligence officers who soon threatened to reveal his illicit activities unless he agreed to supply them with information. This he did until his addiction to drink led to his recall to Britain in disgrace.

Houghton was now entirely compromised and at the mercy of the Polish intelligence service who could force him into acting for them again whenever they wished by merely hinting at revealing his activities whilst in Poland. As soon as he was somewhat unaccountably posted to the highly secret underwater warfare experimental base at Portland as a civil servant he was approached by Polish agents including the Second Secretary of the Polish Embassy in London, who according to Houghton's own account used threats of violence as well as blackmail in order to get him to comply with their request. Hereafter, however, the case of Houghton provided interesting proof of the overriding position of the Soviet intelligence services over those of the European Communist states. Although it was the Polish network in Britain which first made contact with Houghton, as soon as the Moscow Centre became aware of the importance of the information he was in a position to supply, arrangements were made for him to be taken over by the Soviet network headed by Lonsdale, and the Polish intelligence services did not feature in the case again.

Further evidence concerning attempts to recruit members of Western diplomatic or other missions as agents whilst they were serving at posts within the Communist bloc was supplied by Colonel Penkovsky who wrote that part of his duties as a GRU officer holding a "cover position" in the foreign section of the State Committee for the

Co-Ordination of Scientific Research Work in Moscow consisted of making a study of members of British delegations visiting Moscow with a view to assessing their potentialities as sources of information. He was instructed to make a point of establishing friendly relations with delegation members and then to write reports on any of them he considered might eventually be recruited as agents to the Resident of the GRU network in Britain. Upon their return home the Resident would instruct one of his agents to begin "processing" the "prospects" that Penkovsky had indicated.

It has been estimated that there are at the present time over 11 million refugees from countries under Communist rule living in the non-Communist world, and it is not therefore surprising that the Communist bloc intelligence services have frequently attempted to recruit agents from amongst this enormous group of people. All kinds of pressure have been put on refugees in order to force them to take part in espionage activities. Frequently this has taken the form of intimating that their relations in their homelands will suffer if the refugees concerned do not agree to co-operate. One such case concerned Stanislaus Badjer, a former member of General Ander's war time Polish Army who after the war ended settled in England like many of his former comrades in arms. Badjer's wife and family, however, had been unable to leave Poland and in 1949 he was called on by two agents of the newly established intelligence service of Poland's Communist government who asked him to supply information about other Polish refugees in England. He was particularly well placed to give such information as he had obtained a position on the committee of an organisation dealing with the welfare of such refugees. Badjer was told that if he did not co-operate his wife and children would be sent to a labour camp, and in the face of this threat he agreed to supply the information requested until he was arrested and deported.

In the United States, a Rumanian holding an executive position in an oil company who had been forced to leave his two sons behind when he left that country was approached by the First Secretary of the Rumanian Embassy who attempted to strike a bargain with him under which if he agreed to supply information concerning American security arrangements his sons would be allowed to join him. However, he refused to enter into this projected bargain and reported the matter to the American authorities with the result that the Rumanian Embassy official was asked to leave the country. A recent report indicated that the Polish intelligence service has again been increasing its efforts to recruit agents from amongst the Polish refugee population in Britain. These attempts at recruitment are being made when Polish refugees, many of whom have acquired British citizenship, visit Poland. According to this report after many such Poles present their passports for registration at their hotel on arrival in Poland, they are, when reclaiming them, directed to a special room in the hotel which is, in fact, an office of the intelligence and security service. Such offices are said to exist in all large Polish hotels, and in them ex-refugee visitors to Poland are subjected to

a long interrogation by intelligence officers who often have in their possession substantial dossiers concerning the visitor's life and work in Britain. During the interrogation the visitor is asked to answer questions concerning his parentage, his occupation in Poland before the war and his activities during the war and the reasons why he left Poland. He is also asked to supply details regarding his place of residence and work in Britain, his contacts with exile organisations and the names and background of his friends.

Those who are technicians or who have a specialist knowledge of British industry are subjected to a particularly close interrogation, particular attention being paid to those whose work has any connection with the defence industry or military installations. In many cases the interrogation ends with the visitor being asked to act as an agent on his return to Britain. In other cases with him being asked to forward copies of technical publications and factory catalogues to addresses in Poland.

Indications are that the Polish intelligence service engaged upon this attempt to recruit agents amongst Poles visiting their homeland is acting on the direct orders of its Soviet advisers who insist on these efforts being made, despite the fact that they are thought to have caused some disquiet amongst Polish officials charged with encouraging the much needed tourist trade.

Information of all types regarding both the private and political pasts of refugees is utilised for the purposes of forcing them into acting as agents under threat that any past disreputable activities will be revealed to the authorities or employers in countries in which they now reside. Sometimes the fact that a refugee has been a member of the Communist Party in his native country or that he served the Communist regime in some capacity for a time before becoming disillusioned and seeking refuge abroad is used as a basis for such threats. Forged documents are often produced to intimidate defectors. This is particularly so in the case of refugees from East Germany who before the building of the Berlin Wall flocked to the West in large numbers.

Many of these refugees have received letters from the East German authorities, many recipients of such letters being former members of the East German police or armed forces. Sometimes they contain photostat copies of reports the refugee made on anti-Communist activities in East Germany whilst he was still a supporter of the regime and threats are made of the disclosure of these to the West German authorities unless co-operation is forthcoming. Typical of such letters was one reading as follows, addressed to a refugee who had recently defected from East German government service:

"We were astonished to hear of your sudden change of abode, but we are nevertheless interested in maintaining the connection with you, and under the present conditions as well. In the event that you are of a different mind, we have to point out that there are other offices in West Berlin too, interested in your previous reports

to us. To refresh your memory, we attach herewith a little sample. For the time being you can reach us at the following address".¹

Another East German refugee was told to report to an address in East Berlin at once otherwise the West German authorities would be told that he had once worked for and denounced several persons to the East German Ministry of State Security.

One refugee from the former Sudeten area of Czechoslovakia, Alfred Frenzel, went into politics in West Germany and became a leading Member of Parliament. For a number of years he served on the parliamentary committee responsible for West German defence and rearmament and was thus in possession of information of considerable military importance. Before the war he had at one time been a member of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party from which he had been expelled on a charge of embezzling funds. The Czechoslovakian intelligence service was aware of this fact and in the mid 1950s when he was already a member of Parliament made contact with him and threatened that unless he agreed to co-operate with them they would ruin his career by revealing his former Communist affiliations.

The fact that a refugee was in the past an active member of the Nazi party, and particularly of the SS or the Gestapo has also been used as an instrument for inducing him to agree to serve the Soviet bloc intelligence services. Large numbers of former members of these two organisations, some of whom had been responsible for war crimes and all of whom were subject to automatic arrest in the days of Allied Military Government, were recruited as agents by the Soviet and East German intelligence services. One such agent had been a former junior member of the foreign branch of the Nazi intelligence service. After the war he settled in West Germany although his home had originally been in the Soviet zone. Eventually he managed to obtain a job in the West German police and some time later was seconded to intelligence work and was promoted to a senior post. It subsequently transpired that he had been recruited as an agent by the Soviet intelligence service under threat of having details of his former services for the Third Reich revealed whilst he was on a visit to his former home in East Germany.

During 1952 when a substantial number of German prisoners of war still remained in Soviet camps, a survey was carried out amongst them by officers of the KGB on the look out for agents. Prisoners considered for recruitment into the Soviet intelligence service were selected from the following categories: prisoners convicted of war crimes, those with useful connections in West Germany or some other NATO country, former members of Nazi intelligence and counter-intelligence services and those who had informed against fellow prisoners. More than a hundred agents were recruited from amongst these prisoners as a result of this survey and further screening.

Not all refugees claiming sanctuary in the West with stories of

¹*East Berlin, Main Centre of Agitation and Sedition.*

persecution under Communist regimes have been quite what they seemed. In 1955 a sensational story appeared in the Press of many non-Communist countries concerning one Mikhail Boranov, who claimed to be a deserter from the Soviet Army and clandestinely crossed the Czechoslovakia-West German border before asking for political asylum. According to the story he told, he had defected from a Soviet Army unit stationed in the Soviet Union and had at great peril secretly made his way to the Czechoslovakian border on a journey which had lasted two months and during which he claimed to have sustained himself partly by eating wheat grains from growing crops. Doubts began to grow about his story, however, and under interrogation he finally admitted that the whole tale had been concocted by the Austro-German Section of the KGB. Boranov it turned out had been taken prisoner by the German army and after the war like all Soviet ex-prisoners who were returned to the Soviet Union had been sent to a labour camp for "re-education". He had agreed to become a KGB agent in order to secure his release from this camp and the operation involving his faked journey and escape had been planned for more than two years. The object of the operation had been to try and obtain information about NATO intelligence agencies involved in interrogating and screening refugees.

One further source of recruitment and information for the Communist bloc intelligence services has been discontented or avaricious members of the armed forces of NATO and other non-Communist countries. A Czechoslovakian controlled network centred upon Frankfurt-on-Main operated for some time concentrating upon the obtainment of information from members of the American armed forces in the vicinity. A number of women, including some prostitutes were involved in this network which operated from behind the cover of a photographic studio specialising in offering photographic tests to girls anxious to become film stars.

A United States air force clerk employed in the special investigation office of the US Air Force Templehof Base in West Berlin became progressively disgruntled about the conditions surrounding his working life and finally after his commanding officer had told him off for failing to shave he went out on a drinking bout. He then walked into East Berlin, and having contacted intelligence officers, he said that he wanted to defect. Probably because the American clerk, named Robert Thompson was considerably the worse for drink at the time he was sent back to West Berlin by the East Berlin authorities who told him that they did not think that he could be of use to them. However when some days later he was walking near the Templehof base, a car, one of the occupants of which was holding a revolver, pulled up beside him and he was pulled into it and taken to a small house on the outskirts of East Berlin where he had previously been interrogated. Here he was told that unless he agreed to work for Soviet intelligence the American authorities would be told of his previous attempted defection and informed that he was already acting as a Soviet agent.

For the last five months of 1957, Thompson who had succumbed to this threat provided photographic copies of documents including confidential and secret reports to his contacts in East Berlin, stating later that on average he had handed over between 50 and a 100 photographs every fortnight during this period. In January 1958 he was posted to the American Air Force base at Great Falls Montana, an event which according to Thompson's own account later caused his Russian controllers "to get shook up and excited". He was instructed to buy a short wave wireless set when he arrived in America and tune in to a special wave length at certain times and listen for the code words "Amour Lenin". He was also given a cigarette lighter decorated with four aces and told that a Soviet agent with an identical lighter would meet him in a town in Ontario on certain dates. Thompson once back in the USA, however, tried to drop his rôle as a spy and did not follow these instructions. He was traced later by Soviet agents in America and once more forced to co-operate with them under threat that his activities in Berlin would be revealed.

Undoubtedly one of the greatest successes achieved by the GRU in recruiting a serving officer of a non-Communist country as an agent concerned the Swedish Air Force officer Wennerström. He was first recruited in 1948 whilst serving as Air Attache in Moscow. From that date until his arrest in 1963 he provided the GRU with a spate of information not only regarding Swedish defence preparations but more importantly also those of Nato countries. This he found easy to obtain in his guise of Service Attache of a neutral country well disposed towards the West, particularly whilst serving in Washington.

It would seem that there has been a tendency over recent years on the part of Soviet bloc intelligence services to substantially increase the sums of money they are willing to pay locally recruited agents or contacts in return for information. Possibly this is a reflection of their attempts to make increasing use of persons with no definite feelings of ideological sympathy with them. For instance, although in general the various atom spies who supplied the Soviet Union with information of such value in the war and post war years such as Nun May and Claus Fuchs received only nominal "rewards" in one very recent case a British rocket expert and former intelligence officer admitted receiving around £5,000 during a period of four years in return for information ; whilst it was the lavish spending engaged in by both Houghton and Vassal, made possible by the sums they received in return for their services as agents, that first attracted the attention of the British Security Service. The ex-Polish Resident in Washington, Pawel Monat, has recorded that he always kept between \$4 or 5,000 in his safe, "as a special sinking fund for baiting our hooks".¹

Although in the great majority of cases persons are not recruited or persuaded to act as agents until they have been under study for a considerable period or have been subjected to close interrogation,

¹Pawel Monat. *Spy in the US*, Frederick Muller Ltd., London, 1964, p. 147.

incidents have occurred in which attempts have been made to recruit agents on a very much more casual basis. One method employed, notably in Germany, has been by the use of seemingly innocent advertisements inserted in the Press. In one instance a young waiter in West Germany answered an advertisement he saw in a West German newspaper. He received a reply from the 'Rukschamp Registry Office' in Berlin offering him a post in a seaside hotel in East Germany and asking him to come to Berlin for an interview, his expenses being paid by the agency. On arrival at the "agency" however, he was taken to meet officials of the East German intelligence service who immediately asked him to take part in espionage activities against military targets in West Germany.

In another similar case a journalist working in Bremen applied for a post in an East Berlin Press Agency, *Interpress* which he had seen advertised in a newspaper. When he presented himself for an interview he was asked to come back at a later date with a specimen article on the development of Bremen. He did so but instead of being offered the hoped for post was immediately asked to undertake espionage against the West German navy. One case was reported in Britain in which an intelligence officer of one of the Soviet bloc countries working under cover of a diplomatic post inserted advertisements in the personal column of a newspaper asking for those interested in making up parties for tennis with him to write to a box number. When one young civil servant replied he met him and quite soon was dropping hints that he was interested in receiving any information in his tennis partner's possession.

It would seem that on occasions even "illegal" Soviet bloc agents will, if they feel themselves to be in sympathetic company sometimes openly hint at pro-Communist sympathies in order to draw out others who may be of the same frame of mind and who might be made some use of in an intelligence capacity. According to Mr. Comer Clark, for instance in his book *The War Within*, Lonsdale who during part of his stay in Britain studied at London University made a particular point of attending student parties:

"It was here", Mr. Clark writes, 'that he did his talent-spotting for future scientist spies. He specially watched those with, left-wing views and got to know them. The Red Army lieutenant-colonel actually made no secret during these activities that he believed in Communism. He said repeatedly that although Canadian he thought Russia would overtake the West economically and in its standard of living. It was his way of drawing out students with similar views. He also passionately declared that Russia wanted only peace. He lashed the West for sending an army of spies into Russia, it is believed that Lonsdale marked down and transmitted to the GRU in Moscow the names of many possibles among the students to be watched".¹

¹Comer Clarke. *The War Within*, World Distributors (Manchester) Ltd., 1961, p. 98.

Outside university circles, however, Lonsdale was not known to admit openly his sympathies and in general posed as a loyal Canadian citizen. Communist intelligence services have always shown a great interest in trying to recruit students in non-Communist countries as agents. The head of the FBI revealed in 1964 that Soviet agents in the United States had offered to pay for selected students education on condition that they obtained posts in government service after graduation and then passed information to Soviet espionage networks.

Types of Information Sought and Methods of Obtaining Information

In addition to recruiting locally-born agents in non-Communist countries, Communist intelligence services frequently attempt to obtain information from contacts and sources without these being aware that they are providing information for the use of a foreign power. One of their chief means of doing this is by instructing an agent to obtain information "in the dark". This expression simply means that a contact must be kept in the dark concerning the fact that he is talking to a Communist agent. This tactic is used chiefly to approach and obtain information from those unlikely to give it knowingly to agents of a foreign power.

Attempts by Petrov and the agents under his control to obtain "in the dark information" featured prominently in the Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage in Australia. It was no doubt largely to assist in selecting persons holding responsible positions from whom "in the dark information" might be obtained, that the records kept both by the Centre, and by Petrov, on persons prominent in Australian public life recorded whether or not they were of a talkative nature or given to heavy drinking.

One interesting example of an attempt to secure "in the dark information" occurred in West Germany. A woman secretary employed in the Bonn Embassy of a country having friendly relations with the West German Government was one day approached by a man who claimed to be employed by an insurance company, which, he said, was interested in fostering good relations between West Germany and other Western European countries and the United States as part of a drive to expand its business. The secretary was persuaded by this man to provide information ostensibly to help this firm carry out its plans which, would, so she was told, help to foster good will among the Western allies. For two years she supplied large quantities of information until she finally discovered that the "insurance representative" to whom she had handed this information was, in fact, an agent of the East German political intelligence service to the headquarters of which all the material she had provided had been sent.

The practice of attempting to obtain information "in the dark" was commended to the East German intelligence service in 1958 by its chief Soviet adviser when he recommended that the service should concentrate on political espionage and collecting information about government

offices, political parties, employers associations and trade unions. Its agents were to obtain such information under the pretext that it was needed by the West German press or industrial concerns.

One of the most successful exponents of the art of gathering information "in the dark" was a Swiss journalist who became an agent working for a Soviet network and who had many friends holding important positions in the West German Government ministries in Bonn where he obtained a post as a representative of the Swiss Press. All the worthwhile "off the record" information he gleaned in his capacity as a journalist was transmitted to the Moscow Centre.

Switzerland was also the base for an ambitious and for some time successful operation by the East German intelligence services to obtain information of this type by means of a journalistic cover. The cover in this case being the 'Round-Up Press service' registered as a News Agency in Zurich. Its chief editor was arrested by the Swiss security service in 1964 and charged with being an agent of the East German intelligence service. He was alleged to have used his position as head of the agency to obtain invitations to many political and other conferences in Western Europe and to have sent information he so gathered to a post box in East Berlin. It was believed that another member of the agency staff had been responsible for setting up and supervising about a 100 espionage cells in West Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland.

On occasion attempts to procure "in the dark information" may even be made by approaching a contact in the guise of agents of the intelligence service of a non-Communist country anxious to enrol the co-operation of outsiders. According to one report the final uncovering of the ex-British diplomat spy Philby (named as the "third man" in the Burgess and Maclean case) as a Soviet agent occurred when he tried to obtain information from and recruit as an agent ostensibly for the British intelligence service an Arab living in the Lebanon who was, in fact, already working as a British agent.

A great deal of importance is attached in Communist intelligence circles to the gathering of information from an examination of the Press of non-Communist countries. The most comprehensive examination of all foreign newspapers and periodicals down to the most obscure journals being carried out both by Residents of networks in the field and by the Moscow Centre. Colonel Monat, a former Polish military attache in Washington and Resident of the Polish military intelligence network in the USA who defected in 1959 has stressed the enormous value to Communist intelligence provided in various United States technical publications, referring to one such journal concerned with aviation he has said:

"It would have given us months of work and required us to shell out thousands of dollars to various agents to ferret out the facts one by one. The magazine handed it all to us on a silver platter".¹

¹Pawel Monat. *Spy in the US*, Frederick Muller, London, 1964, p. 120.

One further indirect method of gathering information requires the co-operation of the local Communist Party and is known to have been used twice in France. The method involves a general appeal to Party members and supporters to send information of interest particularly regarding "war preparations" that may come into their possession to Communist Party headquarters ostensibly for inclusion in the Party Press. When the information was received at Party headquarters, however, it was carefully screened for any items of real military or political value and these were not used for publication but are passed on to the Soviet or other Communist bloc embassies through contact men.

While it would be true to say that the Communist bloc intelligence services are interested in obtaining information about virtually all aspects of life in non-Communist countries, their quest for information would seem to fall basically into three categories: military and political, economic and personal data concerning prominent personalities.

The interest of Communist intelligence services in obtaining military and scientific information regarding military projects is, of course, an obvious one and one that requires little comment apart from the fact that it has on occasion been extremely productive. Information obtained by the Soviet intelligence services during and just after the war for instance is believed to have enabled Soviet scientists to dispense with ten years of research and development work in the production of their first atomic bomb.

Whilst the search for information regarding the development of nuclear and associated weapons obviously has a priority from the point of view of the GRU there is ample evidence to show that its activities are far from concentrated upon this field alone.

"The Soviet Government goes in for espionage on a huge scale. That is what 'peaceful co-existence' and Khrushchev's 'struggle for peace' really means. We are collecting intelligence always and everywhere. Daily we are improving and expanding our already swollen spy apparatus. I speak basically of military espionage. When I say 'militarily' it does not mean that we are engaged only in military espionage. We conduct technical, scientific and economic espionage as much as military—we operate in all directions. By saying 'military' I mean the espionage conducted by the GRU".¹

A large percentage of GRU activities however have naturally been concentrated upon attempts to obtain information about the plans and equipment of the armed forces under the control of NATO. These attempts have sometimes included the employment of agents within the headquarters of the Alliance itself. In 1964 for instance a senior press officer at NATO headquarters in Paris confessed on his arrest that he had been passing documents to the Soviet Embassy for a number of years. Early in 1967 an attempt was revealed to 'plant' an agent in the new NATO headquarters in Belgium. This concerned "Madame X", a

¹Oleg Penkovsky. *The Penkovsky Papers*, Collins, London, 1965, p. 71.

Belgian woman who had first been recruited into the service of Soviet intelligence when employed on the staff of an American embassy in Africa. She was instructed to obtain employment as a secretary at NATO headquarters under threat of having her past activities revealed. Also involved in this attempt were the TASS correspondent in Brussels and, it is thought, members of the Soviet Embassy staff and a member of the Soviet Film Export Organisation who had brought the reels of the film "War and Peace" to the Belgian capital.

Western Germany has always been a major hunting ground of the military branches of Soviet bloc intelligence a considerable part of whose activities have been centred upon the Lunenburg Area, an area much used for training by NATO forces. In one case a local blacksmith told the authorities that he had been recruited as an agent to supply information for which he was paid the equivalent of £60 a month. His arrest led to the uncovering of a cell consisting of two men and three women, one was engaged to a British officer and another occupied the position of switchboard operator at a large military camp in the area.

One Soviet network responsible for collecting valuable information for the Moscow Centre on allied military installations and troop movements in West Germany was based in Switzerland and had some features of unusual interest. It was headed by a veteran Soviet agent Rudolph Rossler, by origin a German of strong anti-Nazi opinions who had moved to Switzerland in 1933. He became head of a publishing firm much of whose work was devoted to publishing anti-Nazi literature. Because of his excellent contacts in Germany he was recruited as an agent by the Swiss military intelligence service shortly before the outbreak of war. Subsequently he was drawn into the service of the Soviet Union and became a member of the celebrated Soviet wartime spy ring in Switzerland which rendered the USSR such invaluable services. He was given the code name "Lucy".

The wireless operator serving this Swiss group was one Alexander Foote, an Englishman and former member of the British Communist Party. After the war he became disillusioned with Communism and defected, writing a detailed account of his experiences. According to Foote the information that Rossler was able to provide through his German contacts whom he always refused to identify was almost fantastically accurate and reliable. Not only did he provide a detailed warning of the German attack on Russia, but he was able to provide an up-to-date order of battle of the entire German army in the East throughout the Russian Campaign. He was even able on request to trace and give details of the strength and battleworthiness of German Units which Red Army intelligence had lost track of. Moreover he was able to provide information from the German Admiralty and Air Ministry and other government offices which were also of immense value. Foote has stated regarding this Lucy's information that:

"On most occasions it was received within twenty-four hours of it being known at the appropriate headquarters in Berlin. There was

no question of any courier or safe hand-route. The information must have been received by 'Lucy' over the air, and his sources, whoever they were, must have gone almost hot-foot from the service teleprinters to their wireless transmitters to send the information off. It was this speed which was one of the factors that made the Centre distrust this source, and only after bitter experience did they accept it at its face value".¹

Ronald Seth, an authority on Soviet espionage and himself a former British agent has written of Rossler:

"Without exaggeration, Russia owes her victory as much to Rossler as to any other factor. Certainly no agent working for any of the other allies intelligence agencies can claim to have had such a direct and personal influence on strategy and plans".²

The Moscow Centre once it had got over its early suspicions that he was a German "plant" were not ungrateful for his services and eventually was paying him as much as £425 a week. Soon after the war ended he was again approached by Soviet agents and asked to work for Soviet Intelligence again but this time by obtaining information about the Western powers. He was reluctant to do so at first but his publishing business had fallen on bad times and eventually he agreed.

He set up a cell in conjunction with a journalist friend and the Czech military attache to Switzerland, and resumed contact with some of his mysterious German sources, a number of whom had by then it seems obtained jobs in the West German government and were able to supply valuable information about both West Germany and other NATO countries.

This cell operated from 1947 to the end of 1952, information being collected by Rossler in Switzerland from his German sources, micro-filmed and sent in food parcels to an address in West Germany from whence it was forwarded to the Centre. Ultimately for some unknown reason the cells contact in West Germany responsible for this latter part of the operation failed to collect a food parcel from the address to which it was sent and it was returned to Switzerland and on being opened by the Swiss authorities in search of its source, microfilms placed in jars of figs and honey were found which contained reports on air bases in West Germany, the US Air Force in Britain and American army manoeuvres in Germany. Investigation led to Rossler who received a term of imprisonment and died in 1962 still declining to name any of his German sources and stoutly denying that he had ever taken part in espionage.

The existence of a large GRU network extending over a number of countries from North Africa to Austria was revealed in March 1967 by the arrest in Italy of Giorgio Rinaldi, his wife, and their chauffeur. The main rôle of this network seems to have been to obtain information about Western military bases in the Mediterranean area. Rinaldi a

¹Alexander Foote. *Handbook for Spies*, Museum Press, London, 1949, pp. 82-83.

²Ronald Seth, *Forty Years of Soviet Spying*, Cassell, London, 1965, p. 119.

civilian parachute instructor, had been active in a Communist section of the Italian Resistance during the War. His wife on the other hand had been a fervent admirer of Mussolini. The *Daily Telegraph* of 25 March reported her as saying, "I have always admired dictators and today the Communists have taken the place of the Fascists". Rinaldi had received training in espionage techniques at a GRU school whilst on a visit to the USSR.

Shortly after the arrest of this trio a secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Rome, the Second Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Athens, a member of the Soviet Trade Mission in Greece, and two Soviet Air Line officials in Cyprus were all expelled on suspicion of complicity in the network's activities.

Documents which Petrov delivered into the hands of the Australian authorities at the time of his defection shed considerable light on the types of information regarded as particularly valuable by the KGB. One directive from the Moscow Centre to Petrov stated:

"One of the most important aspects of the foreign political intelligence consists of the study and survey of the Department of External affairs of the foreign country . . . Taking note of the importance of this question we request you to set about the study and survey of the Department of External Affairs. For a start compile and send to KGB HQ a report in maximum detail concerning the Department, including official and agent information.

"Besides other information this report should refer to the following questions; brief historical data concerning the organisation of the department, its structure, its location, from whom the personnel is recruited, information about the leadership, about educational institutions where diplomatic cadres are trained, which departments actually deal with matters affecting the Soviet, America and England, as detailed information as possible concerning the heads and personnel of these departments."¹

Other points about which Petrov was asked to obtain information concerning the Department of External Affairs included the arrangements for safeguarding secret documents, whether members of the staff belonged to any trade unions or clubs and how it was possible to make unofficial contact with them.

In another Directive, Petrov was informed that the Centre was interested in receiving "authentic information" concerning the Australian delegation that was to attend the Seventh Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The information he was requested to supply included the following points; detailed biographical particulars concerning the members of the delegation, members of its technical staff and newspaper correspondents attached to it, and "helpful particulars" regarding any of these persons who were considered to be "of operational interest" to the KGB. Other points included were

¹*Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage*, Sydney, 1955, p. 155.

the attitude of the Australian Government to questions listed for discussion on the provisional agenda of the session and its intentions, if any, to table any motions for debate; details of the means of communication between government departments and delegates whilst they were at the session and details of instructions given to delegates by their departments.

The wording of this particular directive strongly suggested that it was a copy of one sent to the Residents directing KGB networks in all non-Communist countries which were members of the UN.

Petrov was also ordered by the Centre to step up the activity of his agents in studying Australian political parties. The Directive which enclosed these instructions stressing that:

"In the matter of exposing the foreign political plans of capitalist states by means of agent penetration into the institutions of Government and leading circles of these Governments, one of the most important priorities is the study of political parties . . ."¹

These instructions to Petrov continued:

"In reports concerning political parties it is desirable to portray the history of their origin and development, what classes of the population they bring together, the condition of membership of political parties, their political tendencies, information regarding their leadership. Their influence on the political life of the country and the activities of the Government, about foreign influence exerted on any of these political parties, the activities of their clubs and printing organs, information about members of political parties who may be of some interest to us, and also your proposals concerning ways of studying them".²

At the time that Petrov was Resident of the Australian KGB network, its work in non-Communist countries was divided into six categories, consisting of:

Intelligence.

Counter intelligence.

Scientific and technical information gathering.

NL or Nie Legalny, work concerned with establishing an illegal network.

EM work, work concerned with emigres from the Soviet Union and other countries of the Soviet bloc.

SK work, this involving watching and reporting on the behaviour of members of the staff of Soviet embassies.

Trade and other missions in foreign countries.

Work amongst seamen.

Work amongst the staff of foreign delegations and embassies.

A considerable part of the work of KGB networks appears to be concerned with collecting information about leading personalities active in every field but particularly in politics in non-Communist countries, for inclusion in the Moscow index. Petrov received instruc-

¹*Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage*, Sydney, 1955, p. 187.

²*Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage*, Sydney, 1965, p. 187.

tions that he should systematically collect and forward both official and "agent" information about a large number of named persons active in public life including cabinet ministers, the British High Commissioner in Australia and the Governor General.

In addition Petrov was continually being asked to supply "additional material and well founded conclusions" on persons whom the Centre considered to be "of operational interest" or in other words might be recruited as agents. Details regarding their past careers were provided by the Centre including in some instances the fact that they had been "under cover" members of the Communist Party.

The manner in which the Centre manages to "keep tabs" on such persons even when they move from one country to another was well illustrated by the case of a man named Shaker, resident in Australia. In September 1952 Petrov received a message from the Centre in which he was informed that Shaker who was then living at an address in Melbourne had been a member of the Communist Party whilst living in Egypt and had "conducted Communist party propaganda amongst the workers". The letter from the Centre continued by stating that Shaker had been forced to leave Egypt because of "persecution" by the authorities in 1948 and was now living in Melbourne where he worked in a factory. The letter instructed Petrov to arrange for Shaker to be contacted by one of his agents with a view to collecting further information about him, "and if possible about his relatives resident in Egypt".

For some reason Petrov never carried out these instructions but the Australian Royal Commission on Espionage in the course of its investigations discovered that Shaker was, in fact, living in Melbourne and had arrived from Egypt in 1948. Shaker denied that he had ever been a member of the Communist Party or had been engaged upon propaganda work in Egypt, but the Royal Commission's Report says:

"The interesting feature of this paragraph in the Moscow letter is that it affords yet another illustration of the widespread sources from which the Moscow Centre collects its information. Obviously, some person in Egypt must have supplied the data, whether accurate or inaccurate, about Shaker's history and his passport. How the Centre discovered that he was living in Footscray, Melbourne, we do not know. Petrov had never heard of Shaker before the arrival of the letter".¹

The evidence available regarding Soviet intelligence operations during the last 20 years shows that the Moscow Centre maintains a tight, if not bureaucratic, control over Residents and their networks. Residents appear to be allowed extremely little initiative and are frequently sent instructions that include the most trifling attention to detail. Petrov was given the most precise instructions on the way in which one of his agents should make contact with an employee of the French Embassy in Australia even down to such details as the first meeting between the

¹*Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage, Sydney, 1955, pp. 279-280.*
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agent and this contact should take place at "40 to 70 miles from Canberra", that a general discussion should be held in a cafe or a restaurant and that the agent should then ask this French contact "the most important questions for our work during a walk in the park or along quiet streets".¹

It is a further indication of the care with which operations even in the most far off lands are planned and directed by the Moscow Centre that Petrov was also instructed to find out very carefully what type of work this contact carried out in the French Embassy, her daily work routine, the time she had her lunch break and where she had lunch and the time she finished work for the day. Other information regarded as "particularly necessary" by the Centre was to discover what room she used for cipher work, whether she had access to the safe, where cipher books were kept, and whether or not she carried the key to the safe on her, and the technique of deciphering and enciphering cables. All these details being considered necessary by KGB headquarters in order for it to be enabled to "determine what would be the best way, least liable to exposure, of effecting the acquisition of deposits of ciphers of her Embassy".²

Residents also maintain tight control of the agents in their network and a careful record is kept of the particular tasks assigned to them. A number of assignment record cards were amongst the papers Gouzenko brought with him from the Ottawa Embassy. These chiefly referred to agents given the task of obtaining technical information regarding armament production in Canada and were broken down into a list of points on which information was required concerning particular projects. In the margin against each point Colonel Zabotin or one of his assistants had written "fulfilled", "partly fulfilled", or "not fulfilled" according to the progress the agent had made with his assignments.

Agents of the Canadian GRU network were also required to fill in detailed reports on all meetings they had with contacts who were supplying them with information and with "prospects" they were studying. Some of these reports provide interesting evidence on the great attention to security paid in arranging all such meetings. One such report from an agent said in regard to a Canadian contact (there) "was a torrential downpour, but he nevertheless came. Gave instructions not to come in the future in such weather ; it is not natural".³

In the much later case of Vassal, his Soviet controllers not only gave him the most precise instructions on the manner in which he was to bring confidential documents out of the British Admiralty, concealed in the folds of his morning paper, but actually supplied him with a stock of envelopes in which to put documents he took away in this manner for photographing.

Soviet agents do not all come up to the standard that has come to be

¹*Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage*, Sydney, 1955, pp. 171-172

²*Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage*, Sydney, 1955, p. 171.

³*Report of Royal Commission*, Ottawa, 1946, p. 157.

expected of them as a result both of actual experience and the reputation for super efficiency given them by fiction. Messages which passed between Petrov and the Moscow Centre concerning a KGB agent in Australia having a cover position as a TASS correspondent and with the code name of "Antonov" providing somewhat amusing proof.

An Australian journalist testifying before the Australian Royal Commission said that Antonov was:

"A timid man, and seemed lost. He was a foreigner, a member of my own trade, who seemed to be a timid, rather lost soul, and I felt a bit sorry for him".¹

Antonov suffered from acute shyness and only spoke English indifferently, both of which factors made the accomplishment of his allotted task, that of getting on friendly terms with Australian lobby correspondents extremely difficult. In addition he excused himself from carrying out one mission on the plea that he was frightened to drive in Sydney. An excuse which when reported by Petrov drew the somewhat curt rejoinder from the Centre that:

"Taking into consideration Antonov's statement that he refuses to take the car because he is afraid to drive a motor car in Sydney, we recommend to Antonov that, pending a final decision, he should take a course of driving lessons and that for this purpose he should use £15 out of the resources of your KGB section".²

¹*Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage*, Sydney, 1955, p. 235.

²*Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage*, Sydney, 1955, p. 391.

CHAPTER IX

Subversion and Special Operations

Communist embassies as bases—Bribery and use of funds for clandestine purposes—Culture as a weapon—Disinformation—China's trade in drugs—Supply of arms—Training of guerillas—The Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation—The Tri-Continental Solidarity Organisation—Aid from the scholars.

THERE would seem to be no doubt that the embassies of Communist countries and the offices of the various missions surrounding them are, particularly in the developing nations used as bases for operations constituting outright interference in the affairs of the country in which they are situated or in neighbouring countries. The members of embassy staffs engaged upon these operations usually being those also holding positions in the KGB.

Aleksandr Kaznacheev has stated that the growth of this side of the KGB's activities coincided with Khrushchev's decision to direct the main thrust of the Soviet political warfare offensive into areas outside Europe. The foreign directorate of the KGB being reorganised specially to meet this new policy in order to enable it to mount special political operations in developing countries. The object of which would be: "penetration and subversion of local regimes, direct and active participation in the struggle between different political parties. The gathering and analysis of information was only a secondary aim."¹

Kaznacheev, who was himself assigned to such duties when recruited into the KGB, has given details of how such operations were conducted from the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon. The main targets were the Burmese political parties, trade unions, and youth groups, KGB agents being detailed to penetrate all of these, and to make contact with persons holding influential positions within them.

Side by side with such activities went efforts to isolate and discredit Burmese politicians known to be active anti-Communists. In particular the then Prime Minister of Burma, U Nu.

From time to time Kaznacheev used to be called upon to translate "battle orders" which arrived at the Rangoon embassy. These "battle orders" were in fact anonymous letters, supposedly written by Burmese citizens, but actually concocted in KGB headquarters in Moscow, and

¹Aleksandr Kaznacheev, *Inside a Soviet Embassy*, Robert Hale Ltd., London, 1962, p. 140.

addressed to leading Burmese politicians to whom they were posted when Kaznacheev had completed his task of translating them into Burmese. These letters were aimed at setting political leaders or factions against each other and often contained libellous allegations concerning prominent Burmese figures. Those who received them were urged to make "good use" of the information they contained.

The KGB network in Burma was also responsible for maintaining contact with the Burmese Communist Party, both that Section working in the open and that operating underground. Acting as a link between Moscow and local Communist parties is a rôle that the KGB has not infrequently been called upon to play in the past. In Burma an additional aspect of its work in this regard lay in attempting to prevent control of the Burmese Communist movement passing to a pro-Peking faction.

In Africa the Soviet embassy in Cairo since the mid-1950's has been a principal centre for directing political operations aimed at increasing Soviet influence on that Continent and undermining pro-Western regimes. In more recent years its efforts have been augmented by Soviet and Eastern European embassies in Conakry, Brazzaville, Bamako, Addis Ababa and Dar-es-Salaam. In the Congo (Leopoldville) the clandestine operations of members of the Soviet Embassy staff led to a breach in diplomatic relations between the two countries and the closing of the embassy.

Communist China has since the beginning of the 1960's been making the most energetic efforts to persuade newly independent countries to grant recognition to her government in order that diplomatic relations may be initiated and Chinese embassies opened in as many new capitals as possible. In many cases these embassies have been shown to have been the centre for large scale subversive organisations. By early 1965 China had established diplomatic relations with Algeria, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Dahomey, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, the Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, the UAR and Zambia. In addition diplomatic relations had been established with nine non-Communist countries in Asia.

The Chinese Communist embassy in Cairo, established in 1956, has played a particularly important part in the Chinese drive to penetrate Africa. Other particularly important Chinese embassies in Africa are located in Brazzaville where it was reputed to have a staff of 250 in three large houses and in Dar-es-Salaam, which houses the headquarters of the various 'liberation movements' of southern Africa. The Chinese Embassy in Somalia upon the construction of which large sums of money have been spent, has also been an important centre of activities.

In Latin America the Soviet Union only maintains diplomatic representation in five countries whilst Communist China is not officially represented outside Cuba at all. The Soviet Embassies in Montevideo and Mexico City are, however, both important centres and the Soviet Embassy in Havana acts as an important co-ordinating point for Communist Parties on the mainland of that sub-continent. The absence of Soviet and Communist Chinese Embassies from most South American countries

means that both countries place great reliance upon using the offices of their respective news agencies, cultural missions, trade missions and friendship societies as bases for political operations. The Soviet Union also relies to some extent upon the embassies of its East European allies.

The staff of Communist embassies are sometimes used to put about stories concerning future Communist intentions amongst Western diplomatic circles which although they have no foundation in fact, it is thought important should gain as wide a circulation as possible. It would seem that on occasions Soviet diplomats try and use members of the staff of Eastern European embassies to spread these stories because they feel they are regarded with less suspicion than their Soviet counterparts. A good illustration of the use of these sort of tactics has been provided by the former Polish military attache in Washington, Pawel Monat, who has recorded that during the height of the Suez crisis in 1956, he was approached by the Soviet military attache, Colonel Edemsky. The Colonel told him that the Soviet Union was extremely anxious to convince Western diplomats that it was determined to send aid to President Nasser in the form of volunteers to fight with the Egyptian Army if Britain, France and Israel, did not cease all military action immediately. Colonel Edemsky explained that as the Soviet Union was in particular disfavour in Washington just then owing to its action in Hungary, and consequently its representatives were receiving few invitations to social functions, at which news of this Soviet resolve could be past around, he would be grateful if Monat could arrange for members of the staff of the Polish Embassy who were regarded as more welcome guests to spread reports of these apparently alarming Soviet intentions. When Monat replied that he would have thought that the geographical circumstances alone were going to make it extremely difficult for the Soviet Union to despatch any such volunteers to Egypt, Colonel Edemsky replied:

"My dear Pawel, do not concern yourself with such details. I can tell you that we do *not* plan to send volunteers into Egypt at all. That would be nonsense. You are right. But we want everyone to *think* we do".¹

Monat has stated that this incident was by no means unique of its type during his period of service in Washington.

Another type of manoeuvre not infrequently attempted by members of the staff of Communist diplomatic missions is to foster or open splits amongst the member States of the Western Alliances. A notable example being provided by the activities of the former Soviet Naval attache in London, Captain Ivanov. During the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the Cuba crisis in the autumn of 1962 Ivanov whose official position was but a cover for his activities on behalf of Soviet intelligence made repeated efforts to get in touch with the British Foreign Office and

¹Pawel Monat. *Spy in the US*, Frederick Muller, London, 1964, p. 139.

persons prominent in British public life, acting through his friend Stephen Ward whose views were sympathetic to the Soviet Union.

In all their attempts to make contact with persons of influence during the latter of these two crises Ivanov and Ward strove to give the impression that the Soviet Union looked to the British Government as providing the only hope of mediation and that if it would only issue a call for a summit conference Khrushchev would gladly accede to such a request. Persons whom they approached became convinced that both men were acting as the mouthpieces of a deliberate attempt to drive a wedge between Britain and America at a crucial stage in the affairs of the alliance. In his report on the Profumo affair, Lord Denning has pointed out that Ivanov in the course of his other well-known activities had been attempting a variation of the same sort of disruptive tactics. Lord Denning wrote:

"It has been suggested to me that Ivanov filled a new rôle in Russian technique. It was to divide the United Kingdom from the United States by these devious means. If ministers or prominent people can be placed in compromising situations, or made the subject of damaging rumours, or the Security Services can be made to appear incompetent, it may weaken the confidence of the United States in our integrity and reliability. So a man like Captain Ivanov may take every opportunity of getting to know ministers or prominent people—not so much as to obtain information from them (though this would be a useful by-product)—but so as to work towards destroying confidence. If this were the object of Captain Ivanov with Stephen Ward as his tool he succeeded only too well."¹

Bribery and Use of Funds for Clandestine Purposes

Communist China has, through its agents, made widespread use of bribery in attempts to influence individuals, political parties, and governments in the non-Communist world. Tung Chi-ping, a graduate of the school of foreign languages in Shanghai and a former cultural assistant at the Chinese Embassy in Burundi has provided testimony regarding Chinese tactics in this field.

Before leaving for Africa Tung Chi-ping has said that he was given a briefing on the part that he was to play in Burundi which was of interest to China primarily as a base for future operations in the Congo, the prize which included important deposits of uranium. He was given special instructions on the use of bribery to obtain influence, which he summed up as follows:

"When we use money, we should pay attention to the discontented elements of a country. At the same time we must avoid offending those in power. We must not be like the stupid Americans, who know only those in power. We do not neglect those in power but our contacts should be wide. We should spend more money on

¹*Lord Denning's Report*, Cmd 2152, 1963, p. 8.

those who have ambitions, but who do not hold high positions, rather than on those in power.

"Africans are easy to deal with. They are friendly to the Chinese, so we can easily win their sympathy and favour. Just give them small gifts or invite them to dinner and you will make good friends. Africans like to be complimented and praised. With only a few words, you can make them feel warm and happy. Our Embassy has plenty of money to give to Africans. But when you give money, do not ask how it is to be spent. Leave those who take it alone and pretend that you never gave them anything."¹

Instances of the use of bribery recorded by Tung Chi-ping included the giving of £2,000 to the leader of a Nigerian opposition group after he had attended a meeting held at the Peking centre of the World Federation of Scientific Workers, a payment to the Mali Minister of Information and Tourism, in return for pro-Peking statements he had made in a French language pamphlet published after his return from a visit to China and gifts of money to members of the Press and radio services. One reporter being paid £200 for writing an article favourable to China.

In Burundi attempts were made to contact the Christian population by leaving cheques in the pews of local churches, these cheques only being payable on presentation at the Chinese Embassy.

Tung Chi-ping has explained that when China gives money she expects concrete results in return, unlike the American habit of giving money without any strings attached. There is evidence that large sums have been offered by Communist China to African countries in return for diplomatic recognition. Dr. Hastings Banda, Prime Minister of Malawi, has for instance revealed that China, "through the steering hand of the Red Chinese Ambassador in Dar-es-Salaam offered to pay his Government the sum of £18,000 in exchange for such recognition".

Other large sums have reportedly been paid into the bank accounts of various leaders of pro-Peking factions in Kenya and other East African countries. President Tshombe of the Congo announced in the autumn of 1964 that he had proof that a sum equivalent to £26,000 had been paid to the rebel forces in the Congo through the Chinese Embassy in Brazzaville.

In countries with which China has no diplomatic representation funds for both bribery and for financing enterprises serving the Chinese cause are often channelled through the office of the New China News Agency. Prior to the coup of January 1964 in Zanzibar the magazine *Zanawe*, a publication consisting entirely of Chinese-style agitation and propaganda and known to be closely connected with the headquarters of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party, whose General-Secretary Rahman Mohamed or 'Babu' became a leading figure in the revolutionary government was almost certainly financed in this way. Babu was himself a former correspondent of the NCNA. Chinese money

¹*Free China Review*, November 1964.

probably also backs the paper *Voce Di Somalia*, which commenced publication in March 1964, employing 24 Communist Chinese on its staff as editors, technicians and printers and using printing machinery presented by China as a gift. There is reason to believe that the Soviet Union also provides funds for the support of pro-Communist newspapers and publications in various parts of the non-Communist world.

Another purpose for which funds are disbursed through Chinese Embassies or agencies is for the support of the various pro-Peking Communist splinter groups which have sprung up in a number of countries since the beginning of the 1960's. Italian police enquiries into the activities of such groups which began operating in Italy in early 1963 with headquarters centred on Rome, Milan, Florence, Genoa, Padova, Naples, and Palermo, led to the discovery that funds were being channelled to them through the China-Italy Society and other similar front organisations from the Chinese Embassy in Switzerland. Prior to the recognition of Communist China by France this Embassy constituted the primary Chinese base in Europe. More recently the new embassy in Paris has supplanted that in Geneva in importance.

Another important Chinese centre in Europe is constituted by the NCNA office in Brussels. Belgium is one of the few European countries whose Communist Party has openly adopted the Chinese side in the Moscow-Peking dispute. A senior member of the Party supervises the translation of articles and their despatch from this office to the press and to party members.

In South America, the NCNA office in Brazil played an important part in maintaining contact between Peking and the pro-Peking section of the Brazilian Communist Party prior to the army revolt of April 1964 which is believed to have just pre-empted a Communist-led revolt. Subsequent investigations showed that sums of money ranging from £100 to £15,000 had been paid from this office to such bodies as the National Union of Students and to selected state deputies and other officials. Evidence was also unearthed pointing to the fact that the orthodox or pro-Moscow section of the Party received financial support and instructions from the legations of a number of Communist countries, notably that of Czechoslovakia. It was further alleged that payments amounting to nearly 18 million cruzeros had been made by the Czechoslovakian Embassy to the left wing leader Senor Goulart and to the leaders of the so called "Groups of 11" intended to be the nucleus of a large scale revolutionary movement. The Rumanian Embassy was also named as having given financial support to subversive elements.

A further means of effecting the transfer of funds from Communist countries to parties, groups, or individuals in non-Communist countries for the purposes of financing subversion or propaganda is through the use of import-export companies set up or managed by fellow travellers or by hidden Communists. This method has the obvious advantage that the source of the sums so channelled is often extremely difficult to trace.

Culture as a Weapon

Both the countries of the Soviet bloc and Communist China make extensive use of cultural missions of one type or another as part of their political warfare campaign. Such missions have two main purposes, both of equal importance to the Communist cause. The first is to act as a convenient cover for agents engaged upon subversive operations or espionage and the second is propagandist. In fulfilling this second rôle there is often a considerable difference in approach between missions sponsored by the Soviet Union and Communist China.

Africa has been the recipient of a very large number of Chinese cultural missions during the last seven or eight years. Between June 1956 and June 1965 these totalled 83, and included Acrobats, sportsmen, journalists, scientists, dancers and musicians, film and television experts, educationalists, writers, artists and doctors.

The activities of the leaders of Chinese cultural missions to Africa have consisted in persuading host countries to sign cultural agreements with the Chinese Government. In 1962 President Nyrere of Tanzania signed such an agreement for cultural co-operation as the result of the visit of a six-man Chinese cultural mission led by Chu Kuang, a deputy director of the 'Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries'. This same mission flew on to Uganda and the Sudan, and thence to Somalia where it succeeded in persuading the government of that country to enter into a similar agreement as that signed by the President of Tanzania. Chu Kuang reportedly took good advantage of this mission's visit to make contact with various extreme left wing movements in East Africa.

The terms of the cultural agreements signed by Communist China with African countries usually include undertakings to encourage the flow of delegations of all types, for the exchange of publications and films, the exchange of radio programmes, exchanges of University professors and school teachers, exchanges of journalists and radio technicians, for the holding of art and cultural exhibitions, for the study of language and literature and sometimes for scientific and technological assistance. Visiting Chinese delegations issue many invitations to cultural organisations of all types in Africa to send return delegations to China and many have accepted the offer. During the ten years between mid-1955 and mid-1965, 191 African cultural organisations accepted invitations to send members on visits to China. By the middle of 1965, Communist China had signed a total of ten cultural agreements with African countries, all providing for the extensive exchange of delegations.

The programmes put on by Chinese concert troupes visiting Africa often consist entirely of blatant propaganda clearly intended to arouse the "revolutionary spirit" amongst their audiences. The programme of one typical such troupe 'The Folk Song and Dance Troupe of China' which visited Zambia in the summer of 1966 included dances entitled: 'Heroic Sisters of Southern Vietnam'; 'Militant Africa' and 'Catch

them all in one net' the "them" referred to being various leaders of Western 'Imperialist' countries. Vocal items included 'The Best Era is the Era of Mao Tse-tung', 'Gun in Hand, Heart and Soul for The Party', 'On Guerillas', 'A Meteorological Worker of a People's Commune', and 'The People of Asia, Africa, and Latin America Want Liberation'.

Brochures distributed by this troupe said that it was hoped that its visit would "contribute to the promotion of the friendship of our two peoples and the strengthening of the revolutionary struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism."¹

The approach of Soviet cultural missions in developing countries, is, as might be expected, rather more subtle. Fritz Schatten in his book *Communism in Africa*² has given an interesting picture of the work of the Soviet House of Culture in Addis Adaba. As is the case in many developing countries Soviet policy in Ethiopia has been aimed at achieving friendships with and influence over the existing government rather than any immediate attempt to bring about its overthrow. The films shown by the mobile projecting vans of the House of Culture which visit even small villages in distant parts of the country concentrate upon portraying the strength and progress made by the Soviet Union rather than on extolling the virtues of Communism as a political creed. Other films stress the amount of aid being given to Ethiopia by the Soviet Union and the friendly feelings felt by the Soviet Union towards that country and they portray all important details of the visit of the Emperor Haile Selassie to the Soviet Union in 1959 including his meeting with Khrushchev. The effect of such performances upon unsophisticated audiences whom may well have never seen any type of film show before is often considerable. As Fritz Schatten said:

"Henceforth people up and down the country who have seen such films will automatically equate all ideas of higher civilisation, greater economic strength, and unselfish friendship with the Soviet Union".³

Disinformation

The existence of a special department within the headquarters of the foreign directorate of the KGB whose activities consist of attempting to "plant" forgeries and inaccurate reports in the Press of non-Communist countries was referred to in the chapter dealing with the organisation of intelligence services. In the three years from the beginning of 1957 to the end of 1960, the intelligence services of the Western powers uncovered no less than 32 such "plants" and forgeries.

The majority of such attempts to mislead public opinion in the non-Communist world have been aimed at fostering anti-American feeling. They have included "publication of a memorandum" from the late John Foster Dulles to President Eisenhower, designed to give the

¹*The Daily Telegraph*, 25 August, 1966.

²*Communism in Africa*, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1966.

³*Ibid.*, p. 123.

impression that the United States was planning to seize the positions of power in the Middle East previously occupied by Britain and France; a supposed secret agreement between the US Secretary of State and the Japanese Prime Minister to permit the employment of Japanese troops anywhere in Asia, and an alleged American plan to assassinate General Chiang Kai-shek. They have also included reports and documents purporting to give details of American plans to overthrow the Egyptian Government, and to use the landings of American troops in the Lebanon in 1958 as a cover for an operation by which America would occupy the whole of the country for a prolonged period during which it would install atomic and other military bases thereby exposing the Arab population to nuclear attack.

On a somewhat different plane, Communist sources put out for the Press what they claimed to be a copy of a letter from Mr. Frank Berry, a former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defence for Health and Medical Affairs to the Defence Secretary which alleged that over 67 per cent of all air crew personnel in the United States Air Force were psychoneurotics and which stated that many of them indulged in excessive drinking and were addicted to the use of drugs.

In the course of the WFTU campaign to win influence amongst African trade unionists and to set up a Communist-dominated Pan-African trade union movement; considerable use was made of forgeries designed to discredit non-Communist trade unions. These included a document entitled 'The Great Conspiracy against Africa' which included a supposed secret annexe to a British Government Cabinet paper on Africa.

Aleksandr Kaznacheev has given interesting information on how forged and inaccurate reports were fed to Burmese newspapers and the Press of other countries of SE Asia during the time he was employed at the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon.

Articles were written in KGB headquarters and specially designed to stimulate resentment against America and her allies, particularly as regards their policies and activities in Asia. These articles were then microfilmed and despatched to the Rangoon embassy by air. Here the films were processed and printed and Kaznacheev would translate them into English. The next step was for a member of the political intelligence group on the embassy staff to arrange for their publication in a Burmese newspaper, usually choosing one sympathetic to the Communist cause. At the newspaper office, an article would be translated into Burmese and some minor changes might be made in the style, a date line would also be added carrying some such heading as "our special correspondent in Singapore", or "our special Djakarta correspondent".

Once articles were published, Kaznacheev had to make a copy of it in Russian exactly as it appeared in the newspaper concerned, and this copy was then sent to Moscow through the TASS Rangoon office. TASS would then distribute this article, in reality nothing more than a device of the Soviet intelligence service, to the world Press together

with favourable comments and the appearance would be given that it was a genuine reflection of popular feeling in Asia.

Kaznacheev records a number of incidents of the successful use of such forgeries, two articles which originated in KGB headquarters were planted in the Burmese paper *Mirror* at the time of the rebellion against Dr. Sukarno's regime in Indonesia in 1958. One contained a letter purporting to be from a rebel leader to the American Ambassador in Tokyo which requested American and SEATO aid for the rebels. The other article contained a letter alleged to have been written by the American Admiral Frost to the rebels in which he was supposed to have advised them not to surrender and said that they could continue to rely on American aid. Both these letters were subsequently taken up by the Communist Press of many countries and were published in Indonesian newspapers. In another article placed in a Burmese paper, allegations were made that the Indian Finance Minister who had a confirmed anti-Communist reputation was corrupt and said to have taken bribes from the United States.

Later attempts of the same nature were made to undermine the standing of Burmese leaders. In this case a report originating in the Disinformation Section of the KGB to the effect that three Burmese newspapers were accepting bribes from American sources in return for carrying out a campaign aimed at ending the Burmese Government's policy of neutrality in the Cold War, was placed in *The New Delhi Times* by a member of the KGB's network in India. It was signed "our Rangoon Correspondent". Hundreds of copies of the *New Delhi Times* were especially flown to Rangoon where local Communists acting on the instructions of the Soviet Embassy distributed them among members of Burmese political parties.

In some cases a paper in one of the East European countries is used by the Disinformation Section to launch a story in the hope that it will be taken up from there by the Communist and extreme left-wing newspapers outside the Communist bloc. One instance of such tactics being the publication in the East German newspaper of a letter alleged to have been written by Governor Rockefeller of New York to General Eisenhower outlining what was described as a plan for American "super colonialism". This report was taken up and repeated in a number of pro-Communist publications in Western Europe.

Probably one of the most successful operations in the field of disinformation took place after the revolt of the French Generals in Algeria in 1961. Very shortly after the revolt broke out on 22 April, the Italian pro-Communist newspaper *Il Paese*, which has a long history of engaging in anti-American propaganda, printed a story which alleged that the US Central Intelligence Agency was behind the revolt. The next day a long article appeared in *Pravda* which stated that the revolt had been encouraged by the Pentagon, the CIA and NATO. The *Pravda* article was relayed in a TASS transmission to Europe and was also broadcast to the Middle East in Arabic.

On 27 April the British *Daily Worker* headed its front page with a

headline "US Spy Agency encouraged revolt". This was followed by a story which laid a large measure of the blame for the revolt at the door of the CIA. The French *L'Humanite* printed a similar story which led to the edition which carried it being confiscated by the French Government. Subsequently a non-Communist paper published a story on the same lines to those that had already appeared, written by a correspondent known to have pro-Communist views who stated that the fact that the revolt had been encouraged by the CIA was "a secret that everyone knows". From then on the story came to be increasingly reported in the non-Communist Press of Western Europe and even America, causing considerable concern in both, and finally necessitating a formal statement from the French Foreign Minister denying that there was any evidence whatever to indicate CIA involvement in the revolt, before the rumours could be quelled.

In a report issued at the beginning of 1965 the Government of South Korea produced evidence of extensive forgery operations that began in 1962 carried out by the government of North Korea. The object of these operations was to despatch Communist propaganda into South Korea concealed within sham editions of non-Communist publications. This forged material which has included copies of 57 different non-Communist publications including the London *Times* was despatched to Eastern Europe and then posted back to South Korea. Over a thousand copies of such publications containing within them denunciations of the Government of South Korea and reports of speeches by North Korean leaders and other propaganda supporting the policies of the North Korean government arrive in South Korea every month.

China's Trade in Drugs

For a number of years reports from non-Communist sources have referred to a drive by Communist China to step up production of opium and heroin and to export it clandestinely in ever increasing quantities to the West. The primary aim being to obtain much needed foreign currency through the enormous sums sale of these drugs can fetch, with a secondary purpose possibly being to undermine the health and morale of the non-Communist world by increasing drug addiction.

Somewhat ironically these reports were in substance confirmed by the Soviet Union in 1964. An article in *Pravda* that September accused China of drug trafficking and of having made the equivalent of £180 million a year from the sale of opium.

There is reason to believe that this Chinese drug export began almost immediately after the Communist Government was established in Peking. Towards the end of 1950 the British Government informed the Secretary General of the United Nations that representatives of the Chinese Governments had approached officials of Imperial Chemicals (China) Ltd. in Hongkong to ask their assistance in finding buyers for 500 tons of opium. The request was needless to say refused.

In 1957 Mr. Harry J. Ainslinger, Chairman of the United States

Commission on Narcotics stated that he had definite evidence that production and smuggling of drugs was under the control of the Chinese Government's State Economic Commission. It has been reliably reported that special 'National Drug Research Farms' have been set up in China to instruct and supervise the work of peasants employed on communes in planting poppies.

State-controlled plants are believed to have been set up in both China and North Korea to produce morphine and heroin from crude opium. The world demand for opium for purely medical purposes amounts to only 300 tons a year. However by 1957, Chinese production of opium had reached 8,000 tons a year, an increase of 6,000 tons a year in the five years since 1952. During 1964 it is estimated that about 10,000 tons of crude opium, heroin, or morphine were exported from Communist China.

Drugs are despatched from China by a number of routes, many tons being sent to Thailand each year where they are sold to traffickers from other countries. Very large quantities of opium are also despatched into Burma each year via the old wartime Burma road from Yunan province. Much of it is brought down to Rangoon by river steamer, and once there, transhipped for passage to Penang and Singapore.

Recent indications are that Hong Kong has become the main distribution centre for the sale of Chinese drugs. These are smuggled into Hong Kong from the mainland in sacks of flour, bags of rice, cans of food and sacks of cement. Chinese Communist agents in Hong Kong then sell these consignments for cash. Drugs are smuggled out of Hong Kong and other dissemination points by crews of ships or aircraft or by passengers acting as couriers. In some cases it is thought that the Chinese Government shares the profits with professional drug traffickers who arrange sales and distribution.

China has sent a number of experts to North Korea to aid in the establishment of drug production plants. There is a large volume of trade in drugs between North Korea and Japan. There is some evidence that proceeds from the sale of these drugs in Japan have been used for financing Communist Party activities. A member of the Japanese Communist Party who was also a member of an organisation known as 'The Society for the Protection of Health and Peace' which operated from the Communist Party headquarters in Tokyo and with branches in all the major hospitals in the capital and also in some other Japanese cities has given information on this point. According to her evidence she and five other women members made tremendous profits for the Tokyo branch of the Party by the sale of heroin through the above named society. She described how at a special meeting of the society a resolution had been passed stating that a particular effort should be made to sell narcotics to hotels, bars and cabarets patronised by American servicemen. The Chairman of the Japanese National Committee for the struggle against addiction to drugs has said that China probably makes about £60,000 a year from the illicit sale of drugs to Japan.

In Korea, Communist agents have been trained in the Communist north of the country at a special school. Then they have been sent across the border into the south carrying large quantities of both heroin and money for the purposes of bribery and corruption. Over 2,000 such agents have been arrested by the South Korean police.

Drugs processed or manufactured in Communist China have also found their way to Europe. It is thought that one of the main routes which is used is through Albania. About nine ships from Communist countries call at Albanian ports every month. A proportion of the supplies reaching there being re-exported to Africa via Paris and Marseilles. Local suppliers of hashish in North Africa have in some instances had to cut their prices by as much as 55 per cent in the face of an influx of low priced Chinese drugs.

In Latin America, Mexico City is believed to be the main point of dissemination for Chinese drugs, gambling dives in some Mexican cities being used as a cover under which to pass drugs to traffickers and the public. Drugs of Chinese origin also reach the American continent via the Philippines into which very large quantities are smuggled each year.

Supply of Arms

By the end of 1965 the countries of the Soviet bloc (primarily the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany) were supplying at least £133 million worth of arms and military equipment to developing countries of the non-Communist world each year—roughly eight times as much as the value of military supplies provided by the United States to developing countries annually and well over twice as much as that provided by the two leading ex-colonial powers, Britain and France.

By the opening months of 1966 the armed forces of the following countries were either wholly or to an important extent equipped with arms manufactured in the Communist, mainly Soviet, bloc. Algeria, Afghanistan, Egypt, Cyprus, Ghana, Iraq, Indonesia, Guinea, Mali, Somalia, Syria, Tanzania and the Yemen Republic. Out of some 2,500 tanks thought to be in the possession of the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (excluding Israel) about 1,900 had been provided by the Soviet bloc which had also replaced Britain as the principal supplier of military aircraft to the area and was equalling Britain in importance as a supplier of naval vessels to developing countries. In addition arms from Communist countries were being supplied in varying but usually large quantities to guerilla movements in South Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Portuguese Guinea, Angola, Mozambique and the Congo, and to similar movements based in Tanzania and Zambia and formed to carry out operations against Rhodesia and South Africa. Arms of Communist bloc origin were also finding their way via Cuba into the hands of guerilla and revolutionary movements in Latin America and into the hands of terrorists in Aden and the South Arabian Federation.

With the exception of some of the naval vessels supplied most of the

arms supplied by the Communist bloc to developing countries are of comparatively recent manufacture and in several instances has included surface to air or ship to shore guided missiles as well as jet aircraft of recent make.

The supply of arms by Communist countries to forces under the control of governments of non-Communist states did not begin until 1955 when Czechoslovakia signed the first of a series of Soviet bloc agreements to supply arms to Egypt. However the provision of weapons to clandestine movements and pro-Communist guerillas started with ELAS in Greece even before the end of the Second World War and then continued through the Greek civil war until 1948.

This was followed by the supply of arms and military equipment in very large quantities by or through Communist China to the army of Ho Chi Minh, the Viet Minh, engaged in revolt against French rule in the Indo-China war of 1945-54. Ho Chi Minh visited Peking in 1950 and in the course of his visit concluded a lend-lease type agreement for the supply of arms and equipment with Communist China.

By 1952 it was estimated that Chinese aid to the Viet Minh forces was averaging 3,000 tons a month and in that one year alone totalled some 40,000 rifles, 4,000 sub-machine guns and 450 mortars together with anti-aircraft and field guns. Before long, weapons of the latest Soviet manufacture were reaching the Viet Minh including a recoilless gun of a type superior to those in use by the French army.

By the middle of 1953, sufficient supplies had been received to enable the regular guerilla forces comprising the hard core of the Viet Minh movement and then already five divisions strong, to be equipped with at least twenty machine guns per battalion, whilst about a third of the personnel of each had modern sub-machine guns. In March 1954, a Soviet bloc military and economic aid pool totalling \$500 million was formed to help supply the Viet Minh. By the time of the decisive action of the war, the siege of Dien Bien Phu in the early months of 1954, the Viet Minh were able to deploy about 300 105 mm field guns around the French positions from which they proceeded to fire a total of no less than 350,000 shells. The Viet Minh had also by then the invaluable assistance of anti-aircraft regiments equipped with radar directed guns and had been provided with well over 500 Soviet built Molotova trucks.

1954 also saw an early Soviet attempt to establish a bridgehead in the Western hemisphere by supplying arms to the pro-Communist Government of Jacobo Arbenz Gusman of Guatemala. About 200 tons of arms and ammunition, including light field guns, were loaded on to a chartered Swedish ship in the Polish port of Stettin. Elaborate security precautions were taken in an attempt to conceal the ship's destination and the nature of her cargo. The arms were landed in Guatemala but swift action by anti-Communist elements nullified this particular Soviet venture and led to the overthrow of Arbenz and his Government.

In the autumn of 1955, the Soviet Union embarked upon its still continuing drive to supply arms to the governments of the developing

nations even when they were not of a markedly pro-Communist nature. The reasons behind this drive was certainly not based upon attempts to secure economic profits for the USSR. In the great majority of cases, arms were supplied under long term credits with liberal terms of repayment. In many instances repayment is to be made in commodities for which the Soviet Union would seem to have no great need and which not infrequently the country receiving the arms finds it difficult to sell on world markets. In the comparatively few instances in which weapons have been sold for cash they have been sold at greatly reduced prices.

The Soviet Government's intentions in entering into agreements for the supply of arms on a massive scale to such countries would seem therefore to be essentially political. Dependence on Soviet bloc arms on the part of the armed forces of newly independent states clearly has many advantages from the Soviet point of view; moreover it would seem that on occasion arms are supplied with the additional object of upsetting local balances of power that the Western Powers have tried to create, as for example in the case of the Arab states and Israel, or with the deliberate intention of inflaming critical situations as with the supply of Czechoslovakian arms to Greek Cypriots.

By far the most impressive ventures in the supply of arms on long term credit by the Soviet bloc has been that to North African and Middle Eastern states. This commenced with the signing of a credit agreement between Egypt and Czechoslovakia in October 1955 and with a similar agreement between Czechoslovakia and Syria signed the following February. Under this agreement Egypt received 200 tanks, 200 armoured troop carriers, 100 self-propelled guns, 120 MIG 15 fighters, 250 field and anti-tank guns and naval vessels including two destroyers and two submarines, as well as large quantities of small arms. Syria also received 100 tanks, troop carriers, anti-aircraft guns, field guns, small arms and fighter aircraft. Both countries also received large quantities of military transport vehicles. In the course of the campaign against Egypt in the autumn of 1956, Israeli forces destroyed many Soviet-made tanks and captured more than 6,000 vehicles and some 10,000 light automatic weapons, almost all of Soviet bloc manufacture. It is probable that all these losses had been more than made up from the same source by the end of 1957.

There would seem to be no doubt that the initiative for the supply of arms to Arab countries came from the Communist countries and was not simply a request for aid being answered. President Nasser has described how he was approached on the subject by Daniel Solod, the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo, a diplomat with experience of Middle Eastern countries going back over a number of years and whose activities in other appointments in the area had already caused him to become known to Western journalists as "Mr. Troublemaker". According to Nasser, Solod took him into a corner at a diplomatic reception and asked him whether the Egyptian Government would be prepared to buy arms from the Soviet Union, saying that if it was, he would see that the proper authorities were informed. Nasser's reaction was to

answer him—"in the same tone saying that I found his offer extremely interesting and that I should be prepared to enter in negotiation in that sense"¹

This conversation would seem to have been the first step in the completion of a series of arms supply agreements between the Soviet bloc and Egypt in which repayment was to be made largely through deliveries of Egyptian cotton, a high proportion of which crop has been mortgaged for many years ahead by these arrangements. The agreements provided not only for the deliveries of equipment, but for the sending of Soviet and Eastern European military missions to Egypt and for the training of Egyptian officers at military academies and schools within the Soviet bloc. By the first months of 1962 the Soviet "take-over" of the Egyptian defence system was becoming so marked that the Secretary of the London Military Commentators Circle wrote:

"The armed forces of the UAR (United Arab Republic—in fact Egypt) have during the past five years become almost a replica of the Soviet Armed forces, being equipped almost entirely with material of Soviet origin and having absorbed Soviet doctrine and mentality."²

By the end of 1965 it was thought that Egypt had probably received about £250 million worth of Soviet bloc military aid. Items of equipment being supplied at 60 per cent of cost. It was also estimated that if Egypt had bought the equivalent amount of equipment on the open market she would have expended £17 million on tanks alone. A British estimate of the probable total tank strength of the Egyptian Army as at the beginning of June 1967 put it at a figure of 1,200 all except 50 being of Soviet make and including 350 T-34's at least 450 T-54's, 60 JS-3's with 122 mm guns and 150 SU-100's with 100 mm guns. A West German estimate put the number of military transport vehicles received from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe at 10,000 with in addition 700 armoured personnel carriers and 1,500 guns of all types, field, anti-tank and anti-aircraft. The Soviet Union has also supplied equipment for 20 batteries of anti-aircraft (SA-2 Guideline) guided missiles. Deliveries of arms from Communist countries allowed Egypt to increase the size of her army to six divisions by the beginning of 1966, two of which were armoured divisions, and to form a parachute brigade and twelve regiments of artillery. A third armoured division was reported to be forming.

The Egyptian Air Force and Navy have also benefited from Soviet bloc aid. The strength of the former in the opening months of 1967 was put at about 550 operational aircraft. All of these were of Soviet manufacture and comprised:

- Two Squadrons of TU-16 medium bombers,
- Four Squadrons IL-28 light bombers,
- Two Squadrons MIG-21s fighters,
- 4 Squadrons MIG-19s,
- 2 Squadrons MIG-15s.

¹Jean and Simon Lacoutoure, *L'Egypte au Mouvement*, Paris 1956, p. 214.

²Captain E. Hinterhoff, *Nato's 15 Nations*, February-March 1962.

The air force has also been equipped with a number of Czechoslovakian and Soviet helicopters and Soviet transport aircraft.

The Navy was believed to have received the following vessels from the Communist countries:

- 4 Skory Class Soviet destroyers,
- 9 Soviet 'W' Class submarines,
- 10 Komar Class Soviet fast patrol boats,
- 36 Soviet built motor torpedo boats,
- 8 Yugoslav built motor torpedo boats,
- 6 Soviet built submarine chasers.

Estimates of the total amount of Soviet bloc military aid received by Egypt up to the commencement of the June 1967 Campaign against Israel put the figure at £400 million. Soviet willingness to replace the enormous losses suffered by Egypt during the campaign soon appeared evident. Within a fortnight of the end of the fighting 500 heavy Soviet transport planes had made landings at Cairo Airport carrying further supplies.

Syria, already in possession of substantial quantities of Soviet bloc military aid, signed an agreement with the USSR for the supply of a further £70 millions worth of equipment in May 1967.

Deliveries of Soviet arms to Algeria under credit agreements commenced very soon after that country achieved independence and by 1966 it was thought that deliveries had included: 300 T.34 and T.54 tanks, 150 armoured personnel carriers, large numbers of field and assault guns, small arms and three submarine chasers, eight motor torpedo boats and about 80 operational aircraft including MIG 15's, MIG 17's, MIG 21's, IL-28 light bombers, helicopters and transport planes. It was also reported, but not confirmed, that the Algerian army had received a delivery of Soviet SAM anti-aircraft guided missiles. Some 800 Soviet military instructors and technicians were known to be in Algeria.

The Republic of Somalia signed a credit agreement for the supply of arms with the Soviet Union in the latter part of 1963. Under it, Somalia was to receive £11.7 million worth of equipment with which to equip an army of 20,000 men and an air force. The first deliveries were made in February 1964 and the first Soviet military missions arrived about the same time. By the beginning of 1966 deliveries had reached a stage at which Somalia's neighbours were becoming seriously concerned at the potential threat entailed in this arms build up. A number of T-34 tanks, personnel carriers and artillery pieces were reported to be already in the hands of Somali units whilst further supplies were said to be arriving on board Soviet ships at the port of Mogadishu. Sufficient MIG 15 aircraft to equip at least one squadron of the newly formed Somali air force had arrived and further supplies including MIG 17's were expected.

Speaking to a correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* in May 1966 the Emperor of Ethiopia said that Soviet military supplies to Somalia

were "far in excess of requirements of national security", and added that he had told Mr. Malik, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister when he visited Ethiopia shortly beforehand. Emperor Haille Selassie also said that Soviet arms had been found in the hands of Somali forces engaged in operations along the disputed Somali-Ethiopia border. Such arms he stated had also been captured from Somali raiders in border areas of Kenya. Considerable numbers of Soviet instructors were believed to have arrived in Somali army and air force camps in the closing months of 1965.

Other countries which have signed large scale credit agreements for the supply of arms with the Soviet Union and the Communist countries of Eastern Europe include Indonesia, which has received an estimated £180 millions worth of military equipment including a cruiser, motor patrol boats equipped with surface to surface guided missiles, and a number of Soviet made "Badger" bombers. Guinea has received large quantities of equipment under agreements with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Equipment provided includes armoured personnel carriers and 105 mm and 122 mm guns. There has also been a promise to supply MIG-17 fighters and transport aircraft. Mali has received military equipment to an estimated value of £1 million.

Soviet arms began arriving in Iraq in large quantities soon after the revolution of 1958. Subsequently the weapons system of the Iraqi army was adapted entirely for the employment of Soviet bloc arms, quantities of which arrived by sea through Basra. An Iraqi military mission was in Moscow in late 1965. It was believed in order to negotiate a new arms supply agreement. Soviet bloc arms have also been supplied to Tanzania in the shape of light artillery, anti-aircraft guns and armoured personnel carriers. There have been reports of a strong Soviet army training mission being present in the country. An agreement for the supply of arms by the Soviet Union to Burma followed the visit of the Burmese Chief of Staff to Moscow. It is believed that equipment to a total value of £8 million is involved.

In the Autumn of 1966, Persia, which had previously depended on Western countries for defence equipment, signed an agreement with the USSR under which it was to receive £30 millions worth of military supplies.

Soviet bloc agreements for the supply of arms often also included for the provision of training facilities for officers and technical personnel of the receiving country. About 1,000 officers and technicians of the Egyptian army had received training in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Poland by February 1962. Some of the officers attended courses at military academies in Moscow of between two and three years duration. About 500 Algerian officers and technicians have been receiving similar training each year.

Contrary to a generally held impression the supply of arms by Communist China, except in the case of supplies to North Vietnam has been on an incomparably smaller scale than that of the Soviet bloc. The supply of arms to the armed forces of governments in Africa, for

instance, has been limited to the provision of small arms, some anti-tank guns, heavy machine guns and mortars to Tanzania and similar deliveries to Guinea, and probably also the Congo (Brazzaville) from which a military mission went to Peking in September 1964. A strong Chinese military mission is also known to be stationed in Brazzaville as are technicians and instructors from the Soviet Union and other bloc countries. A Chinese military mission which had been reportedly training members of the Tanzanian army is believed to have left the country at the end of 1965.

It was announced early the following year that about 200 American Patton tanks lost by Pakistan during the border war with India were to be replaced by Soviet designed T-59's made in China. China was also to help Pakistan replace aircraft losses by providing a number of Chinese made MIG 19's.

What might be called the "clandestine" supply of arms by Communist countries or the equipping of revolutionary and guerilla movements by them has become ever more common since the mid-1950's. The end of the war in Indo-China was followed almost immediately by the outbreak of revolt against French rule in Algeria. Before long the supply of Communist arms to the rebels had become an important and perhaps ultimately decisive factor in the campaign. Most of these arms were transported to Algeria via Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, but a considerable amount were despatched by Soviet and East European ships sailing to Moroccan or Tunisian ports. Much of the work connected with the reception and delivery of Communist arms and equipment destined for the FLN and channelled through Morocco was done by Czechoslovakian experts working under the guise of commercial attaches of the Czechoslovakian legation.

By the end of the campaign French officers estimated that 70 per cent of the FLN's armoury was of Communist bloc manufacture and that an equivalent proportion of their daily ammunition supply originated from the same source. Czechoslovakia had a major part in this arms flow.

A former export director of a leading Swiss armaments firm said at the time:

"I am convinced that the USSR has for many years been maintaining the most dangerous and best organised arms smuggling agency in the world. At Moscow's orders, the Skoda works supply the politically important centres of unrest with all sorts of war materials. It is known that the Fellagas and the Algerian rebels were splendidly equipped with the most up-to-date grenade throwers, machine guns, pistols, radios and landing vehicles, all from Czechoslovakia."¹

"Clandestine" Communist arms first reached African countries south of the Sahara on a large scale in March 1960, when a Czechoslovakian

¹*Der Spiegel*, 28 June, 1961.

military mission arrived in Guinea, to which country the energetic Mr. Solod had by that time been transferred from Cairo as Soviet Ambassador. The mission brought gifts in the shape of two cargoes of small arms and scout cars. It was not long before Czechoslovakian weapons were also to be found in neighbouring states.

Pieter Lessing has recorded that early in 1960, just prior to the granting of independence to the Congo he personally examined crates of new rifles from Czechoslovakia which had been intercepted by the authorities and which were apparently destined for supporters of Patrice Lumumba's *Mouvement National Congolais* and Gizenga's *Parti Solidaire Africaine*.

Even as early as 1957 supplies of Czechoslovakian arms were being received by the terrorist groups of the Communist controlled *Union des Population Camerounaise* in the Cameroons.

During 1960 Soviet trawlers were employed in ferrying arms from Conakry, capital of Guinea to points on the Angolan coast for the use of the Angolan rebel movement *Uniao das Populacoes de Angola* (UPA) which had launched a revolt in Northern Angola from bases in the Congo, a revolt in the preparations for which Solod working from his Embassy in Conakry had played an important part. Arms from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China have continued to provide the major proportion of weapons used by terrorist movements in both Angola and Mozambique.

The success of the extreme left-wing revolution in Zanzibar in January 1964 and the subsequent merging of the revolutionary government with that of Tanganyika was followed not only by deliveries of arms from Communist sources for the use of the armed forces of the new state of Tanzania, but also for an increasing number of African 'liberation movements' which tended to make Dar-es-Salaam their headquarters. Throughout 1964 reports appeared of Soviet and Chinese ships unloading cargoes of arms in its harbour. During 1964 too instances began to occur of members of terrorist organisations being arrested in possession of Communist-manufactured arms and explosives in the countries of the former Central African Federation. It was, however, to the Communist-orientated rebel movement in the Congo that the most spectacular arms supply effort was directed. Although at first it was considered that these supplies were mainly of Chinese origin it subsequently became clear that a high percentage were, in fact, being supplied by the Soviet Union.

Large quantities of these weapons came from stockpiles in Algeria and Egypt. It was estimated that more than 300 tons of arms and supplies were flown from depots at Boufarik, South of Algiers, to Khartoum during December 1964 and January 1965 by a fleet of twelve Soviet "Antonov" turbo-prop airliners. At Khartoum these cargoes were transferred to light aircraft and flown to Juba in the southern Sudan. From there lorry convoys carried them to points on the Congo border. Considerable efforts were made to disguise Soviet participations in this operation. Red Star emblems on the aircraft and other identifying marks were painted out and replaced by Algerian markings; the planes were flown by Soviet crews but had Algerian co-pilots.

Arms from Egypt were also transported south to the Sudan by boats sailing down the Nile and thence from disembarkation points to the Congo frontier by lorry. A report appeared in the *Daily Telegraph* of 11 May 1965 to the effect that the main Communist arms supply route to the rebels was being switched to a seaborne one, five cargoes of Communist arms being said to have been unloaded at the Port of Pointe Noire in the former French Congo during the early months of the year. Ships engaged in carrying such war material on this route including Soviet, Chinese, Algerian, and Egyptian ships. The same report alleged that use was being made of the newly inaugurated Soviet "Aeroflot" direct service between Moscow and Brazzaville, to fly members of the Congo Republic (Brazzaville) army to the USSR for training in the use of artillery, communication equipment and as members of air crews.

With the deepening of the crisis surrounding Rhodesia in the latter half of 1965 further reports began to appear that Communist arms were being supplied to members of the African nationalist parties, ZAPU and ZANU. In April 1966 seven members of the latter party were killed in a battle with Rhodesian police and a number captured together with considerable quantities of Soviet and Czechoslovakian arms. Statements from prisoners said that the band had been sent into Rhodesia for the purpose of conducting terrorism and sabotage from neighbouring Zambia.

The end of the Indo-China war was followed by the supply of arms from the Soviet bloc to dissident movements in Asia. In 1961 the Soviet Union became involved in a large scale supply operation by air in aid of the Pathet Lao, the Communist guerilla force, then operating in Laos. More than 200,000 tons of war material was despatched for the use of the Pathet Lao during the first stage of that operation alone, and this was later augmented by a substantial Soviet air lift which produced a flow of supplies averaging nearly 200 tons a day.

By the beginning of 1963 the forces of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam which in the early days of their revolt had relied to a considerable extent on supplies of arms captured from the French army by the Vietminh in the Indo-China War, were increasingly being re-equipped with weapons of Soviet, Czechoslovakian, Chinese and East German manufacture, many of them of a recent type. The commencement of regular bombing raids on North Vietnam in 1965 by the American airforce brought a Soviet response in the provision of numbers of SAM-11 surface to air guided missiles, while quantities of Soviet equipment was sent overland through China. There were Soviet complaints of Chinese obstruction in the handling of it and reports in early 1966 spoke of an increasing number of Soviet ships leaving South Russian ports and passing through the Suez canal en route for the North Vietnamese port of Haiphong. These indicated that a switch was being made to a seaborne supply route.

In addition to supply efforts in support of the Viet Cong there have also been indications that China has engaged in clandestine arms supply efforts in other directions in Asia. In the autumn of 1964 the Nepalese

police announced that they had arrested 17 Chinese agents and that "alarming quantities" of hidden weapons had been seized. The arms, of Chinese manufacture, had been captured in four different areas of Nepal. Before the arrest and discoveries occurred a defector from a Chinese road building gang employed in Nepal upon work under an economic aid scheme had said that many members of the gang were, in fact, agents or members of the Chinese army using their position in the road building force to carry out surveys of the country and to arrange for the smuggling of arms to dissident Nepalese groups.

In the course of his visit to Egypt in 1964 Khrushchev made a point of stating during one of his speeches that if the Arab peoples needed arms with which to push the British out of Aden the Soviet Union would be only too happy to provide them. By the summer of 1965 quantities of arms and explosives had been seized from captured terrorists in Aden, by far the greater proportion of which originated from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia or East Germany, though it was not clear if these had been delivered directly to the terrorist organisations concerned or passed to them from stockpiles in Egypt. The following year caches were also discovered which included a considerable quantity of Chinese arms. In the middle of May 1967 a large amount of arms including 200 brand new Czechoslovakian made revolvers were found in a consignment of 42 crates labelled as "water pumps" and "engine parts" which were being unloaded in Aden docks.

Beirut, which a number of dissident elements from South Arabia are known to have made their headquarters has several times been the scene of the seizure of cargoes of Communist arms. In one incident a large consignment of Czechoslovakian automatic pistols was discovered in a Czechoslovakian plane which had landed at the airport, the consignment being labelled as spare parts for agricultural machinery. In another incident which took place in January 1966 Lebanese port officials at Beirut discovered that part of the cargo of the Bulgarian vessel, *Veliko Tarnovo* which had been entered on the ship's manifest as "machines" consigned to a Lebanese firm in fact turned out to consist of 1,500 automatic rifles. At the beginning of 1966 the West German Government announced the uncovering of a Czechoslovakian network engaged upon smuggling arms to the Kurdish rebels in Iraq.

The supply of arms from the Soviet bloc to Cyprus began in a "clandestine" fashion during the civil strife in the island early in 1964, possibly from stocks accumulated in Egypt. Later it was put on a more formal basis with the signing of an arms supply agreement between the Soviet and Cypriot Government under which the Soviet Union was to supply large quantities of weapons, including it was thought, artillery and armoured vehicles.

A possible variation in the usual methods of "clandestine" arms supply was reported from Greece early in 1966, when Mr. Garoufalais, a former Minister of National Defence, made a statement that there was reason to believe that the 12,000 Greek Communists who had returned to the country in recent years from the Soviet Union and bloc countries

in which they had obtained refuge after the end of the civil war had smuggled in with them a total of approximately 60,000 sporting guns (rifles and shot guns) of types which could be very usefully employed in street fighting or in a guerilla campaign. Shortly before Mr. Garoufalais made his statement, two Greek Communists both former members of the guerilla movement of civil war days, who were returning to the country from exile in Communist territory were arrested for smuggling in 14 repeating shot guns, 3,000 cartridges and equipment for the manufacture of bombs, land mines and hand grenades. Another Greek repatriate from the Soviet Union was arrested a little later for bringing 16 shot guns across the frontier illegally. Customs officers at Piraeus found 24 hunting rifles hidden in the luggage of returning Greek Communists in one week in April. These incidents coupled with the reports that the Communist Party was forming and training militant groups and the fact that there had been a pronounced increase in the number of guns and rifles imported into Greece through legal channels from the Soviet Union during the last few years (from nil in 1961 to 12,000 in 1962, increasing to 24,000 in 1965) were causing the Greek security authorities to fear that a deliberate programme was being pursued for the re-arming of the Communist Party in preparation for a further "armed struggle".

Training of Guerillas

Although for obvious reasons detailed information on this subject is not easily obtainable, there is conclusive evidence that both the countries of the Soviet bloc and Communist China have given training in the tactics of guerilla warfare and methods of terrorism to considerable numbers of Africans and Asians, including both members of pro-Communist and extremist nationalist political organisations in their own countries and inside the bloc itself.

The principal guerilla training school in the Soviet bloc is situated in Bulgaria near Sofia. Students have included a number from the Congo, Nigeria, Uganda and the Cameroons. The Soviet and East German armies jointly run a similar school at the Red Army Barracks in Leipzig which has also received a number of African pupils.

In 1961 six Africans returning to the Cameroons were arrested and they gave details of a ten week course in guerilla warfare which they said they had attended at a military engineering college near Peking. The syllabus of this course included training in the use of explosives, grenades, fuses and detonators; practice in planning sabotage operations, the manufacture and improvisation of explosives from locally obtained materials, instruction in the use of 'imperialist' weapons, and lectures on the planning of ambushes, the fortification of villages and tactics to be used against armoured vehicles and aircraft. The course also included instruction of the methods of infiltrating political and other organisations and methods of dealing with "unsympathetic" villagers and others. Training in the second part of this course included lectures

on such subjects as "The Chinese Revolutionary Struggle", "The People's War" and "The Democratic Revolution" as well as on how to establish "revolutionary bases" in rural areas. These six men were sent back to Africa carrying instructions for the guerilla movement of the Communist-controlled *Union des Populations Camerounnaises* which was then posing a serious threat to the stability of that country.

A report circulated by the *International Press Service* of West Berlin in June 1964 stated that large numbers of young Africans were being trained in guerilla warfare and sabotage techniques at special Chinese training centres located in Harbin, Nanking, and other centres in North East China. Students were said to come from Nigeria, Dahomey, the Ivory Coast, Algeria, Zanzibar, South Africa, Malagassy, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea, the Cameroons and the Congo. Other reports during 1964 spoke of members of the Luo tribe from Kenya being secretly sent to the Soviet bloc for training in guerilla warfare at the instigation of pro-Communist elements in Kenya.

In March 1966 the Kenya Minister of Defence said that about 180 Kenyan students were known to be receiving military training that had not been authorised or sponsored by the Government in foreign countries. Of these 70 were under training in Bulgaria, the remainder being in the USSR, China, East Germany, and Egypt. The Kenyan Government was asking the Governments concerned that this training should be discontinued.

A number of members of African nationalist movements arrested in Rhodesia on charges of attempted sabotage and terrorism in the latter half of 1965 and early 1966 were alleged to have received training in Soviet bloc countries, Communist China, and in some cases North Korea. One of those arrested who turned Queen's evidence stated that some of those concerned had been sent to the Soviet Union after officials of the Zimbabwe African People's Union at its headquarters in Zambia had told them that they were to be given educational scholarships. He alleged that in his case he had understood he was to be sent to the USA to receive training to fit him for a civil post in a future African nationalist administration in Rhodesia. He had only realised that he was to be sent to the Soviet Union, he said, when the Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Dar-es-Salaam had told him that he and 11 other Rhodesian Africans were being sent to the Soviet Union for training in "intelligence and police work". He was then given a faked passport bearing a false name by a ZAPU official, and flown to Moscow with others of the group. Here they were kept in a large house on the outskirts of the city for four months, during which time they underwent a course which included lessons in political economy and Communist theory, lectures on the methods employed by Western intelligence services particularly those of the United States, and instruction which covered training in the use of espionage techniques, particularly the photographing of documents, radio communications and methods of recruiting agents and the use of "dead letter boxes". They were also given training in the use of mines, time bombs, booby-traps, automatic

pistols, light machine guns and unarmed combat. On their return from training this particular party were sent back into Rhodesia by boat with the intention of obtaining information for ZAPU headquarters in Salisbury and setting up the nucleus of a resistance network in that town.

As well as providing training facilities for guerillas inside Communist countries, numbers of instructors have been provided to staff guerilla training camps in African countries acting as bases for 'liberation movements' equipped with Communist arms. These include camps at Dolisie and Porto Negro in the Congo (Brazzaville) where recruits for the Communist-backed MPLA are trained to fight in Angola, and camps in Guinea, and most notably a series of camps in Tanzania, including those at Konwa and on the coast North and South of Dar-es-Salaam, at Ilala, Mpuku and Kisiju. Altogether a complex of some 15 camps used for recruitment, training and transit purposes serve the guerilla movements based in Tanzania under the control of the Organisation of African Unity. Arms are supplied by the Soviet Union, China and Czechoslovakia while camp training staffs are mainly Chinese or Cubans, often negroid. About 150 Communist Chinese instructors are stationed in two camps in Zanzibar, part of their duties includes giving guerilla warfare training to members of African 'liberation movements'.

The Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation

Since the death of Stalin a number of special bodies have been established either directly or indirectly under the control of the Communist powers to assist the Communist drive to extend its influence in the countries of the developing world. They have played an important part in Communist political and subversive operations during the last 10 years.

The Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation was set up in December 1957, being at first known as the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Council. Its formation being largely the result of the Communist failure to obtain control of the conference organised by the non-aligned Colombo Powers and held in Bandung Indonesia in 1955, and at which a number of Afro-Asian countries expressed their desire to avoid involvement with either Eastern or Western Power blocs. In an attempt to put pressure on the countries attending the Bandung conference, a World Peace Council Meeting was held in Delhi shortly before the Bandung Conference took place, and it was held under the name of 'Conference for the Relaxation of International Tensions'. As a result of this conference it was decided to set up a new organisation to exploit the "Spirit of Bandung" amongst Asian and African countries which would include bourgeoisie as well as Communist or pro-Communist groups in order to conceal its true purpose.

The first concrete step towards the setting up of this organisation came in August 1956 when a 'National Asian Solidarity Committee of the Soviet Union' was formed. At the end of the year the delegates

who had attended the conference in Delhi decided to call an inaugural conference in Cairo. This took place in Cairo in December 1957. Thirty-nine delegations attended from a large number of Asian and African countries. Those attending in an official capacity included delegations of the Soviet Union, Communist China, Morocco, Egypt, and Tunis. Semi-official delegations included representatives of a number of political movements and groups from the then African colonies. The Egyptian Government was officially responsible for managing the conference, but control of it in practice soon passed to the Communist delegations. The Chief Soviet delegate made a point of promising generous aid from the Soviet Union to all the countries represented to assist them break "the grip of neo-colonial exploitation", and to enable them to "escape from economic slavery at the hands of Western colonial capitalism".

Although Communist manipulation of the Conference to serve the ends of Communist policies was blatantly obvious to most Western observers it was not so obvious to many of the delegates from the Afro-Asian countries taking part, one of these from Uganda told Fritz Schatten, a West German authority on African problems some time later:

"For those of us who were taking part in such an important international conference for the first time and rubbing shoulders with cabinet ministers, presidents and prominent trade unionists, scientists, artists, and writers from countries all over the world, Cairo was a tremendous experience. For the first time we felt that we were being taken seriously. They all treated us as equals, whether they had won their own independence 40 years ago or perhaps only a couple of years back. It seemed to us that a new force was coming together here, a force based on true solidarity and a common consciousness of a struggle against the old colonial order and against the obsolete social and economic system of our countries in favour of something new and revolutionary. Although many of us instinctively, and some of us even consciously, rejected Soviet Communist interference in our work, and although many of us distrusted the Communists, this mistrust was outweighed by a feeling of real gratitude that a great world Power should support our demands".¹

These demands, when voiced in the shape of resolutions and communiques issued at the end of the conference included complete and immediate independence for all colonial territories, the abolition of all United Nations trusteeships, and called for the support of nationalist movements in particular, Kenya, Cyprus, Bahrein, Uganda, Somaliland, Madagascar, and the Cameroons.

The Committee for Organisational Questions', dominated by Communist delegates, passed a resolution calling for the immediate establishment of a 'solidarity council' and a permanent secretariat, the

¹John Face, General Secretary Uganda National Congress, as recorded by Fritz Schatten. *Communism in Africa*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1966, pp. 274-275.

task of these two bodies being to implement decisions of the conference and to act as a liaison organisation between sessions of the council. Representatives from 10 countries were thereupon elected to the secretariat, the Soviet Union, Communist China, the Cameroons, Ghana, the Sudan, India, Japan, Indonesia, Iraq and Syria. This secretariat was presided over by a General Secretary, an Egyptian named Youssef el Sebay.

Great care was taken to ensure that although on the surface, as far as numerical strength was concerned, it appeared that delegates from Communist countries were more than counterbalanced by those from non-aligned states, in fact, control remained safely vested in Communist hands. Delegates on the secretariat representing such countries as Somaliland, India, the Cameroons, Japan, Iraq and Indonesia all being, if not actual members of their country's respective Communist Parties or organisations closely connected with them, persons of extreme left wing views. The only non-Communist countries represented on the secretariat by official government-appointed delegates being Ghana and Syria.

Within a short time 'Afro-Asian Solidarity' committees were set up in many of the countries which had sent delegations to the Cairo Conference, amongst the non-Communist countries some of the first to be formed were in Guinea, Mali, Somalia, and Ghana. In some cases such committees were formed from amongst exiles from colonial territories and other countries with governments hostile to the aims of the Solidarity Council and established with bases in Cairo.

The work of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committees in Communist countries soon became important. A number of special days each year have been set apart by the solidarity secretariat in Cairo for the purpose of drawing world attention to various aspects of the anti-colonial struggle. 1 December, for instance, has been named as 'Quit-Africa Day'. Each year special demonstrations are organised by the solidarity committees in all Communist countries. Well publicised through all the various propaganda medium, the purpose of them is to stress the need for the colonialist countries to leave any remaining African bases they possess and to draw attention to the "colonial shame" that is still said to exist on that continent. Special propaganda is issued for use in the Press by the solidarity committees on each of such days, and frequently more concrete action is also taken.

As well as fulfilling a propaganda rôle the Afro-Asian solidarity committees of Communist countries also play an important part in arranging the visits of nationals from Afro-Asian countries to those of the Communist bloc and in acting as hosts to missions and delegations from revolutionary movements engaged in or proposing to launch armed revolt against the established regimes of their homelands. For instance, of all Africans visiting China during the early and mid-1960's about half went on invitations issued by the Peking Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee which has also arranged receptions and provided various forms of material assistance for the Peking missions of the

National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, the Malayan Liberation League and the United Patriotic Front of Thailand. In the case of the latter the committee provided funds to cover the travelling expenses for the front's representatives both in China and abroad.

A number of important results followed on the second Afro-Asian Solidarity Council Meeting in Conakry in February 1961. Probably chief among these was the establishment of an 'Afro-Asian Solidarity Fund'. Officially the purpose of the fund, administered by a special committee including both representatives of the Soviet Union and China, was to give aid to political, trade union and other organisations and individuals actively engaged in the fight against 'Imperialism' and to the dependants of 'freedom fighters' killed in anti-colonial wars. Various types of aid were defined and were to include printing, duplicating and photographic equipment, wireless receivers, teaching and propaganda material, food and clothing. Scholarships and training facilities were also to be provided as was legal aid for those "undergoing judicial persecution" for their participation in the national liberation movement.

Monies for the fund were provided largely by the Communist countries. Within a year of its foundation it is thought that the Soviet Union and Communist China had each undertaken to provide over £16,000 towards it.

Pieter Lessing author of *Africa's Red Harvest* has described the fund as:

"... a useful instrument through which Russians can supply large quantities of money to African organisations without the funds being traceable back to Moscow. Even Africans who would hesitate to accept Russian money have no qualms about accepting it from a so-called Afro-Asian solidarity movement".¹

Various organisational changes were made in the command structure of the Solidarity Organisation at the Conakry Conference, the secretariat was enlarged by the co-option of representatives of Algeria, Guinea, and the Congo; a 27-member Steering Committee was set up to improve the political leadership of the organisation and it was decided to change its name to that of 'Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation', a permanent regional office was also established in Conakry to co-ordinate the organisation's work in West Africa. The Conference itself was notable for the undisguised efforts made by the Communist delegates to attract members of delegations from Asian and African countries to visit the Communist bloc and to attend courses of study in it.

Lavish distribution was made of pamphlets advertising the Lumumba University in Moscow and similar institutions in China but numbers of Communist delegates also personally invited their counterparts from Asian and African delegations to visit the particular member of the Communist bloc from which they came and in some cases presented

¹Pieter Lessing, *Africa's Red Harvest*, Michael Joseph, London, 1962, p. 92.

free airline tickets with the invitations. As well as resolutions calling for the end of colonialism in Asia and Africa, the agenda of the conference carried other resolutions concerning cultural, economic and social problems in those two continents and the need to learn from "socialist experiences" in order to find the correct solution to them.

Other resolutions called for the setting up of a number of special commissions on which Afro-Asian writers, scientists, sociologists and historians could meet and co-ordinate their work. A recurring theme throughout the conference was the point that in the next stage of the struggle against colonialism, freedom from "economic colonisation" must be achieved.

The Solidarity Organisation's third conference was held at Moshi, Tanganyika in February 1963. It was attended by delegates from 58 affiliated organisations and by 40 observers. Speakers included Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta. Held at a time when Sino-Soviet tension was rising to new heights the conference would have seemed to achieve much less in the field of practical results than either of its two predecessors and was notable chiefly for the manner in which an open clash between Soviet and Chinese delegates was avoided, and for the adoption of a resolution by the Cuban delegation for the holding of a Tri-Continental Conference in Havana.

In May 1965 the fourth Conference of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation was held in Ghana at the Winneba Ideological Institute in Accra. Once again the Sino-Soviet dispute seems to have resulted in little in the way of concrete decisions being taken except one to hold a special meeting in Cairo in December to make arrangements for the holding of the Tri-Continental Conference in Havana previously proposed by Cuba.

If the last two major conferences of the Organisation have been somewhat disappointing from the Communist point of view, however, a high level of activity has been maintained by the permanent secretariat with its offices in Conakry and Cairo. A spate of appeals and resolutions has been issued concerning such subjects as the Congo, South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, French atomic tests in the Sahara and "neo-colonialism". In addition a considerable number of subsidiary organisations have been set up intended to operate front groups within particular spheres. They include:

- The Afro-Asian Organisation for Economic Co-operation;
- The Afro-Asian Reconstruction Organisation;
- The International Committee for Aid to the Congo;
- The Afro-Asian Youth Office;
- The Afro-Asian Student's Organisation;
- The Afro-Asian Sport's Committee;
- The Afro-Asian Writer's Organisation.

Throughout its existence, three main themes have dominated the activities and propaganda of the Solidarity Organisation. The first of these has been the need to unleash "a continental struggle against the

colonialists and imperialists", the second being the need for all ex-colonial territories to obtain full economic as well as political independence, or in other words to cut all ties with their former masters and Western countries in general, and the third has consisted of persistent attempts to denigrate any ally and supporter of the West.

The Tri-Continental Solidarity Organisation

The Tri-Continental Solidarity Organisation and the Committee to Aid the Liberation Movements are two new organisations which came into existence as a result of decisions taken at the Tri-Continental Conference held in Havana in January 1966 under the Presidency of Raul Roa Garcia, Cuba's Foreign Minister and attended by delegates from 82 countries including the Soviet Union and Communist China and by 100 observers. The conference was principally concerned with the 'liberation' struggle including the war in Vietnam and with the problems of the developing countries. Its general tone can be gauged from the remarks of the President of Cuba, Osvaldo Dorticos in his opening speech when he said:

"In a People's Conference such as this, a basic truth is obvious: the definite and total overcoming of underdevelopment can only be obtained through the fight against Imperialism and its final and total defeat . . . It is the right and duty of the people to respond to the imperialists' violence with armed revolutionary violence".¹

The conference carried out its deliberations in a series of committees, principally the Political Committee, the Organising Committee, the Economic Committee and the Social and Cultural Committee. As a result of a resolution passed by the Organising Committee it was decided that a new organisation should be set up to be known as, 'The Afro Asian Latin American Solidarity Organisation'. The aim of it was stated to be:

"To unite, co-ordinate and develop the struggle of the peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, headed by US imperialism, and to organise the flow of aid to National Liberation Movements and newly independent countries."²

The new Solidarity Organisation according to the resolution was to have a general Secretary, Captain Osmany Cienfuegos, Chairman of the Cuban Communist Party's International Affairs Committee and 12 Secretaries, four from each continent, including representatives from the following countries. the United Arab Republic; the Portuguese Colonies, the Congo (Leopoldville), Guinea, the Dominican Republic,

¹The Tri-Continental Conference, *World Marxist Review*, March 1966, pp. 11-13.

²Lionel Soto. First Conference of the People of Three Continents, *World Marxist Review*, April 1966, pp. 1-6.

Chile, Venezuela, Puerto Rico, South Vietnam, North Korea, Syria and Pakistan.

For the time being, it was decided that the headquarters of this secretariat should be in Havana. The question of a permanent headquarters was to be decided at the next conference of the organisation to be held in Cairo in 1968.

“‘The Committee to Aid the Liberation Movements and The Struggle Against Neo-Colonialism’ formed as a result of a resolution passed by the Committee on Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism was also to be supervised by a 12-member Committee including in this case the representatives of both the Soviet Union and the Communist China with in addition representatives from Algeria, Ghana, Tanzania, the Congo (Brazzaville), British Guiana, Guatemala, Brazil, Cuba, Cambodia and Japan. The task of this Committee being to promote the methods and means necessary for effectively carrying out the basic aims of the organisation, particularly armed struggle as a legitimate form of defence against imperialist violence.”¹

During the course of the conference a decision was made to set up a Special Committee for Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) with representatives of four countries, the United Arab Republic, Cuba, North Vietnam and Zimbabwe itself and an office in Cairo. The purpose of this Committee being to supervise arrangements for aid to ZAPU in accordance with the terms of a resolution passed at the Conference which called upon:

“All Socialist and Independent countries and progressive organisations in Africa, Asia and Latin America to provide ZAPU with concrete and unconditional support of financial and material assistance, including all other facilities necessary for the intensification of the struggle to achieve victory against British Colonial rule and Imperialism”.²

Two other organisations were formed as the result of the Havana Conference ‘The Tri-Continental Committee for Aid to Vietnam’. The chief task of this was defined as being to:

“... mobilise, organise, co-ordinate and intensify the movements of solidarity, support and aid to the Vietnamese people in all fields, moral, political, material and economic, including aid through volunteers and arms—within the framework of each country, each continent and all three continents”.³

The headquarters of this committee was to be in Havana. In addition a new ‘Latin-American Solidarity Organisation’ was established as the result of a meeting of Latin American delegates the day after the Conference proper ended. It was formed because of the necessity to have “common revolutionary tactics and strategy in this part of the world

¹*Ibid.*

²*Zimbabwe Review*, February-March 1966

³Lionel Soto, First Conference of the Peoples of Three Continents, *World Marxist Review*, pp. 1-6.

where US Imperialism is most sensitive”¹. The Organising Committee included representatives of Brazil, Cuba, Colombia, British Guiana, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. National committees were to be set up in all these countries with the object of mobilising “the most active anti-imperialist circles which enjoy the support of the People”.²

Aid from the Scholars

A number of academic institutions in Communist countries play an important part in helping to shape the foreign policy of the country concerned, particularly as regards their policies towards the emerging nations. Amongst these has been the Moscow Oriental Institute. In 1959, the Director of this Institute stated openly that he regarded one of his main tasks as being to “publish works of importance for the educational institutions and government departments engaged in the practical tasks in the East”.³

Not long afterwards a Soviet magazine declared that Soviet orientalists “regard it as a distinction to publish collections, monographs, pamphlets, articles, etc., whose content can be creatively utilised by Soviet foreign policy in its operations in the Eastern Countries”⁴.

Institutes for the study of Eastern countries such as the Oriental Institute have existed in the Soviet Union since the early 1920's but their direct participation in the forming and carrying out of Soviet foreign policy is of comparatively recent date and can be traced to the reorganisation of such studies that followed the remarks of Mikoyan, at the 20th Congress of the CPSU when he said:

“The Academy of Science does have an institute that studies the problems of the East, but all that can be said of it is that although in our day the whole East has awakened, this institute is still dozing. Isn't it time for it to rise to the level of current requirements?”⁵

An important development in the re-organisation that followed these remarks was the formation of an African Institute, separate from the Institute of Oriental Studies in 1959 under the direction of the late Professor Ivan Potehkin. The Institute is divided into two sections, history and contemporary problems. Technically the new Institute was considered to form a part of the Department of Historical Science of the Institute of Ethnography, which up to that date had acted as a co-ordinating centre for Soviet African studies.

The purpose of the new Institute was defined in the official statement announcing its formation as including:

¹Lionel Soto. First Conference of the People of Three Continents, *World Marxist Review*, April 1966, pp. 1-6.

²*Ibid.*

³*Voprossi Istorii*, No 5 (1958).

⁴*Problemy Vostorovedna*, No. 1 C1959.

⁵*Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, VIII, No. 8, 4 April, 1956, p. 10.

"... the study of the countries of Africa which have won their independence; the political and economic situation in African colonies, in the conditions of the disintegration of the colonial system of imperialism and the national liberation struggle of the enslaved peoples; the workers and peasants movement in the African countries, the study of contradictions between the imperialist powers and the new forms of colonialism in Africa; the exposure of reactionary ideological trends."¹

It was also announced that the Institute was to be entrusted with:

"The task of establishing contact with the scientific and cultural institutions in African countries, and also with individual scholars and persons connected with culture in those countries, for collaboration in the study of present-day African problems in all fields."²

Potehkin's own views on the correct Soviet approach to Africa had been made clear a few months before he took over the chairmanship of the institute, when speaking as Chairman of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee he said:

"I venture to appeal to all African people to unite . . . remember in your sacred struggle you are not alone . . . the people of my country, the Soviet Union, have always come out in favour of the right of nations to self-determination and national independence."³

About the same time in the course of an article in a Soviet publication he attacked African leaders who were willing to compromise with colonial governments and believed that they should obtain independence through constitutional reform and non-violent methods, saying that such beliefs were:

"A harmful illusion, deliberately fostered by the imperialists in order to prolong their domination of Africa".⁴

Professor Potehkin subsequently repeatedly made it clear both in articles in the Press and in broadcasts that the Institute had a prime interest in problems connected "with the struggle of the African people for independence" rather than mere academic research work. Throughout the years since its formation, there appears to be no doubt that it plots the future course of Soviet policy towards African countries with the ultimate aim of ensuring that they choose "the Socialist road". The practical work of the Institute in pursuit of this aim can be divided into three categories, firstly providing background information and analyses of African problems of all types for the use of government departments and Party organisations concerned with implementing Soviet African policies, secondly to provide a Marxist-Leninist interpretation of African history, particularly in regard to the colonial problem and thirdly the drafting and presentation of Marxist-Leninist solutions to African problems in the manner most likely to encourage support for such solutions from amongst the more educated African classes and

¹*Russia Looks at Asia*, Central Asian Research Centre, London, 1960, p. 11.

²*Ibid.*

³*Ibid.*

⁴*Ibid.*

political leaders. A considerable flow of publications has emanated from the Institute and members of its staff not infrequently take part in broadcast programmes intended for African audiences. Its present Director is Professor Vassily Solodnikou. Its staff numbers about a hundred, and one subject now given special study is that of Economic Aid to Africa by the USSR and other Communist Countries.

Late in 1961 it was announced in Moscow that an Institute of the Peoples of Hispanic America had been established as part of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, under the direction of S. S. Mikhailov, a historian, who is known to have also been connected with the Soviet diplomatic service. The apparent intention was that this new institute should carry out much the same work in regard to Latin America as that already being performed in regard to Africa by the Africa Institute, and the Africa Section of the Department of Ethnography at the University of Leningrad.

In China, an Asia-Africa Society was formed in 1962 for the purpose of carrying out research into the problems of Asian and African countries with a view to strengthening Chinese influence and contacts amongst them and aiding the spread of Marxist theories, the Institute has a membership of more than 500, most of them research workers and including a number of university professors.

Other special bodies and institutions which have been established within recent years to assist in the propaganda drive of Communist countries or in the conduct of their foreign policies include, the Chinese People's Institute for Foreign Affairs, established in December 1949 as officially a "peoples organisation" devoted to the study of international affairs. Its work, however, includes issuing invitations to foreign political leaders to visit China and establishing contacts on a personal level with citizens of foreign countries. The Soviet Institute of International Relations which is a subsidiary body of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign affairs, has its own publishing house and periodically issues books and pamphlets with a strong propaganda slant on current international problems. The Chinese Islamic Association has been active in issuing appeals via the Press and radio for Muslims throughout the world to unite with Chinese Moslems to fight against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. This organisation has been active in sending delegations to many Muslim countries and in arranging receptions for delegations visiting China.

The growing involvement of the Communist countries with hitherto largely strange parts of the world has led to a number of innovations and changes in the various government departments concerned. Surprisingly there was no department within the Soviet Foreign Ministry devoted entirely to African affairs until mid-1958. Until then responsibility for Africa was divided between the second European department, the department also concerned with Britain, which covered British colonies in Africa and the Near and Middle East department. In February 1961 the latter department was split into two sections which became known as the first African department and the second African

department, the first department dealing with countries North of the Sahara and the second department with those South of it.

In China, an African Office has been set up under the direction of the Foreign Ministry. It is sometimes known as the General Africa Directorate. The Research Commission for African Subjects which is responsible to the State Council exercises a general supervision over planning and execution of Chinese operations in Africa, whilst the Commission for Social Relations with the Peoples of Africa operates directly under the control of the State Office and is responsible for passing on orders and instructions to Chinese Communists actually in African countries. A Special Committee for Africa has formed part of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party since 1960.

The Rôle of Three Communist States

In addition to the continual campaign of political warfare and subversion carried on by the leaders of the Communist camp, the Soviet Union and China, the efforts of three of the lesser Communist countries to subvert their neighbours and other non-Communist countries are worth some study. These three countries chosen are East Germany, Cuba, and North Vietnam.

East Germany

The importance of obtaining control of the whole of Germany as a stepping stone to the eventual attainment of control of the whole of Europe stems back to the earliest days of Communist considerations of foreign policy. In the early 1920's and '30's, Germany was the scene of intense activity inspired by the Comintern and Soviet intelligence services as well as by the German Communist Party.

In the years since its establishment in 1952 the Government of East Germany aided by its Soviet sponsors has built up an intricate machine with which to wage political warfare against the Federal Republic of Germany. This campaigning has had the twin aims of first undermining confidence in the West German Government and eventually of bringing about the re-unification of Germany under a Communist-dominated regime.

This machine is centred round the Central Committee of the East German Communist Party (SED) with headquarters in East Berlin. The section of the committee actually responsible for controlling the campaign against West Germany being known as the *Arbeitsburo*. In 1959 this was divided into ten sections and had a staff of about 100 specially selected Party members. One of its functions is to exercise an overall control over the activities and policies of the illegal West German Communist party (KPD). The Cadre Section of the *Arbeitsburo* is in charge of the training of leaders of the KPD. Decisions of the *Arbeitsburo* are passed on to the West German Party through so-called "instructors" who travel clandestinely to the Federal Republic and pass on orders to regional headquarters of the KPD. A courier system is

also used to maintain contact between the KPD's own Central Committee and the Politburo which have their headquarters also in East Berlin and Party Branches and area headquarters on West German territory.

A determined effort has been made to infiltrate the main opposition party in West Germany, the Social Democratic Party. A special section of the *Arbeitsburo* is in control of activities directed against this party. To aid its activities it has under its control not only the KPD but all Communist front organisations in West Germany. It also makes use of a number of left-wing Socialist associations for the purpose of spreading the Communist view point.

In addition to the *Arbeitsburo* the various 'Mass Organisations' commonly to be found in Communist countries such as youth, women's and trade union organisations play an important part in the campaign against West Germany. Each such organisation includes a 'West Section' within its Central and area headquarters. The duties of these sections consisting of organising and carrying out activities and propaganda campaigns designed to obtain West German support from amongst the particular section of the community with which the organisation is concerned.

The West Section of the official East German youth movement, Free German Youth despatches large quantities of propaganda by mail to youth organisations and individual young people in West Germany. In the past this propaganda has often made a particular point of stressing the idea of a confederation of East and West Germany.

The West Section of the East German cultural organisation *Deutscher Kulturbund* and the 'Committee for Cultural Relations with West Germany' with which it co-operates have been allotted the rôle of supervising all front organisations active in West Germany concerned with culture. The campaign which these two organisations run jointly is intended to attract the sympathies of West German intellectuals for the East German regime.

Probably by far the biggest part played in East Germany's campaign against the Federal Republic is that played by the trade union organisation the *Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund*, generally known as the FDGB.

A special office within the headquarters of the FDGB known as the 'Office for German Labour Union' controls activity directed towards West German trade unions. Directives being handed down to this office by the 'Labour Union Policy' section of the *Arbeitsburo*. By the end of the 1950's no less than 3,400 persons were employed by the FDGB in jobs connected with West activity.

Large numbers of instructors are despatched by the FDGB to work amongst West German trade unionists. Their missions include contacting and, if possible, recruiting the aid of West German trade union leaders and officials and encouraging the organisation of strikes.

Some of the instructors despatched into West Germany, are in fact, members of the special intelligence service of the FDGB whose tasks consist of collecting information on such subjects as the numbers of

workers employed in West German factories, the nature of the composition of the labour force and works councils, the importance and equipment of particular factories, production problems, especially concerning factories engaged upon the manufacture of armaments, the destination of manufactured exports, morale in factories and the general state of labour relations. Large quantities of propaganda literature designed for trade unionists are smuggled into West Germany and then distributed from clandestine dissemination points.

As well as trade unionists another major target for East German attempts at disruption are the West German armed forces. A special organisation, 'The Independent Section' of the East German Ministry of National Defence is responsible for carrying out subversive activities against them. It has its headquarters in East Berlin and works in close co-operation with the Soviet intelligence services. The section's activities consist largely of the preparation and despatch of large quantities of anti-militarist literature addressed to both members of the West German armed forces and to persons in age groups liable for military service. The aim of this campaign being to lower morale and incite disaffection.

Material for inclusion in this propaganda literature is obtained from a special network of agents in West Germany and from a very thorough examination of the West European Press. Dissemination takes place from secret bases in West Germany from which it is mailed to individuals and organisations.

Sections of East Germany's political intelligence service the MFS have also been responsible for the production of a number of forged letters supposed to originate from the headquarters of the West German armed forces. These forgeries, complete with extremely accurate copies of the correct letter headings, stamps, etc., have included false call up and discharge notices, sent to carefully selected groups of people. They have also included forged documents and letters of the type issued by NATO headquarters and military units. They have been carefully designed to sow alarm and despondency amongst those who receive them.

The desire of many Germans to see their country re-united is exploited by the Communist regime of East Germany through an organisation with the title of 'The National Front of Democratic Germany' which came into being in 1950. Section V of the National Front which is responsible for directing activities in regard to West Germany has its headquarters in East Berlin. The various branches and district headquarters of the Front throughout East Germany also have sections within their headquarters which concern themselves with similar activities. A subsidiary organisation of the National Front is the 'Committee for the Investigation of the Conditions of Life Prevailing in West Germany under the Conditions of the NATO Policy and Atomic Armament'. The duties of this organisation consist of mounting propaganda campaigns against West German membership of NATO.

A continuous campaign has been waged by a number of East German political warfare organisations to discredit the West German Govern-

ment by spreading abroad propaganda material designed to prove that a serious revival of Nazism is imminent in West Germany and that the Government either ignores this threat or is unwilling to take action to meet it, or even gives those behind it secret encouragement. These allegations are often coupled with others to the effect that West Germany intends to accomplish the re-unification of Germany by means of a military attack upon East Germany. Frequent assertions are also made that "Nazi" diplomats, service officers, jurists, economists, and civil servants, are in the service of the West German authorities.

One of the principal organisations responsible for originating this propaganda is the 'Committee for German Unity'. Founded in 1954, this Committee is presided over by a member of the East German Communist Party's Politburo. The East German Foreign Ministry also takes part in this campaign, as does the 'Society for Relations with Foreign Countries'.

The foreign intelligence service of the East German Ministry of State Security (HVA) has been extremely active in taking part in the campaign of political warfare carried on by the East German Government against the Federal Republic. During the General Elections of 1957 in West Germany a special operation was carried out by the HVA aimed at influencing its outcome. This operation included transporting large quantities of literature printed in East Germany across the frontier and supervising its distribution in West Germany. The literature consisted in the main of slanderous attacks on the West German Government and individuals in it. More recently it is thought that sections of the East German intelligence services have been involved in the compilation of elaborately produced forged documents and planted news stories designed to prove that the West German Government had secretly sent fighting units of their armed forces to the assistance of the Americans in Vietnam.

The aim behind all this activity can perhaps be best seen to be summarised in a speech made in 1958, by the then Foreign Minister of East Germany, there being no reason to think that the policy or attitude of the East German Government has undergone any substantial change since that date. The Minister, Dr. Lothar Bolz, said:

"In the German people, there is no co-existence between imperialism and socialism, but only the stubborn and unrelenting fight by all working persons against imperialism in an effort that the balance of power be irrevocably shifted in favour of the anti-imperialist groups in West Germany and that the imperialist groups in West Germany can be definitely defeated and annihilated and the victory of Socialism be achieved in all Germany".¹

Although the main efforts of East Germany in the arts of political warfare and subversion have been directed principally towards West Germany they have by no means been exclusively confined to that quarter. When for instance Dr. Nkrumah of Ghana was looking for experts in intelligence work and political warfare with which to aid him

put his ambitious plans in Africa into effect it was East Germany that helped to meet his need. At the time of the coup that overthrew the Ghanaian President in February 1966 several officers of the East German Intelligence services were engaged upon running a course for potential Ghanaian agents under cover of the East German Trade Mission in Accra. East German experts have also played an important part in Zanzibar.

North Vietnam

The efforts of the government in North Vietnam to extend Communist rule in South-East Asia are two sided. There being firstly, the support given in the form of arms and reinforcements to the Viet Cong terrorists operating in South Vietnam and to the Pathet Lao guerillas in Laos. Secondly, the campaign of political subversion which has been waged through agents and organisations controlled by the North Vietnam Government in the Southern half of the country and to a lesser extent also in Laos and Cambodia.

It was in May 1962 that the International Control Commission in Vietnam, set up to supervise observance of the terms of the Geneva Conference of 1954, finally came out with a report which said that there was clear evidence that North Vietnam was violating that armistice by sending arms, supplies and reinforcements to the terrorists in the South. In point of fact there is every reason to think that the North Vietnam Government had been organising the despatch of such supplies and reinforcements to the Viet Cong ever since the latter part of 1958. It emerged that the Commission had been effectively muzzled and prevented from making any critical reference to Communist activities prior to the date of this report, owing to the fact that the Polish member of the Commission had always vetoed any such attempt and that prior to the Chinese attack on India, its Indian chairman had always overruled attempts of the Canadian members of the Commission to bring the true facts of the situation to light.

A report published by the United States State Department in February 1965 provides much valuable information about the manner in which this aid to the Viet Cong from North Vietnam was channelled, and concerning the training given to North Vietnamese troops and agents before they are infiltrated into the South. The report states that at the minimum 20,000 members of the North Vietnam army had been sent to join the Viet Cong up to 1959, with the probability that the real total for this period approached nearly double that figure. The majority of the troops thus infiltrated into the South being experienced and well trained regulars. These numbers take on a special significance when it is remembered that the total strength of the hard-core regular force of guerillas had been put at only 35,000 at that time.

North Vietnamese officers and other ranks selected for service in the South are often former members of the Vietminh and veterans of the war against the French.

One of the main training camps for troops destined for active service in the South is at Xuan Mai, South-West of Hanoi; courses last on average between four to six months. Statements of prisoners taken by the South Vietnamese forces indicate that about three quarters of the curriculum of these courses is of a military nature and one quarter political.

After completing training at this and other camps, units usually move to an assembly area on the coast and after a short rest start to move South through Laos. A special unit of the North Vietnamese army "The 70th Transportation Group" being responsible for making arrangements for their journey. At the Laos border, units are split up into groups whose size varies greatly; some groups only consisting of five men, others of as many as 500. At the border also, members of infiltration groups hand in their North Vietnamese army uniforms and are supplied in return with sets of black pyjama-like clothes, rubber sandals, mosquito netting and waterproof sheeting.

The majority of infiltration groups move South to join the Viet Cong along routes parallel to the border of Laos with South Vietnam, turning eastwards towards the end of their journey. Regular routes for the infiltration groups have been established along which they are led by guides. Camping places staffed and equipped to feed groups in transit have been established at about one day's march apart. Here too members of groups who fall sick are cared for until fit enough to continue their journey.

Direct commitment of fighting units of the North Vietnamese Army in the fighting in the South began in 1964-65. By the end of 1965 two regular North Vietnamese Divisions had been identified in action.

The steady flow of reinforcements to the Viet Cong on foot was augmented during 1965 by the introduction of the use of motor transport on a large scale for the first time. In October 1965 a large force of engineers from the North Vietnam army was sent into Laos for the purpose of improving roads leading to South Vietnam. In the early months of 1966 prior to the May Monsoon, 1,500 trucks were used to transport men and equipment to the South. It is estimated that the rate of infiltration of men reached a peak of about 10,000 men a month during this period, subsequently declining to an average of about 5,000 a month. Despite the American air offensive truck movement from North to South Vietnam doubled during the first five months of 1966 as compared with 1965.

The majority of arms sent into South Vietnam for the use of the Viet Cong from the North have been transported by ships sailing from the port of Haiphong. Sea transport provides a much quicker and more economic means of supply than transport by porters over land, and is facilitated by the fact that South Vietnam possesses many miles of canals and rivers navigable by sampans or even ships of quite large tonnage.

In February 1965, a 100 ton cargo ship was sighted at anchor off the coast of South Vietnam and after it had opened fire on an investigating South Vietnamese air force plane, it was attacked and sank in shallow

water. This ship, which had been built in China, was found to be carrying a cargo of arms which it had discharged and which were discovered when South Vietnamese forces occupied the area. At least 100 tons of military equipment was discovered on the shore near where the ship had been anchored, including many weapons manufactured in Czechoslovakia and Communist China. Amongst these supplies were 1,000 sub-machine guns, 2,500 rifles, over 100 carbines, about 1,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, grenades, heavy and light machine guns, and medical supplies some of which had come from the USSR, East Germany and Czechoslovakia, as well as China. Papers found in the ship and on the bodies of members of the crew showed that the ship had sailed from Haiphong a few days before.

Large numbers of agents, specially trained in the arts of subversion have been infiltrated into South Vietnam in the course of the campaign carried on as part of North Vietnam's assistance to the Viet Cong by the Hanoi Government's intelligence service, The Central Research Agency. In most cases these agents are sent in by sea, sailing from North Vietnam in small craft disguised as fishing vessels and themselves passing as fishermen and provided with convincing cover stories in case they should be intercepted by hostile patrols in the course of their voyage.

Particular efforts have been made to create disaffection amongst the student population of South Vietnam and in this regard the story told by a defector from the service of the Central Research Agency is particularly interesting.

Nguyen Van Vy, at the time of his defection 19 years old, was born in a district that now lies just within North Vietnam. He joined the village group of the Communist Party youth organisation and in the autumn of 1962 was told that he had been chosen for propaganda work and enrolled in a special course run by the Communist Party district headquarters. This course included political indoctrination and instruction in the general North Vietnamese plan to obtain control of the country and the responsibility of youth for the putting of this plan into effect. Those who passed this course then entered a period of advanced training.

At the end of this course Nguyen Van Vy and his fellow trainees were given their missions in the South. In the case of Vy he was told that he was to be infiltrated into South Vietnam and once there should give himself up saying that he was "tired of the miserable life in the North". He was also instructed to say that he wished to obtain education in the South and wished to live with relatives in order to do so. Once his story had been accepted by the authorities and he had been allowed to enrol in a school, he was to begin his work as an agent. However, he was not to do so immediately he entered the school but was to wait for three or four months until any suspicions there might have been about the authenticity of his story had been dispelled.

The first part of Vy's activities was to be merely of a preparatory nature and to consist of observing his fellow students carefully and collecting biographical information about them and to take note of their

personalities, capabilities and ambitions. He was then to try and make friends with those whom it seemed to him might be converted to the Communist cause by propaganda. The next step was to try and bring them round gradually to a point of view favourable to North Vietnam. Once he had found a group of students he had influenced successfully, he would be given assignments to try and draw in others. Particular attention was to be paid to students who wanted to avoid service in the South Vietnamese armed forces, and if possible Vy was to help such students to get to North Vietnam. He was to attempt to carry out these tasks under the supervision of an older agent to whom he had to report regularly and he worked in collaboration with an assistant. This three-man team being infiltrated into South Vietnam separately.

Another agent who subsequently defected had been given an assignment to create a network in Saigon, composed of local "hoodlums" and Communist sympathisers for the purpose of sabotage and collecting information. He was equipped with an automatic pistol with a silencer, a knife that could insert poison into the body of a victim and explosives. His orders were to be ready to sabotage ships in Saigon harbour and oil storage depots on shore and to be prepared to assassinate Vietnamese officials and Americans.

The Lao Dong, or Communist Party of North Vietnam, maintains complete political control over the Viet Cong through a number of specially set up organisations and committees that operate under the direct supervision of the Lao Dong's Central Committee. These organisations are, firstly 'The Re-unification Department'. This is, in fact, a special section of the Lao Dong's Central Committee responsible for the general strategy and long range planning of the campaign in the South.

Orders and plans of the Re-unification Department are passed through 'The Central Office for South Vietnam' which has a number of subsidiary organisations and committees under its control. These include sections of its headquarters including the Secretariat, Liaison Department, Military Affairs Department, Intelligence Department, Propaganda and Training Department, Personnel Department, and departments responsible for Finance, "Popular Fronts" and bases. Orders are passed downwards through a chain of regional, provincial, district, town and village committees or cells, and perhaps most importantly through the 'National Front for Liberation of North Vietnam'.

This organisation, often referred to as the 'National Liberation Front' was established as the result of a resolution taken at the 1960 National Congress of the Lao Dong. Its purpose is to conceal Communist political control of the Viet Cong. The parties comprising the National Liberation Front are the 'People's Revolutionary Party' which is in effect the 'Communist Party of South Vietnam' and some 14 other parties and organisations whose formation was abruptly announced by *Radio Hanoi*, in most cases after the formation of the National Liberation Front in the early 1960's. These parties and organisations include the 'Radical Peasant's Union for Liberation', 'The Association of Patriotic

and Democratic Journalists', and the 'Vietnamese Nationals of Chinese Origin' amongst others. In the main these organisations had never been heard of before Hanoi announced their existence and there is little doubt that in most instances they are no more than front organisations formed in the hope of giving a non-Communist appearance to the National Liberation Front.

The real intentions behind the formation of the National Liberation Front were portrayed in a directive to Communist Party provincial committees in South Vietnam that fell into the hands of the South Vietnamese forces towards the end of 1962. This directive read in part:

"Party Central (The Lao Dong's Central Committee) has had to introduce the tactic of the Front and to create the NFLSV with the object of drawing into its ranks capitalists and intellectual classes, including the capitalist youth, students, and intellectuals of the cities and the middle and rich farmers of the countryside.

"The policy of the (Communist) Party is nothing more than a tactic appropriate to the present stage. When the revolution to liberate South Vietnam has achieved victory, that policy will be altered. At that moment our Party will proclaim itself by its actions, for it will play the leading part in a proletarian revolution in South Vietnam".¹

The headquarters of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam include a Department for Overseas Activity, a Propaganda Department, and the 'Liberation News Agency'.

North Vietnam maintains embassies in Guinea, Mali and Algeria, and the National Liberation Front has made contact with opposition parties in a number of French-speaking African States, Senegal, Togo and Dahomey. In the Congo, North Vietnam accredited an ambassador to the pro-Communist Government of Antoine Gizenga and *Radio Hanoi* in its overseas broadcasts has given encouragement to subsequent Congolese revolutionary movements. Documents discovered by Western intelligence officers in 1962 indicated that a North Vietnamese organisation with the title of 'Secret People's Revolutionary Army' had given advice on guerilla warfare tactics to terrorist movements in Portuguese Guinea and Kwiliu province of the Congo. Investigations showed that this organisation was under the control of the Lao Dong.

The North Vietnamese embassy in Algeria is particularly active. General Nguyen Giap, former field commander of the Vietminh in the war in Indo-China against the French and Minister of Defence enjoys an extremely high reputation amongst Algerian army officers and is believed to have paid several visits to Algeria.

The Lao Dong are known to have sponsored visits of teachers, journalists and technicians to African countries particularly to former French colonies in West Africa.

¹Quoted by Brian Crozier. *South-East Asia in Turmoil*, Penguin Books, London, 1965, p. 142.

Cuba

Of all the lesser Communist states, Cuba has played by far the most active part in attempting to subvert the established regimes of its non-Communist neighbours and to encourage open revolt against their governments. Cuban sponsored subversion has, in fact, affected to a greater or lesser degree all 19 Latin American States and Cuban influence has in addition made itself felt in Africa.

Some idea of the scale of Cuban activity in the Latin American area can be gained from a resumé of some of the known incidents that have taken place during the last six years.

In April 1959 a force of approximately 100 Panamanians set out from Cuba with the intention of launching a revolt in their home country.

In June 1959, two attempts were made to invade Dominica by groups under the command of the 'Dominican Liberation Movement', based in Cuba.

In August 1959, Cuba was proved to have been responsible for providing military and financial aid to groups invading Haiti.

In October 1959, Nicaraguan exiles attempted to start a revolt in their country with Cuban support.

In 1960, the Castro Government began to form close contacts with Francisco Juliao, leader of the 'Peasant Leagues' active in the North West districts of Brazil. Juliao's family live in Cuba and a number of members of the Peasant's Leagues are known to have received training in Cuba. It is reliably believed that Juliao has received large sums of money from Cuba for the purposes of organising Peasant's Leagues, perhaps amounting to as much as \$400,000. Reports from Communist sources have also indicated that the Peasant Leagues have received shipments of small arms from Cuba.

In July and August 1960, members of the staff of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City took part in organising anti-American demonstrations. In 1960 the Bolivian Government requested the recall of the Cuban Ambassador because of his attempts to interfere in Bolivian internal affairs.

In March 1961, a Colombian Senator presented in Parliament a photostat copy of a \$25,000 cheque, signed by the Cuban Leader, Ernesto de Guevara, that had he said been given to the president of the Colombian Merchant Marine Union to foment unrest along the coast. In April, Honduras broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba after members of the staffs of the Cuban embassies and consulates had been found to be recruiting supporters on the North East coast. The Government of Uruguay requested the recall of the Cuban Ambassador early in 1961, accusing him of interference in the countries internal affairs.

In the latter part of 1961 and in 1962, Cuba gave active encouragement to a number of armed risings which were organised by the Communist Party, one of which took place in Peru. In March 1962 the sum of

\$10,000 was handed to the leader of the Guatemalan '13th November Revolutionary Group', this money being reportedly given to a leader of the Group in Mexico by a Cuban emissary. The purpose of these funds was to launch a new guerilla movement in Guatemala, and in November of that year the Guatemalan Government reported that the Cuban-backed campaign of agitation and terrorism was being stepped up. Argentinian police enquiries in 1962 led to the discovery of a store of explosives and propaganda in a warehouse in a suburb of Buenos Aires, the owner of the warehouse being in touch with Cuban Communists. A quantity of propaganda, some of it from Cuba was also found on board two East German ships which docked in the port of Rosario. Further police enquiries revealed that some 150 Argentinians had received military training in Cuba. The intention was to employ them in guerilla activities in the wooded areas of Eastern Argentina and other parts of the country. In Ecuador the pro-Castro 'Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorian Youth', many of whose members belong to a guerilla organisation under the control of the Communist Party received at least \$22,000 during 1962 from Cuban sources. The guerilla group was also equipped with Czechoslovakian rifles, almost certainly originating from Cuba.

Not long after the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, the American FBI discovered a large quantity of weapons, incendiary bombs and explosives hidden in the New York area. Three people were arrested in connection with these discoveries, and two members of the Cuban mission to the United Nations were named as being involved with other pro-Castro Cubans in a plan to use these supplies for the purposes of sabotage and of creating panic in the New York area.

In November 1962, the Venezuelan Government presented evidence before the Organisation of American States that connected Cuba with a major sabotage campaign directed against the Venezuelan oilfields the previous month. It also stated that instructions to Venezuelan Communists were being broadcast from a Cuban ship off the coast.

A year later, a three-ton cache of arms was discovered on the coast of the Paragana Peninsular, Venezuela. Enquiries provided irrefutable proof that these arms which included 81 automatic rifles and 275 bazookas came from Cuba. Also found at the same time were detailed plans for the seizure of the capital of Venezuela by Communist-led guerillas. Shortly afterwards the Communist-controlled movement 'Armed Forces of National Liberation' launched a guerilla campaign which is still continuing.

The Cuban Charge d'Affaires in Bolivia was expelled from the country in August 1963 as a result of the resolution of the Bolivian Senate after it had received information that \$150,000 had been passed from the Cuban Embassy to the Communist organisers of a strike of tin miners. A few weeks earlier, an officer of the government party's youth movement had been dismissed from his post for having received the sum of \$20,000 from the Cuban Embassy with which to carry out anti-government propaganda amongst students. In November, the Cuban

cultural attache was expelled from Bolivia for receiving state documents from a junior member of the staff of the Bolivian Foreign Office.

Mr. Forbes Burnham, Prime Minister of the then British Guiana (now Guyana) announced at a Press conference in May 1964 that he had evidence that arms were being smuggled on board Cuban ships that put into Georgetown Harbour to load a cargo of rice.

Financial assistance has frequently been provided through the Cuban embassy in Mexico to political leaders from Guatemala, Nicaragua and other countries of Central America who are living in exile in Mexico. Similar assistance has also been provided through travellers coming from Cuba and from *Prensa Latina* representatives. The Cuban Embassy in Chile has been responsible for financing the activities of the Chilian-Cuban Institute of Culture, an organisation directly under the control of the Chilian Communist Party.

In Uruguay, the Cuban Embassy paid regular sums equivalent to \$250 a month to four members of the 'United Front for National Liberation', a Communist Paraguayan exile group, for the purposes of financing pro-Castro activities. The Brazil-Cuba Institute in Rio de Janeiro was named by the President of the Investigating Committee set up to enquire into subversive Communist activities in Brazil in 1964, as being one of the organisations that had been financing such activity.

The above list of incidents of Cuban-sponsored subversion is by no means complete, nor does it take into account any of the almost continuous stream of speeches by leaders of the Cuban Government, Fidel Castro and Che Guevara in particular, which have included sustained encouragement to the population of Latin America states to revolt. In May 1962 for instance, Castro urged the Brazilian Communists to start the revolution "as soon as possible". In a May Day speech in the same year Che Guevara stated that Cuba was in the vanguard of liberation in America, and that the popular masses were only waiting for the signal to "hurl themselves into the struggle to take over power by any means".

After the Organisation of American States had voted for economic and political sanctions against Cuba, as the result of repeated acts of interference in the internal affairs of its member states by the Cuban Government, Fidel Castro announced in July 1964 that Cuba would "promote revolution" in any other country that complied with the terms of the OAS resolution.

Che Guevara was the author of a text book on guerilla warfare, *The War of the Guerillas*, in which he lists four South American countries as being particularly suitable for launching a revolutionary movement. These four countries Guatemala, Panama, Venezuela and Colombia are all ones in which guerilla movements or armed bandits are active, and all are within easy reach of Cuba.

The organisations through which the Cuban Government have sought to implement their revolutionary policies include

The Revolutionary Orientation Committee (Comite de Orientacion Revolucionaria) (COR). This organisation was created in 1962 by the

body known as the Integrated Revolutionary Organisations (ORI), for the purposes of directing propaganda and controlling the Press, radio and television. It includes a commission responsible for co-ordinating Cuban propaganda activities in Latin America as a whole, and exercises censorship functions over all broadcasting transmissions. The propaganda co-ordinating committee referred to is under the control of a representative of COR, a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a representative of the official Cuban news agency, *Prensa Latina*.

COR works closely with 'The Cuban Institute of Friendship among Peoples', 'The Private Bureau for Cultural Interchange' and 'The House of Cultural Development'.

The Special Section of the Foreign Affairs Ministry is charged with supervising the despatch of propaganda through Cuban embassies and other diplomatic channels and with directing the work of 'Solidarity with the Cuban Revolution Movements' in foreign countries.

The Centre of International Culture is controlled by the Politburo of the Cuban Communist Party. Its activities consist of publishing all types of propaganda literature and news bulletins, and its aims are stated to be to "strengthen ties between Cuba and the people of the United States and its colonies". The English-speaking members of the staff include a number of American citizens, including the American coloured leader Robert Williams, who has advocated armed revolution by the negro population of the United States. He was a frequent broadcaster over *Radio Havana* in programmes intended for American negro listeners and is now in Peking.

The Cuban Institute of Friendship Among Peoples was formed in 1960 ostensibly to "strengthen the ties of friendship and solidarity with all peoples of the world". In practice it has functioned as the directing and co-ordinating body for the numerous friendship associations that have sprung up in recent years linking Cuba with other countries of the Latin American and Caribbean areas. The Institute is under the control of the Secretary of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the ORI. An important part of its activities consists of recruiting young people on the Latin American mainland for training in Cuba and of making the necessary arrangements for their journeys. It has close ties with the main Cuban intelligence service the Foreign section of the G-2, or State Security Police.

Since 1961, the Institute has kept in close touch with two missions from African countries in Cuba. One of these represents the ruling party of Zanzibar and the other the African National Congress of South Africa.

The subversive activities of the official Cuban news agency had by the end of 1963 resulted in it being barred from operating in Guatemala, El Salvador, Panama, Costa Rica, Argentina and Venezuela. Information gathered by *Prensa Latina* when considered of sufficient importance is passed to the G-2 foreign intelligence service. Many *Prensa Latina* reporters are themselves believed to be members of the G-2.

A leading member of the staff of the Cuban office of TASS which is situated in the same building as the headquarters of *Prensa Latina* is reputed to be an officer of the KGB.

The Board of Liberation for Central America and the Caribbean has the rôle of directing subversive operations mounted from Cuba within the area named in its title and of arranging for the despatch of Cuban agents into the area. Another such body 'The Board of Liberation for South America' fulfils the same functions in regard to the countries of South America.

The Continental Latin American Student's Organisation (OCLAE) was established in August 1966 as the result of a Student's congress held in Havana. Its aims are stated to be to promote "the fighting solidarity of Latin American students in their struggle against imperialism". Special emphasis being laid in its first declarations on the need to employ "armed struggle" as the most effective means of pressing this campaign. OCLAE's headquarters are in Havana and it has a Cuban President and a Secretariat composed of representatives of Communist or other extremist student unions from Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Guadeloupe, Panama and Uruguay. To an increasing extent students in Latin American countries have, in Communist eyes, come to be regarded as being the most suitable class to form the spearhead of the revolutionary movement.

In addition to the above organisations sponsored by the Cuban Government, a number of organisations composed of exiles and opponents of existing Latin American regimes are based in Cuba where they train and plan for the day of the return to their homelands. The Cuban Government gives them assistance both overtly and covertly. Such organisations are known to exist and are composed of emigres from Dominica, Nicaragua, Haiti and Guatemala. In April 1961 'The Cuban Argentine Friendship Institute' was inaugurated by the Argentine community in Cuba, the Institute having its headquarters in Havana. One of its leading members is John William Cooke, a one-time head of Peron's proto-fascist political machine. Cooke works through that faction of the Peronist Party that favours combined action with the Argentine Communist Party, and maintains constant contact with sympathisers in the country.

A mission of 'The Venezuelan National Front for Liberation' was established in Havana in 1963. It is in effect the political arm of the Communist-led 'Armed Forces of Liberation' (FALN) which have been carrying on a desultory guerilla campaign in Venezuela since the autumn of that year.

On the military side 'The Revolutionary Commandos for Latin America' (CRAL) has as a command organisation to supervise the training of an International Brigade whose main rôle is to instigate revolts against "anti-popular" governments on the South American mainland, with Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Haiti, Panama, El Salvador, Columbia and Paraguay being its special targets. It is under the command of the Spanish Civil War veteran General Albert

Bayo, and Czechoslovakian, Chinese and other Spanish guerilla warfare experts.

The training of large numbers of young South Americans in the tactics of guerilla warfare in special training camps in Cuba has been one of the main objects of the concern felt by members of the Organisation of American States about Cuban activities. Ten such camps had been established by 1963, by 1966 the number had grown to 44.

Juan De Dios Marin, a Venezuelan who received training in one of these camps, and who afterwards, becoming disillusioned with the Castro regime, subsequently defected, has given an account of the training he received. The school he attended was at Tarara, situated in a confiscated estate on the coast ten miles east of Havana. It was under the direction of General Alberto Bayo, who served with the Republican forces during the Spanish Civil War and also trained Castro's original force of 80 guerillas in Mexico before they set out for Cuba. Most of the instructors were either Czechoslovakians or from the Soviet Union, with Cubans acting as their assistants. Courses at the school were of two or four months' duration. Particular attention was given to training students in the tactics of guerilla warfare and terrorism in cities, and they were also given instruction in the incitement of riots and the handling of mobs. Lessons were given in the techniques of sabotage, the improvisation of weapons, and the manufacture of booby traps. Training was based upon a text book written by General Bayo and entitled *150 Questions for a Guerilla*.

After two months at this school, Marin was sent to an advanced training school at Minas del Frio, in Oriente Province, near the headquarters used by Castro in the Sierra Maestra during the early days of the revolution. On arrival, all students were instructed to fill in a long questionnaire about persons prominent in public life in their particular district of their home countries. Questions included were: Did certain Senators have mistresses, gamble, drink too much or run up big debts? What rumours were there about the private lives of local judges, police chiefs or politicians? The students' answers to these questionnaires were then collected and sorted through in search of information that could be of value in providing opportunities for blackmail against those to whom the questions referred.

The school at Minas del Frio, like that at Tarara was presided over by a former supporter of the Spanish Republican Government, in this case General Enrique Lister. The school specialises in giving training in the use of heavy weapons including tanks and anti-aircraft guns, and also in such subjects as industrial sabotage, the fomenting of strikes, the use of blackmail for political purposes, and the "liquidation" of police officials.

Marin was told that he was to receive four months of such training, the intention being to provide him with sufficient knowledge to enable him to assume command of a tactical combat unit of the 'Armed Forces of National Liberation' upon his return to Venezuela. As the

unit for which he had been selected was operating in the mountainous area in the north of Venezuela, he was given special training in mountain warfare. About a 1,000 other students attended the school while he was there, the great majority of whom came from Venezuela.

A defector from the Cuban army reported that students from Chile, Ecuador, Argentina, Guatemala and Brazil were also being sent to this school. Early in 1964 the Vice-President of Peru stated that some young Peruvians invited to Cuba on university scholarships had returned home as fully trained guerillas. After an explosion in a house in Buenos Aires in July 1964 it was revealed that it was being used as the headquarters of a Communist cell, complete with ammunition store, wireless transmitting set and maps. The police reported that there was clear evidence that several of the persons involved had received training in guerilla warfare and sabotage in Cuba.

One Cuban school of instruction in subversive tactics, that in the La Cabina Fort in Havana, concentrates upon giving training to young people, whilst another, the Julio Antonio Mella school also in Havana runs courses especially designed for trade unionists.

In the late summer of 1965 two young men from the then British Guiana who had gone to Cuba to study under a Cuban Government run scholarship scheme left the island because, they said, the curriculum of the course on which they found themselves engaged turned out to consist mainly of lessons in sabotage techniques, military tactics and Communist indoctrination. In December the same year a purser who defected from the Cuban Government airline, *Compana Cubana de Avacion* and who had been serving in aircraft flying between Havana and Mexico said that he had come to the conclusion that the chief purpose of each flight flown by the company on this route was either to fetch potential agitators and guerillas to Cuba for training or to return them to the mainland when they had completed their courses. Such passengers he said often talked to him quite freely about their plans to employ the fruits of their learning in Cuba in their homelands.

Estimates of the numbers of Latin Americans who have received training in Cuban guerilla warfare and terrorist schools vary considerably. One from an American source put the numbers who had received such training at over 5,000 by the beginning of October 1965. This figure including 500 Venezuelans, 300 Peruvians, 200 Panamanians, 75 Dominicans and 60 Salvadorans. Overall control of the schools and camps and training at them is under the *Direccion General de Inteligencia* (DGI), headed by Manuel Pinerion Lozado who is also known by his various aliases of "Red Beard", "M-1" and "Petronia". Lozado also controls the operations of Cuban intelligence agents in Latin American countries.

In addition various Cuban organisations and institutions provide training courses for both Cuban and foreign students which include a heavy dose of political indoctrination, amongst these are 'The Association of Rebel Youth', and the 'Federation of Cuban Women'.

Cuba's foreign interests have not been confined to the Latin American and Caribbean areas. Contact with newly independent African countries and African nationalist movements have for some time been a prominent part of Cuban foreign policy. Particularly close ties having been established with Algeria. It would seem a point of Cuban policy to emphasise Cuba's historical ties with Africa owing to the fact that a large proportion of the Cuban population is descended from negro slaves. Last year, *Prensa Latina* quoted the Senegalese revolutionary leader, Mamadou Keita as saying that Cuba has "a specific rôle to play in the national liberation movement in Africa" particularly by providing "experience in the battle for liberation".

Cuba has established diplomatic relations with Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mali, Morocco and Tanzania. Agreements have also been made to establish diplomatic relations with the Congo (Brazzaville) and Liberia.

Great attention was paid by Cuba to the revolution in Zanzibar in January 1964. A number of the revolutionaries had received training in Cuba. In May 1962, Ali Sultan Issa, a known Communist and a close political associate of Mohammed Babu, generally recognised as being the main planner behind the revolt and also well known for his Communist sympathies, had visited Cuba at the head of a trade union delegation. Two months later, five members of the youth wing of Babu's UMMA party arrived in Cuba to attend courses officially stated to be connected with trade union affairs. They were followed by groups made up of yet more members of the UMMA Party's youth wing. Numbers of these students were arrested when they returned to Zanzibar prior to independence for importing seditious publications. Mohammed Babu has himself visited Cuba on at least one occasion since the Zanzibar revolution.

Che Guevara admitted in August 1964 that Cuba had given Zanzibar "revolutionary help". Whilst on a visit to Algeria early in 1965 he said that Africa was "one of the most important battlefields in the struggle against imperialism". Cuban propaganda dealing with Africa has always stressed support for "armed struggle". Considerable support has been given in Cuban propaganda literature to the activities of the rebel movement in the Congo engaged in guerilla warfare against the Leopoldville government.

Dr. Leonel Alonso, the former Cuban Ambassador to Lebanon and Syria who defected to America in the summer of 1966 revealed that his Embassy in the Lebanon acted as a centre for subversive Cuban activities in the Middle East. He said:

"I personally was required to meet Syrian, Lebanese, and Jordanian Communists to finance and discuss their anti-government activities. Numerous times I handed over thousands of dollars to Communist couriers to finance Communist subversion in the Middle East."¹

¹*Daily Telegraph*, 25 August, 1966.

Dr. Alonso cited the Cuban Embassies in Madrid, Mexico City, Brazzaville, and Dar-es-Salaam as being particularly important headquarters for subversive activities. About 150 Cuban guerilla warfare instructors are known to be based on Brazzaville where their duties include training members of terrorist movements from Angola. A number of others form part of the staff of guerilla training camps in Tanzania.

Possibly Cuban policy towards its neighbours and the non-Communist world in general has been best summed up by the alleged statement of a Cuban emissary to the Guatemalan Communist Party. He is reported to have said:

“It is not a matter of standing around with Arab fatalism waiting for events to take place . . . we should act efficiently so as to precipitate the death of imperialism. Because of this we are ready to help anyone who may decide to struggle against imperialism anywhere”.

CHAPTER X

The Auxiliaries

Foreign students in the USSR, Eastern Europe, China and Cuba—Methods of attracting foreign students—Educational aid to emerging nations—Economic aid.

THE training of foreign students in the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe on a large scale began in 1956. By late 1960 it was estimated that there were 2,257 students from non-Communist countries in the Soviet Union. This represented an approximate fourfold increase in the number attending Soviet universities in 1956. 1,166 of these students came from Africa and 496 from Latin America whilst 1,281 came from the Middle East. Estimates made by *Radio Free Europe* put the total number of foreign students in Communist countries during the academic year 1962—1963 at 30,000; the overwhelming majority of them undergoing courses at Soviet and Eastern European universities and institutes but a few hundred were receiving instruction in China.

By 1964 a total of 22,000 foreign students from more than 100 countries were studying at educational institutes in 76 cities of the Soviet Union. Eleven preparatory schools had been established for the purpose of enabling foreigners to study Russian before commencing specialist courses. Countries from which the students came included Afghanistan, Egypt, Kenya, Somalia, Ghana, Angola, Syria, the Sudan and Tanzania. In mid-1967 it was estimated that a total of about 33,000 foreign students were under instruction in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

The rapid increase in the number of foreign students undergoing instruction in the Soviet Union since 1956 is due in large part to the opening of the Lumumba University in October 1960. This university is the first educational institution to be set up in the Soviet Union specifically for the education of foreign students, apart of course, from the various colleges such as the Lenin School and the Sun Yat-Sen University set up in the 1920's for the training of officials of foreign Communist parties in political warfare.

According to Soviet sources the decision to establish the Lumumba University was made in response to a great demand from many different sources asking for an increase in the training facilities available for foreigners in the USSR. It seems that these requests were then taken up and supported by three leading Soviet 'public bodies', the All-Union

Central Committee of Trade Unions, the Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. The first official intimation that it had been decided to take action over the matter came in a speech made by Khrushchev when he was in Indonesia in February 1960. He mentioned the possibility of opening "a friendship university" in the USSR at which students from Asian, African and South American countries could obtain further education. Details of the new university being subsequently given in an announcement by the Soviet Council of Ministers towards the end of the same month. The Lumumba University was officially opened on 1 October 1960 by Khrushchev.

The first course was attended by 500 students. According to Soviet claims no less than 50,000 applications were received for vacancies during the first year of the university's existence. By May 1963, 2,000 students were attending courses at the university, these students coming from over 80 different African, Asian and South American countries and the university's capacity was increased so as to allow the enrolment of another 700 students in the academic year starting that September. It is planned to raise the capacity of the university progressively until it can accommodate between 3,000 and 4,000 students at any one time. In August 1964 it was reported that the number of students at the university had reached 2,500 and that another 700 were to be enrolled for the next academic year.

At the present time the Lumumba University is spread over several different buildings. A new building is under construction near the State University, and as well as class rooms, this will include a hostel for up to 5,000 students, clinics and sports fields.

The Rector of Lumumba University is Sergei Rumyantsev, a Doctor of Sciences of Technology and a former rector of the Aviation Institute of the USSR and at one time the Deputy Minister of Higher and Secondary Special Education. The university is administered by its Senate, which is a "collective body" composed of representatives of the three organisations responsible for sponsoring the university and in addition representatives of the Soviet youth organisation, Komsomol, and of the Ministry of Higher and Special Education. The Rector and Pro-Rector; and representatives of the teaching staff together with the Chairman of the Student Councils are elected by the students studying in each faculty. The university has a teaching staff of over 500, 150 of whom have masters degrees in Science. All tuition is given entirely free and no charge is made to students for the use of laboratories or text books. Hostel accommodation for students, medical services, and warm clothing for the winter are also provided free and each student is paid a monthly stipend of about £30. Students are also given free admission to museums and exhibitions outside the university.

Courses at Lumumba University have been specially designed for students from the developing countries, it having been found that courses at Soviet Universities were not always suitable for foreign students. In some cases subjects normally included in the syllabus of

Soviet university students are omitted in the case of students at Lumumba University.

All students spend between one and three years at the preparatory faculty, the aim of which is to give them a sufficiently good knowledge of Russian to understand lectures and tuition when they pass on to the various other faculties, as all instruction throughout the University is given in Russian. The preparatory faculty has accommodation for up to 1,000 students at a time and has a staff of over 200 teachers, all of whom have had previous experience in teaching Russian to foreigners before they came to the university. Classes at the preparatory faculty are small with not more than ten students in each. Every class has two instructors one of whom teaches the vocabulary and grammar of the Russian language and the other of whom concentrates upon teaching phonetics. The preparatory faculty also gives instruction in general subjects, including mathematics, physics, chemistry, geography and history.

The university's other faculties consist of: the engineering faculty, where instruction is given on mechanical engineering, power engineering, construction and maintenance and also on geology and mineral prospecting and the development of mineral resources.

The physio-mathematical and nautical science faculty specialises in courses in physics, mathematics and chemistry, while the faculty of agriculture devotes a four year study course to such subjects as zoology, botany, anatomy and the physiology of domestic animals, plant physiology, microbiology, soil science, agrochemistry, irrigation, plant cultivation, the processing of agricultural products and mechanisation of agriculture. The faculty of economics and law, which is divided into two departments, one concerned with teaching international law and one with economics and economic planning; and the faculty of history and philology, which has departments of history and a department concerned with the Russian language and history.

The rôle intended for the faculty of economics and law is to produce teachers of law, government officials, diplomats, journalists and newspaper or periodical editors. The faculty of history and philology aim to produce teachers and also government officials, and instruction includes psychology, logic and pedagogical theory.

In the faculty of agriculture great stress is laid on practical work and at the end of their first year of training they spend a period at the Nikitsky Botanical Gardens near Yalta in the Crimea.

Plans are made by both the university staff and other educational governmental institutions to provide activities for the student's leisure time and holidays. According to a statement by the Rector of Lumumba University most of the students spend their holidays inside the boundaries of the USSR. The university maintains a holiday home at Mokapse on the Black Sea, and also a summer holiday-work camp in Moldavia at which the students spend four hours a day working on collective farms and have the remainder of the day free. The Rector is also reported as saying that it is the aim of the University that the students should obtain

the maximum possible knowledge of all aspects of life and culture in the USSR in their extra curricula time. To achieve this end, special plans are drawn up to cover the entire five year period of study which the average student spends at the university, and they are aimed at increasing the student's knowledge of music, painting, literature and architecture. Under monthly schedules which are in part drawn up by the students themselves other extra curricula subjects are planned and these include organised meetings between students and prominent Soviet personalities and between groups of students from different countries and areas.

Although attendance at all lectures at the university which last from 9 a.m. to 3 p.m. is compulsory, students are encouraged to take part in sports, and the preparatory faculty has a special "chair of physical education and sport" which has under its control sections providing facilities for gymnastics, track and field athletics, football, boxing, swimming, etc.

Students are also encouraged to celebrate their respective country's independence days and to form national associations, the purpose of which is to keep in touch with their home countries.

In 1963 it was reported that 2,000 foreign students from 70 different countries were attending the Lomonosov State University in Moscow. Unlike the Lumumba University, this also caters for large numbers of Soviet students.

Foreign students mainly from the developing countries are also to be found in varying numbers in Soviet universities in Leningrad, Kiev, Baku and Tashkent and other provincial centres. According to one report there were 600 students from Cuba at Kiev University by the early 1960's.

In January 1964 the Soviet Ministry of Education permitted foreign students in the USSR to form organisations of a political nature, with the proviso, however, that they work closely with Soviet students.

Several 'permanent seminars' have been set up in Moscow primarily for the purpose of keeping in touch with foreign students after they have completed their studies. They include one for Arab students formed in December 1965 and operating under the title of 'The Soviet Union and The Arab Peoples' and another known as 'The Soviet Union and The New Africa'. This latter held 'The First Scientific Youth Conference on African Problems' in March 1966.

Foreign Students in Eastern Europe

During the academic year 1958-1959 there were approximately 500 students from the Afro-Asian countries in East Germany, mainly concentrated at Leipzig and Dresden Universities. In early 1966 there were about a thousand foreign students at Leipzig alone. An 'Africa Course' was opened in addition to the courses already being held by these two universities at the Wilhelm Pieck Youth College at Bogensee in East Germany (near Berlin) in April 1964. This course is of eight months' duration and the syllabus includes economics and lectures on 'The

History of the National Liberation Movements'. The Mayor of Leipzig stated early in 1964 that East Germany had spent DM 80 million on the training of foreign students, apprentices and workers during the preceding five years. In August it was reported that a group of students from Mali had arrived at Halle university to embark on a two year plant protection course in the agricultural faculty. In addition there are three special colleges for the training of trade unionists in East Germany which are known to have been attended by trade unionists from African and Asian countries. These colleges are operated by the state trade union organisation and are located in East Berlin, Bernau and Leipzig.

It is claimed that a total of 600 foreign students have attended courses at Jena university since 1954. In 1964, 90 students from 29 countries were studying at this university. Some of the training provided in East Germany has included a marked degree of political content. For instance a course run by the Communist Youth League at its High School at Bogensee in 1960 in conjunction with WFDY included on its syllabus, intended for African students, the following items: Marxist-Leninism, formation of Communist cells at universities and schools in colonial and semi-colonial areas, the organisation of protest demonstrations and methods of propaganda distribution.

In Czechoslovakia 3,000 foreign students were enrolled at the 'November 17th University' in Prague for the academic year 1962-1963. The November 17th University also maintains several preparatory faculties for foreign students in the provinces. Courses for students from Mali in electro-chemistry and railway engineering have been offered by the Czechoslovakian Government. L. Holubek, an official of the Czechoslovakian Ministry of Education, has explained his ministry's attitude to foreign students as follows:

"We want our foreign guests to return to their countries not only as outstanding experts, but also as Czechoslovakia's dedicated friends and adherents to Socialist ideas. To obtain this object it is necessary to create an adequate milieu and atmosphere . . . and to gain influence over the foreign student".¹

For the last eight years Prague University has run four week courses during the summer for university teachers of Slavic languages, history and literature. The course held in August 1964 was attended by about a 100 teachers from 23 countries including India, Japan, the United States and the United Arab Republic.

According to an article appearing in the Czechoslovakian paper *Haj* on 23 January, 1966, there were then about 2,500 foreign students in the country including those from Communist bloc countries but also including Vietnamese, Peruvians, Bolivians and students from a number of African countries. Others had come from Australia, America, and Britain. All those students who had come from other Communist

¹*Vysoka Skola*, Prague, January 1959.

countries or developing countries were studying under scholarships provided by the Czechoslovakian Government. Some of the others were present under university exchange programmes, while a third category consisted of students who had come to Czechoslovakia under scholarships publicly advertised by the November 17th University. A fourth group, mostly students from Afro-Asian and Latin American countries had received scholarships from one of the international fronts.

An agreement for cultural co-operation between Czechoslovakia and Somalia was signed in August 1965 which provides for the training of Somali technicians in Czechoslovakia and co-operation between the schools of the two countries.

During 1964 about 1,200 students from over 50 foreign countries were attending courses at Rumanian universities. Rumania also provides special facilities for training technicians from abroad in the oil industry and in prospecting. Students from 70 foreign countries attended courses at Polish universities in 1962. The first African students to study in Poland completed their studies in May 1964. Warsaw University is to open a four term African course concentrating on practical and scientific subjects. Applications for vacancies on this course are being invited from Africans interested in the political, economic, cultural and public development of their countries. Language courses at Lodz University have also been attended by African students. 850 students from 50 Afro-Asian and Latin American countries were studying in Yugoslavia on government scholarships during the year 1965-1966.

Foreign Students in China

The first offers of places at Chinese universities to foreign students by the government of Communist China were made in 1951, when a small number of invitations for students from India and other Asian countries to come and study in China were extended. By the middle of the 1950's there were several hundred foreign students studying at various Chinese universities, many of them from Africa, particularly Somalia. Overall supervision of their training is carried out by the 'Institute of Foreign Students' in Peking. At a meeting of Latin American student organisations held in March 1960 in Peking it was decided to found a Chinese Communist Student Committee which would allocate 100 free places at Chinese universities and an increased number in 1961 to students from Latin American countries. An association of African Students in China was established in April 1961. The numbers of foreign students studying in China would still seem, however, to be very small compared with the numbers studying in the USSR and the Eastern European countries. One American estimate for instance put the numbers in Communist China at the end of 1963 at barely 300. In September 1966 China's foreign student training programme was brought to an abrupt halt as a result of "the cultural revolution".

Foreign Students in Cuba

Considerable numbers of Latin American students are known to have received training in Cuba since 1960. Arrangements for their voyage to Cuba and training whilst on the island being under the control of the 'Cuban Institute for Friendship with Peoples' (ICAP). A 100 Russian language teachers were imported into Cuba from the USSR soon after the conclusion of the revolution, to join the staff of Havana University, the rector of which is a former President of the Cuban Communist Party. In June 1961 Castro announced that his government intended to grant 1,000 scholarships to students from other Latin American countries and 100 scholarships to students from other countries. During 1962, 100 scholarships were granted by the Cuban Government to students from Bolivia.

Admission to universities and colleges in Communist countries for foreign students is arranged in a variety of ways. In cases where the students come from countries which have diplomatic and friendly relations with Communist countries, providing education facilities may well be arranged at governmental level. In other cases, invitations to students to come to Communist countries for education is made through Communist missions of various types, through friendship societies and through local Communist Parties. As has been already mentioned, the International Union of Students provides scholarships for a number of students to go for training in Communist countries each year. Between February 1963 and February 1965 it granted more than 700 scholarships to foreign students. 336 going to African students, 226 to Latin American students and 129 to those from Asia. Sometimes, students from the developing countries seem to find their way to Moscow or Peking not direct from their own homelands but via the capital of some non-Communist European country where they may have already started a course of study before being persuaded or invited to complete their studies in the Communist bloc. Such invitations appear to come from special contact men, working in close liaison with the embassy of the Communist country concerned and probably also with the Communist Party of the country in which the student is staying at the time he is approached. In a book based upon the experiences of a number of students from the then British Guiana who received training in Moscow, the author, Jan Carew refers to the existence of one such contact man in London who was responsible for selecting recruits for the Lumumba University from amongst the youth of that country in Britain. He was a member of the Communist Party of British Guiana and also active in British left-wing politics having lived in Britain for 25 years, and he encouraged his fellow countrymen in Britain to take part in various demonstrations. He was apparently kept informed of the progress of the students he selected for training in Moscow and in turn sent back reports upon them to the Communist Party in Guiana.

Although reports appear from time to time of discontent and dissatisfaction of foreign students, particularly those from African and

Asian countries with living and educational conditions in the Communist countries in which they are being trained, it has been estimated that only about five per cent of the students attending courses in the Soviet bloc leave voluntarily before their courses are completed and the indications are that a large percentage of those who remain and obtain their degrees form lasting professional and emotional ties with the countries of the bloc in which they receive their training.

The amount of outright political indoctrination foreign students receive seems to vary considerably, but there is little doubt that there is a cumulative effect which at least sows the seeds of distrust of the West and its policies in their minds. One student from Uganda who studied in the Soviet Union in 1960 has described the tactics used in this regard. Referring to the Russian language lessons received during the first two or three months of his studies he has stated:

"The Soviet authorities attach particular importance to the introductory lessons. When I was there all the language teachers were women. I was put into a class with students from Iraq. Right at the start our teacher told us: 'Forget everything you ever learned before you came to Russia'. Our first exercises were all to do with Russian popular heroes and people's leaders. Comparisons were made and parallels drawn with our own countries. Finally we were asked whether we would not wish such heroes and revolutionary leaders for our own countries, and it was made quite clear to us what reply was expected. This method of instruction was intended not only to indoctrinate and mould us, but also to discover our own ideas and tendencies.

"The students were sifted according to political, not intellectual, criteria. All my friends experienced the same sort of thing. The teachers deliberately dragged out their lessons and never lost an opportunity to slip in little political homilies, at the same time studying our reactions in order to be able to sift and classify us. One of our teachers, Valeria Dmitrievna, was particularly cunning. She admitted openly that our lessons were intended to educate us politically, and by her apparent frankness she hoped to win our confidence. She also assured us that the British, French, and Americans did not want us to become educated and become free, whereas on the other hand, all Russians were eager to help Africans".¹

That sometimes attempts are made to recruit the services of foreign students to undertake tasks of subversion upon their return to their own countries is shown by the testimony of another young African, this time a Somali, Mahdi Ismail, who was studying in Prague in the late 1950's. Mahdi Ismail came to London in 1957 to study law. He was drawn into contact with the British Communist Party through attending study groups run under the auspices of the Party's Africa Section, for the purpose of discussing Marxism-Leninism and its application to contemporary politics. He was given an introduction to the Czecho-

¹*Neue Züricher Zeitung*, 12 December, 1960.

slovakian cultural attache in London by members of the Party and arrangements were made for him to go to Prague to study political economy.

During the course of his studies in Prague, Ismail and his fellow African students were subjected to a considerable degree of political indoctrination. The Africa Section of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party helped them to set up an 'African Study Group' in which they were supposed to hold discussions relating the ideological side of their education to the problems of their own countries. Lecturers impressed on them the need for speed in bringing about the African Revolution, before the emergence of a strong African bourgeoisie made its accomplishment more difficult. They were told that once they returned home they should commence agitation in favour of their country adopting a Communist-type economy, and increased economic ties with Czechoslovakia and other countries of the Communist bloc. They were also encouraged to plan to infiltrate political parties, trade unions and youth movements.

Whilst still in Prague Ismail met for the first time members of the Greater Somalia League (GSL), a party which had been formed in Somalia in 1958 with Egyptian support. He subsequently discovered that the GSL was regarded by the countries of the Communist bloc as the vehicle by which a revolution in the Somalia Republic might eventually be brought about and were giving it all possible aid. Members of the GSL received a virtual monopoly of the scholarships granted to Somali students anxious to receive training and they received great assistance from the Italian Communist Party which arranged their journey to Prague via Rome and paid any expenses they incurred in transit. The Secretary General of the GSL was himself a member of the African Section of the Italian Communist Party and to all intents and purposes the Italian Communist Party controlled this new left wing party in the former Italian colony. Later Ismail visited Moscow and had talks with the Chairman of the International Department of the Soviet All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and a representative of the Central Committee of the CPSU. He was told that the Somali Republic had been designated as the Communist bridgehead for expansion into East and Central Africa, Kuwait, Aden, Saudi Arabia, the Yemen, and Bahrein.

Ismail was asked to help the GSL when he returned home and to assist in the infiltration of other political parties. The ultimate aim was to form a 'united front' consisting of parties under Communist control centred upon the GSL in the hope that such a movement would become an irresistible force. He later found out that the Secretary General of the GSL had been assured that supplies of arms would be forthcoming if it became necessary for the 'united front' to seize power by force.

The scope of possible dangers and problems in store for the Governments of developing countries and for the West with the growing volume of students returning to their homelands after completing their studies in Communist countries can perhaps be gauged by the fact that in 1963

it was estimated that between then and the end of 1967 at least 3,000 such students would return to Nigeria alone from the countries of the Soviet bloc.

In addition to providing training facilities for foreign students in their own countries, the governments of the Communist bloc have also entered into a number of agreements to assist in increasing the educational facilities in some of the developing countries themselves. An agreement was signed between East Germany and Ghana early in 1964 which provided both for the training of Ghanaian students in East Germany and for a number of scientists and other specialists from East Germany to deliver lectures at Ghanaian universities. A similar agreement signed in Delhi the same year provided for the despatch of 16 school teachers from the USSR to fill posts in Indian Universities and Colleges.

In June 1964 it was revealed that the rector of El Salvador University had, whilst on a visit to Moscow, entered into an agreement under which the USSR would provide 12 professors to join the staff of the university during the next three years. Under the same agreement the USSR was also to provide textbooks, study programmes, laboratory equipment and there was to be an exchange of post-graduate students.

Teachers from Communist countries sent to developing countries as the result of such agreements have not always confined themselves to imparting a normal educational syllabus. Members of educational missions sent to Guinea for instance have delivered lectures on 'Diamat' an abbreviated name for 'dialectical materialism' in the state run schools. The amount of political indoctrination being imparted by the teaching staff of the 'Lumumba Institute' in Kenya, presented as a gift to Kenya after independence by the Soviet Government ostensibly to act as a centre for educational activities caused President Kenyatta to close it and ask for the withdrawal of its staff in 1965.

Economic Aid

The first official pronouncement of the willingness of the Soviet Union to grant economic aid to non-Communist countries outside Europe was made during a meeting of 'The Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East' in 1949. In 1952 came the World Peace Council sponsored 'World Economic Conference' in Moscow, at which great stress was laid on the theme of international co-operation for the industrialisation of the developing countries and the Soviet Government announced that it was both ready to provide technical assistance for these areas and also to build complete factory installations in them. No practical moves on the part of the Soviet Union to follow up this announcement were made until 1953 when the Soviet economic aid programme may be said to have commenced with the signing of an agreement for a limited amount of technical assistance to Afghanistan. It was not until 1956 that Khrushchev announced in his celebrated speech to the 20th Congress of the CPSU that aid to countries outside the 'Socialist' camp was in

future to be regarded as a major aim of Soviet foreign policy. By the end of 1963 the total amount of economic aid granted by the countries of the Soviet bloc to the developing countries amounted to the equivalent of about £4.4 billion, mainly in long term credits. The countries receiving the largest share of the aid given by the Soviet Union during this period being the United Arab Republic, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Afghanistan and Ghana.

By mid-1962 some 30 non-Communist countries were in receipt of Communist aid, 78 per cent of which was coming from the Soviet Union and the remainder from the countries of Eastern Europe and China. More than two-thirds of Soviet aid has been given in the form of long term credit agreements and three-quarters of such credits have been earmarked for expenditure on specific projects in the receiving country.

Control and administration of Soviet economic aid is exercised through the State Committee for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries. Employees of this organisation are trained at the Institute of Foreign Trade in Moscow where recruits for the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Trade are also taught. The school of economics attached to Moscow University also has special courses designed to train specialists in the economics and languages of countries in the developing areas.

Under the credit agreements entered into by the USSR the Soviet Government normally agrees to provide equipment and specialist personnel for the construction of factories or the execution of engineering projects and to finance the construction of such enterprises, with the receiving country providing the bulk of the labour and locally produced raw materials. In addition the Soviet Government usually undertakes to give technical training to personnel from the receiving country so that they may be able to operate and take over control of the project once it has been completed. Aid has been concentrated on industrial projects which have accounted for 53 per cent of the total number of projects undertaken by the Soviet Union. Irrigation and hydro-electric schemes have accounted for 22 per cent and improvements in communications 14 per cent. A high proportion of the aid granted has taken the form of military equipment provided on credit.

Most Soviet loans under credit agreements with non-Communist countries carry an interest rate of 2.5 per cent (as compared with the 4—5½ per cent of most loans granted by Western countries). Occasionally loans are granted interest free as in the case of one loan to Afghanistan. Most of the agreements provide for a repayment period extended over twelve years, in some cases a longer period is allowed for repayment and may be extended to as much as 50 years as in the case of a large loan granted to Afghanistan in 1961. The bulk of repayments are usually made in local produce of the country receiving the loan although a provision in most credit agreements provides for a part of the repayment to be made in convertible currency. The details of repayment are arranged during annual negotiations between representatives of the Soviet Government and the recipient country at which prices and quantities of goods to be delivered as repayments are agreed. In the majority of

cases the country in receipt of the loan does not have to begin making repayments until the projects on which the loan is to be expended are completed or the USSR has delivered all the equipment it has promised. Interest starts to be charged on the loan, however, from the date the recipient country first draws on the credit extended to it.

The Soviet Government has as a rule displayed a readiness to take goods in payment which the country obtaining the loan normally finds it hard to dispose of on world markets rather than goods which would seem likely to be of great benefit to the Soviet economy, examples being cotton taken in payments for credits to Egypt and wool and hides taken in payment from various other countries despite the fact that considerable efforts have been made in recent years to step up domestic production of both these two commodities.

The number of technicians from the Soviet bloc countries working on economic aid projects in the developing countries by 1963 was estimated at about 11,500 most of them being concentrated in Algeria, India, Iraq, the Somali Republic, the United Arab Republic, the Yemen, and Afghanistan. The biggest group of these technicians were engaged in planning and supervising the building of factories and other industrial installations. Prospectors and surveyors engaged upon looking for oil and minerals and making geographic surveys made up the next biggest group. Up to 1964 almost 2,000 Russian technicians were employed on the construction of the Aswan High Dam, the number subsequently falling to around 800. In some countries it appeared that a special effort had been made by the Soviet authorities to place leading technicians as advisers to ministries of planning, education, internal security and other key government departments.

The period in which the greatest number of new credit agreements were signed between the Soviet Union and non-Communist countries was 1959-1961. The total value of new agreements signed each year during this period amounting to an average of £300 million. In 1963 the number of new agreements entered into by the Soviet Union dropped but in 1964 the Soviet drive to secure new aid agreements was stepped up. The target area receiving the largest increase in Soviet aid in recent years has been Africa. A considerable proportion of credits already extended have not yet been drawn on by the recipient countries.

Grants and loans under credit agreements to Afghanistan now total £169 million. This sum has been or is being used for a wide variety of projects including, the construction of wheat elevators, irrigation and hydro-electric schemes, the construction of a 470 mile road from Kandahar to the Soviet Arganistan border, paving the streets of Kabul, the construction of motor vehicle repair works on which some 50 Russian specialists are engaged, and the construction of airfields. New credits extended to Afghanistan have been earmarked chiefly for the development of oil resources and hydro-electric work.

The major Soviet aid project in India, which has received £327 million worth of credit since 1955, has been the construction of Bhilai steel mill with a planned capacity of 2½ million tons of steel a year.

Heavy machinery plants are also being built with Soviet assistance and prospectors have been responsible for the discovery of six new oilfields. Work has also been completed or is underway on a hydro-electric scheme, sugar refineries, and a large number of factories. Repayment of Soviet loans is to be made over a period of 12 years. Recently new agreements have contained a clause to the effect that this repayment will not commence until a year after the work for which the credit has been extended has been completed.

Indonesia has received £198 million worth of credits from the Soviet bloc. Credits from the USSR have been spent mainly on road construction, the building of a steel mill, installations for light industry and hydro-electric schemes. A sports stadium to seat 100,000 spectators has also been constructed with Soviet assistance, as has a hospital.

Other Asian countries receiving substantial amounts of economic aid from the Soviet Union include Burma (£5 million), Cambodia (£8 million), Ceylon (£19 million), Nepal (£33 million), and Pakistan (£10 million). This aid has been used or is intended for use on a number of major development schemes including, the construction of a dam in Burma, a hospital, a dam and a power station in Cambodia, the building of an iron and steel works and a motor tyre factory with a planned output of 250,000 tyres a year in Ceylon, a cigarette factory, sugar mill and hydro-electric scheme in Nepal, and the carrying out of an oil survey in Pakistan. A hotel, technological institute and a hospital have been presented as gifts by the Soviet Union to Burma and Soviet experts have been engaged in clearing jungle in Ceylon in order to make way for sugar plantations.

Egypt is well known to have been one of the largest recipients of Soviet aid, the most spectacular project on which it has been expended being, of course, the Aswan Dam for which the Soviet Union has granted loans totalling £112 million. Altogether Egypt has received more than £245 million worth of aid from the Soviet bloc. During his visit to Egypt in 1964 Khrushchev promised credits worth £80 million to assist with the development of Egypt's second five year plan. Aid commenced with the signing of an agreement between Egypt and the USSR in January 1958. The first annexe of this agreement covered 40 specific projects on which it had been agreed that the aid was to be spent. These included the construction of three textile factories, the provision of equipment for the steel and engineering industries, geological research and prospecting, and the building of a number of other factories. The second annexe contained a list of a further 25 areas of potential co-operation between the two countries. By 1963 agreements between Egypt and the USSR had been concluded which covered the construction of more than 80 new industrial installations of various types in Egypt including 14 iron and steel works, nine machinery plants, seven installations connected with the oil, chemical or pharmaceutical industries, food processing plants and a shipyard. Also included were the construction of a number of new schools and technical institutes and irrigation schemes. In May 1966 it was reported that Soviet oil experts were to search for

oil in both the Western and Eastern Egyptian deserts. The search it was estimated would cost £12 million. The USSR was to provide all the equipment needed for it.

An important development in Soviet aid to Egypt became known at the beginning of 1967 with the announcement that the Soviet Union was to replace the USA as the principal supplier of wheat to that country. Deliveries of 650,000 tons being promised for 1967.

Soviet aid to other Arab countries has included credits totalling £64 million to Syria to cover river development and irrigation schemes, railway construction, the construction of a fertiliser plant and power stations and survey and prospecting work. Early in 1966 it was announced that the USSR was to grant economic aid to Syria to aid in the construction of a £100 million dam on the Euphrates, reports stated that the USSR would provide a grant equivalent to £53,570,000 towards the dam's first stages. Credits totalling approximately £73 million have been extended to Iraq to cover the construction of a steel mill, fertiliser plant, a pharmaceutical plant, railway expansion and other projects including telephone exchanges and a shipyard. A credit of £98 million was granted to Iran in December 1965 to cover the cost of construction of a steel mill and a machine-tool plant. The Yemen has received Soviet bloc credits totalling over £9 million, the bulk of which has been spent on the construction of a port at Hodeida. An airfield has also been built under Soviet supervision near Sana, and Soviet technicians are assisting with agricultural development.

Projects and schemes for which Soviet aid has been granted to African countries other than Egypt include a wireless transmitting station, a fruit and vegetable cannery and a cold store in Guinea, a sports stadium and a cement plant in Mali, a wireless station, a printing plant and a meat packing plant in Somalia, an oil refinery and a gold ore processing plant in Ethiopia. Ethiopia was the first 'black' African country to receive a credit grant from the Soviet Union. An announcement that credits worth £3.4 million were to be granted being made during the visit of the Emperor to Moscow in July 1959.

Ghana has received the greatest amount of aid of any African country in terms of long term credits, having received about £57 million worth of such aid of which the USSR has provided about £36 million. A tractor assembly plant, a gold refinery, a steel mill, a concrete plant and a cotton mill have been amongst the industrial installations established with this aid and construction programmes included the provision of an isotope laboratory. The coup of 1966 in that country has brought a total of 19 Soviet aid projects to a halt. Soviet prospectors concerned with either oil or minerals have been active in Ghana, Mali, Guinea, and Ethiopia. The USSR concluded an agreement with Algeria in 1963 in which that country was to receive a £33 million credit for the purpose of agricultural development; the development of food processing plants and the development of oil and gas resources in the Sahara. Since the signing of the agreement considerable numbers of Soviet technicians have arrived in Algeria. By 1966 their number was estimated at 3,500

and the Soviet aid programme to Algeria was second only to that of France in size, running at the rate of about £33 million a year. Soviet engineers were working on the country's first steel plant at Bone.

Credit agreements between the Eastern European countries of the Soviet bloc and developing countries normally take the same form as those extended by the Soviet Union, although a few of the loans given under such agreements have carried somewhat higher interest rates. Examples of aid provided under agreements concluded with these countries include the building of a sugar refinery in Indonesia, the construction of 20 industrial installations in Egypt and the construction of a printing works by East Germany in Guinea, which is said to be the largest in Africa. Hungary has constructed a power station in Egypt and has also provided it with railway rolling stock. It was also announced in 1966 that Hungary was to grant a credit of £14 million to Egypt for the import of complete factories and equipment for Egypt's second five year plan. Poland has undertaken to extend and improve the port of Famagusta in Cyprus, and has granted a £10 million loan to Morocco for the purchase of industrial and capital equipment. Other Polish projects have included the construction of two sugar refineries in Iran and a shipyard in Indonesia. Work commenced on a sports stadium in Tunis which was built with Bulgarian assistance early in 1966. Shortly afterwards it was announced that Bulgaria had signed a £1.6 million credit agreement with Syria.

Of all the East European countries, however, it would seem that Czechoslovakia has been the most active in the field of economic aid. Credit agreements have included £16 million to India; credits to cover the building of a tyre factory in Indonesia; the provision of 2,000 tractors for Burma, the construction of a tyre factory, tractor assembly plant and sugar refinery in Cambodia. In addition Czechoslovakia has granted credits totalling about £11 million to Egypt for the construction of sugar refineries, various factories, and the purchase of machinery for development schemes. Czechoslovakian credits amounting to £7 million have been extended to Syria for the construction of cement plants, sugar refineries, and an oil refinery. Czechoslovakia has also granted credits worth £3 million and £1.6 million for various projects in Ghana and Guinea respectively, and in addition assisted with the development of cotton and sugar plantations in Ethiopia and with the construction of a technical institute in Somalia.

In March 1966 Czechoslovakia delivered to Algeria complete equipment for a radio-teletype station for the use of the Algerian news agency *Algerie Press*. Equipment provided, included two 4-kilowatt transmitters to be used for broadcasts to the Middle East, Central Europe and the Mediterranean area, and a 43-kilowatt transmitter for broadcasts to Africa, Asia and America.

It was estimated that by the beginning of 1962 Czechoslovakia was committed under existing credit agreements with developing countries to build more than 200 factories and other industrial installations, and had built or was building a total of 35 complete factories in Egypt alone.

The Czechoslovakian view of the purpose of this aid was given in an article in a Czechoslovakian paper, *Pravda* of Pilsen, on 4 July, 1963, which stated that such aid was :

“A new type of international economic relations which prove the strength of our order and thus makes Socialism attractive for the people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America”.

Ghana and Guinea have both been particularly large recipients of aid from the East European countries. By the end of 1965 Ghana had received credits from Hungary amounting to £2.5 million, and £1 million from Poland, while Guinea had received Polish credits amounting to the equivalent of £2 million and some £9 million from East Germany. In addition both countries were in receipt of the large credits previously mentioned from Czechoslovakia.

In November 1965 it was reported that work had started on a new publishing house in Cairo which was being constructed with East German assistance and which when completed would be the largest in the country. A party of East German technicians arrived in Egypt in the Spring of 1966 to assist in the construction of a model village near Cairo.

An additional form of aid from the countries of the European Communist bloc takes the form of outright gifts of equipment of various types to universities, hospitals, and other institutions serving the public in the developing countries. These gifts are not usually made by the government of the Communist country concerned but by some ‘public body’ within it. An example of this type of aid was the £8,000 worth of printing equipment sent to Mali as “a token of fraternal aid” by the Dresden Branch of the East German Union of Journalists, the money having been raised by an appeal organised by an ‘African Solidarity Committee’ set up by the branch.

The Polish Journalists’ Association has made a contribution of 2.5 million zloty to help African states extend their publicity services. The Czechoslovakian Journalists’ Association has reportedly provided assistance towards the establishment of press facilities in Mali.

Chinese Communist aid to the developing countries first began in 1956 and has been on a very much smaller scale than that provided by the Soviet bloc. By the end of 1963 for instance the total amount extended by China in loans under credit agreements amounted to £148 million, or barely 10 per cent of the total extended by the Soviet bloc.

Chinese aid is normally designed to cover specific development schemes in the recipient country. Interest rates are usually lower than those charged by the Soviet bloc states. The period allowed for repayment is in most cases longer and does not begin until some years after the project for which the loan has been made has been completed. There is normally a ten year “grace period” allowed before the final payment is made.

By the beginning of 1964, £90 million worth of Chinese aid had been allocated to Asian countries, £50 million worth to countries in Africa,

and £12 million to countries of the Middle East. Individual countries in receipt of largest amounts of Chinese aid up to that year were Burma (£28 million), Cambodia (£16 million), and Algeria (£17 million). The number of new economic aid agreements entered into by China rose to a peak in 1961, in which year China committed herself to providing £33 million worth of aid. After that date, the number of Chinese agreements seemed to drop off, but increased again towards the end of 1963 with a total of £8 million worth of credits and grants to Somalia. It was estimated that the number of Chinese technicians working abroad on aid projects numbered about 470. During 1961 it had been estimated that there were about 800 Chinese—allegedly soldiers in civilian clothes—in the Yemen engaged upon road construction work but it is believed that this work has now been completed and the bulk of this labour force withdrawn.

Communist China's largest single loan has been to Burma, which was granted a loan of £28 million in 1961, and so became one of the few countries in receipt of a greater amount of aid from China than from the Soviet bloc. The loan to be used for the construction of a textile spinning and weaving mill, a sugar, paper, and tyre factory, electric power stations, other industrial installations and two bridges. The loan was granted interest free, the agreement included a provision for the importation of about £1 million worth of machinery from China.

Cambodia, Ceylon, Nepal and Indonesia have all been granted loans of varying amounts by China. Under the loans to Cambodia various factories and industrial plants are to be constructed and agricultural development work carried out.

Ceylon has received more than £12 million under credit agreements and £4 million in grants. Construction work under agreements with China include the building of a textile factory and some railway rolling stock has been provided. In Nepal, which has received £15 million, the major Chinese aid project is the Kathmandu-Kodari Road; Nepal being another country which has received more Chinese than Soviet bloc aid. In 1956 China agreed to fund an Indonesian trade deficit of £5 million and has since offered over £10 million in loans and grants to that country, a proportion of the loans being intended for the construction of textile mills.

In 1958 China granted a £5 million interest free credit to the Yemen to cover the construction of a 142 mile road between Hodeida and Sana and also for the construction of a textile mill. Chinese aid to African countries began in 1960 with an £8 million interest free credit agreement with Guinea, the credit being intended for use on an industrial expansion programme and an experimental tea farm. In 1963 the Prime Minister of Guinea announced that China had transferred £1 million to Guinea for the purpose of enabling Guinea to make purchases in any country. Ghana was in receipt of Chinese loans and grants totalling £7 million extended in 1961 but little of this appears to have been used so far. Mali received a £7 million credit under an agreement signed in December

1963 under which China was to build several factories, a rice mill, a sugar refinery, a cotton ginning plant and a cotton oil refinery.

Chinese aid commitments to countries on the African continent entered into during 1964 included an interest free loan of £5 million to Kenya and an outright grant of £1 million to the same country, a £14 million interest free loan to Tanzania plus a £1 million grant for economic development and at the end of the year a further grant of £163,000 for the purpose of constructing a high powered radio transmission station, and an interest free loan of £8 million to Ghana to assist in the carrying out of that country's first seven year plan. Construction projects planned under this programme included the building of a plant for the production of hand grenades and another for the manufacture of land mines.

Early 1965 saw the completion of negotiations for the signing of new aid agreements between China and several African countries. These included a credit of £3 million to Tanzania for the construction of three projects including a textile mill and a farm tool plant. A long term loan equal to nearly £7 million to the Congo (Brazzaville) for the purpose of developing the economy and the signing of an aid agreement with Uganda which reportedly involved a loan of £4 million and an outright grant of £1 million.

It would seem that in general the economic aid programme of Communist China has not achieved as great a degree of success so far in enhancing China's reputation amongst the developing nations as its sponsors would have wished, despite the fact that the terms offered tend to be more liberal than those offered by other Communist countries. This is probably due chiefly to repeated failures to complete or even start agreed projects on time. The programme of aid to Burma, for instance, provided for under the agreement signed in 1961 had not begun to be put into operation by the end of 1963, although under the programme the factories to be built as a result of it were due to have been completed by the end of 1962. In a number of cases industrial installations constructed with Chinese aid have been found to be inefficient or uneconomic in operation. The frequency with which China has used acceptances of offers of aid as a means whereby to carry on subversive activities in the recipient countries and the blatant manner in which the Chinese Government has used aid in efforts to secure diplomatic recognition have also been factors causing concern and suspicion amongst the governments of many genuinely uncommitted, neutral nations.

PART 2

THE ATTACK FROM WITHIN

CHAPTER XI

“The Spearheads of Communism”:

Communist Parties in Non-Communist Countries

Historical Survey—Party Organisation—Finance—Recruitment—Party political education.

THE establishment of Communist Parties in countries throughout the world followed hard on the successful conclusion of the Communist coup in Russia in 1917. Each Party was modelled on the organisation laid down by Lenin. In a number of cases, notably in the case of the American Communist Party, their formation was aided by the despatch of special representatives from the Soviet Union and other European countries. These agents travelled in a clandestine fashion and worked under the protection afforded by some innocuous “cover”. The duties of these “reps”, as they were known, was to instruct and help the new Parties. Leaders and potential leaders of them were often invited for subsidised visits to Moscow where they received training at the famous Lenin College and other institutions such as the college for ‘The Toilers of The East’. The syllabus at these training establishments included a grounding in political warfare, the tactics of guerilla warfare and the techniques of revolution as well as instruction in Marxist theory. Graduates of these colleges played a leading part in the history of the Communist Parties of a number of countries for many years and in some cases still continue to do so.

From 1920 until 1943 the Communist Parties of the world operated under the control of the Central Committee of the CPSU in Moscow which used the Comintern and its area secretariats. That in Western Europe, for example, being situated first in Berlin and then in Copenhagen. That the Comintern did, in fact, command the allegiance and direct the activities of all Communist Parties is demonstrated by, amongst many other things, the fact that up till its dissolution in 1943 the membership cards of all members of the British Communist Party bore the words, “Immediate carrying out of the decisions of the Communist International (the Comintern) is binding upon all members”.

The degree of supervision the Comintern maintained over Communist Parties outside was partly revealed by the evidence of Ivor Gouzenko, the Soviet Embassy official whose defection from the Soviet Union's Embassy in Ottawa in 1945 was to provide the West with further proof of the extent of the Communist challenge with which it was to be faced. In the course of evidence before a Canadian Royal Commission investigating the Soviet espionage network whose existence had been revealed by his defection, Gouzenko stated that the Comintern possessed a file on every member of every Communist Party in the world.

Such an allegation might seem utterly fantastic were it not known from other sources that an obsession with records providing information which might come in useful sometime is an integral part of any Communist bureaucracy. Certainly the papers which Gouzenko, and Petrov, who defected some years later from the Soviet legation in Australia, brought with them showed that the Comintern and the organisations that succeeded it in Moscow were in possession of an enormous wealth of information about individual members of the Communist Parties of the world.

The Comintern was officially dissolved in 1943 for the sake of bringing about greater unity between the Soviet Union and its wartime allies. The extent to which its machinery and institutions were, in fact, dismantled and the extent to which these merely took new forms has never been very clear. Gouzenko stated before the Canadian Royal Commission in the face of persistent questioning that at that time (1945) the Comintern had only been abolished in name, and that all its files and records had been kept and the personnel retained to carry on its activities as before.

The Cominform which was established in 1947 with its headquarters in Belgrade acted as the co-ordinating organ of International Communism throughout the early years of the Cold War. Officially styled an "Information Bureau" it consisted of representatives of the European Communist countries with, in addition, representatives of the Communist Parties of France and Italy. The rôle of the Cominform at the time of its inception was defined as follows:

"The Information Bureau is to be entrusted with the task of organising the exchange of experience, and, should the necessity arise, with the task of co-ordinating the activities of the Communist Parties on the basis of mutual agreement".¹

The Cominform was dissolved in 1956.

Despite the fact that no formally established central organ now exists to co-ordinate or direct the activities of the world's Communist Parties, strong links and influence still bind the great majority of Communist parties outside the Communist bloc to Moscow. Under the principle of 'democratic centralism', under which all Communist Parties now operate, members are bound not only to accept the decisions

¹*Soviet Monitor*, 5 October, 1957.

of their own National Executive in advance, but the decisions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as well. The Chinese drive to make Peking instead of Moscow the focus of Communist loyalties seems to date to have been remarkably unsuccessful. With the eclipse of the Indonesian Communist Party after the abortive revolt of 1965 no party which in any true sense can be called a "mass party" now gives outright acknowledgement to Peking's leadership whilst the few that do are small with virtually no foreseeable prospects of achieving power. Similarly the pro-Peking splinter groups which have made their appearance in the last few years in a number of non-Communist countries are with very few exceptions small in numbers and insignificant in influence.

Evidence exists to show that directives, or at least requests for certain action to be undertaken, are on occasions handed down to Communist Parties in the non-Communist world through KGB networks or where the Party is Peking orientated through Chinese equivalents. The normal means of contact between Communist Parties outside the Communist bloc and world Communist centres, however, are through the constant coming and going of delegations, inter-party conferences, and the services provided by TASS and the NCNA for the Party press throughout the world. In the case of the underground Communist Parties a courier service is operated. Couriers not infrequently travel as the members of crews of ships sailing to Communist ports.

A small or inexperienced Communist Party may sometimes be placed under the guidance of an older established or more powerful Party. This was the case with the Burmese Communist Party which in the immediate post war years was placed under the orders of the Indian Communist Party. According to Douglas Hyde, a former Assistant Editor of the *Daily Worker*, the French Communist Party was given the special task of guiding the Communist Party of Great Britain at the same period.

Both Moscow and Peking seem to regard Communist Parties in the non-Communist world increasingly as expendable instruments of their foreign policy. The proscription of a Communist Party by a particular government does not inhibit either of the two leading Communist powers from embarking upon or continuing a policy of close relations with that government, provided that it seems in their general interest to do so and its policy is on the whole anti-Western. This can be seen most notably in the friendly attitude maintained by the Communist bloc towards both the UAR and Algeria.

The strength of Communist Party membership in the world is not easy to assess accurately, as there is reason to believe that figures published by Communist sources are in some cases exaggerated, whilst the accuracy of estimates made by non-Communist sources can only be problematical. It is, however, believed that the membership of Communist Parties outside the Communist bloc probably now approaches six million divided between 85 Parties. The strength of all the Communist Parties is set out in the Appendix.

Parties in which there would seem to have been significant increases in membership during recent years include that of Cyprus, where membership of the Communist Party (AKEL) has risen from an estimated 5,000 in 1960 to 10,000 in 1966, and that of the United Kingdom where membership figures have risen from 27,000 in 1960 to 33,734 in 1966. Membership in the Italian, Indian and Indonesian Parties has, however, fallen substantially in recent years. In the case of the Italian Party it has fallen from 1,500,000 in 1960 to 1,350,000 in 1966, a surprising fact in view of the increasingly high percentage of the total vote the Party has been claiming in both national and local elections in recent years, and one that has been blamed upon poor party organisation in some rural areas. In the case of the Indian Party the decrease in membership was even more marked, a drop from 230,000 in 1960 to 125,000 in 1966, this was of course largely a result of public reaction to the Chinese attack upon India's northern borders

Prior to the Chinese border dispute the Indian Party had provided one of the most impressive examples of rapid growth of a Communist Party in a non-Communist country on record. In the three years from 1945 to 1948 membership was almost trebled (from 30,000 to 89,263), and in the following nine years it increased to reach 125,000 by 1957.

After the anti-Communist military coup in Indonesia in 1965, the strength of its Communist Party declined dramatically.

Published membership figures of Communist Parties do not normally include membership of the various official Communist youth movements which exist as an offshoot of the Communist Party in many countries, although these are often sizeable and active in giving the Party valuable support in a variety of ways. The British Young Communist League, for instance, now claims a membership of over 4,500. Nor do membership figures include "concealed members", those members who for one reason or another think it best not to admit their membership of the Communist Party.

In the main, Communist Parties in countries outside the Communist orbit draw their strength from industrial workers, dockers and miners, but in certain countries, Belgium for example, they have a considerable following among some categories of white collar and public service workers. In Italy about 30 per cent of the Party's strength comes from agricultural workers and tenant farmers.

There is abundant evidence to prove that Communism appeals to some intellectuals and members of the professions as well as to manual workers. In France for instance it is known that about 20,000 school teachers hold membership cards. In Britain there are a number of admitted Communist Party members amongst lecturers at leading universities.

The 38 Communist Parties which operate in conditions of illegality vary in size from the Brazilian Communist Party with an estimated 36,000 members and the Communist Party of Argentina with 45,000 members to the Communist Party of the Lebanon with 300 members.

The largest "illegal" Communist Party in Western Europe is that of Greece with an estimated 20,000 members.

Three of the most recent Communist Parties to be formed are those of Lesotho (formerly Basutoland) founded in 1961 largely as the result of the activities of members of the South African Communist Party living in that country in exile, and those of Nigeria and Swaziland.

Party Organisation

Communist Party national organisations are centred round a national headquarters and a number of area headquarters under which come the local and factory branches.

The national headquarters are sub-divided into a number of departments each under its own head and dealing with such subjects as education, organisation, international affairs and propaganda, industrial affairs and in some instances specialised departments such as women's departments, ex-servicemen's departments, and in countries with large racial minority groups a minority department or departments; for example the Negro Commission and the Nationalities Commission of the Communist Party of the USA. The various area headquarters are staffed by full-time paid employees of the Party. As a general rule Communist Parties have an average of one paid party official to every 25 members in contrast to an average of one to 1,000 or one to 5,000 as is the case of most other political parties.

Control of policy is exercised through a series of committees. In the case of the British Communist Party these are:

The National Executive Committee consists of 42 members. According to the Party rules this is elected bi-annually at the Party Conference.

The Political Committee meets weekly and consists of 12 members. It is this Committee under the direction of the Secretary General which exercises the real power. It is composed of full-time Party officials, elected by the Executive Committee.

As sub-committees of the Executive Committee come a number of specialist committees which include:

The International Affairs Committee. In recent years much of this Committee's work has been concerned with studying developments in 'The National Liberation Struggle' in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The Party's leading expert on Africa, Mr. Jack Woddis, is this Committee's chairman and during the period January 1963 to July 1965 it held more meetings on Africa than on any other single subject.

Social Services Committee. This Committee has been responsible for preparing General Election policy statements on issues concerned with home affairs and the Welfare State generally and for issuing information on these subjects to Party candidates at local elections in conjunction with the Press and Publicity Department.

Women's Advisory Committee. An important part of this Committee's activities has been concerned with developing the "united action of women for peace", including the organisation of lobbies, delegations, and demonstrations over such subjects as the Test Ban treaty, NATO and SEATO council meetings and the CND Easter march. It has also been responsible for carrying on a campaign amongst women in favour of a cut in arms expenditure and for equal pay for women. Another part of its activities has been concerned with organising protests at the rising cost of living.

Youth Advisory Committee. This Committee is mainly concerned with work designed to strengthen the Young Communist League and with the Party's activity amongst university students. Attempts are being made to set up Area Youth Advisory Committees. The National Student Committee operates as a subordinate body of this Sub-Committee. It normally meets two or three times during university terms with the object of advising the Executive Committee on Party Work in the universities. In some districts "Student Committees" have been established whose rôle is to advise on Party work in all institutions of higher learning in the particular area concerned.

Economic Sub-Committee. Its main work is concerned with the production of a special annual report on economic affairs which is published in the Party's theoretical journal *Marxism Today* after approval by the Executive Committee. It also carries out a critical examination of each year's national Budget and important government economic projects which may be announced from time to time.

The Cultural Committee. An important part of this Committee's work is concerned with organising discussions on subjects "designed to help our comrades play their part in the battle of ideas in the cultural and ideological fields".¹ A by-product of these discussions being the provision of articles on cultural subjects for the Party press. It maintains close liaison with the Party's history group and music group. It publishes its own bulletin, a quarterly production, entitled *Cultural Work* which is circulated to some 400 Party members throughout the country.

The Science Sub-Committee. This is the newest of the sub-Committees being only established in May 1964 for the purpose of informing and advising the Executive Committee on:

"policy matters arising from developments in the fields of science and technology, the organisation of scientific and technological work and research and their effect on society".¹

¹29th National Congress Report of the Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Great Britain, p. 12.

It met four times between June 1964 and July 1965 and amongst the subjects it studied were probable trends in automation and the possibilities for scientific development in Britain. It also issued a questionnaire on fundamental research which was circulated to selected Party members to assist it in drafting a policy statement on the subject.

In addition to the above committees and sub-committees a number of 'Advisory Sub-Committees' function under the control of the various departments of the national headquarters. The British Party's International Department is aided by specialist Advisory Sub-Committees on Asia, Africa, the Middle East, the West Indies, and Latin America. The Party's Executive Committee Report for the period January 1963 to July 1965 stated in regard to the International Department that:

"In the past two years there has been a considerable expansion in the work of the department, arising from many new developments in the international situation and the continued growth of the national liberation struggle on a world scale".

According to the same report activities conducted by the Department during those 18 months included campaigns against apartheid, for African majority rule in Rhodesia, for the granting of independence to Kenya, in support of the Zanzibar revolution, against the Malaysian Federation, and for the release of political prisoners in Iraq, India, Spain, Portugal, and Greece. It was also active in providing many articles on Vietnam for use in the Party Press and in giving assistance to organisations engaged upon mounting protest campaigns against American action in Vietnam. As well as providing information on particular subjects for the use of the Department they serve, these Advisory Sub-Committees assist in the preparation of articles for use in the Party Press and also for publication in other countries. It is of some interest that the British Party's Executive Report previously referred to for 1963 to 1965 makes a particular point of recording in the section devoted to the International Department that a recent development had been the publication of a number of articles by leading British Communists in a number of African journals which had also reprinted features which had first appeared in the British Party's publications.

Discipline in Communist Parties is strict; most Parties have within their organisation a department charged with security and the maintenance of discipline among members, such as the Communist Party of the USA's National Review Commission. In countries in which Communist Parties have ultimately gained power such departments have often been used as a foundation for the construction of a political police force.

Defectors from Communist Parties have spoken of the existence of special courts to try offenders accused of offences of right or left wing "deviationism", or manifesting "bourgeois tendencies". Penalties inflicted include demotion from Party Office or expulsion from the Party. Officers of the Party can be and sometimes are ordered to resign from their jobs and take others, to move from one town to another, and in certain cases to break off contacts with friends or even relations.

Members of Communist Parties are expected to accept the Party line on all essential matters of policy without serious question, clauses to this effect being sometimes written into the Party's constitution.

Although members of the various committees of Communist Parties are officially elected at Party conferences and congresses, the normal practice is for a list of official candidates to be presented for election *en bloc*, the effect being to vest the established leadership with an oligarchical form of control, which, short of a major revolt inside the Party, it is difficult for the rank and file membership to shake off even if they should wish to do so.

Finance

Although there is considerable evidence to indicate that various Communist Parties received substantial subsidies from the Soviet Union in the early days of International Communism, nowadays this would seem to be more of an exception than a general rule.

When subsidies are granted in particular circumstances to Parties by Moscow it is probable that they are only sufficient to cover about 20 per cent of the Party's running costs, and is only given for expenditure on items laid down by Moscow such as the running of the Party's central organisations and newspapers. It appears that subsidies are granted to help such special projects as agitation and infiltration of government departments and armed forces. They are also made available if a Communist Party gets into financial difficulties as was the case with the Australian Communist Party in the early 1950's. Financial assistance is also given to Parties which have been operating underground for lengthy periods.

The main basis for the financial support of Communist Parties are membership fees and donations from sympathisers. According to its Balance Sheet for the period 1 January, 1965 to 31 December, 1966, the British Communist Party received £41,588 from donations, and a special 'Into Action Fund'.

Donations come from many different categories of sympathisers sometimes few of whom are actual members of the Party. Douglas Hyde has said that:

"The Party does not hesitate to make big financial demands from Fellow Travellers because most of them have bad consciences because although they will not admit it what prevents most of them from joining the Party is a lack of moral courage or their pre-occupation with a career. So they subsidise Communist causes

in order to salve their consciences. Thus the Party has a hold on them which it does not hesitate to use. A man who has at some time associated with the Party is in a vulnerable position. Among contributors are left wing politicians, ministers of religion, University professors, stockbrokers, and industrialists".¹

The Argentine Communist Party claims that thousands of "activists" and non-members donate money to the Party and that in a recent fund raising drive it received support from more than 350,000 people (it has a membership of 45,000). In order to help meet its financial requirements this Party has established a network of "fund raising" Committees, 350 of them all told, which receive contributions from over 50,000 persons.

The collection of subscriptions from Party members is regarded as a major Party activity. The Communist Party of Great Britain's 'Handbook for Members of the Communist Party' states that:

"Every quarter the Branch Committee should review the dues position of the Branch as a whole and take energetic steps to eliminate any arrears that may have arisen".

The same handbook lays down details of the manner in which the collection of subscriptions or dues from members should be carried out.

"All members including those who regularly participate in the life of the Branch should be covered by Dues Collectors, so that if there should be any interruption in this there is automatically a comrade responsible for seeing him, keeping his card clear, letting him know what is going on, and helping to sort out any political or practical problem that may have arisen. This will work most effectively where capable comrades are as Dues Collectors and where the Branch Committee helps the Dues Collectors to understand the political aspects of their tasks, including the rôle of helping the personal development of their members and drawing them towards the branch . . . Obviously it is desirable that each Dues Collector be responsible for a limited manageable number of members—in the region of six per Collector. No member should be left without contact for more than a fortnight."²

The Indian Party's constitution includes a provision that the Central and Provincial Committees may raise extra funds by imposing a levy on the incomes of certain members of the Party earning substantial salaries. Communist Members of Parliament of this Party and some other Parties such as that of Italy are required to turn over a percentage of their salary to Party headquarters. A requirement which has not always been complied with by the Party members concerned without some protest.

Funds are also raised by Communist Parties through sales of literature,

¹Douglas Hyde. *I Believed*, William Heineman, London, 1950, p. 136.

²*Forging the Weapon*. Handbook for Members of The Communist Party of Great Britain, London, 1962, p. 28.

for example the British Communist Party raised £31,445 during the period 1 October, 1962, to 31 December, 1964, by this means. A great many special appeals are launched by Communist Parties. In Italy money is also acquired through agricultural wholesale firms and brokerage firms engaged in East-West trade and under Party control.

In some developing countries special measures are resorted to to raise funds. In the Argentine for instance some peasant supporters of the Communist Party make their contribution to it in the form of products, which are then sold by the district committee. A large percentage of the Indonesian Communist Party's income was raised by "production activity" carried out by teams of Party members and sympathisers. The work of these teams included such projects as tree planting, poultry breeding, fish pond building and general agricultural work. The teams worked the land of Party members who had full-time Party jobs and so could do the work themselves. The existence of the teams helped certain Party members out of a somewhat awkward situation for they could not let the land they had no time to work without being stigmatised as a "landlord" and so losing the respect of their comrades. Money raised as a result of work done by the teams and the sale of produce grown by them was divided between the central area and branch committees on a quota basis.

Recruitment

The continual recruiting drive engaged in by Communist Parties is a twofold one, employing both direct and indirect methods.

Chief among the direct methods are the recruiting campaigns and publicity campaigns engaged in by most parties and well illustrated by the Communist Party of Great Britain's "Party Building Year" which lasted from June 1961 to June 1962. 583 public meetings were held during the course of the campaign, nearly six million leaflets were distributed and over 15,000 posters put up. The campaign produced over 3,400 new members for the Party and the strength of the Young Communist League was more than trebled from 1,187 to 4,019. A similar mass recruiting campaign was launched in the summer of 1967. The emphasis this time being on obtaining new members from industrial areas.

The direct recruiting appeal of Communist Parties tends to be very much more specialised than that of most other political parties. Special appeals are being made and special literature being addressed to particular categories of workers such as transport workers, dockers, and agricultural workers from time to time. Particular attention is paid to recruitment amongst women and young people.

Indirect recruiting methods employed by Communist Parties are directed towards sections of the community and individuals, who although not unsympathetic towards the aims of the Party might be wary of responding to a direct appeal to join it. A number of particularly well established techniques are in constant use. One of these is the

'Study Group' or 'Discussion Group' meeting which has drawn many of the intellectual sympathisers into the Party.

The normal practice employed in this method of recruitment being either for public meetings to be advertised at which it is stated that there will be discussions on such subjects as "The Differences between Socialism and Communism", "The Future of Marxism", or "The Problems of the International Communist Movement". Those who attend such meetings and show particular interest in or sympathy with Communist views are then the subject of an intensive but gradual campaign aimed at their complete conversion to the Communist point of view, and their eventual recruitment into the Party.

Such tactics were used on a widespread scale during the 1930's and early 1940's by the Canadian Communist Party, and were successful in drawing a number of Canadian citizens holding responsible positions into the Party, including some in government service. The true political affiliations of Study Groups is not always demonstrated to new members at the outset, and sometimes they may be of an ostensibly non-political nature such as "music listening groups" or groups devoted to studying literature. One ex-member of a Canadian 'Study Group' stated that he was drawn into it by a friend who first invited him to join an "informal discussion group" and that he did not realise for some time that, in fact, it was a Communist Party cell, although later he realised that it was just that.¹

Summing up evidence regarding the "secret" use of such apparently "non-aligned" study groups by the Canadian Party for recruiting purposes, the Canadian Royal Commission on Espionage stated:

"Any small Study Group however called which will allow more experienced Communists to influence and simultaneously to study the physiological development of potential recruits will do in the early stages of the new recruits development . . . The existence of secret Communists in generally informal small discussion groups appears to be one of the methods used to attempt to develop some or all of the other participants and to later draw them into more specifically Communist groups, if possible by turning the earlier informal unit into such a unit, without the full realisation of all the other participants of the change that has taken place. Alternatively, persons considered suitable for development are designated to cell leaders and then invited to join the cell instead of continuing with the group".²

The "illegal" Communist Party of West Germany amongst others has made extensive use of the study group technique in more recent times and it has also been used in Africa, particularly in Basutoland and South Africa.

Party recruitment is a major rôle of the various cultural and specialist groups officially sponsored by Communist Parties such as the musical,

¹*Report of the Royal Commission, Ottawa, 1948, p. 78.*

²*Ibid.*

literature, theatre, and history groups, and also of the Communist front organisations which attempt to engage the more promising of their non-party members in the same sort of gradual involvement employed in the study group technique.

Considerable importance is attached by Communist Parties to recruiting efforts made by individual members. An American Communist Party manual giving hints on recruiting states that Communists should mix with their fellow workers during the midday break and to try and steer their conversation into political channels and always to try and seize a chance to get the party line across. If a worker shows interest he should be given a pamphlet and invited to attend a meeting or join a study group. Members are advised that they should not try and put over the party line in the usual Communist jargon, but in "good American slang" and that they should try and stay with any likely recruit they may meet in the course of their work when work is over because "the majority of our Party members become Communists only after working hours, around 6 p.m."¹

A type of recruiting favoured recently by the British Communist Party earned special mention from the Party's General Secretary who said when addressing the Party's 28th Congress at Easter 1963:

"There is a splendid idea developing in the Party, I meet everywhere up and down the country, the idea of the Communist family. Now this is an important conception. Often now when a comrade gets a man to join, he tries at the same time to get the wife to join too and in addition if there are boys and girls of YCL age to chat about the possibility of the all-round Communist family".²

Recruiting amongst trade unionists is largely the responsibility of Communist 'factory branches', branches based upon a particular works and composed entirely of its workers, functioning independently of any local branch that may be operating on an area basis. Particular attention being paid to recruitment amongst the younger workers.

Much recruitment work amongst young people is carried out by Young Communist leagues and other youth movements, and also by special organisations for students which may or may not be official Party organisations and by student sections or departments within Party headquarters. The British Party's National Student Organiser reported to the Party's Executive at the end of 1963 that Communist Party membership among students had reached 500 for the first time and that there were now branches in almost every university and a number of other colleges as well. He also stated that "given the occasion and the lead, students can be militant. During the Cuban crisis, about half of the demonstrations were student based".

The organisation of the YCL parallels that of the Communist Party itself, maintaining its own echelon of organisational and political

¹J. Edgar Hoover. *Masters of Deceit*, Henry Holt, New York, 1958, p. 268.

²CPGB 28th Congress Party's Report, p. 28.

committees. In the Summer of 1966 it was announced that the British Communist Party was to spend £3,000 in the next year in a special drive for young recruits.

Party Political Education

The training of Party members both in the theories of Communism and in practical Party work is an essential part of the Party's activities. The ultimate aim of this training is to produce a steady flow of new cadre members. Cadres are the backbone of Communist Parties. Fully educated in Marxist philosophy, experienced in the problems of work amongst "the masses" and with an unswerving dedication to the cause, it is these members upon whom both the legal and illegal parties rely to maintain their organisations and to carry out tasks of special difficulty or responsibility.

Many Communist Parties have their own Party schools. The French Party has six such schools and the American Party also maintains a number of such residential establishments. Other Parties including the British Party make use of conference centres in various parts of the country for the holding of schools and weekend conferences. The Party's 'Handbook for Members' asserts that:

"Systematic study of Marxism is one of the most important forms of political activity that Communists can undertake. Without it the Party cannot fulfil its responsibility as the vanguard of the working class within the Labour movement".¹

The same publication goes on to say that considerations should be given to organising classes or discussions for particular "groups of comrades; e.g. new members, housewives, factory workers, etc.". Another recommendation that the handbook makes is for "collective reading of major works using the study guides prepared by the Central Education Department". The syllabus for Party education laid down by headquarters includes the study of such Party publications as *Our Aim is Socialism* An Introductory Course, *The Communist Manifesto* (1848) by Marx and Engels, *The State and Revolution* by Lenin, *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism*, and *The British Road to Socialism*.²

Party members are expected to do a considerable amount of reading in their spare time whilst undergoing instruction, for at classes held "to raise the theoretical level of the comrades". The greater part of the proceedings consist of the instructor making a short introductory speech and questioning his pupils on theoretical points which the reading they have done should enable them to answer.

¹*Forging The Weapon*. Handbook for Members of the Communist Party of Great Britain, London, 1962, p. 29.

²*Forging The Weapon*. Handbook for Members of the Communist Party of Great Britain, London, 1962, p. 30.

CHAPTER XII

Activities and Tactics of Communist Parties in Non-Communist Countries

The search for support from the masses—Unity campaigns—Peace work—Support for ‘national liberation’—Support for minorities—Cultural activities—Pressure campaigns.

WHEN writing on the question of Party organisation, Lenin stated that “the whole art of conspiratorial organisation consists in making use of everything and everybody and finding work for everybody”.¹

In those words lie the seeds of one of the main differences between the attitude of members of Communist Parties and other political organisations towards the parties which they support. For whereas the majority of political parties in democracies consist largely of “passive supporters”, paying a membership fee and voting for the party but otherwise, except perhaps during election campaigns, taking little active part in the party’s activities, in Communist Parties the most strenuous efforts are made to ensure that practically every member plays some active part in working for the cause. Moreover an atmosphere is created in which members are made to feel that they are taking part in a crusade, which if it is successful will not just improve their individual lot but entirely alter the human race for the better. A sense of great urgency and impending crisis is created, and members are given the impression that at any moment they may be called upon to strike a decisive blow against the “class enemy” or frustrate some “imperialist plot”.

Members of Communist Parties are told that they are fighting a ruthless and heartless enemy against whom no holds must be barred and that in the words of Lenin “Even routine activities must be regarded as rehearsals for more important events”. Lenin wrote:

“To train a network of agents for the rapid and correct distribution of literature, leaflets, proclamations, etc., is to perform the greater half of the work of preparation for an eventual demonstration, uprising. It is too late to start organising literature distribution at a moment of interest, a strike or ferment; it must be done gradually, distributions being made twice or even three times

¹V. I. Lenin, ‘A Letter to a Comrade on our Problems of Organisation’ (1902), *Lenin On Organisation*, Lenin Library, Daily Worker Publishing Co., Chicago, 1926, pp. 124-125.

a month . . . The distribution machine must in no case be allowed to remain idle. We must try and bring the machine to a pitch of perfection that the whole working class population can be advised, and so to speak, mobilised overnight".¹

The Search for Support from the Masses

The main aim of Communist Parties, in pursuit of their ultimate goal of achieving power is to gain the support of "the masses" or the workers by appearing as their natural champion in the struggle against "capitalist exploitation", "imperialism", and "warmongering". To achieve this end they are prepared, and in fact, consider it a duty, to support actively the cause of practically any section of the community which has a real or imagined grievance, whether invited to do so or not, and if possible to become the leading champion of such causes.

The Communist Party of Great Britain's 'Handbook for Members' emphasises that it is not only the more dramatic or eye-catching causes that should receive support stating that domestic issues such as:

"Rents, housing, rates, fares, social amenities and so on are all questions which play an important part in the lives of the people, and our branches should emerge as the champions of the people defending their interests in these matters. In this way we will avoid appearing to be only interested in the bigger issues which sometimes seem far removed from everyday life, and we will be more successful in our efforts to explain how our efforts are linked up with the questions of national policy—how for example the shortage of council dwellings at reasonable rents is related to the excessive expenditure on armaments and the weapons of mass destruction".²

The handbook goes on to state that "there is an almost endless variety of methods of developing agitation—petitions, deputations, special meetings, use of the local press, poster parades, leaflets, etc." . . .

"The important thing is that on all the main local questions the Branch should seek some appropriate way of making its attitude public and we should try to draw all our members and supporters into helping the campaign in some way. The more our branches are seen as organisations which take up local issues, the more frequently we are likely to be called on to give assistance in individual cases such as evictions, pensions, problems, etc."³

Communists have always been particularly active in carrying out agitation against rent increases, the Secretary General of the British Party claimed in 1955 that:

¹V. I. Lenin. 'A Letter to a Comrade on our Problems of Organisation' (1902), *Lenin On Organisation*, Lenin Library, Daily Worker Publishing Co., Chicago, 1926, pp. 124-125.

²*Forging the Weapon*. Handbook for Members of the Communist Party of Great Britain, London, 1962, p. 12.

³*Forging the Weapon*. Handbook for Members of the Communist Party of Great Britain, p. 17.

“there was hardly a place where rent increases have been carried out or threatened where our Party branches have not gone into battle”.¹

Another British Communist Party publication entitled *The Role of The Communist Party*² states that no aspect of the struggle is “too humble” to earn the support of the Party because capitalism is weakened and the working class strengthened by every victory in “the immediate struggle”. If the Communist Party works “correctly” the workers taking part in such struggles will learn the “facts” about the nature of capitalism and the need to change it. The Communist Party, according to the same publication, must not only give “every support of all organisations which in any way defend the interests of the mass of people”, it must, “help to select the most effective issues of struggle and most effective forms of struggle. They will work to lift up, step by step, the level of the struggle from the more humble issues to the more vital political issues.”³

A favourite technique is to inspire or support campaigns on any issues that can be used to demonstrate the Party’s concern for the man in the street and at the same time “reveal” official callousness, inefficiency, or dishonesty. The campaign carried on in support of the construction of more deep air raid shelters at the beginning of the last war, a campaign in which Dr. Nunn May, later to be imprisoned for espionage on behalf of the USSR took a prominent part provided just such a case. Douglas Hyde was to write of it afterwards:

“The shelter campaign had everything to it from the Communist Party’s point of view. It had the appearance of being a crusade for the greater safety of the common people whilst at the same time it spread alarm about the provisions already made by the authorities”.⁴

According to the author of a report from South America, himself a member of the Communist Party concerned, “the popular struggle, headed by the Communists” was a decisive factor in bringing in 10,000 new recruits to the Party in Chile in 1961. The author cited the example of how the Party’s popularity rose after it had launched a “solidarity movement” and a big campaign to prevent the eviction of squatters from land they had seized in Santa Adriana, and how when the government ultimately agreed to grant the squatters building rights and facilities on other plots of land, 350 of them joined the Communist Party.

“Unity Campaigns”

A recurrent theme in the activities of Communist Parties has been the launching of “Unity Campaigns”. These involve attempts by

¹*Daily Worker*, 28 November, 1955.

²*The Role of the Communist Party*. Education Department, Communist Party of Great Britain, London, 1961.

³*The Role of the Communist Party*. Education Department, Communist Party of Great Britain, London, 1961, p. 10.

⁴Douglas Hyde. *I Believed*, William Heineman Ltd, London, 1950, p. 94.

Communist Parties to form alliances with Socialist and other left-wing or "progressive" parties in order to pursue a common policy for the overthrow of the existing regime. Such unity campaigns have once again become an important part of current policy. The main task discussed by the delegates to the 29th National Congress of the British Communist Party at the end of November 1965 for instance was to discuss:

"How to generate in the country the widest possible movement to secure a turn to the left." The Party "sees the left in Britain as consisting of not just the left MP's and left leaders in the unions. It sees also the politically conscious militants in the trade unions, in the factories, in the labour organisations in the constituencies and in the co-operatives . . . the left also extends to the various peace organisations—the CND, the Vietnam Committees, Anti-Apartheid Committees, the British Peace Committees and others".¹

According to the Party's General Secretary "These diverse forces and movements of the left should have the aim of creating a broad and militant alliance . . . based on the co-operation of the Communists, Socialists and militant trade unionists." This united left should "vigorously combat anti-Communism, while the Communist Party on its part should get rid of any obstacles and actions that hamper unity".¹

In furtherance of this call for unity, the Party has circulated about half a million copies of a nine point discussion programme to "all working class organisations, peace and youth organisations", and men and women prominent in "progressive organisations". The programme contained the following points: rejection of the government's incomes policy; no anti-union legislation; rejection of the government's White Paper on immigration; the end of British support for American action in Vietnam; no multi-lateral or Atlantic nuclear force, and an immediate end to "repressions" in Aden, the war in Malaysia and white supremacy in Rhodesia.

The French Party carried its decision to wage a unity campaign as far as refraining from putting up any candidates of its own in the Presidential elections of 1965 and urging all its members to vote for the Socialist candidate Francois Mitterand. In Finland, the Communist Party has been attempting to form a left wing coalition with the Social Democratic Party which later, however, rebuffed the invitation. In Tunisia, the Communist Party is attempting to create an alliance with "all progressive national forces, and with the Destour Socialists, within the framework of a united front".²

A call for "working-class unity" was the main theme at an important meeting held in Prague in October 1965 to mark the 30th anniversary of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International (Comintern).

¹John Gibbons. 'British Communists in Congress', *World Marxist Review*, February 1966, pp. 49-50.

²Mohamed Harmel. 'Under the Banner of Peace, Freedom and Democracy,' *World Marxist Review*, December 1965, pp. 44-57.

This meeting was organised by the Editorial Board of *Problems of Peace and Socialism* and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. It was attended by representatives of the Communist Parties of Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, India, Italy, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Mexico, Peru, Salvador, the Soviet Union, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Syria, Tunisia, Cyprus, Iran, and a number of other parties.

According to a writer in *World Marxist Review* discussions at this meeting centred round how best to put into effect in the light of modern conditions the decision taken at the Seventh Congress that:

"The Communists could not by themselves avert world war and fascism and safeguard peace, democracy and social progress. Hence it was necessary to approach the question of working-class unity in a new way, to broaden out the alliance with other sections of the working people, with all democratic and progressive forces, including some of the democratic forces in the political camp of the bourgeoisie. The Congress considered that the primary task of the Communists was patiently to convince the working people, on the basis of their own experience, of the soundness of the Party's policy, to win over the working masses to the side of progress by practical activity, and not only by propaganda".¹

"Peace Work"

Apart from the "struggle for workers' rights" and against monopolists conducted largely through the trade unions and agitation over local issues, the primary aim of Communist Parties in non-Communist countries, particularly European countries, is to try and secure the leadership of "The Peace Movement". The peace movement in Communist eyes consists of all "anti-war" movements including campaigners for nuclear disarmament, religious and secular pacifist groups and Communist Party front organisations. A Cominform Directive of 1949 on the peace campaign read:

"Particular attention should be devoted to bringing together into the movement of the supporters of peace the trade unions, women's, youth, co-operative, sports, cultural and educational, religious and other organisations, as well as scientists, writers, journalists, workers in the cultural field, parliamentary leaders who are in favour of peace and against war".²

By taking a leading part in the work of the peace movement, Communist Parties are not only able to support the policy of the USSR in posing as the champions of peace, but also hope to capitalise on the fear of war and horror of nuclear weapons of the average citizen of the non-

¹'The Ideas of Internationalism—An Invincible Force', *World Marxist Review*, December 1965, pp. 2-3.

²Quoted in Stephen King-Hall's *The Communist Conspiracy*, Constable and Company Ltd., 1953, p. 122-123.

Communist world. One of the British Communist Party's publications on its syllabus for instructing new members states that:

"The Communist Party will support every organisation for peace, and it will at the same time endeavour to achieve the broadest unity in action between all sections of the peace movement".¹

The importance of maintaining the unity of the national peace movement and assisting the world peace movement is constantly stressed in Communist publications. But it is always made clear that the unity that is to be sought can only be achieved on Communist terms. The theory held by some pacifist organisations that the Communist and non-Communist world systems are both equally responsible for the danger of war, is repudiated. In fact, the rôle of the Communist Party in the peace movement is to persuade the public that only if the demands of the Communist bloc are agreed to and Western defences dismantled can peace be assured.

In the eyes of the British Communist Party, the struggle for peace should include demands for the renunciation by Britain of the manufacture and use of all nuclear weapons; the conclusion of a German Peace Treaty; the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam; the withdrawal of Britain from NATO and all similar pacts; the closing down of British, and American overseas bases; and the entry of Communist China into the United Nations. It is always made clear that Communists are not pacifists, and that it is their duty to support the forces of progress in "just wars", such as the "Egyptian people at the time of Suez", "the struggle of the Algerian people", and the "struggles of the people of Laos and South Vietnam against US imperialism".²

The peace movement, in the Communist view, has a most important part to play in hindering the war preparations of the 'imperialists'. It should always be mobilised to help frustrate any attempt of the 'imperialists' to "interfere" with a Socialist state or a newly independent country. Its main rôle as far as Communists are concerned is in fact to do everything possible to paralyse Western reaction to Communist moves in the field of foreign affairs by exploiting fear of war in the non-Communist world.

Because of their militancy, and careful planning, Communist parties often succeed in making their presence and influence felt in peace organisations to an extent quite out of proportion to their numbers.

A great deal of Communist peace activity is carried out by the front organisations who often make a specialised appeal to particular sections of community or members of a profession to help aid their supposed efforts to ease international tensions.

¹*Communism and the World Today*, Central Education Department, Communist Party of Great Britain, London, 1963, p. 26.

²*Communism and the World Today*, Central Education Department, Communist Party of Great Britain, London, 1963, p. 16.

Support for 'National Liberation'

Since the days of the Baku conference in 1920, when the victorious Bolshevik leaders first conferred with the leaders of Asian revolutionary or nationalist movements, the world Communist movement has never concealed the importance it attached to allying itself to forces working for the 'liberation' of their various countries. The basic idea behind the Communist belief in the importance of this alliance was that of a gigantic 'outflanking' movement against the Western Powers. The primary objective was to deprive the West of the strength of its colonial possessions, and with them its sources of raw materials and strategic bases. Once the West had been stripped of its overseas possessions, it was considered, it would be able to offer little opposition to the advance of Communism.

Palmiro Togliatti, later to become leader of the Italian Communist Party said as long ago as the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International in 1928 that a Communist Party that did not "systematically and practically support the revolutionary activity in the colonies, is not a revolutionary party but a party of idlers and traitors".¹

Coming to more recent times Khrushchev and his successors have emphasised that peaceful co-existence in their view includes the maximum support for "the oppressed nation". A major theme of the propaganda literature of the Soviet bloc is that "peaceful co-existence is strengthened by the revolutionary struggles of the people".²

There is abundant evidence that the Communist Parties of the colonial powers have implemented the directives regarding support for colonial liberation movements and for the formation of Communist Parties in Colonial territories. British Communists were active in India from the early 1920's onwards. One of these early Communist workers in India was Philipp Spratt who afterwards wrote in his memoirs³ that he was despatched to that country for the purpose of contacting Indian Communist sympathisers with the object of helping them to form a 'Workers' and Peasants' Party', which would, in fact, be a mere cover for Communist activity.

The British Communist Party has also given consistent support to all the various African 'liberation movements', and there is evidence that it has assisted colonial students in London to travel to Moscow for the completion of their studies. The Party has been consistently active in supporting anti-colonial demonstrations and campaigns. It has formed particularly close links with the South African Communist Party.

The French, Portuguese and Belgian Communist Parties have all also been effective in the field of anti-colonialism. The French Party was extremely active in attempting to organise opposition to the wars in Indo-China and Algeria. Paradoxically for some years the French Communist Party worked not for the independence of French African

¹Palmiro Togliatti, 'Social Democracy and the Colonial Question', *Revolution*, Vol. I, No. 10, pp. 46-77.

²*Peace, Freedom and You*, Peace and Socialism, Prague, 1963, p. 15.

³*Blowing up India*, Prachi Prafashan, Calcutta, 1955.

territories but for closer integration with France. The theory being that if this were to come about its own strength in metropolitan France would be increased by the support of the recruits it had gained in Africa. The Party still retains close links with some political parties in the now independent states of the French community, particularly the *Parti Democratique de Guinee*; the *Union Soudanese* of Mali, and the *Union des Populations Camerounaises*, which for some time both before and after the Cameroons became independent carried on a terrorist campaign amounting to a guerilla war in an attempt to overthrow that country's new government. The French Party's expert on Africa, Raymond Guyot, who is a member of its Central Committee, has emphasised the importance of establishing contact, "especially personal contact" with the people of Africa. He has stated that it is the Party's duty to help the Marxist groups springing up in Africa with their educational work, and when conditions are promising to help them form Communist Parties.

According to Major Edgar O'Ballance in his book *The Indo-China War 1945-54* the French Communist Party retained links with the Viet Minh (Communist forces in Indo-China) throughout the campaign. He also states that the French Communists and other left wing groups and sympathisers did all they could to hinder the French war effort and that as much as 40 per cent of some consignments of supplies for the French army in Indo-China were sabotaged before they reached their destination.¹ It still maintains close links with the Communist Party of North Vietnam for whom it carries out propaganda work amongst students from South Vietnam studying in Paris.

Members of the Belgian Communist Party were active in the Congo prior to independence, and the Party made contact with the future first Prime Minister of that country, Patrice Lumumba, whilst he was in Brussels for independence negotiations. It is believed that the Belgian Party was in fact acting as an intermediary for the Soviet Embassy at this time, and that it was during this period that Lumumba and a number of his future ministers first formed an affiliation with the USSR. The Belgian, French and Portuguese Communist Parties are thought to have supplied de Andrade, the leader of the Angolan nationalist movement *Movimento Popular para a libertacao Angola* (MPLA) with money.

De Andrade joined the Portuguese Communist Party whilst a student in Lisbon and was also at one time a member of the French Communist Party. The General Secretary of the Portuguese Communist Party has declared that:

"The Portuguese Communist Party has always given and always will give its active support for the just struggle of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies for their national independence. Our Party is conducting a consistent campaign against the colonial policy of

¹Edgar O'Ballance. *The Indo-China War 1945-54*, Faber and Faber, London, 1964, p. 198.

the Government, it is leading our people to the struggle against that policy, organising resistance, collective desertions and mutinies in the army against the war in Angola and Guinea, and giving every possible assistance to the liberation movement in the Portuguese colonies".¹

In recent years the terms colonial and colonialism have been considerably extended in Communist phraseology to cover situations and countries to which most non-Communists would be unlikely to consider them to apply. The Communist view of the position was stated in a pamphlet published by the World Federation of Trade Unions in 1953 which stated that:

"There are 'true' colonies and territories under protectorate status. This is the position of most African countries. Then there are countries such as India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Thailand, Burma, the countries of the near and Middle East and several Latin American states which, despite legal independence are nevertheless also a part of the colonial and dependent countries of the world".²

George Donahue, author of *Focus on a Communist Front* commenting upon this statement wrote:

"... in effect this means that, in the Communist definition of the term, any country outside North America, Western Europe and, of course, the Soviet Bloc, is a colonial country or may be classified as one if this should happen to suit Communist propaganda purposes".³

Since the beginning of the 1960's the Soviet Union, Communist China, and the Communist Parties of the non-Communist world have been engaged in an all out assault on 'neo-colonialism' as well as colonialism itself. 'Neo-colonialism' has been defined in a British Communist Party publication as "economic aid from imperialist powers with strings and conditions attached, the sending of technicians and advisers from the imperialist countries to former colonial territories, the activities of the American 'Peace Corps', and numerous agencies for propaganda to sell the American, or British or French way of life", and the granting of scholarships to "selected students whom the imperialists hope to indoctrinate with capitalist ideas".⁴ The existence of military bases for the use of the forces of the former ruling power in ex-colonial territories or Western commercial investment in former colonies are both regarded as being prime examples of neo-colonialism. This label can be attached

¹M. de Silva and W. Sheppard, 'Liberation Movement in the Portuguese Colonies', *World Marxist Review*, April 1964, p. 84.

²"Under the Banner of Unity and International Solidarity: The WFTU and the Colonial and Semi-Colonial People's Fight for Their Demands, for Liberty and for National Independence."

³George R. Donahue. *Focus on a Communist Front*, Phoenix House Ltd., 1958, London, p. 61.

⁴*Communism and the World Today*, Central Education Department, Communist Party of Great Britain, London, 1963, p. 51.

to any attempt by Western countries to maintain links with former colonial territories.

The part played by a number of European Communist Parties in aiding the spread of Communist theories amongst Africans was praised by the Soviet African expert, Professor Potehkin, first Director of the Moscow Africa Institute. Writing in the magazine *Sovremenni Vostok* No. 4 of 1960 he commented:

“The Communist Parties of the metropolitan territories, especially those of Britain and France, have made a valuable contribution to the cause of spreading Leninist ideas in Africa. Many thousands of Africans coming to the metropolitan territories learn many new things about the Communist movement, read Marxist literature and return home enriched with progressive ideas.”

Support for minorities

At first sight it might seem surprising to find a political party firmly committed to championing the interests of “the masses”, also frequently emerging as the champion of minorities and emigre populations, yet such is the case.

The support of the American Communist Party for the cause of the negro population of the United States dates back to the early 1920's when the Comintern provided a substantial grant to the American Party to be used for propaganda work amongst that section of the community. In 1928 the American Party was instructed by the Comintern that it should regard the American Negroes as an oppressed race and should campaign for equal rights on their behalf. For some years the Party also campaigned for the establishment of a separate Negro state. This was to be sliced out of the territory of many of the southern states and to consist of areas where the Negro population was densest, called by the Party “the Black Belt”. Since 1956 however less has been heard of support for “self-determination” in the Black Belt, although the Party still considers the Negro population to be a national as well as a racial minority.

The Party's Secretary General, Gus Hall, speaking at a meeting attended by leading members of the Party early in 1964 included support for the Negro civil rights struggle as being one of the main tasks confronting the Party.

The American Communist Party has always also paid great attention to the various “foreign language” groups in the country, immigrants from Europe of comparatively recent arrival. When the Party was first formed in 1919 the majority of its members were foreign born, and its work was hampered throughout its early years by the fact that only a few of its members could speak English fluently enough to explain the principles of Communism in that language. The Party attempts to exert influence among the foreign language groups by posing as the protector of their national cultures, and organising national dances, bazaars, etc. It also attempts to gain support from such groups by acting

as the champions of immigrants threatened with deportation or denied entrance to the United States.

The Canadian Communist Party has come out strongly in support of the claims of the French-speaking minority of the population, and is calling for a new constitution. A report presented at a 1964 convention of the Party stated that:

"The test of Communist principles on the national question is how Communists as Internationalists fight for the rights of the French Canadian Nation, how they combat all attempts, no matter under what guise, to limit or distort those rights".

The Party holds that:

"... the settlement of the national rights of the French Canadian Nation is the gravest domestic issue facing the people of Canada. To save the unity of the country in the face of the predatory aims of US imperialism towards Canada as a whole is a foremost task of every Canadian democrat".¹

In France, the Communist Party pays great attention to activities amongst the immigrant population of Algerians, Spaniards, Portuguese, Italians and other nationalities. A report from a member of the Party stresses the importance of work amongst immigrants in view of the fact that "in many enterprises and building sites" immigrant labour comprises as much as seven per cent of the total labour force".²

The French Communist Party has been demanding better housing conditions for immigrants and the same scale of family allowances for Italian workers as for French workers. It carries on much political education work among immigrants; during 1962 the Party's Central Committee published 700,000 leaflets, pamphlets and bulletins in foreign languages, mainly in Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Polish and Armenian. About a dozen regular newspapers are published in foreign languages on a local basis by Party branches for distribution amongst immigrants.

A special effort was made to keep Spanish workers in France informed about the progress of the strikes in the Spanish mining industry in 1962, and special meetings are held for foreign workers at which Communist speakers give reports about developments in their homelands. The French Party helped a number of Italian immigrants to visit Italy during the elections of 1958 and 1963 in order to enable them to vote for the Italian Communist Party's candidates.

Article 11 of the rules of the French Communist Party states that:

"For purposes of agitation and propaganda in the languages of the immigrants competent bodies, subordinate to the corresponding Party body shall be formed. These bodies called language groups are a means of drawing the comrade from abroad into Party activities, among the various nationalities, into activities of the

¹A. Dewhurst, 'Eighteenth Convention of the Communist Party of Canada', *World Marxist Review*, June 1964, pp. 42-45.

²Rochet Le Francois, 'Work Among Immigrants in France', *World Marxist Review*, February 1964, pp. 56-59.

democratic organisations of the immigrants, the organisations of the CGT and the Peace Committee".¹

In Britain, Communist front organisations exist for the purpose of recruiting support from amongst Irish and also West Indian workers. Party spokesmen have stressed the importance of work among immigrants of all types.

Cultural Activities

The British Communist Party's 'Handbook for Members' states that:

"Sometimes our Party branches present a rather austere picture to the average worker who may be interested in our policy . . . It should be the aim of every branch to break through the routine and to bring to its members the excitement and inspiration that can come from planned social and cultural activities".²

In fact such activities are planned to suit all kinds of tastes. Some of them are intended both to increase the Party's support among intellectuals and some of a lighter kind to attract youth. Into the latter category comes the lectures on various kinds of music, including pop music, open to the public and organised by the Party's Music Group which has also sponsored classical concerts. The Party's Music and Artists Groups have also organised meetings on such subjects as "The Artist in Society", whilst the History Group has organised conferences on such topics as "Stages of Social Development".

The Party's Cultural Committee which controls these various specialist groups meets regularly to discuss such subjects as "Socialism and Culture", "Humanism", "Sociology", "Psychology and Education" and current trends in films. One function organised jointly by the History and Music Groups in 1963 was a meeting on "Workers' Songs". This was no doubt a reflection of a growing interest on the part of the Party in the revival of British folk music that began to manifest itself in the early 1960's.

Pressure Campaigns

Intensive campaigns which attempt to bring about changes of government policy on specific issues are often mounted by Communist Parties, and if conditions appear to be favourable for the purpose similar campaigns may be launched to force the collapse of a government or to precipitate the calling of an election. A variety of tactics are usually employed in such campaigns ranging from the use of demonstrations and the holding of 'protest meetings' to the organised writing of letters to the Press.

Demonstrations forming part of such campaigns may be officially organised by the Party or one of its front organisations or may be

¹Rochet Le Francois, 'Work Among Immigrants in France', *World Marxist Review*, February 1964, pp. 56-59.

²*Forging the Weapon*. Handbook for Members of the Communist Party of Great Britain, London, 1962, p. 31.

called by some movement in which the Communist Party has strong influence through the existence of concealed Communist sympathisers within its ranks. Alternatively, the Communist Party may decide to support demonstrations being held, or a campaign being waged, by organisations that are genuinely independent of it but whose objectives on some specific subject are the same as those of the Communists even though for very different reasons.

The question of whether violence is to be used in a Communist-organised or supported demonstration is always one that is decided by the Party leadership with great care. If it is to be used it is not as a rule sparked off by the ordinary Party members whom the Party has no wish to see become compromised with the police or perhaps become casualties, but members of 'the detachments', specially selected strong-arm men, whose duties also include combating organised anti-Communist forces and who in a "revolutionary situation" act as the nucleus of the Party's street fighting units. Training of the detachments in their duties is sometimes carried on behind the cover of Party sports clubs or associations.

The degree of violence to be used in a given demonstration is carefully planned, and the government's reaction closely watched. If a government shows weakness in the way it deals with the demonstration or shows itself susceptible to this sort of pressure, the degree of violence used will be stepped up in subsequent demonstrations. If the ground has been thoroughly prepared beforehand and the existing regime sufficiently weakened, strikes and demonstrations may well become the precursor to a *coup d'état*. Demonstrations have been used as a cover for attempted coups with crowds creating the maximum confusion and occupying the attention of the security forces; whilst the detachments attempt to capture strategic objectives such as communication centres, government buildings and police stations.

A manual for Communist agitators in Europe contained detailed instructions on crowd handling and included 24 diagrams illustrating methods of countering police action against demonstrations and means of forcing a passage down streets barred by the police.

Communist Parties will often seize upon small and even seemingly pointless occasions for demonstrations in order to rehearse their members in effective demonstration methods so that an effective effort can be made when particularly suitable conditions for putting pressure on a government arise.

Examples of large scale Communist organised demonstrations that achieved a considerable degree of success were the student demonstrations that prevented President Eisenhower from visiting Japan on a good-will visit in 1960 and the riots directed against Vice-President Nixon in South America. In the case of the Japanese riots the Communists had developed a body of students over a number of years using them on occasions for demonstrations but with the main object of keeping them in reserve for just such some occasion as the American President's intended visit when they could be ordered to go all out to

make the maximum impact. A point of interest regarding this case is the fact that the demonstrations were in fact called not by official Communist organisations but by various Socialist splinter groups which had been infiltrated by Communists and which used nationalistic rallying cries to whip up feeling against the United States. More recently Communist organisation and planning has been plainly evident in large scale anti-government rioting which has taken place in the Sudan, Greece and Panama. Large scale and sometimes violent demonstrations are also a favourite weapon of the Indian Communist Party.

Other forms of open pressure employed by Communist Parties include the organisation of deputations to "lobby" Ministers or Members of Parliament and the organisation of campaigns by letter and telephone calls to similar prominent people. During debates in the French assembly on EDC, for instance, it was estimated that the Communist Party and Communist organisations were responsible for inspiring the despatch of some 15 million letters to Deputies and others. Sometimes the letters contained threats to the safety of those to whom they were addressed even to the extent of threatening "vengeance on the night of revolution".

Letters to the Press are also frequently used as a means of getting the Communist line across or counteracting criticism of Communism. Parties organise "letter brigades", consisting of members and sympathisers whose function it is to write to any paper which attacks Communist policies or policies supported by Communists. The result being that a paper which prints an article which is either anti-Communist or not in sympathy with Communist aims may get dozens of letters from people most of whom the Editor will not know to be Communists. The effect of which may be to make him think that his paper is losing the support of its readers and that a more unprincipled editorial line should be adopted.

A favourite field for Communist Party agitation, using all the methods outlined above and others, are demands for the release of political prisoners or detainees. Those whose release is being sought may, or may not, be members of the Communist Party and the campaign may be organised on either a national or international basis. Such campaigns are often divided into a number of different phases. The first commencing when the victim or victims of alleged injustice or persecution are arrested. During this stage it is often claimed that evidence has been faked or that the charges have been trumped up. During the trial itself allegations will probably be made by Communist sympathisers of the accused that the jury is prejudiced, and that the trial will, therefore, not be a fair one. During the appeals stage after sentence, the campaign is further stepped up and rallies and demonstrations commence. If the appeal is turned down a further stage in the campaign is opened. Heartbreaking accounts of the visits of relatives to the victim and the latter's treatment in prison appear in the Communist and fellow travelling Press and quotations from their past speeches or writings are given the maximum publicity. Full scale efforts for their release then commence, with further demonstrations, mass

lobbyings and the organised despatch of protest letters and telegrams and the collection of signatures petitioning for the victims' immediate release.

Similar campaigns have been used by Communist Parties in attempts to prevent official enquiries which have been unwelcome to them. One such case being that of the enquiries of the Australian Royal Commission on espionage in 1955. In its report the Commission stated that:

"The Communist Party of Australia consistently tried to hamper the work of the Commission. Legal proceedings being taken in the name of a Communist to prohibit the enquiry. Witnesses were maligned and the proceedings misrepresented in the press and in pamphlets. Scores of telegrams in the names of Communist-controlled unions, particularly the Seamen's Union, were received by the Commission insisting that the proceedings should be stopped and on occasions organised disturbances, obviously Communist inspired, were staged inside and outside the court-room".¹

Sometimes special Front organisations are set up to carry on such campaigns.

In his book *Masters of Deceit* J. E. Hoover, Director of the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation wrote:

"At all times Communists are told to try and make bourgeois courts look weak and silly. If brought to trial they are expected to turn the court-room into a sounding board for Communism . . . Every possible tactic is used inside the court-room to obstruct the operation of justice".²

These words would seem to be well borne out by the instruction contained in a pamphlet *Five Points on Party Building* by a leading member of the illegal Venezuelan Party. This states that if a member of the Party is arrested:

"The member should not give way to panic or feel nervous, he should always keep cool and be able to analyse the situation. He should not forget that he is a soldier of the revolution. Having fallen into the enemy's hands, the Communist should realise that he is now on a new battlefield, that his imprisonment is not a matter of his personal life but part of the class struggle, a political event, a blow at the party, and that he must fight might and main on this new front in order to be useful to the cause of the Party and revolution".³

Other tactics in campaigns intended to discredit "bourgeois" justice in the eyes of the public include allegations of police brutality or corruption.

¹*Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage*, Sydney, 1955, pp. 100-101.

²J. E. Hoover. *Masters of Deceit*, Henry Holt, New York, 1958, p. 141.

³S. Regalado, 'From the Experience of the Underground Work of the Communist Party of Venezuela', *World Marxist Review*, January 1962, pp. 55-57.

On occasions a Communist Party may mount a deliberate campaign designed to disrupt the work of the security or counter-espionage service of a non-Communist country. One such example being provided by the Swedish Communist Party. In the Summer of 1966 the Party's paper *Tidsignal* announced that the Party intended to compile a register of members of the Swedish security service and intended to "record their associates, their meetings and their journeys abroad".¹

The register being compiled was also to include photographs of security agents taken by photographers of *Tidsignal* as they entered and left the security service's headquarters building. *Tidsignal* subsequently commenced to publish lists of names of counter-espionage agents and to issue appeals for further information about them. It made a special request for photographs of security men to its readers, even offering to provide a photographer to take such photographs if readers would inform the paper where security men might be found. It also published lists of the numbers of cars believed to be used by the security services, and asked readers to report on their movements. The aim of the whole operation clearly being to deprive Swedish secret agents of the anonymity so essential to the efficient prosecution of their duties.

Although the Party claimed that it was carrying on this campaign in order to prevent the authorities persecuting persons taking part in demonstrations against American action in Vietnam, it was thought that the real intention was to at least seriously inconvenience the security services which had in recent years successfully tracked down a number of Soviet agents engaged in acts of espionage which in some cases had involved members of the Swedish Communist Party.

¹*Sunday Telegraph*, 24 July, 1966.

CHAPTER XIII

Publishing Activities of Indigenous Communist Parties and Communist Activity in Trade Unions

The Party daily press and periodicals—Publishing houses—Trade Unions—Organisation—Tactics and policies—Parliament.

NATIONAL Communist Parties maintain at least one daily paper in practically every country of the non-Communist world. Even in those countries in which the Party itself is proscribed, great efforts are made to bring out some sort of daily publication, even if it is only a duplicated news-sheet perhaps produced with the help of a Party in a neighbouring state.

The importance of Communist Parties making every endeavour to maintain publication of their own papers was emphasised by Lenin who wrote:

“A paper is not merely a collective propagandist and collective agitator, it is also a collective organiser . . . around a paper, there will automatically develop an organisation that will be concerned, not only with local activities, but also with regular general work. It will teach its members to watch political events carefully, to estimate their importance and their influence on the various sections of the population, and to devise suitable methods to influence these events throughout the revolutionary party. The mere technical problems of procuring a regular supply of material for the newspaper and its regular distribution will make it necessary to create a network of agents of a united party, who will be in close contact with each other, will be acquainted with the general situations, will be accustomed to fulfil the detailed functions of the national work, and who will test their strength in the organisation of various kinds of revolutionary activities”.¹

It is no doubt, with the above points in mind, that even the smallest Communist Parties make strenuous efforts to publish a newspaper despite the heavy financial burden this often places on them. For the circulation of Communist dailies is usually small when compared with that of others, and it would seem doubtful if many of them could continue to exist without a heavy subsidy.

The daily paper of the Communist Party of Great Britain, *The Morning Star* (formerly the *Daily Worker*) receives about £200,000 a year from sales and about a further £23,000 from advertising. It has to meet

¹V. I. Lenin, ‘Where to Begin’, *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, p. 114.

an average trading loss of £50,000-£70,000 by means of contributions from a special fighting fund, mainly from sympathisers in trade unions, from the proceeds of special functions such as bazaars, and by donations under deed of covenant.

Membership of the Communist Party is not compulsory for employees of the *Morning Star* although only a very small minority are not members. The paper has its own special party branch which caters mainly for workers on the production side who are precluded from attending meetings of their local home branches by reason of their hours of work. All employees including the editor are paid at the standard union rate, but it is the practice for the editorial staff to make a donation of as much as £10 per week under covenant to the paper. The paper's circulation was given as 60,246 in 1965, a sharp fall from the days when it could in 1946 claim a circulation of 120,000. The paper changed its name from *Daily Worker* to *Morning Star* in April 1966, in order to try and increase its appeal to a wider potential readership, not all of whom might consider themselves workers in the strict Marxist sense.

In most countries of Western Europe, the circulation of Communist dailies has fallen considerably below that achieved just after the end of the Second World War. An exception to this general rule being that of *L'Unita*, the daily paper of the Italian Communist Party whose circulation has consistently risen since 1948 and which by 1955 had reached 306,000. This is the largest circulation of any Communist paper in Western Europe. In the Autumn of 1966, *Red Flag* the daily paper of the Communist Party of Belgium which had for several years been following a pro-Peking line was forced to cease publication owing to lack of financial support. This was a serious blow to Peking's attempts to extend its influence amongst European Communists.

As against a general fall in the circulation of Communist dailies in Western Europe, however, their circulation in other areas of the non-Communist world has tended to rise, examples being Japan and South America. In addition to a main national paper many Communist Parties also publish papers on an area or district basis.

Periodicals published by Communist Parties can be divided into four main groups:

- Publications dealing with current political affairs.

- Specialist publications produced primarily for certain sections or classes of the population.

- Publications ostensibly dedicated to culture and the arts.

- Theoretical journals and other publications intended mainly for use within the Party and sometimes used as a basis for education.

Examples in the first group include the British Communist Party's weekly review *Comment*, which first appeared in January 1963, being the successor to *World News* which ceased publication the previous year. Into this category of general reviews of current affairs come also such British Communist publications as *Labour Monthly*, edited by the Vice-Chairman of the Party, Mr. Rajani Palme Dutt and published

through the Communist-sponsored concern 'Trinity Trust', and *Bulletin* published fortnightly by the London District Committee of the Communist Party.

Specialist Party publications are represented in Britain by *Education Today and Tomorrow* published quarterly by the Party's Educational Advisory Committee; *Challenge* published monthly as the journal of the Young Communist League; *Country Standard* published quarterly by the Party's National Agricultural adviser; *Marxism Today* a monthly magazine concentrating upon theory and discussion; and *Party Life* a quarterly journal concentrating upon problems of Party organisation and leadership.

In some cases, where the Communist Party of a certain country is under proscription, arrangements are made for a publication to be produced on its behalf in another, and usually neighbouring, country by some of its members working in exile aided by members of the Communist Party of the host country. The publication is then smuggled into the country to whose Communist Party it belongs for clandestine distribution.

An unusual instance of this kind is *The African Communist*, which is the quarterly journal of the banned South African Communist Party. It is currently being produced not in Africa but in Britain, a plan to publish it in one of the neighbouring High Commission territories having misfired. It is published in both English and French editions. Although originally its circulation was confined almost entirely to South Africa, the magazine now carries a notice saying that the magazine is intended as a forum for Marxist-Leninist thought throughout the African continent. It is claimed that the circulation of *The African Communist* has grown to almost 30 times that of the original editions in English which only ran to a few hundred copies, and that it now "reaches every corner of our continent". This hundred page magazine not infrequently carries articles by prominent British Communists.

Editorial articles and notes in the magazine have asked readers in Africa to "form groups of readers to discuss the contents of every issue, and other Marxist-Leninist literature". Adding:

"Such study groups can be very important. They should study the conditions in their own country, in the light of Communist theory. They should take part, as loyal members, in the national liberation struggle. They should work for the brotherly unity of all Communists in each country, preparing the way for the eventual formation of a Communist party to advance the cause of the workers and help in building a united front of national liberation, comprising all parties and classes, and people of all patriotic views. An important task which can and should be undertaken by an African Communist study group is to prepare articles for this journal based upon a study and analysis of conditions in their own country, and the solution proposed for its problems".¹

¹*The African Communist*, Vol. 2, No. 1, Journal of the South African Communist Party.

Evidently, those in charge of *The African Communist* have not forgotten Lenin's dictum that one of the rôles of a Communist paper is to act as "a collective organiser". Appeals also appear in the magazine for African readers to become agents or distributors for the publication, special discounts being available to cover the expenses of those doing so. It is planned to publish Swahili and Zulu editions of the magazine as soon as possible, the intention being "to make it the voice of the African Revolution".

Publishing Houses

Publishing houses owned by Communist Parties exist in a number of non-Communist countries, probably the largest being in Italy.

In Britain, the *Morning Star* is published by the Morning Star Co-operative Society Ltd., which pays the editorial staff and management, and is owned by the People's Press Printing Society which owns nearly all the paper's assets including land, buildings and printing plants. Nearly all the management committee members of these two bodies are common to each organisation. The People's Press Printing Society has 29,576 shareholders owning between them £140,229 non-profit-making shares.

All Communist Parties are prolific in their production of pamphlets and leaflets. During the two years from January 1961 to December 1962, the British Communist Party at a cost of £26,635 published a total of 77 pamphlets, broadsheets, leaflets and folders dealing with a wide variety of subjects from the Berlin crisis to the persecution of Communists in Iraq and the pay demands of dockers, engineers and railway workers.

The Party has produced special recruiting folders directed to youth, engineers, transport workers, railwaymen, women, agricultural workers, miners and building workers.

Between January 1963 and July 1965 the Party produced a total of 95 publications of the same type. During the period 1 January, 1965, to 31 December, 1966, the Party's expenditure on printing amounted to £52,383. More than £1,500 per head for each of its officially claimed 34,000 members.

Trade Unions

It is probably through their activities in the trade unions by means of industrial disruption that members of Communist Parties in non-Communist countries most often come to the notice of the general public. The trade union movement throughout the world has of course, been a prime target for Communist infiltration and attempted capture since the earliest days of the Comintern. A much quoted passage from Lenin's writings reads:

"We must be able to resort to all sorts of stratagems, manoeuvres, illegal methods, evasions, and subterfuges only so as to get into the

trade unions, to remain in them, and to carry on Communist work within them at all costs".¹

From the early 1920's up to the outbreak of war in 1939 general control of Communist activity in trade unions was exercised through 'The Red International of Labour Unions', to which belonged the trade unions of the Soviet Union and Communist-controlled unions outside it. This organisation in effect performed much the same rôle as the present World Federation of Trade Unions in seeking to increase its influence by establishing so-called 'minority movements' in as many countries as possible. These minority movements were, in fact, nothing more than industrial front organisations, controlled by Communist members of the trade union in the countries in which they operated and acting as instruments of the policy of the Red International.

In Britain, such a minority movement was formed in 1924, announcing its birth by passing a resolution addressed to the Trade Union Congress which began:

"For the first time in the history of Congress a definite and organised opposition within the unions faces the existing leadership, and raises unreservedly the banner of revolutionary working class politics in British trade unionism".²

During the same year the Comintern laid down a tactical doctrine to govern the activity of the British Communist Party in regard to work amongst trade unionists. There is abundant evidence to indicate that this was a directive of which the Party took heed and in general abides by right down to the present day. It included the following recommendations:

"The (Communist) nucleus in the factory should influence all the bodies and organisations in the factory, such as factory committees, Co-operative Societies, Trade Unions, etc. The nucleus should draw up the agenda and put forward candidates for the official posts in these organisations . . . Experience shows that if we make our plans beforehand it is usually easier to get our points carried . . . The nucleus as such works privately, not officially . . . The experience of the Russian workers shows that it would be very useful if the nucleus could make use of an influential non-party skilled veteran worker who would act in the spirit of the decisions of the nucleus. By this means the source of the ideas could be kept a secret . . ."

By 1928 Communist disruptive activities in industry had grown to an extent that the Trade Union Congress was forced to carry out an investigation. It issued a warning that the Communist Party was attempting to set up further front organisations for the purposes of industrial agitation through the minority movement.

Throughout the 1930's the main aims of Communist Parties outside

¹V. I. Lenin. *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 198, 3rd Russian Edition.

²*Democracy or Disruption*, T.U.C. Publicity Department, p. 6.

the Soviet Union was the formation of 'national or popular fronts' and alliances with other left-wing political groups. The emphasis in Communist trade union activity was concentrated upon attempts to achieve "unity of action" between Communist and non-Communist unions and workers' organisations. With the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact and outbreak of war in 1939 Communist activities, particularly in Britain, France and the United States, became largely concentrated upon arousing opposition to the war and attempting to impede the allies' re-armament programme by trying to persuade workers to refuse to make arms for use in "an imperialist war".

The German attack upon the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941 brought an abrupt end to this particular phase of Communist foreign policy. Communist shop stewards and agitators became overnight the most enthusiastic supporters of all-out production in every sphere of industry, exhorting the workers to ever further efforts by constantly stressing the need to provide aid for "our heroic Soviet brothers".

For two years after the end of the war the policy of the Communist Parties of Western Europe remained virtually unaltered. The rôle of the Communist worker in industry was to champion the cause of higher production and greater industrial efficiency in order to raise the standard of living of the people. In Britain with an effective Labour Government in power for the first time, the Communist Party line was to concentrate upon the fact that only real "socialist" planning, as was then being introduced into the countries of Eastern Europe, as compared with the mere "reformism" of the British Government's "milk and water" nationalisation moves could, in fact, lead to the hoped for rise in national production and a fair deal for the workers. The *Daily Worker* made a particular point of showing up incidents in which alleged cases of bungling or mismanagement by government officials had resulted in loss of efficiency, and in production targets not being met. At the same time the Party began to give support once more to demands for higher wages, but not to the point of supporting strikes.

Suddenly in 1947 came another sudden change in the policy guiding Communist trade union activity. Douglas Hyde, then Deputy Editor of the *Daily Worker* has given a graphic description of how this change was brought home to him and other members of the paper's staff :

"For years my industrial reporters had been writing stories aimed at raising production and ending impediments to all out industrial effort. One of them had made a study of railway problems. Reports were being received of increased output in the Yorkshire coalfields and it occurred that the value of these would be largely lost if a bottle-neck, which we had previously exposed, still existed at the important Doncaster rail centre.

"I discussed it with my specialist and he agreed that unless things had improved, the coal would pile up at the pit-heads and in time, would slow output right down again. We decided that no matter whether the bottle-neck had been cleared or whether it still existed there would be a story either way. If the former, it would be a

story of achievement—a morale building story—if the latter it would mean yet another exposure. I informed the editor that I had sent the reporter to Doncaster and he agreed that it was a good and necessary assignment.

“In due course the story was ‘phoned to me. The bottle neck had been cleared by a combination of managerial efficiency and workers’ effort . . . with the editor’s approval it was made the leading story on the main home news page. It came in for a word of special commendation from the editorial chair when the first edition was examined at the Conference which preceded commencement of work on the second edition.

“But half an hour later, when work on the edition was just about to start in earnest the editor called me into his office. We should, he told me, have to lose the story. When I asked why, he replied that it was ‘pure sunshine’ and went on to explain that a new approach to such stories was now needed. Increased production, ‘under present conditions’ he said, meant not a higher standard of life for the British people, but higher profits for the American capitalists, and moreover it simply assisted them with their plans for the defeat of Communism in Europe . . . The story which had an hour earlier come in for special praise was thrown out. The new line had arrived from Belgrade”. (Then the headquarters of the Cominform.)¹

Increased Western production no longer formed any part of Communist plans. Henceforward it was to be the task of Communist Parties to do all they could to prevent the non-Communist world increasing its economic lead over the Communist bloc.

By 1948, the new Communist offensive amongst British trade unionists was in full swing, and in October, the Trade Union Congress issued a statement that Communists in the unions were acting as:

“The abject and slavish agents of forces working incessantly to intensify social misery and to create conditions of chaos and economic instability in which the unions would find it impossible to pursue their essential task of protecting and advancing the best interests of work people the world over.”²

This was followed by the publication the following year of a pamphlet entitled *The Tactics of Disruption* by the TUC, in which Communist tactics were described as follows:

“It has been known by the General Council for more than twelve months, that the open emphasis of Communist Party organisation was being changed from the political field to the industrial field. The fact that the Communist Party proposes to put a large number of candidates into municipal and County Council elections and to contest more seats at the forthcoming General Election must not be taken at its face value. This apparent increased activity on the

¹Douglas Hyde. *I Believed*, William Heineman Ltd., London, 1950, pp. 244-246.

²*Defend Democracy*, T.U.C. General Council, London, 1948.

political field is a camouflage for the activities to which they attach real value, which is recruitment inside the Trade Union movement and the capture of official positions, whether those of Branch Secretary, Convener, Shop Steward, Trade Council Secretary, District Committee Secretary, Membership of National Executive, and other leading positions."¹

These two statements drew official attention to the commencement of an all-out campaign of disruption in British industry which still continues and which the introduction of the policy of co-existence by the Soviet Union has only served to sharpen.

Organisation

Central control of the Communist offensive in the unions of the non-Communist world is vested in the World Federation of Trade Unions its various specialist and area committees, its 11 subsidiary organisations and the Trade Union Internationals, as described in Chapter V. Deputations of trade union workers from non-Communist countries are constantly attending conferences and meetings organised by the WFTU and the TUIs and there is no doubt that increased agitation in the industries of their home countries follows their return.

On a national level most Communist Parties have within their national headquarters an industrial department which lays down basic policy and supervises co-ordination of the Party's work amongst trade unionists throughout the country as a whole. Recommendations or orders of this department are passed on to lower levels of the Party through industrial organisers in district headquarters and through special advisory committees. Each of these advisory committees which is composed of Communist members of the union or unions concerned, is responsible for deciding how Party policy shall be implemented in the case of a particular union or group of unions. These committees meet regularly in private, often in local Communist Party offices. As a rule Party officials will be present as observers, if they are not the local district office will be informed immediately of what took place when the meeting is over.

Business on the agenda at such meetings may include the selection of sympathetic candidates to stand for union offices and the organisation of election campaigns including the drafting in of help from outside the area to assist with canvassing. If a strongly anti-Communist candidate is standing a plan may be made to attempt to discredit him in the eyes of his fellow unionists. These committees are an invaluable source of information to the Party about all aspects of union affairs.

These advisory committees have also an important function in co-ordinating the activities of the various factory branches operating in particular industries. They operate on an unofficial basis, and the British Communist Party does not formally admit that it has any advisory committees under its control but there is good reason to believe that

¹*The Tactics of Disruption*, T.U.C. London, 1949.

there are at least 14 of them in existence in various parts of the country.

A former Communist who said he had himself been a member of the 'National Advisory Committee', Mr. Frank Chappel, said in the course of giving evidence during the ETU ballot-rigging case that:

"There are advisory committees of the Communist Party dealing with every facet of life in Britain, all the trade unions, industries and even the Law Courts."¹

Another ex-Communist giving evidence in the same case described how Communist Party policies were imparted to members of the national advisory committee, who were then responsible for seeing them put into practice through the trade union branches or trade councils to which they belonged.

The instrument through which the Communist Parties principally attempt to recruit rank and file members of trade unions or to gain their support is the factory branch. The British Communist Party's 'Handbook for Members' devotes considerably more space to the organisation and activities of factory branches than any other single subject. The reason for the existence of factory branches is stated clearly enough:

"We need a strong Communist organisation in the factories in order to see that the militancy and decisive strength of the industrial workers is brought into the heart of the political struggle on the basic immediate issues and at the same time to explain the need for socialism and to win the workers to support our policy."²

The point is made that:

"The Branch needs to get to know the facts about the factory, its links with other enterprises, its profits and basis of organisation, how many workers (women, youth, skilled and unskilled, etc.) are employed and what trade unions cater for them, the wages structure, etc.

"By building up its basic knowledge of the factory, the Branch is able to begin to work out a policy for the factory which will take into account the immediate problems facing the workers there and relate them to our national political policy for the industry as a whole. Such a policy becomes a guide to the Branch in developing its work."³

The importance of building up a good circulation of the Party's daily newspaper inside the factory was also emphasised. Recommended regular activities for factory branches are factory gate meetings and lunch-time discussions, with in addition "invitation meetings". At these, workers who have shown particular interest in or sympathy for Communist Party policy are invited to attend special meetings which

¹*The Agitators*, The Economic League, London, 1964, p. 18.

²*Forging the Weapon*. Handbook for Members of the Communist Party of Great Britain, London, 1962, p. 6.

³*Forging the Weapon*. Handbook for Members of the Communist Party of Great Britain, London, 1962, pp. 8-9.

are addressed by Party speakers on "appropriate aspects" of policy and then asked to join the Party.

Writing in *World Marxist Review* of April 1964, a British Communist, G. McLenan, has given a description of the use of factory-gate meetings by the Party in the Clyde area:

"Almost any day of the year," he writes, "when weather permits, at one or other of the factories and shipyards, members of the Communist Party can be seen in action."

He goes on to describe how the Party's opportunity occurs after lunch when many of the workers come outside to get a breath of fresh air. A loud speaker mounted on a car or van will have been positioned in readiness at the factory entrance and when the workers start to emerge the meeting commences. Meetings are of short duration, not exceeding 20 minutes. The Chairman is usually a worker from the factory at which the meeting is being held, well known to his colleagues. The main speaker will probably also be an employee of the factory or perhaps of a neighbouring one.

"The comrade undertaking this task", Mr. McLenan states, "must present the policy of the Party in straightforward working class language, free of jargon and complicated argument. He must avoid trying to cover too many issues or too many points so that he gets across one main idea to his audience in the few minutes at his disposal."¹

The 'Handbook for Members' strongly urges that local Communist Party branches should make every effort to assist in the formation of factory branches in works in their locality and to co-operate with them once they have been launched. It is known that local branches do, in fact, quite frequently give valuable help to the activities of factory branches and work amongst trade unionists generally. Such help has been forthcoming in particular from local Communist branches in the South Essex District which covers the giant Ford works, a centre of much industrial unrest ever since 1952. In 1964 the District Committee produced a four page folder for use by factory branches throughout the British Motor Industry. It was written by the South Essex District's full-time industrial organiser and by an ex-employee at Fords.

Some idea of the forms political action by factory branches can take was given in an article in the British Communist monthly *Comment* in November 1963, describing the activities of a factory branch in Glasgow. This branch consisted of a total of 95 members, 27 of them being shop-stewards. It claimed to sell 200 copies of the *Daily Worker* each day and that about the same number of copies of each pamphlet produced by the Communist Party were sold within the factory by the end of the second day after publication. The branch also produced its own pamphlets, one of these demanded "real socialist nationalisation of the industry", and 5,000 copies of it were distributed amongst workers at five other factories in Scotland owned by the same company. During

¹J. McLenan, 'Factory Gate Meetings in Scotland', *World Marxist Review*, April 1964, pp. 46-48.

the Cuban crisis the branch was particularly active. A special leaflet was produced which was handed out to the workers as they arrived in the morning. Members of the Branch having stayed up all the previous night in order that supplies of folded leaflets should be ready to enable this to be done. In addition the branch sponsored the despatch of seven telegrams supporting the Soviet and Cuban standpoint.

This particular factory branch amassed sufficient funds to pay for all the election expenses of a Communist Candidate at a local election, and to send a donation of £100 towards the defence of CND demonstrators arrested when taking part in an anti-Polaris protest on Holy Loch. It had also been able to buy and convert a large store building which it used as a headquarters and for meetings and social functions. The claim was made that the branch was "constantly able to give support when agitation is taking place in other industries".

In the light of such reports featuring factory branch activities it is perhaps not surprising that Mr. John Gollan, the present Secretary General of the Communist Party of Great Britain said in a report in 1955 that:

"The factory branch is the highest and most important unit of Communist organisation . . . No matter how effective the Communist work outside the factory gate is, however, it is work inside, by our factory comrades and organisations, which is decisive."¹

Highly important to the effective work of Communists is a network of unofficial liaison committees, typified in Britain by such bodies as 'The National Power Workers' Shop Stewards' Committee', 'The Engineering and Allied Trades' Shop Stewards' National Council', 'The London Building Workers' Joint Sites Committee' and perhaps the best known because of the frequency with which the name of its leader, Mr. Jack Dash, has appeared in the national Press, 'The Liaison Committee of the London Docks'. These committees controlled by Communist sympathisers form an invaluable means of maintaining contact between Communist or fellow travelling shop stewards or their equivalents in the same union but working in different enterprises. They have often been found to have been extremely active in instigating or attempting to prolong unofficial strikes and stoppages of work. As with all types of front organisations of which these committees are a species, their value to the Party lies in the fact that the true political complexion of the elements controlling them is often not realised by the workers and the general public.

The problems of Communist Parties in trade union activities are considerably eased by their ability to "draft" selected Party members and sympathisers from one industry to another, in order to strengthen their forces in particular industries and plants as required.

¹*The Agitators*, Economic League, London, 1964, p. 11.

Tactics and Policies

Communist Party machines both at the national and the local level are closely geared to giving all possible support to Communist or Communist-backed candidates fighting elections for union office. As a result Communist candidates are often provided with facilities for bringing election campaign helpers from outside their own areas, office accommodation and other important aids to success which are seldom available to their opponents.

The tactics of campaigns in which candidates with Communist sympathies are standing are carefully worked out beforehand at meetings of Communist "factions". Sometimes these factions take the form of the previously mentioned advisory committees. Ultimate control of the campaign will probably be in the hands of the Party's local full-time industrial organiser. When the candidate has been chosen, measures are put in hand to obtain nominations from union branches upon whose support the Party can rely. There follows a campaign to publicise the candidate in the Communist press, and Party emissaries visit every branch that the union has in the particular district in which the election is being held, in order to brief their sympathisers on ways of obtaining support.

If a particularly strong non-Communist candidate is standing in opposition to the Party's choice a deliberate campaign may be set in train to discredit him in the eyes of his fellow unionists. An instance of this sort of tactic was described in a letter to the *New Statesman* of 9 August, 1958, by an ex-member of an Advisory Committee and a former Branch Chairman of the ETU who wrote:

"At the last advisory committee I attended, in February 1958, the only topic of discussion was how to defeat our ex-comrade Cannon in the pending March election. We were directed to make contacts in each branch that had nominated Cannon and to undermine him principally by describing him as 'the candidate of the capitalist Press'. I challenged that allegation. No evidence was produced then or since to support it."¹

If, as is sometimes the case, union rules forbid open canvassing in support of candidates, Party members will be instructed to solicit support for the Communist candidate on the quiet. When the election is a particularly important one, extra paid Party officials will probably be drafted into the district on a temporary basis. Every attempt is made to ensure that the workers who will be voting in the elections become acquainted with the Communist candidate by parading him before them at every possible type of meeting on every pretext. His past record "as a fighter for the rights of the workers" is also constantly impressed upon them.

In addition to efficient organisation, a factor which frequently enables Communist candidates to be elected to important union posts despite the fact that the number of Communist Party members or fellow travellers

¹*New Statesman*, 9 August, 1958.

in the union to which they belong may be extremely small, is the general apathy of large numbers of non-Communist union members who frequently do not bother to vote. This is a fact which counts a great deal in Britain, and can be illustrated by the fact that when the ETU was under Communist control it is likely that the number of actual Communist Party members in the union did not exceed 2,000 out of a total membership of two millions; and that whilst in 1963, 42 out of 150 full-time organisers in the Amalgamated Engineering Union were held by officials who had been elected with Communist backing it has been calculated that probably not more than 5,000 of the one million strong total membership of the union were members of the Communist Party.

Strong opposition to Communist activities by individual trade unionists can lead to their victimisation by Party shop stewards, whilst Communist-controlled trade union branches can make it extremely hard for active anti-Communists to find employment.

That Communist activity in trade unions has by no means been confined to industrial workers, has been revealed by amongst other sources the report of The Radcliffe Committee on security procedures in the public service, published in April 1962. Paragraphs 33 and 36 of this report state:

"We enquired into the penetration by Communists of the Civil Service Staff Associations and Trade Unions and were disturbed at the number of Communists and Communist sympathisers who are holding positions in those bodies either as permanent full-time paid officials or as unpaid officers or members of executive committees. We understand that there is no evidence that the Communists have made any exceptional effort to gain control of these unions, but they appear in fact to have achieved a higher degree of penetration here than in almost any other section of the Trade Union Movement. No evidence has been brought to our knowledge that Communist Union Officers, whether serving on a paid or unpaid basis, have been detected in any form of espionage. Nevertheless, we regard this presumably deliberate massing of Communist effort in the Civil Service Union as most dangerous to security, however one defines it.

"In addition, we think that the dangers of the present situation are aggravated by the fact that very few people are aware that they exist. We recommend that, without jeopardising secret sources of information, Heads of Departments and Principal Establishment Officers should be told more frankly than we believe to be the present practice the scale of Communist penetration of the Civil Service Unions and should be warned of the identity of individual Communists with whom they are likely to have dealings. More generally we think that Civil Servants who take part in staff negotiations should be warned in general terms that the Communist representation among Civil Service Union officials is disproportionately high and that they should be as careful to avoid disclosing

secret information to union officials as to anyone else outside the Government service.”¹

The Radcliffe Committee classified five out of the ten full-time assistant secretaries of the Civil Service Clerical Association as security risks. Between 1948 and 1962, 165 cases involving “non-industrial” civil servants have been dealt with by the security “purge” procedure. Of these 65 were transferred to non-secret work, seven were dismissed, ten resigned and 20 were reinstated.

Union branches and area organisations under Communist control are often a useful source of financial support for the Party or its fronts. Financial statements of the Scottish Union of Mineworkers relating to the years when it was under full Communist control having disclosed donations to The People’s Press Printing Society which controlled the *Daily Worker*, The Labour Research Department, one of the oldest of the British front organisations, the British-China Friendship Association and the British Peace Committee.

A high degree of control of a selected country’s trade union movement is regarded as a vital pre-condition by Communist Parties planning to embark upon an “armed struggle”. The Malayan Communist Party prior to launching its guerilla campaign in 1948 engaged in intense activity amongst trade unionists. It established its own ‘General Trade Union’ which set up offices all over the country, and exercised control of existing trade unions, particularly those covering workers engaged in the tin and rubber industries through committees composed of open Party members and the manipulations of fellow travellers and undercover sympathisers. Lack of effective Communist control of trade unions has been blamed by writers in subsequent Marxist publications as being one of the factors which caused the defeat of the Communist forces in the Greek Civil War.

Communist publications, whether of a national or international character make no attempt to hide the importance which the Party attaches to the use of strikes as a weapon to secure the advance of “Socialism”. The rising number of strikes in capitalist countries is gleefully recorded and extolled as welcome evidence of blows being struck against the “monopolists”. Typical of this sort of comment was an article which appeared in the Czechoslovakian Party newspaper *Rude Pravo* on 11 December, 1963. After stating that the position of the workers’ movement in capitalist countries was steadily improving the article went on to say:

“Available statistical data shows convincingly that during the years of the peaceful offensive of the Socialist countries there is no decrease in the revolutionary movements of the working people in capitalist countries. Just the opposite, the number of strikes, which was always an important pointer to the sharpening of class differences was on the increase.

¹*Security Procedures in the Public Service*, HMSO, Cmd. 1681, London, 1962, para. 33, p. 9.

"During the year 1958 the number of participants in strike actions in imperialist countries was about 13.5 million persons; in 1959 already 16 million; in 1962, 42 to 44 million. The strikes in the leading capitalist countries in the years 1960-62 amounted to more than three-fifths of all the strikes in capitalist countries. In Africa where the proletariat as a class is only in its initial development, the number of strikes has not overstepped one million. In Asia (without Japan) it fluctuated between one and 2.5 million. In Latin America in 1958 some 9 to 10 million working people participated in the strike fights; in 1959, 18 to 20 million; in 1960, 9 to 10 million; in 1961, 7 to 8 million and in the year 1962, 13 to 17 million."

Louis Sallant, President of the WFTU said of the strike weapon:

"As regards the strike movement, economic demands continue to play the main rôle. As before, the basic demands are higher wages, better conditions, shorter hours without wage cuts, better social security, longer holidays, higher pensions, defence of trade unions' rights and democratic freedoms. At the same time, brief strikes in support of peace and disarmament, against fascism and reaction against colonialism old and new, and for genuine national independence have been a feature of the working class movement during the past year.

"An important aspect of the growing strike movement is the emergence of new forms of struggle. These new forms, born of the experience gained in mass actions, include lightning strikes lasting fifteen minutes, half an hour or an hour, and repeated over and over again, sometimes scores of times, at the same enterprise in support of some particular demand. As a supplement to the bigger actions, these form an effective weapon in the workers' fight."¹

The *World Marxist Review* periodically carries what is called a "chronicle of the strike movement". In which details are given of major strikes that have occurred in the recent past in capitalist countries.

Communist sponsorship of, or support for strikes is often organised with the same thoroughness that characterises Communist activities in union election campaigns. Mr. Victor Feather, former Assistant Secretary of the British Trade Union Council has said regarding the strike at the Ford works in the early 1950's:

"The whole membership of the local Communist Party was heavily engaged although the majority of them were not even employed at Ford's or Briggs'. Other Communists from various East End London Branches were associated with much of the behind the scenes activities. Full-time officers of the Communist Party headquarters were receiving telephone calls several times a day and were advising on tactics to be used in conjunction with the strike . . . All the propaganda leading up to the Ford and Briggs stoppages was the subject of consultation with officials of the Communist Party."²

¹Louis Sallant. 'Growing Unity of the Working Class and Trade Union Movement', *World Marxist Review*, May 1964, pp. 2-9.

²Woodrow Wyatt. *The Peril in our Midst*, Phoenix House Ltd., 1956, pp. 14-15.

The part played by the various Communist-controlled shop steward committees instigating or prolonging stoppages of work in different industries has been the subject of much comment in a whole series of such incidents in Britain in recent years. One of the most active of these Committees has been the 'National Power Workers' Shop Steward Committee' which was responsible for an unofficial strike in the power industry in November 1959 and a go-slow in January 1963.

This committee emerged as the result of a re-organisation of Communist workers in power stations in 1954. It was originally called the 'London Combined Shop Stewards' and Works' Committee', and first became actively engaged in strike action in the industry late in 1955. In September 1959, 150 shop stewards from all over Britain met in conference at Birmingham. At this meeting the 'National Power Workers' Shop Steward Committee' was officially formed and issued a call for a ban on overtime and a one day strike in support of pay claims. The ban on overtime was only partly effective, but the committee fixed 30 November as the day for a one day strike, and under the leadership of a Communist member of the AEU went ahead to solicit support for this stoppage.

The Committee's efforts succeeded in producing strikes at about 18 power stations on the chosen day, and in persuading the staff of another 18 to work to rule.

After this strike the Committee's activities were redoubled. A member of the Committee told a questioner that the workers who had taken part in the strike had realised the strength that they could exert and were willing to use it again whenever necessary.

During 1960 the Committee was threatening to sponsor a three day national stoppage throughout the power industry plus a ban on overtime and a work to rule. These threats, however, were never put into execution owing to the fact that a new wage award was negotiated by the unions concerned; and the Committee accordingly decided that the time for 'mass action' was not ripe. In September 1962 the committee began to work on a plan which resulted in the go-slow of January 1963. Coming as it did in the middle of a spell of extremely cold weather it had particularly damaging results.

The fact that large amounts of equipment are operated by comparatively small numbers of men, and that the failure of these men to perform their duties can have a chaotic effect on large areas of the country makes the electrical power industry a particularly suitable target for strike action.

Other shop stewards' committees involved in major strikes during the late 1950's and early 1960's have included, the British Overseas Airways' Shop Stewards' Committee and the British European Airways' Shop Stewards' Committee. These two committees, both of them are presided over by Communist chairmen, were involved in an unofficial strike in February 1961 which resulted in the cancellation of 236 flights by the two corporations concerned. The Liaison Committee of the London Docks under the leadership of Mr. Jack Dash is notorious for unofficial

strikes. The report of the Committee of Enquiry under the chairmanship of Lord Devlin into the Port Transport Industry published in August 1965 said of this Committee:

“Mr. Dash is a member of the Communist Party and the policy of the Liaison Committee is the same as that of the party . . . Mr. Dash came to his position in the Committee three or four years ago, but did not emerge as a force to be reckoned with until the middle of 1964. The years from 1960 to 1963 were years of comparative peace in the docks. They were also years when work was not too abundant. Pressure of work, as there was in 1964, makes a docker feel in a stronger position *vis-à-vis* his employers. The wage claim of 1964 and the difficulties arising out of the 40 hour agreement presented opportunities which Mr. Dash, feeling, it is said, his position in London threatened by the attacks of the Trotskyites was quick to seize. With plenty of work on offer, weekend overtime was an easy target. The attempt of official leaders to compromise on the wage claim so as to improve the prospect of long term reform enabled the settlement to be presented as a victory for unofficial pressure. The overtime ban has been extremely successful. The Liaison Committee, which started in the Royal Docks, has been able to extend its influence to Tilbury, hitherto free of this sort of trouble. These favourable conditions will probably not last. But it is likely that Mr. Dash's influence will be quite considerable if new proposals for decasualisation are brought forward.”¹

In January 1966 a new shop stewards' organisation was set up with the avowed policy of supporting all strikes whether official or unofficial. This is known as 'The London Industrial Shop Stewards' Defence Committee'. It was formed as the result of a Conference in which known Communists and Trotskyites played a leading part. Trotskyite competition for the allegiance of the more militant workers in unions in Britain constantly spurs the Communist Party on to greater efforts in the industrial field. Throughout 1966 representatives of this new committee were busy preparing the ground for an important conference to be held in December in conjunction with eight other shop stewards' committees from the London Area, including the London Dock's Liaison Committee, the London Building Workers' Joint Sites Committee and the London Exhibition Workers' Co-ordinating Committee, both bodies also much involved in strike action in recent years. It was hoped that 700 delegates would attend this Conference, the organising Secretary of which was a well-known Communist.

Agitation in the engineering industry would seem to be concentrated upon trying to get union members to repudiate the package deal concluded between the unions and employers. In general there has recently been a tendency for Communist agitation aimed at producing strikes to be aimed less at producing mass stoppages involving thousands

¹*Final Report of the Committee of Enquiry under the Rt. Hon. Lord Devlin into Certain Matters Concerning the Port Transport Industry*, HMSO, Cmd. 2734, 1965, paras. 110 and 111, pp. 41-42.

of workers directly, than at causing interruptions in work in smaller but key factories engaged upon specialist work, such as producing vital components for the car industry. Stoppages at such plants can have a devastating effect on the particular industry to which they belong and can bring the whole process of work in many assembly plants to a halt.

The British Communist Party was quick to commence agitation against the British Government's wage freeze policy announced in August 1966. What the Communist Press described as the first strike against the freeze took place amongst employees of a big Sheffield firm in late August and was led by the work's convener, a former Communist Parliamentary candidate and member of The National Executive Committee of The Communist Party. The Party was largely responsible for the organisation of the demonstration of motor industry workers protesting against redundancy that took place at the opening of the Labour Party Conference in October 1966.

The publication of reports emphasising workers' grievances consisting of interviews with "typical" workers and whose membership of the Communist Party is never mentioned is a favourite *Morning Star* news reporting technique. The paper devotes a considerable amount of space to trade union affairs and reputedly has one of the best informed industrial correspondents in Fleet Street. It has made great efforts to increase its circulation amongst trade unionists by advertising at trade union conferences and other such functions. The Communist Party weekly paper *Comment* is also used to propound the Party line on industry. Three specialist periodicals of note are *The Platform* designed to disseminate extremist views among bus workers, *The Metal Worker* published by the Communist-controlled Engineering and Allied Trades' Shop Stewards' National Council, and the *Power Worker*, published by the National Power Workers' Shop Stewards' Committee.

Almost any grievance, real or imagined, amongst industrial workers may be seized upon by the Communist Party as a basis for agitation. A favourite standby, however, stems from the Marxist theory of "surplus value". In essence this theory maintains that however high the wages received by workers in capitalist countries they are still exploited by their employers who together with the shareholders reap unmerited rewards from the labours of the working class. It forms a recurrent theme of most Communist propaganda dealing with industrial affairs. Typical was a booklet produced by the British Communist Party entitled *The Money Game*, with the sub-title *Or How Much Money Do You Make For Your Boss*.

Parliament

Although Communist representatives only constitute an effective force in the parliaments of a small minority of non-Communist countries, it is nevertheless thought that the "constitutional road to power", or, in other words, that through electoral victories the majority of Communist Parties are now basing their hopes of achieving power. An examination

of the Communist attitude towards parliament and the tactical use of parliament is not, therefore, of purely academic interest.

The fundamental Communist approach towards parliament is still governed by Lenin's statement that :

"Communism rejects Parliamentarianism as the form of the future; it rejects it as a form of the Class Dictatorship of the Proletariat; it rejects the possibility of winning over the Parliaments; its fixed aim is to destroy parliamentarianism.

"Therefore, there can be a question only of utilising bourgeois State institutions with the object of destroying them . . .

"The Communist Party enters such (bourgeois government) institutions not in order to do constructive work, but in order to direct the masses to destroy from within the whole bourgeois state machine and Parliament itself."¹

The tactics by which a Communist Party can gain control of a country by non-revolutionary means have been explained in detail by Jan Kozak, a member of the Secretariat of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in a booklet entitled *How Parliament Can Play a Revolutionary Part in the Transition to Socialism and the Rôle of the Popular Masses*.² Mr. Kozak has based his booklet on the actual experiences of the Czechoslovak Communist Party during the period 1946-1948, when it used the tactics of joining a coalition government to seize power. The techniques used were those known as "pressure from above" or pressure from Communist deputies inside parliament and ministers in the coalition government and "pressure from below", or pressure exercised by Communist Party members in the country itself, mainly through the trade unions.

The first post-war elections in Czechoslovakia took place in May 1946, eight political parties participated in these elections as part of the 'National Front of Czechs and Slovaks'. The Communist Party emerged as the strongest single party, having obtained 38 per cent of the total vote cast. Then began the struggle to eject the "bourgeois elements" in the National Front from power. Mr. Kozak has described this struggle as follows:

"This struggle took place during the period 1946-48. In the course of these years the working class, led by the Communists, made effective use of all its old forms of fighting, employed by the revolutionary workers' parties in Parliament, adjusted however to the new conditions and found new ones. Helped by Parliament, which was used by the working class for deepening the revolution and for the gradual, peaceful and bloodless change of the national and democratic revolution into a socialist one as 'pressure from above' and by its effect on the growth of the share in the power, This gradual and bloodless driving of the bourgeoisie from power

¹*The Communist Party and Parliamentarianism*, Theses and Statutes of Communist International, New York Central Committee of the Communist Party of America, 1921.

²The Independent Information Centre, London, 1961.

and the quite legitimate constitutional expansion of the power of the working class was completed in February 1948 by the Parliamentary settlement of the Government crisis engineered by the bourgeoisie. The scope of power was definitely settled in favour of the working class, and Parliament, as one of the instruments of its power, immediately began to serve the socialist transformation of the country."¹

The lessons to be learnt from the Communist success in Czechoslovakia are, he wrote:

"A preliminary condition for carrying out fundamental social changes and for making it possible that Parliament can be made use of for the purpose of transforming a capitalist society into a socialist one: is (a) to fight for a firm Parliamentary majority which would ensure and develop a strong pressure from above with that from 'below' emanates from the principle that questions regarding the class struggle (and, all the more, the social revolution) are decided and can be decided by strength alone. The pressure from 'above' is a combination of preparations of the conditions for the creation and organisation of the strength of the revolution, for its aggressiveness and its drive."²

In entering any coalition or national front government a primary Communist aim is to try and ensure that control of the government ministry controlling the nation's police and security forces is allocated to Party members or sympathisers. In the case of Czechoslovakia the Communist Party was able to apply "pressure from above" because control of the Ministry of the Interior which controlled the state security police was in its hands from the outset.

At the same time Communist deputies in parliament were forcing the government gradually to adopt a whole series of measures that had, in fact, been formulated by the Communist Party. The fact that banks and many of the larger industrial concerns had already been nationalised provided another channel for pressure and allowed the fellow-travelling forces in the government to paralyse, "bourgeois counter-revolutionary intrigues aimed at economic decline and chaos".³

Extremely important in the process of applying "pressure from above" was the systematic denigration of the various other parties constituting the National Front by Communist ministers and deputies who made every possible effort to discredit them in the eyes of the people:

"All organs vested with powers (the national committees) Parliament, the government, became places for the working class in which the anti-people policy of the bourgeoisie and of its parties was being uncovered. The Communists made use of these organs for sharp criticism levelled against the other parties and their representatives on the grounds of inconsistency and obstruction

¹Jan Kozak. *How Parliament can Play a Revolutionary Part in the Transition to Socialism*, Independent Information Centre, London, 1961.

²*Ibid*, pp. 12-13.

³*Ibid*, p. 16.

regarding the fulfilment of the tasks accepted in the programme . . . These disclosures were especially tilted at those parties which professed to be socialist by their name and slogans, particularly at the National Socialist Party and the right wing of the Social Democratic Party. Their lying slogans and bourgeois conception of socialism were uncovered on the hand of their concrete activity within the organs and their 'socialist cloak' was torn from before the eyes of the working people."¹

"Pressure from below" was exercised by a whole series of movements and organisation in which the Communist Party had the controlling voice. This included the 'United Revolutionary Trade Union Movement', 'Peasants' Commissions' recruited from tenant farmers, the owners of smaller farms and farm hands and a string of front organisations such as, 'The United Association of Czech Peasantry', 'The Association of Liberated Political Prisoners', 'The Association of Friends of The Soviet Union', etc. From these organisations and many others came a constant stream of petitions, appeals and demands in support of the actions of the Communist deputies in parliament, and innumerable protest meetings and demonstrations were also organised by them.

Another, and more sinister form of "pressure from below" was exerted by the existence of armed bodies of workers under Communist control. These derived their existence from the wartime Czechoslovakian resistance movement in which Communist influence had been strong. They were mobilised and issued with arms in the summer of 1947 after a "counter revolutionary conspiracy" was alleged to have been discovered. The more experienced members of these bodies were used to form the nucleus of a new armed security force working under the direction of the Ministry of the Interior, whilst others were formed into units of "factory guards", which had the ostensible task of protecting industrial establishments from sabotage. In Mr. Kozak's words:

"In the last instance it was the arming of the workers' class which took away the bourgeoisie's liking for an armed conflict, which prevented bloodshed and ensured the undisturbed course of the revolution."²

Those responsible for exerting "pressure from above" worked in the closest co-operation with those exerting "pressure from below". This co-operation could be clearly seen in the manner in which the Communist-controlled Ministry of Agriculture submitted the draft of a bill for land reform to the various peasants' organisations for their comments. This had the effect, as had been anticipated of triggering off immediate "pressure from below" on the part of those Party-controlled organisations. Pressure was mounted such that the other parties in the government were forced to capitulate and agree to the plans for land nationalisation which had originated in the Ministry of Agriculture.

¹*Ibid.*, p. 16.

²Jan Kozak. *How Parliament can Play a Revolutionary Part in the Transition to Socialism*, Independent Information Centre, London, 1961, *Ibid.*, p. 21.

The nationalisation of industry was affected by a similar tactic throughout the three years between 1945 and 1948. "The claws of the pincers were being closed by pressure from 'above' and from 'below' ", and as Mr. Kozak puts it, were "penetrating deeper and deeper into the flesh of the bourgeoisie."¹

By the end of 1947 this twin pressure had become so acute that the morale of the non-Communist parties had suffered acutely and they were beginning to disintegrate, their popular support disappearing rapidly as a result. In February 1948 the Communist Party struck by means of a *coup d'état* and won.

If the case of Czechoslovakia provides a most valuable case study of the uses to which a Communist Party can put Parliament when large numbers of Communist representatives have been elected and achieved positions of power, the pages of *World Marxist Review* provide valuable information as to the tactics to be employed by Communists in parliament today when they only constitute a small minority.

The October 1964 issue carried a report of a conversation with Gaston Moulin, Chairman of the five-man strong Communist group in the Belgian Parliament:

"For some time our work in Parliament consisted of eloquent but often not very constructive statements. The thesis that Parliament should be used for propagating our views was understood by us in a purely mechanical way. But what were the results? Of course we stated our views, but their impact on the country was not very great.

"Today we work in a different way. For some years now . . . in keeping with the decisions of the eleventh Congress which sharply condemned dogmatism and secretism, the parliamentary group has not engaged in abstract doctrinaire presentation of our views: instead we have raised the cardinal questions agitating the country endeavouring to advance a concrete programme for their solution in the interests of the community on the basis of our Marxist-Leninist principles."²

Moulin went on to say that the programme he had mentioned had included a proposal for the reduction of Belgium's military budget by five per cent and stated:

"Generally speaking, the political climate in our country is extremely favourable for posing the question of cutting military expenditure and taking effective steps in defence of peace. Of course, the climate alone is not enough. What is needed is a growing pressure from below. In this respect demonstrations like the anti-bomb march of the youth on 15 March are very important."³

¹Jan Kozak. *How Parliament can Play a Revolutionary Part in the Transition to Socialism*, Independent Information Centre, London, 1961, *Ibid.*, p. 25.

²Interview with Gaston Moulin, 'Communists in Parliament', *World Marxist Review*, October 1964, pp. 56-58.

³*Ibid.*

In France, Communist deputies take particular pains to keep in touch with the leaders of mass organisations in which Communist sympathies are strong and they work out concerted plans of action with them:

“In this way the Communist Parliamentary groups, working in close contact with the masses, are using Parliament to expose de Gaulle’s one-man rule as an authoritarian regime serving the monopolies, to uphold the demands of the various sections of the population, and to show how much the people would gain from the introduction of genuine democracy and the creation of a sovereign parliament representing the national interest instead of the interests of the monopolies”.¹

The objective behind the British Communist Party’s extremely unsuccessful drive to obtain parliamentary representation was explained in a speech by John Gollan, Secretary General of the Party in a speech at the Party’s 28th National Congress in 1963 when he said:

“What is our aim in the coming election? It is put clearly in the resolution. In the coming General Election the Tories must be defeated and a Labour and Communist majority returned. Why a Labour and Communist majority? Because the replacement of a Tory government by a Labour government is not enough. The pressure of the mass movement must force the Labour government to break with bi-partisan policies. A necessary guarantee of this would be a group of Communist MP’s”.²

¹Robert Ballanger. ‘Communists in Parliament’, *World Marxist Review*, April 1964, pp. 42-45.

²John Gollan. 28th Communist Party Congress Report, Communist Party of Great Britain, London, 1963, p. 14.

CHAPTER XIV

The Concealed Offensive

Fellow travellers and concealed Party members—The weapon of infiltration—Parties and the use of fronts—The illegal Parties—Publishing activities of the illegal Parties.

COMMUNIST Parties in the non-Communist world are aided in their activities by a large number of sympathisers who do not, for one reason or another, actually join the Party, and by secret members who have, in fact, joined the Party but who have specifically been instructed not to reveal their membership. Such agents are more dangerous to the West than known Party members.

The first category constitute the so-called "fellow travellers", many of whom are to be found in the ranks of the Party's front organisations. A high proportion of them are so-called intellectuals. Their reasons for not actually joining the Party with which they sympathise are many and various; extending from a genuine reluctance to completely identifying themselves with all aspects of the Party's policies and aims to mere reluctance to jeopardise a career or social position. Their ranks also include publicity seekers, cranks, opportunists and careerists, who believe that they can use the Communist Party to serve their own interests.

It would seem that it is not Communist Party policy to try and persuade fellow travellers to join the Party if they display any reluctance to do so, but they are allowed to go on considering themselves politically independent. By this means it is hoped to obtain their assistance for the movement without forcing them into a total and formal commitment which some might balk at. The Party's attitude towards fellow travellers was defined by George Dimitrov, Secretary General of the Comintern, in 1938, and there is every reason to suppose that it has remained materially unaltered ever since:

"Let our friends do the work. We must always remember that one sympathiser is generally worth more than a dozen militant Communists. A University professor who, without being a Party member, lends himself to the interests of the Soviet Union, is worth more than a hundred men with party cards. A writer of reputation, or a retired general, are worth more than five hundred poor devils who don't know any better than to get themselves beaten up by the police. The writer who, without being a party member defends

the Soviet Union, the union leader who is outside our party ranks, but defends Soviet International policy, is worth more than a thousand party workers. Those who are not party members or marked Communists, enjoy greater freedom of action. Our friends must confuse the adversary for us . . . carry out our main directives, mobilise in favour of our campaigns people who do not think as we do, and whom we could never reach. Particularly, we must use ambitious politicians who need support; men who realise that we Communists can clear them a path, give them publicity, and provide them with a ladder. Such men will sell their souls to the devil—and we buy souls”.¹

The practice of enlisting secret or concealed Party members was brought to public notice by the report of the Canadian Royal Commission on Espionage, which read in this regard:

“It seems to be general policy of the Communist Party to discourage certain selected sympathisers among certain categories of the population from joining that political party openly. Instead, these sympathisers are invited to join secret ‘cells’ or study groups, and to take pains to keep their adherence to the Party from the knowledge of their acquaintances who are not also members of the Communist Party. The categories of the population from which secret members are recruited include students, scientific workers, teachers, office and business workers, persons engaged in any type of administrative activity, and any group likely to obtain any type of government employment”.²

Since 1946 when the report of the Canadian Royal Commission was published, evidence from other sources has made it plain that such tactics are a fairly general practice amongst Communist Parties today. They hope by such means to be able to avail themselves of the services of men and women likely to reach positions of influence in the life of the community or the government, the services they can render the Party obviously being very much more valuable if their allegiance to it is unknown. Sometimes secret members are recruited in order to maintain the Party’s skeleton underground organisation which most Parties keep in being in case, at some future time, the Party might be proscribed and many of its leaders arrested. Such members play only a sleeping rôle in normal times deliberately avoiding all obvious contact with the Party.

On occasions known Party members may be asked to resign from the Party, or even be expelled from it on some faked pretext, in order that they may take up some special task free of any stigma that they are Party members. In such cases they continue to work for the Party as actively or perhaps more actively than before, but henceforward as secret or concealed members. Douglas Hyde mentions that prior to taking up his assignment in charge of preparations for the production of an “illegal” edition of the *Daily Worker* in 1940, he was instructed

¹*National Congress Report*, p. 91.

²*The Report of the Royal Commission*, Ottawa, 1946, p. 69.

to give up all his normal Party activities, and to avoid the company of friends and colleagues in the Party in order to give the impression that he had "ratted". He was also provided by the Party with a car and a chauffeur, partly to help him in his new duties, but also to give the impression that he had left the Party and taken a well paid job in business.

The Weapon of Infiltration

One of the theses presented at the Second Congress of the Communist International stated that:

"The fundamental principle of all organisational work of the Communist Party and individual Communists must be the creation of Communist nuclei everywhere they find proletarians and semi-proletarians although even in small numbers. In every Soviet of workers' deputies, in every trade and industrial union, co-operative association, factory, tenants-union, in every government institution everywhere, even though there may be only three people sympathising with Communism, a Communist nucleus must immediately be organised. It is only the power of organisation of the Communists that enables the advance guard of the working class to be the leader of the whole class. Communist nuclei working in organisations adhering to no political party must be subject to the party organisations in general, whether the party itself is working legally or illegally at the given moment. Communist nuclei of all kinds must be subordinated to one another in a strictly hierarchical order and system".¹

Twenty-five years later the Canadian Royal Commission on Espionage described as a "basic policy of the Communist Party":

"The election of secret members to the directing committees of as many types of functional organisation as possible, including trade unions, professional associations and broad non-Party organisations such as youth movements, and civil liberties unions. Similarly, secret members or adherents of the Communist Party may be used to take the lead in organising new, broad, and ostensibly non-political organisations, after which they obtain for themselves and other secret adherents key positions on the controlling committees of the organisation".²

The method by which Communist Parties seek to obtain control of non-Communist organisations is by operation of the "faction system". Factions consist of small groups of Party members or fellow travellers who have become members of the organisation it is desired to capture. These groups meet secretly to discuss tactics between themselves but generally do not operate openly as a group in the movement to which they belong, but in public they act individually in accordance with a pre-arranged plan. Their initial aim is to guide the policy of the organisation they have joined in the direction the Party would like to

¹F. Brown. *Essential Problems of Organisation, Party Organiser*, May 1938.

²*The Report of the Royal Commission*, Ottawa, 1946, p. 70.

see it go and to make sure that the adoption of any policies which seem harmful to the Party's interests are opposed. Their ultimate aim is to place Communist Party members or sympathisers in office. To this end they try and enlist the aid of any disgruntled non-Communists there may be in the organisation.

In the case of large organisations the Party concerned will probably appoint a "leading faction" consisting of the ablest Party members or sympathisers within the organisations' ranks. Subordinate to them will come a number of lower factions each with its own committee and secretary but each acting under the orders of the "leading faction" right down through the organisations' entire structure.

Organisations which rank particularly highly on the list of national Communist Parties for capture are youth and political organisations, study or research groups—even those of a pronouncedly anti-Communist nature—pacifist and anti-fascist movements, movements championing the rights of minorities, emigre bodies and organisations formed to support some cause overseas such as anti-colonialism. Virtually no organisation or movement is, however, immune from the possibility of attempted Communist infiltration, and many which started out by being either non-political or non-partisan have ended up by becoming no more than Communist fronts. An interesting example of Communist infiltration and capture of an organisation at the national level is that of the Labour Research Department. This organisation was founded in 1912 by Sydney and Beatrice Webb to provide the Fabian Society with an information and research department. By 1922, however, control had passed from Socialist to Communist hands to such an extent that both the Labour Party and the Fabian Society were forced to disown the organisation which now figures on the Labour Party's proscribed organisations.

Political parties, both those of the left and even of the right, police and armed forces, the Press, news agencies, broadcasting and television companies are all priority targets for Communist infiltration and capture, so are government departments. Evidence placed before the Canadian Royal Commission showed that the Canadian Communist Party had been successful in placing Party members in reasonable positions in the National Research Council of Canada, the Office of the High Commission of the United Kingdom, the Canadian Army's Directorate of Artillery, the Canadian Navy's Directorate of Supply, the Directorate of Intelligence of the Canadian Air Force, the Department of Munitions, the Research Department of the Bank of Canada, the Canadian Information Board, the Inter-Departmental Committee on Psychological Warfare, the Wartime Requirements Board and the Staff of two Canadian Universities.¹ Evidence available to the Australian Royal Commission on Espionage plainly indicated the existence of at least one highly placed Communist sympathiser in that country's Department of External Affairs during the immediate post war years.²

¹*Report of the Royal Commission, Ottawa, 1946, p. 58.*

²*Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage, Sydney, 1955, p. 117.*

The weight of the evidence available indicates that Communist Party members and sympathisers holding positions in government or other responsible positions will, as a rule, place loyalty to the Party above other considerations. Douglas Hyde has revealed that members and sympathisers of the Party employed in government offices were a continual source of the most valuable confidential information to the British Communist Party and helped it in formulating its policies during the war and immediate post war years. He recalls one instance in which a new young girl recruit to the Party who worked in a government department was so anxious to pass on any important information she obtained in the course of her work that she had to be forbidden from using her office telephone as a means by which to communicate it.¹

Possibly the classic case of a Communist sympathiser inside a Government department using her position to supply the Party with confidential information was that of Kathleen Willsher. Miss Willsher emigrated from Britain to Canada in 1930 when she was 25 and obtained employment as a secretary in the Office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in Ottawa. A graduate of the London School of Economics and a talented young woman speaking German, French and Russian, she was promoted to the registry division in 1939. She became Assistant Registrar in 1944, a post which gave her access to practically all Secret and Top Secret documents passing through the hands of the High Commission. Two years before reaching this position, however, she had joined a secret cell of the Canadian Communist Party then operating under the name of the Labour Progressive Party. As early as 1935 she had agreed to supply a member of the Central Control Commission of the Party with any information that came her way that she thought might help it formulate its policies, and she supplied such information for four years. Later, in 1942, she was approached by her superior in the Party with a further request to supply information and again agreed to do so, continuing to supply such information until 1945. In giving evidence in the Gouzenko case she said that when first asked to supply information she had had some twinges of conscience, but had finally decided to do so. She said:

“I felt that I should contrive to contribute something towards the helping of this policy (the Communist Party’s) because I was very interested in it, I found it very difficult, and yet I felt that I should try to help”.

The Canadian Royal Commission found that:

“Miss Willsher’s evidence, taken as a whole, shows that she felt her own position in the Communist Party to be a relatively humble one, that her one important contribution to the cause of the Party lay in the transmission of the secret information to which her official position gave her access, and that it was expected of her

¹Douglas Hyde. *I Believed*, William Heineman Ltd., London, 1950, pp. 238-239.

that she should not hesitate to make this information available on request to Party leadership".¹

Douglas Hyde states that in his experience it was often Communist Party members occupying comparatively lowly positions in the Party who would take the biggest risks in order to supply it with inside information.

All the various media of public communication are priority targets for Communist attempts at infiltration. The advantage the Party stands to gain from having members in a position to influence the presentation of news being obvious and are well illustrated by two incidents from the United States.

A prominent New York radio news commentator and author who always presented himself as an unbiased authority on world affairs and claimed to have met many statesmen and politicians was, in fact, a fellow traveller. His many lecture trips were frequently organised by Communist front organisations and he received money from a "concealed" member of the Party to help cover his expenses. Despite this fact he was able to build up a reputation of some standing as an impartial "world observer", the "objectivity" and "independence" of whose views could be considered helpful in guiding the American people in their thinking. Whether broadcasting, writing or lecturing he always followed a subtle pro-Soviet line which took in many non-Communists and for some time was able to exert a considerable degree of influence on American public opinion.

The other case concerned a concealed Party member who became the editor in chief of an American publishing firm, who used his position to secure the publication of pro-Communist literature. His method of operation was to arrange for Communist authors to submit their drafts to him to make sure they were in publishable form. He would then tell the author to submit them to the firm in the normal way, the near certainty being that they would be accepted as a result of his preparatory efforts. He was to continue operating in this fashion for a considerable period, largely thanks to the unwillingness of the firm's President to believe that its editor in chief could be a Communist because he was "obviously a gentleman" and had disclaimed any Communist sympathies.

The invaluable aid which Party members or fellow travellers in positions of respectability in the national Press can give the Party is so obvious as to need no emphasising. Their rôle is to influence the policy of the paper without the editor and the rest of the staff being aware that they are doing so with an ulterior motive. Pages or columns dealing with international news and book and film reviews are both particular targets from which hidden Communist sympathisers have been known to attempt to exert influence. These latter two fields are particularly important because through them readers may be encouraged to read books supporting the Soviet line and ignore those opposing it. Today the technique used is more to attack anti-Communism rather

¹*The Report of the Royal Commission*, Ottawa, 1946, pp. 75-76.

than propagate pure Communism. News agencies are also subject to attempts at infiltration by Communist sympathisers, and local Communists often attempt to "condition" agencies' foreign correspondents who live abroad for long periods.

Another opinion forming field which the Communist Party is anxious to gain access is that of education. Communists are particularly active amongst school teachers in all countries. In Britain approximately 1,000 school teachers in the London area are believed to have Communist sympathies.

The opportunities open to a Communist who has secured a post in charge of a department within a school are manifold. He is, for instance, as a teacher given a free hand in choosing text books which the children in his department will use and is also asked to advise on the selection of books for the school library. Probably books openly championing the Communist cause will not be included in his selection but a Communist in such a position can see to it that books whose general approach to Communism is sympathetic or whose approach to current affairs is in line with that of the Communist Party are included. The possibilities open to a headmaster or a headmistress are, of course, even greater. Teachers charged with giving instruction in current affairs can also bring important influence to bear.

An article which appeared in the magazine *Teachers' World* in February 1962, written by a reliable and experienced political observer stated that:

"The Communist Party is making its biggest ever bid for control of the NUT . . .

"Teachers are one of the three vocational groups recently selected by the higher command for intensified infiltration. The other two are staffs of mass radio broadcasting, television and so on, and the clergy.

"Considerable progress has been made, especially among teachers. There are now over one hundred cells covering the country. The greatest concentrations are in Greater London and the big cities, but cells are springing up in rural areas.

"The Communists are allying themselves with the activist section (of the teachers). They are subjecting them to incessant propaganda with important results.

"Already the cells have organised or inspired over 20 area agitational movements, wherever possible these are fronted or officered by non-Communist stooges.

"The cells seem well supplied with money. Big sums are being spent on literature, pamphlets, paper, postage, transport, hire of halls and general organisation in order to ensure the biggest possible attendances at their area meetings".¹

Known members of the Communist Party and fellow travellers are also to be found holding important positions on the staff of a number of universities and colleges. Communist cells exist in the universities of

¹'Communist Take Over Bid', *Teachers' World*, 9 February, 1964, p. 5.

London, Cambridge, Oxford, Leeds, Sheffield, Manchester and particularly Hull. The Party pays particular attention to trying to gain recruits from amongst those students studying at faculties of science. It has been estimated that possibly about 10 per cent of the total teaching staff of British universities have Communist sympathies.

Communist attempts to infiltrate the churches are of long standing. One of the first major attempts in this field being in the United States in the 1920's at a time when many Protestant clergymen were still sympathetic to the revolution. The Methodist Federation for Social Service being penetrated to such an extent that it was later disowned by its parent body. Albert Vassal, a defector from the French Communist Party stated in 1955 that in 1936 orders had been sent out from Moscow for specially selected members of the Communist Youth movement in France to enter seminaries and become priests, others infiltrated the religious communities, particularly the Dominicans. A former American Intelligence agent has described how one of the divisions of the Communist dominated Hungarian secret police, the dreaded AVH, was given the task of infiltrating the Hungarian churches and their youth organisations. Just after the war their task was facilitated by divisions that arose within the Catholic Church and they had considerable success in infiltrating the Hungarian Jesuit community.

It has been estimated that at least eight bodies with religious titles operating at the present time in the United States are in fact under Communist control.

Infiltration of political parties, particularly those of the left has, of course, always been a favourite tactic of Communist Parties. It was used on a vast scale and with great success in the countries of Eastern Europe in the period immediately following the "liberation" of those countries by the Red Army. It is a tactic that has also been applied with considerable success in developing countries, both towards political parties in countries already independent and towards various nationalist movements and "liberation movements".

In Britain, the Communist Party has almost since its inception waged a continual campaign for some form of alliance between itself and the Labour Party, and has constantly sought to attract the sympathies of influential members of the Labour Party and to enrol their support in its activities. The Labour Party has consistently and determinedly fought off these Communist advances, but there is evidence that Communist efforts to gain support amongst the Party's left wing have not always been altogether without success. For instance in 1952 the late Mr. Hugh Gaitskell said that:

"A most disturbing feature of the Labour Party Conference was the number of resolutions and speeches which were Communist inspired, based not even on *Tribune* so much as on the *Daily Worker*. I was told by some observers that about one sixth of the constituency party delegates to the Conference appeared to be Communists or Communist inspired, if it should be one tenth or

even one twentieth, it is a most shocking state of affairs to which the National Executive should give immediate attention".

In addition Communists have made particular efforts to obtain control of the London Co-operative Society and have in large measure succeeded in bringing it under their control.

The Labour Party issues each year a list of "Proscribed Organisations", membership of which is barred to members of the party on the grounds that the organisations are under Communist or Fascist control. At the present time the list contains the names of 42 such organisations known to be under Communist control. Moves by the National Executive to make association with these organisations and participation in their activities as much a disciplinary offence as actual membership of them, have so far failed to gain the sanction of the Labour Party Conference.

Expulsion of members of the Labour Party for membership of proscribed organisations or for involvement in other Communist activities has not been an uncommon occurrence, although in some cases those thus expelled have later been re-admitted to the party.

The Illegal Parties

Communist Parties always have to face the fact that at any moment due to some change in the international or domestic situation they may be proscribed and their leaders arrested. At the present time for instance 37 Communist Parties are under proscription.

To cope with this ever-present threat a system has been designed over the years by which the Party can swiftly go underground and continue operations on a considerable scale as soon as a ban on its open activities is imposed or even seriously threatened. The cardinal points of this system are largely based on the writings of Lenin on the problems of Party organisation, and stem originally from the experiences of the early Bolsheviks and their clandestine organisation in tsarist Russia.

The basis of the system is a skeleton underground Party network kept permanently in existence and composed of members earmarked for important duties or high office in the Party organisation should its open working become impossible. Such members are very carefully chosen from the ranks of the Party's most reliable and experienced cadre workers, and when possible also from amongst those least generally known to be Communists. Some of them probably being persons who take no public part in the life of the Party in normal times at all. These concentrate upon making preparations for a possible enforced spell underground, selecting suitable hideouts and drawing up plans for the production of clandestine literature. Their duties may also include the maintenance of clandestine channels of communication between the Party and Moscow.

In general the maturer Party members are selected for responsible positions in the underground network. When the American Communist Party was operating underground between the years 1951-1955 it is known, for instance, that out of 25 leading workers in the underground system all had been in the Communist Party for over 20 years and that

their average age was over 40. The care with which leaders of the underground are chosen is illustrated by the fact that members of the American Party selected as potential recruits for important underground work were known to have been required to complete an elaborate questionnaire which probed into every detail of their most intimate personal lives.

As the threat of proscription grows so the skeleton underground network gradually expands. Douglas Hyde has given a description of this process as he saw it as a member of the British Communist Party in the early days of the war.

“Such an organisation therefore provided a ready made basis for the underground movement when it was needed. It was itself already more than half underground and was in touch with all the undercover members in the services, Government departments, the civil service and within other organisations.

“People whose jobs had prevented them from being publically associated with the party but who had perhaps done tutorial work for years would quietly disappear from the Party. Any member who enquired what had happened would be told ‘He is doing more important work comrade, it is part of your duty to forget that he ever had anything to do with the party’.”¹

In such a way a Party can gradually submerge, until a complete organisation has been built up underground. In the final stages of this “going to earth” operation it probably becomes necessary for key personnel to leave their jobs and homes at very short notice.

As Party members cease their surface activities and are received into the underground they are made ready for their future assignments. To this end they have to be provided with a new name and personal history and all the certificates and papers essential to modern life, such as driving licences, insurance certificates, bank deposit books and, in many countries identity cards. All these papers are provided from stocks compiled previously by members of the skeleton underground. These stocks may consist of faked papers or genuine papers that have been obtained with the aid of sympathisers in government and other offices. Before members commence their duties in the underground they will also receive instructions on how to dress unobtrusively and on methods of disguise, on how to answer awkward enquiries and how to provide convincing cover stories.

Security precautions are obviously extremely strict. Often the Party leadership will be rotated as a special security measure and a number of potential leaders are held in reserve, either in the underground or “upstairs”, i.e. in that section of the Party still operating in the open, so that if an existing leadership of the underground falls victim to action by the security forces, it can be replaced rapidly. As a rule contacts in the underground Parties operate only from the leadership downwards. Members cannot contact others at higher levels and will

¹Douglas Hyde, *I Believed*, William Heineman Ltd., London, 1950, pp. 92-93.

often not even know the identity of their superiors. Should the organisation be penetrated by the security forces, only the identity of the underground workers on the level penetrated or lower levels will be discovered.

Types of hideout used by Communist Parties operating underground fall into three groups; those designed merely for temporary use for a courier or other Party worker in transit, and which may consist of just a room in the house of a reliable Communist sympathiser; those designed for the emergency use of underground workers in which they can take refuge if sick or if they believe themselves to be in danger of exposure or arrest and those designed to give shelter to one or more underground members for long periods where they can be provided with all the necessities of life for months or even years, such hideouts usually being located in isolated country districts in farms or country cottages.

The essential requirements of a good hideout include the following points. The reliability of the owner must be beyond doubt. If the hideout should be in a flat there must be no porter or liftman. There must be no children or servants in the house. The owner must not be a prominent member of the Party or too well known for his Communist sympathies, and should be someone who knows the neighbourhood well and who has reliable friends in it who will be able to inform him if enquiries are being made.

A special drill has been laid down for the conduct of meetings of members of the underground. This includes such provisions as arrangements for members to arrive and leave at staggered intervals if the meeting is a large one. The election of one member to act as a rearguard, whose duties include checking the scene of meetings after they are over in order to make sure that no incriminating documents or other pieces of evidence are left behind. Underground workers are also given comprehensive instruction in the best tactics to employ to "throw off" any followers whether they should be travelling either on foot or by car or public transport.

So strictly are these security regulations enforced in some instances that it is known, for example, that in one case during the American Communist Party's period underground, no less than six weeks were spent in assembling 20 members by means of a number of subterfuges for the purpose of attending a secret conference. In another case a high ranking member of the American Communist Party underground travelled 360 miles on a car journey that would normally have included only a 185 mile journey from his starting point to destination. The extra mileage he covered on his twelve hour trip being made up by the false trails he laid in the form of detours to throw off possible pursuers.¹

The pages of *World Marxist Review* sometimes give revealing and on occasion fascinating glimpses of the activities and methods employed by Parties operating in conditions of "illegality". A resolution of the Portuguese Communist Party which has been operating underground

¹J. E. Hoover. *Masters of Deceit*, Henry Holt and Co., New York, 1958, pp. 248-249.

for many years reported in the February 1964 edition of this magazine stated:

"Last year the enemy was able on three occasions to raid underground centres, arrest 19 functionaries, among them Blanqui Teixeira, member of the Central Committee. A number of party branches and underground publications were discovered and large numbers of members arrested.

"The resolution emphasised that uninterrupted and successful underground work is possible given a combination of correct protective measures and firm discipline.

"Underground functionaries above all are obliged to observe strictly all the rules of the underground in guiding party activities. Mistakes in this respect are liable to take a heavy toll of cadres".¹

This resolution of the Portuguese Party also includes the statement that all underground members should master the necessary discipline "... which does not tolerate adventurism and improvisation".² "Party committees" the resolution goes on to lay down "should not be composed of just any people of goodwill", but of "members whose life and activity are well known to their comrades". The merits of "a functionary" can be assessed it is said:

"Only by verifying how he fulfils the tasks entrusted to him, knowing well his moral outlook, his work, his personal conduct and his readiness to withstand difficulties and endure the sacrifices entailed by the struggle".³

"The task", the resolution continues, "is to turn the Party into an impregnable fortress."

Some of the main lessons learned by the Venezuelan Communist Party during its 18 years of underground existence were published in the form of a pamphlet written by one of its members which states that:

"The Party would not have been able to develop the struggle successfully had it not preserved its leading core. The leading centres should have bodies which could immediately substitute them in the event of any breakdown.

"The Party worker working illegally should not ask what does not concern his work or try to find out more than is necessary for him to know. Every member should know what is vital for carrying out his particular task.

"Party members must bring up for discussion every case of slackness in Party security that becomes known to them.

"Communists are comrades-in-arms. This is more than friendship and mistakes and shortcomings should not be slurred over for fear of spoiling friendly relations".⁴

¹Liborio Vasquez. 'Defying Fascist Terror', *World Marxist Review*, February 1964, pp. 85-87.

²*Ibid.*

³*Ibid.*

⁴S. Regalado. 'From the Experience of the Underground Work of the Communist Party of Venezuela', *World Marxist Review*, January 1962, pp. 55-57.

The pamphlet also makes the point that for underground work all large Party units should be split up into smaller ones, and that every underground unit should maintain shelters for "persecuted revolutionaries". Meeting places should be chosen in such a way that it is possible to warn members in time should a police raid take place, and before each meeting those attending should agree how to behave and what to say in case one of their number is arrested.¹

Communist Parties are able to continue operating on an often surprisingly large scale under conditions of illegality by the use of such measures as those outlined above; even carrying out recruiting campaigns and increasing their membership whilst doing so. However the restrictions imposed upon them for the sake of security whilst operating illegally inevitably slows down their operations, and forces them to devote a considerable proportion of their efforts to self-preservation. For this reason no Communist Party will ever go underground unless the situation compels it to do so, and even when it does, a portion of the Party will always remain above ground, operating under the protection of some disguise. Usually this disguise takes the form of a front organisation such as 'The Society for the Protection of Children', a Communist dominated organisation through which the Communist Party of Iraq (Tudeh Party) was able to continue to operate to some extent on the "surface" after the Party itself had been banned and driven underground. Alternatively it may take the form of some specially set up extreme left wing political party which although, in fact, Communist-controlled poses as being independent of the Party. An example being the United Democratic Left Party of Greece (EDA), which, although the Greek Communist Party itself continued to be banned, controlled a substantial number of seats in the Greek Parliament. Another example being the Party known as 'The League of Free Germans' which has put up candidates for both the state and federal elections on behalf, though not admittedly so, of the banned West German Communist Party. Attempts are also made to infiltrate and secure control of non-Communist organisations, which can then be used to act as the mouthpiece of the underground Communist Party. Campaigns will also probably be started and new organisations set up by fellow travellers and concealed Party members to fight for the repeal of the laws under which the Communist Party was made illegal, similarly attempts will be made to secure the release of Party members who have been arrested.

The importance of the combination of the two forms of struggle, that carried on by the Party's underground organisation and that carried on by members and sympathisers still operating on the surface was recently emphasised in an article in *World Marxist Review*, the author of which said:

"Only by properly combining the two (forms of struggle) can they hope to be successful in underground work. A party which confines itself to illegal forms of struggle runs the risk of isolating

itself from the masses and becoming an exclusive conspiratorial group doomed to failure. Lenin noted that 'revolutionaries who are unable to combine illegal forms of struggle with every form of legal struggle are poor revolutionaries indeed'.¹

An illustration of an "illegal" Party's attempts to follow this doctrine comes in the form of a report on the Spanish Party's activities in recent years. The author of this report states that the more experience the Party accumulated "the more we appreciate the profundity and wisdom of Lenin's counsel about combining legal and illegal work"; he continues:

"We realised that work in legal organisations is a better way not only to protect our militants, while bringing them closer to the masses, but also to recruit new members for the Party from amongst those people in these organisations who are not suspected by the police, or even from among those regarded as 'respectable' by the authorities. Experience has shown that for every Communist who works in a mass organisation the party can gain several new members, not to speak of the many who, while not committed formally to the party, nevertheless support us in these organisations".²

The author claims that the Communist Party has:

"... established contact inside the Falange and its Youth organisation with those who although they were not completely divorced from the regime were 'non-conformists' or discontented. Contact was also made with small groups of progressive intellectuals. As a result non-conformist Falange groups have grown in size".

The Party has also used trade unions as a channel for its propaganda line, and has "made contact with anti-Franco bourgeois groups" and made efforts to persuade their "more politically conscious members" to combine their anti-Franco activities with "action against all bourgeois trends".

One problem affecting the Spanish Party is the growing age of many of its leading officials, and the strain imposed on them by over 20 years of working under illegal conditions. To counteract this the Party is making a special effort to recruit new members from the age group 18-35, amongst whom it is hoped to find suitable replacements for some of the older leaders of the underground.

The main aim of the Spanish Communist Party's activities at the present time is to prepare the ground for a general political strike, and as a step towards this it has recently engaged upon a recruiting drive which has been given the name of "Asturias" in commemoration of the miners' strike in Asturias in 1962. It being felt that this "glorious name symbolises the militant spirit and political conscience of the working

¹Kostas Kolliannis, 'Master all Forms of the Revolutionary Struggle', *World Marxist Review*, February 1964, pp. 9-16.

²Santiago Carrillo, 'The Underground Party and its Contact with the Masses', *World Marxist Review*, April 1961, pp. 11-20.

class". A resolution passed by the Party's Executive recommended that:

"Admission to the Party should be made easier for intellectuals, all working people and consistent anti-fascists eager to join it".

The appeal issued at the commencement of this recruiting drive stated that:

"It is essential to have a strong Party and youth organisation in every enterprise and educational institution, in every village and in every working class district, an organisation capable of leading the actions of the masses for their demands".¹

In the same appeal it is stated that:

"A friendly attitude should be taken towards the many representatives of the Catholic youth struggle who support our programme and who are eager to carry on the struggle in the ranks of our party. Their religious beliefs should not be regarded as an obstacle to their joining the ranks of the working people".

A Communist Party declared illegal in its own country will often use the territory of a neighbouring state as a base for its underground activities. This method of operating is made easier if the neighbouring state is under a Communist Government, sympathetic to the bloc or neutral.

Publishing activities of the illegal Parties

The strenuous measures that Communist Parties will take to maintain the circulation of some form of publication even when the normal Communist press has been suppressed and the Party itself proscribed or threatened with proscription, have been well described by Douglas Hyde. He has described how in the days before the Nazi attack on the USSR when he was given the task of taking charge of the Party's underground press organisation when the *Daily Worker* itself was banned as a result of the Party's anti-war attitude.

Under Hyde's supervision and instruction, "illegal" printing presses were installed in a number of carefully selected locations, the intention being to produce a "clandestine" edition of the *Daily Worker* when the time was considered ripe.

The largest printing unit was established in a warehouse in Acton, which was obtained for the use of a firm of "general dealers" specialising in machine parts. This firm was, in fact, purely a "cover" concern, although a bank account was opened in its name to give the appearance of authenticity. Several printing machines and large quantities of material were installed in the warehouse, a staff of two Party workers being instructed to maintain it. These two were supposed to be "General Dealers" normal warehouse staff, to heighten the impression that this was an active commercial concern parts of the printing presses were left dismantled and in view as though forming part of the firm's stock of machine parts.

¹Santiago Carrillo. 'The Underground Party and its Contact with the Masses', *World Marxist Review*, March 1961, pp. 47-49.

Another printing machine was installed in the cellars of a London saw makers where it was hoped that the noise of the machinery would drown the noise of the printing press in action. Other printing presses were installed in the back rooms of two cobblers' shops in Surrey and one in a cobbler's shop in the suburbs of North London. Stocks of type and equipment for typesetting were stored in a number of places in the London area and stocks of newsprint were hidden in houses, shops and in some cases allotment sheds in widely dispersed locations.

A scheme was devised by which teams of workers would operate this underground printing system working only in pairs for reasons of security. Members of each pair knowing only the man he worked with and Hyde and his driver, who handed each team's completed work on to the next pair of workers. Distribution of the completed "illegal" paper was to be through a system of couriers operating at night.

In the event, however, with the Nazi attack of Russia, Hyde's system was never put into operation. However, a plan to use it for launching a special paper aimed at causing disaffection in the armed forces was nearly completed when the Soviet Union was invaded. The Party's consequent switch in policy caused this plan to be hastily dropped.

Currently some 38 Communist parties are operating under bans of varying degrees of effectiveness and completeness. The great majority of these continue to bring out one or more regular publications. The Portuguese Party, for example, still manages to bring out a regular paper, a bulletin and a number of area papers despite the fact that the Party has been operating in "illegal conditions" for many years. A member of the Portuguese Communist Party in an article in the *World Marxist Review* has said:

"All our publications are printed in the country, in the extremely difficult conditions of illegality. In view of the constant police surveillance, the work entails tremendous risks. The utmost caution is therefore required at every step, beginning with the purchase of type and paper, its delivery to the printing house, and ending with the printing work itself which calls for real heroism on the part of the workers. The regular appearance of the Party's organ *Avante* (Forward), its bulletin *O Militante* (the Activist) and its various regional papers, not to mention pamphlets, leaflets, and appeals, is assured solely by strict discipline, proper organisation and the careful selection of cadres. The fact that during the past 14 years our central printing house has not been discovered and that for 22 years our national paper has been appearing regularly speaks of the organisational skill of the party".¹

Regional papers printed by the Portuguese Party include *O Campnes* (The Peasant), *O Textil* (The Textile Worker), and *O Cortisiro* (The Corkscrew) which all circulate in the Southern part of the country and are intended for workers in the agricultural, textile and cork making industries respectively.

¹*World Marxist Review*, October 1963.

CHAPTER XV

Communist Parties and the Revolutionary Road to Power

Communist Parties and revolution—The high priests of revolutionary war: Mao Tse-tung, Che Guevara.

THE current Communist global political warfare offensive is designed to seize power either peacefully or by armed force. Lenin wrote:

“Whoever recognises the class struggle cannot fail to recognise civil war, which in every class society are the natural, and under certain conditions, inevitable continuation, development and intensification of the class struggle. All the great revolutions prove this. To repudiate civil war, or to forget about it, would mean sinking into opportunism and renouncing the Socialist revolution.”

Laying down a number of conditions which must exist, if a Communist-led revolution is to be successfully launched, Lenin added:

“... when these conditions are operating it is a betrayal of Marxism and of the revolution to refuse to treat insurrection as an art”.¹

Despite the efforts that have been made in recent years to give Communist Parties a more respectable and democratic image no Communist Party in the world has, in fact, renounced the possibility of using violence as a means of obtaining power. The argument between Moscow and Peking is based not upon the morality of using force but purely upon the effectiveness of “direct action” as opposed to non-violent means, and above all perhaps upon an interpretation of when conditions in given countries are, in fact, ripe for the use of force.

Lenin’s views on the crucially important questions of timing were:

“To be successful insurrection must rely not upon conspiracy and not upon a party, but upon the advanced class. That is the first point. Insurrection must rely upon the rising revolutionary spirit of the people. That is the second point. Insurrection must rely upon the crucial moment in the history of the growing revolution, when the activity of the advanced ranks of the people

¹Lenin. ‘Marxism and Insurrection’, quoted by Rostas Rollianis, ‘Master all Forms of the Revolutionary Struggle’, *World Marxist Review*, February 1964, pp. 9-16.

is at its height, and when the vacillations in the ranks of the weak, half-hearted and irresolute enemies of the revolution are at the strongest. That is the third point."¹

Parties supporting the Moscow line in general hold that insurrections should not be launched unless all hope of the Party obtaining power by constitutional means have been blocked or conditions are exceptionally favourable. Those supporting the Peking line tend to see preparations for armed action as the foremost duty of Communist Parties, particularly those in the developing countries, and they point out that no Communist Party has ever yet come to power through purely constitutional means.

This difference in attitude between the Soviet Union and China is probably at least partly explained by each country's own experience. The more cautious Soviet line stemming from the fact the USSR has in the past had the experience of supporting, sometimes purely by means of propaganda and sometimes in more practical form a number of revolts in distant non-Communist countries. Many of these have ended in disastrous failures with consequent loss of face for their Soviet backers. Amongst these have been the pre-war revolts in French and Dutch Colonial territories which followed on the Baku Conference, the Communist revolts of the 1920s and 1930s in Germany, the insurrection in Greece of the late 1940s and the Communist guerilla campaigns in Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia.

On the other hand, since the Chinese Communists came to power in their homelands the two major revolutionary wars for which they have provided support, the Indo-China War and the Algerian revolt have both achieved victory, whilst a large measure of success has also attended their support of revolutionary forces in South Vietnam. At the same time, however, it is evident that despite the more cautious Soviet line, its support can still be expected for revolts which from the Communist point of view make promising progress, as evidenced at the present time by the full support being given to the revolts both in South Vietnam and Venezuela. It is just as evident that if it appears likely that a revolt is about to be crushed Soviet support for it will be swiftly withdrawn, as witnessed by events in the Dominican Republic.

Amongst Communist Parties which envisage armed action as being a probable prerequisite to their attaining power are the Portuguese, Spanish, South African and a number of Parties in Latin America. Although the Greek Communist Party is a follower of the Moscow line, a leading member of it writing in *World Marxist Review* in June 1964 gave an interesting summary of the Communist view on the use of violence. Commenting upon Lenin's three points on the conditions necessary for the launching of a successful revolution he wrote:

"From this standpoint Communists consider it to be of the utmost importance to know just when to start an insurrection and how to direct it successfully.

¹V. I. Lenin. 'Marxism and Insurrection', quoted by Kostas Kollianis, 'Master all Forms of the Revolutionary Struggle', *World Marxist Review*, February 1964, pp. 9-16.

"In these cases when the situation necessitates rejecting armed struggle, we must be able in good time to withdraw the forces of revolution from the line of fire, to reorganise our ranks and to turn to new forms of struggle which would help us to consolidate the victories won in the closing stages of the revolution and to develop them in new conditions.

"In those cases when the Parties in some countries were unable for one reason or another to find their bearings in the changed situation and to decide in good time to switch over to peaceful forms of struggle, the revolutionary movement found itself in critical straits. Both the past and recent history of the world Communist movement knows of such cases.

"But the development of the revolution is also adversely affected when the Communist Parties fail to make the necessary preparations for armed struggle and to determine the right moment when all forces must be thrown into armed action to defeat the enemy."¹

The High Priests of Revolutionary War: Mao Tse-tung

In the years since the close of the Second World War an identifiable and distinctive Communist doctrine of guerilla warfare has been developed, based principally upon the writings and teachings of two successful revolutionaries, Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara, one of the chief lieutenants of the original band of guerillas with which Fidel Castro launched the Cuban revolution.

Both these authorities base their theories partly on their practical experience as guerilla leaders and partly upon the works of other experts, including Lenin, and in the case of Mao Tse-tung at least on the teachings of some very much earlier experts in the use of violence, such as Sun Tzu who in his *Book of War* written over 2,400 years ago coined the phrase "Uproar in the East, Strike in the West" which in only slightly changed form was to become one of Mao's own maxims.

Mao Tse-tung first set forth his principles of revolutionary conflict in a pamphlet entitled *Guerilla Warfare* which was published in 1937, at which time Mao was 34, having been a member of the Chinese Communist Party since it was formed in 1921. He had already had more than ten years' experience of active guerilla campaigning behind him. By the time he set about writing this book the Japanese invasion of China had already been in progress for some time, and indeed in the pamphlet he was principally concerned in outlining a campaign aimed at liberating the Japanese occupied areas of his country. A campaign in which he visualised guerillas acting not on their own but in conjunction with regular forces. Many of the points he stressed, however, were of general application and have indeed become the basis of the training of Communist guerillas in lands far removed from China.

To Mao, guerilla operations are "but one step in the total war, one aspect of the revolutionary struggle. They are the inevitable result of

¹Kostos Kolliannis, 'Master all Forms of the Revolutionary Struggle', *World Marxist Review*, February 1964, pp. 9-16.

the clash between oppressor and oppressed when the latter reach the limit of their endurance".¹

He advocates that a guerilla campaign should be divided into three phases. In the first, the nucleus of the guerilla organisation is established and bases are established and consolidated. The second stage sees the beginning of aggressive action by the guerillas and a campaign of terrorism and sabotage. In the third stage the guerillas convert themselves into a regular army organised on conventional lines and capable of defeating the enemy's regular forces.

Mao asks "What is basic guerilla strategy?" and answers:

"Guerilla strategy must be based on alertness, mobility, and attack. It must be adjusted to the enemy situation, the terrain, the existing lines of communication, the relative strengths, the weather and the situation of the people."²

"In guerilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from the East and attack from the West; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When guerillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws. In guerilla strategy, the enemy's rear, flanks and other vulnerable spots are his vital points, and there he must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted and annihilated."³

Mao envisaged that the leaders from the guerillas would in the main be drawn from students, teachers, professors, members of the professions, artisans, "local soldiery", and "those without a fixed profession, who are willing to exert themselves to the last drop of blood". The rank and file he expects to be drawn from "the masses of the people", deserters from the enemy forces, from the ranks of bandits or in some circumstances from regular army units allocated a guerilla rôle.

The establishment of secure bases is to be regarded as a prime necessity, within such bases the guerillas must train, build up their organisation and equip themselves. The security afforded by bases in mountainous areas is particularly to be recommended.

The headquarters of the guerilla force exercises control through a number of area commands, each presided over by a military commander and a political commissar. The area headquarters should include special offices controlling propaganda, "peoples' mass movements", and other related activities. Below the area headquarters come district headquarters, each presided over by a military commander and several political commissars. Co-ordination of military and political affairs in areas in which guerillas are active should be the task of special committees established at an area level, and composed of representatives

¹Mao Tse-tung. *Guerilla Warfare*, Cassell and Co., London, 1964, p. 31.

²*Ibid.*, p. 34.

³*Ibid.*

of both the military and political sides of the guerilla movement. The members of this committee should be elected by the guerilla troops themselves and one of its functions is to "act as a forum for the discussion of military and political matters."¹

The guerilla force itself is pictured as being divided into "combat" groups to carry out aggressive action against the enemy and "self-defence units" whose rôle includes: "local sentry duties, securing information of the enemy, arresting traitors, and preventing the dissemination of enemy propaganda. When the enemy launches a guerilla-suppression drive, these units armed with what weapons there are, are assigned to certain areas to deceive, hinder and harass him".²

Mao also stated that these "self-defence units" can also fulfil other functions such as providing stretcher bearers, and porters to carry food supplies to the combat units. The entire population, he states, aged between 16 and 40 living in guerilla-controlled areas must be mobilised into such self-defence units. If their area is occupied by the enemy the local self-defence unit should organise from amongst its members a small guerilla group of not more than ten men armed with pistols to carry out local actions.

Every large guerilla unit should have a printing press and duplicating material for the production of propaganda literature, in addition to large brushes and chalk with which to paint slogans on the walls of buildings. The smallest formation in a combat unit of guerillas should be a "a squad" consisting of between nine and eleven men, a platoon should consist of between two to four such squads, a company between two and four platoons, a battalion two to four companies. The guerilla regiments visualised by Mao consist of three battalions and brigades of two regiments. A battalion should be formed in each guerilla controlled sub-district, normally it will operate in the sub-district in which it was formed but may be transferred to other districts for special operations.

Mao lists six points which he considers essential to successful guerilla action.

Retention of the initiative.

Conduct of operations should be planned to complement those of the regular army (if any).

Establishment of secure bases.

A clear understanding of the relationship that exists between the attack and defence.

The development of mobile operations.

Correct command.

When sufficient guerilla forces cannot be concentrated for a successful attack, they must disperse and limit their action to that designed to harass and demoralise the enemy. Guerillas must withdraw and disperse when they are threatened with encirclement by the enemy, when the

¹Mao Tse-tung, *Guerilla Warfare*, Cassell and Co., London, 1964, p. 57.

²*Ibid*, p. 58.

nature of the terrain is unfavourable to large scale action on their part and when they have insufficient supplies to withstand a major action. "A relatively large group" of guerillas should always be retained in reserve as a central force. When a unit is forced to disperse each of its component parts should be given definite orders regarding their responsibilities, and the place, time and method of reassembly. Mao wrote:

"When the situation is serious the guerillas must move with the fluidity of water and the ease of the blowing wind. Their tactics must deceive, tempt, and confuse the enemy. They must lead the enemy to believe that they will attack from the east and north, and they must then strike from the west and south. They must strike, then rapidly disperse. They must move at night."¹

On the importance of maintaining effective control over guerilla units he says:

"Guerilla commanders must adjust their operations to the enemy situation, to the terrain, and to prevailing local conditions. Leaders must be alert to sense changes in these factors and make necessary modifications in troop dispositions to accord with them. The leader must be like the fisherman, who with his nets, is able both to cast them and to pull them out of the current or the presence of any obstructions that may foul them. As the fisherman controls his nets through the lead ropes, so the guerilla leader maintains contact with and over his units. As the fisherman must change his position so must the guerilla commander. Dispersion, concentration, constant change of position—it is in these ways that guerillas employ their strength."²

Guerillas must never attack objectives they are not certain of being able to capture. When, however, the guerilla forces have grown in strength and have improved their equipment they may extend their activities to include cities and points on the enemy lines of communication which they may try and hold for at least temporary periods. If an enemy advance forces guerillas to retire to their bases groups should be left behind to operate against him from inside the areas he has re-occupied.

A guerilla force must always have a clear political goal which must be explained to the population of the area it occupies as well as to the troops themselves. It should have three basic tactical political aims encompassing the establishment of "spiritual unification of officers and men within the army", "spiritual unification of the army and the people" and, "destruction of the unity of the enemy".³

Mao expresses strong disapproval of "militarists" who say that they are only interested in military affairs and disclaim any interest in politics. It is vital, he says, that:

¹Mao Tse-tung. *Guerilla Warfare*, Cassell and Co., London, 1964, p. 74.

²*Ibid*, p. 73.

³*Ibid*, p. 65.

"These simple-minded militarists be made to realise the relationship that exists between politics and military affairs. Military action is a method used to attain a political goal. While military affairs and political affairs are not identical, it is impossible to isolate one from another."¹

Throughout his writings on guerilla warfare Mao emphasises that for a guerilla movement to be successful it must assiduously cultivate good relations with the civil population amongst whom it operates. In *The Anti-Japanese Guerilla War* published in 1938 he compares the guerilla fighter and the population to the fish and the sea, the guerilla fighter being as dependent on the civil population for his existence as the fish is the sea. In order that the guerilla should be able to move easily about the "sea" of the people in search of his prey, Mao has advised that the guerilla fighter bases his behaviour towards the civil population by a strict code containing eight points, these being:

Politeness to the people.
Be fair in all dealings with them.
Return everything borrowed.
Pay for everything damaged.
Do not bully the people.
Do not damage the crops.
Do not flirt with the women.
Do not ill-treat prisoners.

A cardinal point of Mao's teaching is that a guerilla campaign will certainly fail unless it is being fought in pursuit of a realisable political goal, and furthermore such a goal must coincide with the aspirations of the people:

"Because guerilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and co-operation."

Ernesto "Che" Guevara, the other "high-priest" of Communist guerilla warfare theory was born in Argentina and became a doctor. By the time he joined Castro's embryo guerilla force training for the invasion of Cuba in Mexico in 1956 he had earned himself the reputation of being a professional revolutionary and was known to be a Marxist.

Originally Guevara was the medical officer of the small force which landed in Cuba under Castro in December 1956. Almost immediately it met with disaster being dispersed by air attack. It was at this early juncture of the Cuban revolution that Guevara permanently forsook his medical duties for those of a more militant nature.

Guevara published his *Guerilla Warfare* in 1960 and it was intended to be a guide to revolutionary warfare. It contains many of the points formerly made by Mao Tse-tung, though Guevara tends to go into greater detail than does Mao.

¹*Ibid*, p. 65.

²*Ibid*, p. 33.

Guevara says that:

"Certain minimum pre-conditions are needed to kindle the first spark (of revolution). The people must be shown that social wrongs are not going to be redressed by civil means alone. And it is desirable to have the oppressor, wittingly or not, break the peace first."¹

"Why does the guerilla fight? He is a social reformer. He takes up arms in response to widespread popular protest against the oppressor, impetuously hurling himself with all his might against anything that symbolises the established order."²

Like Mao he stressed the importance of the guerillas identifying themselves with the wishes of the mass of the people in the area in which they operate; and like Mao he visualises guerillas basing their support on the countryside rather than the towns. He advocates that the guerillas should:

"... represent the desires of the great masses of poor farmers to possess their own land, animals, and all that makes up their life from the cradle to the grave. According to Guevara, the guerilla is —above all else—an agrarian revolutionary."³

In order to win the co-operation of the population the guerillas must conduct an intensive campaign about the purposes of the revolution, emphasising "the unquestionable truth" that resistance to the revolution is futile because it is sure to be victorious.

Outlining the course of a hypothetical guerilla campaign, he pictures it commencing with an ill-armed band taking refuge in "some remote, hard-to-reach spot". After this has had the luck to have a few minor successes against local Government forces it is joined by "a few more discontented farmers, young idealists, etc.". The band then carries out reconnaissances and makes contact with the population of nearby inhabited areas and begins a series of "hit and run attacks". The size of the guerilla band continues to grow and eventually the time comes when it is able to inflict a serious defeat on an enemy force sent against it, subsequently directing its operations farther afield. Semi-permanent guerilla bases are set up, administrative services are established and in general the guerilla force begins to adopt "the characteristic of a Government in miniature":

"Small industries, hospitals, and radio stations are set up, laws are decreed, a court administers justice and ideological indoctrination is intensified. An enemy attack is beaten off, more arms captured, and more guerillas armed. When the band's radius of action no longer increases in proportion to the increase in manpower, elements are detached to form a new band operating in a new area."⁴

The new band commences operations in the new area in exactly the same way as the original band did, until guerilla bands, operating from

¹Che Guevara. *Guerilla Warfare*, Cassell and Co., London, 1964, p. 111.

²*Ibid.*, p. 113.

³*Ibid.*

⁴Che Guevara. *Guerilla Warfare*, Cassell and Co., London, 1964, p. 136.

separate bases, have permeated an entire region of the country. This process being repeated again and again. Gangs of saboteurs become active in Government held areas, cutting roads and bridges, planting mines, and sowing unrest. With their increasing success the guerillas begin to capture supplies of heavy arms from the Government forces and are so empowered to begin conventional fighting against them. Finally:

“... having paralysed the enemies’ logistics by sabotage and exhausted his combat forces by attrition, the guerillas seize the initiative, attacking on all fronts at will. The enemy can stand it no longer and the remaining forces capitulate.”¹

Thus Guevara portrays a guerilla campaign developing in three stages, as Mao has done, with, in the culminating stage, the guerillas becoming in effect a conventional army amply equipped with modern arms.

He suggests that guerillas should be mainly recruited from the age group 16-40, though recalling that one of the leaders of the Cuban revolution was aged 65. The organisation of guerilla units in Guevara’s view should be largely dependent upon the terrain in which they are fighting, this he divided into two categories, favourable and unfavourable. Favourable ground consisting of ideal guerilla country such as mountains, forests and swamps; unfavourable, plains and open country.

When operating in favourable terrain, Guevara says that the numbers of guerillas in each band can be quite flexible, although suggesting that 25 is a good average number. Bands fighting in unfavourable country, however, he says should not consist of more than between ten and 15 men. The reason being that this number is large enough to give mutual support and a good volume of fire it is also small enough to be able to keep together without difficulty when making the forced marches and swift manoeuvres Guevara foresees such a band having to undertake.

Basic guerilla tactics must be to:

“Hit and run, wait, stalk the enemy, hit him again and run, do it all again, giving no rest to the enemy.”²

“There is a saying: The guerilla is the maverick of war. He practises deception, treachery, surprise, and night operations. Thus, circumstances and the will to win often oblige him to forget romantic and sportsmanlike concepts.”³

“Throughout the day in woods and crags, and throughout the night in open country, the enemy is made to feel that he is inside hostile jaws.”⁴

Guevara has described one particular tactic he favours and which he calls “the minuet”. This consists of guerillas surrounding an advancing enemy force on all sides. “The dance” commences with

¹Che Guevara. *Guerilla Warfare*, Cassell and Co., London, 1964, p. 137.

²*Ibid*, p. 114.

³*Ibid*.

⁴*Ibid*, p. 117.

the guerillas one side of the enemy column opening fire as a result the enemy moves in their direction, the guerilla detachment which has thus engaged the enemy's attention then withdraws pulling the enemy after them, fire is then opened by a guerilla detachment on another of the enemy's flanks, and when he moves to deal with it, fire is opened from yet another side, and so on repeatedly until the enemy has become confused and demoralised and his ammunition exhausted.

After a guerilla attack there should be a period of "total passivity" in the area in order to lull the enemy into thinking that things have returned to normal. Then a sudden "lightning blow" can be launched from a new direction catching him off his guard.

When in the latter stages of the campaign guerilla bands come to be set up in suburban areas and cities, they must work under the strict control of a headquarters situated outside their area of operations. The main rôle of such bands will be sabotage, each band being allotted some special task, such as cutting telephone wires, sabotaging electricity supplies or railway installations. These sabotage gangs should each consist of only four or five men, and should operate mainly at night. They should only carry small personal arms that do not hamper their movements. In the countryside sabotage should be aimed mainly at cutting the enemy's communications. Guevara gives a word of warning against the indiscriminate use of sabotage causing unnecessary distress or hardship to the civil population or incurring the risk of permanent damage to the country's economy.

No mercy need be shown to "traitors" but conscripts within the government forces should be well treated if taken prisoner, and if captured in areas in which the guerillas have no bases should be released. No executions should normally be carried out without some form of trial and indiscriminate terrorism must not be used.

"To attain the statute of a true crusader, the guerilla must display impeccable moral conduct and strict self-control. He must be ascetic. At first he will not stress social reform, acting more as a big brother to the poor farmers in matters of technology, economics, morals, and culture. He does not steal; if he cannot pay, he leaves IOU's.

"The guerilla emerges as the people's standard bearer, justly punishing any betrayal of the cause, taking from the rich, and giving to the poor. If the former owner wants payment, he gives him bonds. These bonds of hope bind old and new owner to a common hope for the success of the cause. Whenever there is a particularly juicy plum to be handed out, he tries to set it up as a people's collective, if the popular mentality is ready for this.

"The guerilla provides ideology for social reform by personal example—by his ideas, his plans, and lessons from experience. He stresses the force of arms and spiritual dedication. Guerilla leaders are not men bowed down by daily farm labour. They are men who see the need for agrarian social reform and team up with the people

for its goal. First, they personally set the example of armed rebellion. Then the people get the idea and carry it forward with practical improvements thus snowballing it into nation-wide rebellion."¹

Early in the campaign agents should also be sent into the towns and cities in order to try and paralyse the government's counter-action against the revolution by bringing about a general strike. Both Mao and Guevara heavily stressed the necessity of an efficient and extensive guerilla intelligence organisation under the control of two separate staffs. One of these should have responsibility for propaganda addressed to the country as a whole, and the other concentrating upon political indoctrination of the guerilla forces themselves:

"Since recruits join up with fuzzy concepts of liberty, freedom of the press, etc., they need indoctrination on guerilla aims, economic factors and motivations of national history, national heroes, behaviour in face of injustice, analysis of the current situation. Set up teacher-training centres and prepare textbooks for indoctrination. Encourage reading, and supervise the choice of books. Above all, inculcate a reasoning, not a mechanical self-discipline. This is the best assurance of success when the chips are down in combat. Gradually, standards are raised in the school and hence through the whole guerilla force."²

Guevara states that a hard core of between 30 and 40 guerillas should be enough with which to launch a revolution in any country in Latin America. As the original force grows it should be split into different groups so that the loss of one group will not mean the end of the entire movement. He lays down strict security rules for the planning stage of a revolt:

"Absolutely nobody must learn anything beyond his immediate concern. Never discuss plans with anyone. Check incoming and outgoing mail. Know what contacts each member has. Work and live in teams, never individually. Trust no-one beyond the nucleus, especially not women. The enemy will undoubtedly try to use women for espionage. The revolutionary secretly preparing for war must be an ascetic and perfectly disciplined.

"The location of headquarters may be revealed to most of the group and serve as the meeting place for the volunteers, but the leaders of the conspiracy should appear there only rarely and no compromising documents are to be kept there. The leaders should stay dispersed in secret hiding places . . . Arms are not to be distributed until the operation is ready to start, so as not to endanger those involved and to avoid possible loss of costly equipment."³

¹Che Guevara. *Guerilla Warfare*, Cassell and Co., London, 1964, pp. 126-127.

²*Ibid.*, p. 144.

³*Ibid.*, pp. 146-147.

CHAPTER XVI

Notes on Communist Guerillas

Communist guerillas in Greece—South-East Asia—Malaya—The Philippines—Indonesia—Burma—The Viet Minh—The Viet Cong—Thailand—Sarawak—Cuba—Venezuela—Colombia—Guatemala—Brazil—Angola—The Congo—"Operation Mayibuye".

ONLY once since 1945 has a major Communist guerilla movement been in arms in Europe. That was in Greece during the period 1946-1948.

Following on the failure of the attempt by Communist elements to stage a *coup d'état* at the time of Greece's liberation from occupation by German and Italian forces in the winter of 1944-1945 a lull in armed activity on the part of the many ex-members of the Greek resistance with Communist sympathies followed. In February 1946, however, the Central Committee of the Greek Communist Party, the KKE, took a secret decision that the "All-people, pan-democratic struggle could reach the stage of general strike and armed resistance."¹

This decision that the time was ripe for renewed violent action on the part of the Communist Party was based upon an appreciation of the current political situation in the country which took into account the facts that:

The non-Communist parties were heavily occupied in feuds about the monarchy.

The economy had been ravaged as a result of the war and civil strife of 1945.

The Civil Service had been heavily infiltrated by Communists and both it and the armed forces were ineffective.

Large quantities of weapons had been taken from the former German and Italian occupation forces and stored secretly in mountain areas where some 4,000 former Communist resistance men were also in hiding.

The KKE was a legal party and, therefore, free to carry on extensive propaganda amongst the disunited population.

In April 1946 a training camp for Greek guerillas was opened at Bulkes in Yugoslavia which continued to operate until early 1949.

¹D. G. Kousoulais, 'The War the Communists Lost', *Studies in Guerilla Warfare*, United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland, 1963, p. 83.

Throughout the campaign the guerillas received invaluable logistic support from across the northern borders with Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.

The guerillas opened their campaign with a series of murders of government officials in Northern Greece and similar attacks on the mayors of small villages and individual policemen. This was followed by attacks on police posts, forcing the police to withdraw to the protection of the towns, and subsequently by raids on the villages from which the government's protection had been withdrawn.

When the army was called in the guerillas used much the same tactics against it as they had done against the police. They attacked isolated posts whenever they were set up and forced the troops to concentrate for their own protection and to abandon large stretches of the country which became guerilla-controlled areas. Outside these areas they carried out raids on towns and villages systematically removing food supplies and livestock and forcing the inhabitants to flee. On occasions the inhabitants of one village would be massacred in order to persuade those of others in the area to take to flight.

The guerilla object in making these raids was two-fold; first to increase their own food supplies and improve their security, and secondly to add to the government's troubles by creating a refugee problem and to increase the already critical national food shortage. In general the guerilla campaign was aimed not at engaging the Greek armed forces, but against unsympathetic elements in the civilian population, the police and public services. Commerce, industry and the government forces' lines of communication were additional targets. Bands operating in government-controlled areas obtained food and necessary supplies by the extortion system. In some cases they gave orders that one house in each block in a given area must put a basket of food outside the door on each day of the week. If the basket was not there when the guerillas came to pick it up everyone in the household whose turn it was to provide it would be killed.

At the commencement of the campaign the Communists had an active force of about 2,500 men. This had increased to 8,000 by the end of 1946, to 14,250 by April 1947 and 18,000 by November, finally reaching a peak strength of 26,000. To begin with the guerillas operated in bands **approximately 60-80 strong**. Gradually companies and battalions were formed and in the spring of 1948 a complete guerilla division. By the end of that year the total guerilla force consisted of eight divisions, divided into 23 brigades and 42 battalions. There were also 18 independent companies, a cavalry brigade, and some anti-aircraft and field artillery units. Guerilla-controlled areas were divided into commands with a military headquarters and a separate "Sector Headquarters" which was responsible for political control of the district, intelligence, supplies and communications. The guerillas were active mainly in the mountainous areas of northern Greece but also in the Peloponnese. For some time the KKE remained a legal party and acted as the political arm of the guerillas in government-occupied areas.

Amounts of training received by members of the guerilla forces varied from almost none to courses of about two months. A high proportion of training was devoted to political subjects, and all members of fighting units were subjected to continual doses of political indoctrination. Arms were derived from a number of different sources and were of great diversity, providing many problems in regard to the supply of ammunition and spare parts. In the end defeat came to the Communist rebels largely as the result of their decision to try and hold ground they had occupied and to engage in conventional warfare against the Greek army which had been re-organised and was in receipt of large quantities of up-to-date American arms. Why the Communist commanders decided on such tactics which were contrary to all the proven rules of guerilla warfare, and which offered scant hope of victory remains something of a mystery. Possibly the decision was taken as a result of a desire to maintain the impression that the "Provisional Democratic Government" set up in the Grammos mountain areas in December 1947, did, in fact, control a sizeable area of Greek territory. The failure of the Communists to arouse widespread popular support for the guerilla movement was an important contributory cause to its failure as was Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948 which severed the sanctuary of their base area.

South-East Asia

There is strong circumstantial evidence that the Communist-led revolts that broke out during the first six months of 1948 in Malaya, Burma and the Philippines occurred not purely on the initiative of the Communist Parties concerned but as part of a plan worked out and imparted to them by the then still existent Cominform.

At the meeting of that body in September 1947, one of Stalin's chief assistants, Zhdanov, told the assembled delegates that it was apparent that the world had split into two opposing blocks, and that the time was ripe for the colonial peoples to rise and seize their country's independence. This message was passed on to the Communist Parties of the world by means of the Cominform journal, *For a lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy*.

In February 1948 the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students staged an Asian Youth Conference in Calcutta. There is good reason to suppose that it was at this conference that the delegates from the Communist Parties of the three countries mentioned above were told that their Parties should start putting Zhdanov's advice into practical form at once.

In all four countries leading members of the Communist Party had already had, to a greater or lesser degree, some experience in the use of arms. In the Philippines the Communist Party had set up a resistance movement during the Japanese occupation, known as the 'Hukbalahap', a name taken from its initials in Tagalog, and standing for 'People's Anti-Japanese Resistance Army'. This force, which became known as

the 'Huks' established a training school which was under the supervision of Chinese instructors drawn from the Eight Route Army. This was the force which Mao had described as "essentially guerilla" and whose experience formed the basis of much of his writing on guerilla warfare. In Burma an anti-Japanese resistance movement was formed known as the 'People's Freedom League'. Many of its members had originally been members of a pro-Japanese guerilla force formed to fight the British in the early days of the Japanese invasion. This later merged with a Communist-controlled "anti-fascist" resistance movement to form the 'Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League', which formed Burma's first independent Government. In Indonesia, a small Communist resistance movement operated for a time against the Japanese, and later, surprisingly, after the Japanese had promised Indonesia independence, they set up study groups for the study of both nationalism and Marxism. It was probably in Malaya, however, that the Communist wartime military experience had been most extensive.

The Malayan Communist Party was established in 1926. From its inception it made little progress amongst the Malay population and concentrated upon trying to gain support amongst the Chinese community in that country. In this, it was not altogether unsuccessful.

During the war the MCP obtained a virtual monopoly of the leadership of the anti-Japanese resistance movement in Malaya by means of its formation of two separate but closely allied movements. These were the 'Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army', a force of guerillas operating from bases in the jungle, and a political movement 'Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Union' (MPAJU). This latter organisation had the task of issuing propaganda, intelligence work and obtaining funds and supplies for the guerillas. MPAJU's action against the Japanese was always on a comparatively small scale and tended to be secondary to the elimination of "traitors"; or in other words anti-Communist elements. From 1943 onwards the MPAJU received considerable quantities of arms and equipment through "Force 136", the organisation which had been set up by the Allied South East Asia Command to help resistance forces. Most of these arms were, in fact, not employed against the Japanese but carefully hidden away in jungle camps. When hostilities came to an end, the MPAJU was some 7,000 strong but officially it demobilised.

In the immediate post-war years the MCP set about re-establishing itself as a legal political party, many new fronts being established and great efforts were made to infiltrate the trade unions. During the latter part of 1947, Party leaders made visits to China, Hong Kong, and Thailand to confer with their opposite numbers in those countries. A delegation from the MCP attended the WFDY-IUS conference in Calcutta in February 1948 at which the Cominform's instructions for revolt are believed to have been passed on to the Parties concerned.

A campaign of terrorism directed against anti-Communist elements during these early post-war years provided a forerunner of the more widespread violence that was to come, two hundred and ninety-eight

people being murdered by Communist terrorists between October 1945 and June 1948.

In the summer of 1948 a number of raids on banks and businesses by members of the MCP's so called "Blood and Steel Corps", an organisation of party thugs, in order to increase party funds gave further indication that the Party was about to embark upon "direct action" or "armed struggle". When, as a result of these raids Party headquarters were raided by the police in June, it was discovered that many of the MCP's Party leaders had already taken refuge in the jungle.

The Communist plan for the "liberation" of Malaya was to have been carried out in three phases. The first consisted of the setting up of bases; the second the expansion of such bases, and in the third and final phase the liberated areas round the various bases were to be joined up and extended over the whole country.

The guerilla force the Communist Party established was known first as the 'Malayan Peoples' Anti-British Army', and later as the 'Malayan Races' Liberation Army', (MRLA). It was organised in regiments, companies, platoons and sections. The Party established control of the force right down to platoon level through its 'Central Military Committee'. Some 5,000 'Liberation Army' camps were established during the course of the campaign. Some of these were capable of housing up to 300 guerillas. The average number that could be catered for in each camp, however, was between 40 and 50. A defector from the MRLA said of guerilla life in the camps during the earlier stages of the rebellion:

"At that time we followed a very strict schedule; every day it was pretty much the same thing. Reveille was at 5.30. Then after bathing and brushing our teeth at 6.00, we had the flag-raising ceremony. We would sing the Internationale or Red Flag song and then we had roll call. After this, they would read parts of the laws and regulations of the MRLA. Then we had calisthenics until 6.30 when we got a cup of tea and a rest period. At 7.00 we began drilling again, this time with weapons, and we practised jungle warfare tactics . . . On Monday, Wednesday, Friday and Sunday, there were political classes and on the other days military classes."¹

Guerilla units ordered to carry out an operation moved into the appropriate area and based themselves on their under-cover supporting organisation's local branch headquarters, from which they obtained food, ammunition and information gathered by members of the Party's fifth column. Communication between guerilla units was carried out by means of couriers operating under strict security rules. Messages were not delivered in person but left in "dead letter boxes", usually easily recognisable hollow trees from which a courier from the unit to which they were addressed picked them up.

The civil and political arm of the MRLA was known as the 'Min

¹Frederick S. Down. *Guerilla Communism in Malaya*, Princeton University Press, 1956, p. 93.

Yuen'. The primary rôle of this organisation was to keep the guerillas living in the jungle supplied with food and other necessities. This it did through an extortion system under which the inhabitants of villages and hamlets were made to supply both a quota of money taken from their weekly wages, and food.

On the political side the Min Yuen had under its control peasants' unions, liberation leagues and women's unions. It operated through state, regional, district and branch committees.

A third element employed by the Communists were the 'Lie Ton Ten' or killer squads, who were used for the elimination of "traitors" and acts of minor sabotage. By 1951 it was estimated that the guerilla units had a total strength of more than 10,000 and terrorist attacks had reached an average of nearly one per hour. It was also believed that at this time the MRLA had the support of about 50,000 members of the population. Thereafter, however, government counter-measures began to take effect. These included the removal of thousands of squatters from areas on the edge of the jungle where they were an easy prey for the Min Yuen and the operations of deep penetration army and police patrols which sought out guerilla camps. The MRLA was never able to develop its campaign beyond the first stages of the second phase of its plan.

Under the pressure exerted by the security forces, and the difficulties of command and communications the revolt began to break down. In some cases directives took as much as a year to reach units. In an attempt to remedy this situation the MRLA command introduced a "quota system" under which the Central Committee met each year and allotted each individual guerilla unit a fixed number of tasks to be fulfilled in the forthcoming twelve months. These tasks included attacks on army units, isolated police stations, communications, tin mines and rubber estates. Each unit was supposed to act independently and to carry out the tasks it had been given without waiting for further orders.

Despite its claim to be 'people's' warfare, all members of the MRLA were certainly not recruited by voluntary methods. According to one estimate as early as 1952 about 80 per cent of all new recruits were being drawn into the guerilla ranks either through coercion or some form of trickery. One member of the Min Yuen unit who subsequently surrendered to the security forces, described the way he "became a fighter for the revolution". He had been a rubber tapper working on an estate on the edge of the jungle. One day he was approached by three armed members of the Min Yuen who engaged him in a conversation and asked him about his work. A few days later the same three again approached him whilst he was at work and asked him to do them a few simple favours, such as obtaining tobacco for them. This he did, and was immediately asked to do them other and more important services, which he was too frightened to refuse. Finally, one day two of the three Min Yuen only came to see him. They told him that the third had given himself up and had told the police about what he had done to help the Min Yuen. This story he later found to be quite untrue, but it had its

effect and terrified of being arrested as a Communist sympathiser, he followed the two Min Yuen into the jungle and was immediately enrolled into their organisation.

The total strength of the MRLA was never more than 15,000 at the most though that of the Min Yuen was very much higher. The crushing of the revolt was not accomplished without the employment of some 15,000 regular troops, 150,000 regular police and 250,000 "home guards". The total cost of operations against the guerillas during the period of the state of emergency from 1948-1960 has been estimated at about £450 million, or about £30,000 for each guerilla killed. Altogether 3,282 civilians were murdered or abducted by the MRLA or its subsidiaries during the course of the campaign. This compares with 1,865 members of the security forces killed in action. Some 6,000 guerillas are known to have been killed during the course of the campaign, but a force believed to be approximately 1,000 strong is still in existence in the jungles of the Malaya-Thailand border, which shows signs of renewing the 'armed struggle'.

In the Philippines in 1948, there had been fertile ground for revolt. Although independence had been granted in 1946, nothing had been done to improve the lot of the Filipino peasants oppressed by absentee landlords. The government and political system were corrupt. The 'Huks' now reappeared as an armed force, their full name had now been changed to 'People's Liberation Army'. The revolt they mounted was led by their wartime commander, Luis Taruc. From the political angle the campaign was shaped so as to appear as a spontaneous rising of peasants against their landlords rather than as a Communist-led revolt. Political indoctrination was, however, carried on in special camps in the jungle which came to be known as the Stalin Universities. The Huk forces were organised into squadrons and initially achieved a considerable degree of success; by the end of 1950 they had overrun large tracts of country and several major towns in the Province of Luzon. The campaign was marked by a characteristic that was to become a marked feature of Communist guerilla warfare in the future. The Huks showed consideration for the civilian population as a whole, whilst at the same time being capable of acts of merciless savagery against the security forces, and any civilians who opposed the revolution or their wishes.

The revolt was finally crushed by the energetic implementation of a social and land reform programme and military force. Luis Taruc gave himself up in 1954. A small force of Huks has however remained active in Central Luzon north of Manila and there have been reports of agents being sent from both Cuba and China to make contact with them.

In Burma, the Communist Party launched a revolt in January 1948, saying that the country had been betrayed by the Government and given only a "phony" independence. A Trotskyist Group calling themselves the Red Flag Communists had already been in revolt for some time, so when the orthodox Party took to arms it called its forces the White Flag Communists to distinguish them. Both these groups and a number of other non-Communist dissident groups have remained in a state of

almost perpetual revolt for the last 17 years suffering various changes of fortune during this time. At the beginning of 1962, it was estimated that White Flag Communists had about 1,000 men under arms, and the Red Flags about 500. Military operations against the White Flags were still going on in the summer of 1967.

In Indonesia, the Communist revolt proved to be extremely short-lived. The Party was handicapped in its preparations by having only the network of a very small wartime resistance movement on which to build. In addition, these preparations were upset and thrown out of gear by over-enthusiastic Party members setting off anti-government demonstrations in the towns that alerted the security forces. The Party issued a "call to arms" on 18 September 1948, but by the end of October the revolt had been crushed. Most of its leaders were killed in the fighting or taken prisoner and subsequently shot.

The Viet Minh and The Viet Cong

The Indo-Chinese Communist Party was established in 1931 by Ho Chi-minh, now President of North Vietnam. By the time war broke out in 1939, the Party, which had been afforded a legal status in the late 1930's, had built up a fairly strong position and its agents were already at work laying the foundations of an underground movement. In November 1940, taking advantage of the precarious position of the French colonial regime after the fall of France, the Party launched a peasant revolt in the Mekong Delta. The revolt was crushed and the Party was forced to go underground. Many of its leaders took refuge in China where they were joined by Ho Chi-minh.

In the spring of 1941 a conference was held under the auspices of Ho Chi-minh at Chingsi, delegates including those from the Indo-Chinese Communist Party and other left wing organisations and nationalist parties. The result of this conference was the formation of a new political Party called the 'Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi', or 'League for the Independence of Viet Nam'. It was composed mainly, but not exclusively, of Communists and was to become generally known as 'The Viet Minh'.

The first action of the Viet Minh was to draw up a plan for the opening of guerilla operations against the French in the border province of Cao Bang. The man selected to take charge of these operations was a Communist school teacher named Vo Nguyen Giap. Initially he concentrated upon creating an intelligence network whose agents became active throughout the border provinces and which was based upon his headquarters in the mountains of North Tongking. The tentacles of this network reached out to the towns of the Red Delta. By the end of 1941 it was working effectively enough to allow Giap to leave the direction of operations for the time being and to return to China to visit Mao Tse-tung. He stayed in China for the whole of 1942 undergoing a course in guerilla and political warfare at the special school in Kangta in Yen-an Province. It is known that he was particularly struck

with the theories expounded in Mao's second major work on guerilla warfare *The Strategic Problems of the Anti-Japanese War* which had been published in 1938, as well as his earlier *Struggle in the Chin-Kan-Shan Mountains* and *Guerilla Warfare*, the last of which Giap decided would be his constant guide.

Upon his return to Indo-China in 1943, Giap, with a group of about 30 men under his command, prepared to begin his campaign. To increase the number of his men he joined forces with a group of border bandits and as a result soon found his force increased to about 1,000 strong. His first offensive operations were directed mainly against anti-Communist elements amongst the local civil population; direct conflict with the French security forces was avoided. His operations developed so successfully that during the rainy season of 1944 he was able to assume complete control of Cao Bang Province. That October Ho Chi-minh crossed the border from China and set up his headquarters in an area controlled by Giap's forces, from where he at once began to establish a resistance movement based upon the Mao Tse-tung theories. During the first part of 1945 the guerilla offensive succeeded in establishing control over most of five more provinces. The virtual Japanese takeover of Indo-China had resulted in a steadily increasing flow of war materials being despatched to the Viet Minh from allied sources, enabling it to form new units, although, in fact, the arms supplied were not used against the Japanese. The Viet Minh left the Japanese garrisons and their communications strictly alone in order not to antagonise them as they advanced through the countryside.

With the Japanese collapse, the Viet Minh were ordered to take control of as many towns and villages as possible. Before long they were in possession of all Tongking and Northern Anam except for Hanoi and Haiphong. Viet Minh committees were formed down to the village level all over the country. On 2 September, 1945, Ho Chi-minh issued a proclamation announcing the establishment of 'The Democratic Republic of Vietnam' under a cabinet of which all the principal members were Communists. At the same time he announced severance of all ties with France.

With the return of the French forces to Indo-China in force in the opening months of 1946, the Viet Minh's Commander, Giap, decided that it was now necessary to envisage a lengthy guerilla campaign based upon Mao Tse-tung's teaching. He selected areas in the mountains known as the Viet Bac (in which he had formed his original guerilla force in 1941) as his main bases from which this campaign was to be supported, and to which his troops could retire if they were too hard pressed.

This decision of Giap's was to mark the beginning of the Indo-Chinese War proper, which was to end with the disastrous defeat of the French forces at Dien Bien Phu six years later, one of the greatest defeats ever suffered by a European Army at the hands of Asiatic troops. The campaign was to mark the first large scale employment of Mao Tse-tung's guerilla warfare tactics outside China.

Throughout the campaign the Viet Minh forces were organised into

three different categories of fighting units. Regular troops, regional troops and militia. Regular troops were the hard core of the guerilla force and were, as their name implies, full time guerillas. Regional troops normally only operated within the province in which they were raised on a part time basis; being mobilised for a particular operation and then they were stood down again on its completion. They usually operated at night in units not above platoon or company strength and assumed the appearance of peaceful villagers by day. In the early stages of the campaign they wore no uniforms and only a proportion of them were armed. The militia, which was essentially a home guard force, consisted by the time the war ended, of every physically fit male in the villages under Viet Minh control. Their duties included hindering the movements of enemy troops that came into their locality by all means in their power; including the sabotage of bridges and the placing of booby traps. They also provided a labour force and acted as an intelligence source. Only a comparatively small number of them carried arms.

A system of upgrading existed by which units of regional troops could be given additional training and upgraded into the ranks of the regulars, whilst militiamen could be upgraded into being regional troops when necessary. Ultimately, most members of the regular units had started their careers in the Viet Minh as being members of the militia. Then of a unit of regional troops and finally achieved regular status. Potential officers were sent to a special officer training school in the Viet Bac.

Dual control of all types of guerilla unit right down to platoons were exercised by the military and political commands of the Viet Minh. A political officer was attached to each unit, and had equal status with its commander whose orders he could veto. These political officers belonged to a special department, known as 'Service For Surveillance and Propaganda', whose members were specially picked and who received an intensive course of training.

In the regular units, political control was further ensured by the existence of groups known as the 'Chi Bo'. In effect, these were Communist Party cells consisting of between five and ten men. Each member of such a cell was responsible for the behaviour of all the other members. They existed in each regular unit down to platoons. A similar system of cells was used to ensure the reliability of the regional troops and militia.

In the summer of 1950 after Chinese aid in the shape of arms and equipment began to arrive in quantity, the number of regular troops was increased by the upgrading of about 25,000 regional troops. This gave Giap a total strength of more than 60 regular battalions, and these were then organised into five infantry divisions, each consisting of four regiments, each of which had three battalions. A signals unit and an engineer battalion were included in the organisation of each division, the average strength of which was approximately 12,000 men.

From the end of 1951 onwards, the Viet Minh headquarters were divided into three departments consisting of the General Staff, the Central Political Office, and the Supply Service. The General Staff itself

was sub-divided into departments dealing with personnel, intelligence, communications, planning and operations. In addition to supervising the work of political officers in the army and agents in charge of village committees, the political office also operated a political intelligence network in French-occupied areas, which also acted as a terrorist organisation.

Training for members of Viet Minh units was divided into three categories: military, political and economic. These forms of training involved the holding of large meetings in which all ranks took part. The official line on the strategy to be used against the French was explained to those present at 'political democracy meetings'.

After recruits had received basic training they were allowed to attend 'self-criticism' meetings. These were presided over by the political officer and a wide variety of subjects was discussed at them. Everyone present was allowed to speak his mind. Decisions taken at these meetings were binding and after the operations or exercises to which they referred were completed, anyone whose behaviour had not come up to the expected standard had to stand up and confess their faults.

From the outset the Viet Minh command under Ho Chi-minh's and Giap's direction paid the greatest attention to Mao's advice that the civilian population should be both well treated by the guerrillas and instructed in the purposes of the revolution.

Viet Minh units were careful not to take more produce from the peasants in their locality in levies than it seemed they could be reasonably asked to spare without suffering undue hardship. Supplies of any kind that were required from the civilian population were officially requisitioned in the name of the Viet Minh and put into the common pool of the unit obtaining them. Units bivouacked in villages had to behave towards the inhabitants according to a strict series of rules. Part of each day was supposed to be kept for helping them with the harvest or with other of their normal occupations. If the unit was to stay in the village for a prolonged period, its commander would look for some tasks it could carry out that would create a lasting impression of goodwill¹. These included building or repairing houses, digging ditches or sinking wells.

Even as early as 1945, Ho Chi-minh embarked upon a large scale literacy campaign amongst the civilian population in the areas under his control, the chief aim of which was to enable its members to read the propaganda and political literature produced by the Viet Minh printing presses. Viet Minh units also carried paint brushes for slogan painting as part of their normal equipment. Political indoctrination was carried out under the direction of agents who received special training in a school in the Viet Bac. Two or three evenings a week, the entire adult population of villages in Viet Minh-controlled areas would be summoned to communal meetings whose proceedings sometimes included public confessions by any who had deviated from the official Party line. Attendance at literacy campaign lessons also became compulsory, Ho Chi-minh claiming that by 1949 no less than 6½ million peasants had

been taught to read through attending compulsory evening classes after work.

Discipline and morale amongst the civilian population were maintained by the so-called 'Armed Propaganda Units', in reality political police under the control of the Viet Minh Political Office. These units sometimes used the most ruthless methods against villages which had refused to comply with Viet Minh orders. The peasants were expected to work hard to grow as much food as possible and were also called upon to provide the vast number of porters upon which the Viet Minh supply system relied throughout most of the campaign. It has been estimated that in order to supply a Viet Minh Division engaged in operations away from its base, it was necessary to employ about 50,000 porters each carrying a load of 45 lbs., fewer being needed when the nature of the ground made it possible to use bicycles. Porters, who carried their own food with them, were not usually kept away from home for more than ten to 14 days at a time before being relieved.

A number of small factories were set up in the hills and caves of the Viet Bac base area. These manufactured grenades, mines, small mortars, soap, cloth and paper. Damaged arms were also repaired and shell and cartridge cases refilled in workshops. In order to obtain supplies that could not be found or manufactured in the guerilla areas, an extortion system was run in the French-controlled towns by Viet Minh agents who took as their particular targets the wealthier Chinese and other traders. Money was obtained by the same means.

A number of special Communist-led organisations and associations were formed, into which the inhabitants of occupied areas were gradually recruited. As a tactical measure and in order to overcome the suspicions of the peasants about Communist land policy, the Viet Minh Command announced in mid-1949 that all land in areas under their control was to be provisionally given to the peasants actually working it.

As the campaign progressed greater quantities of modern and heavier arms were received from China, whereas beforehand the Viet Minh forces had had to rely mainly on captured French arms. Twelve artillery battalions were formed in 1951 and later on an artillery division known as the "351st Heavy Division" came into being. This consisted of two artillery and one engineer regiments. Artillery ranges over the Chinese border were made available to the Viet Minh for training. In 1953, an additional infantry division was formed, and independent Viet Minh regiments appeared for the first time. At this time the number of regular troops numbered about 110,000. There were about 75,00 regional troops, whilst the militia totalled over 120,000. Support companies equipped with 120 mm mortars were added to the infantry battalions and anti-aircraft units to the divisional organisation. Motor transport began to supplant the use of porters to some extent and improvements were made in the medical services.

By the time the siege of Dien Bien Phu commenced, the Viet Minh regular troops had virtually completed their transformation from guerillas into regular troops. They then engaged the enemy in full scale

positional warfare that Mao Tse-tung had advocated should take place in the third and last phase of his plan for a successful guerilla campaign. The campaign cost the French forces 20,685 in killed and missing from French units alone, with a further 11,620 Foreign Legionnaires, 15,229 North African Troops and 26,686 Indo-Chinese troops also killed or missing.

The Viet Cong

The present war in South Vietnam being an almost direct extension of the Indo-Chinese War of 1944-54, it is not surprising to find much the same manner of tactics and organisation being used by the Communist guerilla forces—Viet Cong—taking part in it as were used by their predecessors the Viet Minh.

The Geneva Agreement of 1954 which formally ended the Indo-Chinese War partitioned that country along the 17th Parallel. The portion to the North of it becoming the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam under a Communist Government headed by Ho Chi-minh. Under the Agreement, the French were to withdraw all their forces from North of the 17th Parallel, whilst the Viet Minh forces were to withdraw from all territory they had occupied South of it.

In practice whilst the regular troops of the Viet Minh, did in the main withdraw to the North, many of the regional troops who had been locally raised in the South merely returned to their villages, buried their arms, and awaited further orders ; as did the militia formed in Southern villages. The call to new action came at the end of 1957, at a time when the South Vietnamese Government forces were heavily engaged in guerilla fighting against private armies of two powerful political-religious sects, the Cadoa and the Hoa Hoa. The Viet Minh veterans living in the South at first identified themselves with, and then infiltrated and took control of, these two sects. From the merging of these three forces was born the Viet Cong. This immediately began to call for a revolt, which had as its ostensible aims the implementation of land reform and the holding of a general election.

The Viet Cong launched the new guerilla campaign with attacks on local anti-Communists. By the middle of 1959 murders of government officials were averaging one a day. The number of attacks increased vastly in the following two years. Between the beginning of 1960 and the end of 1961, 6,130 murders and 6,213 abductions were attributed to the Viet Cong, not including battle casualties. At the same time they sought to obtain support among the peasantry by promising them exemption from government taxes and rents to landlords, in return for co-operation in the form of food, shelter and information. By the beginning of 1961 the Viet Cong had, it is thought, about 10,000 men under arms and this figure increased to around 30,000 by the following year. By 1959, a factor which was to become a major feature of the campaign began to make itself evident. This took the form of ever increasing reinforcement of the Viet Cong by officers and men of the North Vietnamese Army,

most of them former members of the Viet Minh with combat experience against the French. They were infiltrated across the border from the North and landed on the coast of South Vietnam from junks and by the Ho Chi-minh trail through Laos to join the ranks of the Viet Cong.

Viet Cong organisation, as in the case of the Viet Minh, is based upon three different categories of fighting units. Regular troops, known as the 'Bo Doi', regional troops and local militia known as the 'Du Kitch'. By the spring of 1965 the number of regular troops had risen to approximately 35,000 whilst regional troops and militia together numbered about 100,000. At that time the Viet Cong claimed to be in control of more than 50 per cent of the population of South Vietnam.

By the end of 1964 regular Viet Cong troops were divided into 45 battalions or 'Chuc Lucs', about half of them being formed into seven regiments for administrative purposes. Battalions were composed of three rifle and two support companies and based on 'inter-zones' covering several provinces. Battalions of regional troops were usually slightly smaller and did not normally operate outside the province in which they were raised. Viet Cong units were constantly on the move and as a rule did not remain in the same location for more than 72 hours.

A system of upgrading similar to that formerly used by the Viet Minh is used by the Viet Cong. Recruits are first enrolled in a local village militia and then transferred in succession as their training progresses first to the regional troops and finally to those of the 'Bo Doi' or whole-time regular formations.

Interrogation of prisoners taken from Viet Cong units operating on the outskirts of Saigon early in 1966 provided further interesting information as to the working of this upgrading and training system. This showed that recruiting for the Viet Cong was carried out mainly by special agents from what were known as 'Propaganda and Proselyting Cadres'. Recruits spent the first three months of their service in the Viet Cong on Home Guard duties in the militia. Eighty per cent of their training during these three months was concentrated upon political matters. At the end of that period recruits joined regional units, here 60 per cent of the content of their training was political and the rest military. This period of their training lasted for four months at the end of which they were sent to join the regular battalions. They received a further four months of training with the regular unit to which they were posted, 60 per cent of which was military training and the rest was political. During their political training Viet Cong recruits had to copy down *Radio Hanoi* broadcasts into special notebooks and to learn to chant such slogans as 'We passionately love revolutionary optimism'. Political training also included teaching illiterate local civilians to read.

A tactic greatly favoured by the Viet Cong is to capture a small enemy outpost, and then lie in wait for the arrival of the column that has been sent to try and relieve it, attacking it from ambush positions and mining its line of retreat. When an enemy post is selected for attack, the greatest possible efforts are made to slip a member of the attacking force surreptitiously inside the post in order

to make a thorough reconnaissance. As a result of this report a detailed diagram or perhaps a model of the post will be made and used for briefing its attackers who converge on their target in small groups to avoid detection from the air. After the American special forces base at Pleiku had been raided by such a force an American Intelligence Officer said:

"We have captured documents showing detailed drawings of every obstacle on the post. They knew just where every door was and that if you went through this particular door, there would be a picture on the wall."¹

As well as receiving large quantities of sophisticated and modern arms supplied to them by China and the Communist countries of Eastern Europe via North Vietnam, arms of French origin with which they largely started their campaign, and arms captured from the South Vietnamese forces, the Viet Cong have made extensive use of home-made weapons. These have included sabres hammered out of motor vehicle springs, mortars made of pipe or heavy metal tubing, bamboo arrows shot from a bamboo bow or cross bow, the points of the arrows having been dipped in poison, and guns, the barrels of which are made of water pipe and the stocks carved from bamboo. Such guns are primed with a charge of explosive taken from unexploded bombs and fire a 'bullet' which consists of a hard ball of wax containing pieces of iron, steel nails and bits of rusty wire. Shot guns made from pipes are designed to be set off by a trip wire.

From the beginning of the campaign the Viet Cong have made use of captured weapons and war material. This has continued to be an important factor in easing their supply problems and in equipping new recruits. Government forces have often lost large quantities of arms of which only a small proportion have subsequently been recovered, in December 1964 for instance the Government lost 4,746 weapons and recovered only 1,569. It can reasonably be supposed that a high proportion of those lost passed into the hands of the guerillas.

The basic rations of the Viet Cong guerilla engaged upon an operation consist of rice spiced with chilli peppers. He carries a week's supply of cooked glutinous rice wrapped in cloth in a kind of sausage shaped coil strung round his neck. His uniform usually consists of a suit of black, pyjama-like clothes, and a helmet covered with a net framework in which he puts twigs and leaves. Supplies of calcium and vitamins for intravenous injections have sometimes been found in captured or abandoned Viet Cong camps, presumably intended as a supplement to rations when supplies are short.

One captured Viet Cong document was a detailed report describing how one of their units had turned a village into a 'combatant village' supporting their cause. To begin with government forces were in the area and the unit was forced to take cover in the marshes and fields in the daytime and was only able to slip small parties into the village to

¹'Profile of the Viet Cong', *Newsweek*, 12 April, 1965.

contact its inhabitants at night. These emissaries from the Viet Cong directed their approach not along the lines of Marxist doctrine but by stressing the land reform aspect of their Party's programme: "Several farmers were interested in the struggle to get land and allowed themselves to become indoctrinated easily".

A Party group of 11 members was formed with a base at a farm. Then further agitation commenced amongst local farmers, the emphasis being in arousing their support for the Viet Cong by holding out promises of protection from landlords and the handing over of ownership of the land to the farmers themselves. The slogan "Kill the land robbers" was used as a rallying cry. The next step was the elimination by one means or another of the village elders and local government security agents. Gradually the villagers were persuaded to cease co-operating with the government authorities and local government administration in the area began to break down. It was replaced by the Viet Cong civil administration, whose health, education and sanitation experts were soon busy in the villages. However, their services were not provided free, payment for them being demanded.

A hard core Communist Party group of 26 members was formed together with a Party youth group of 30 members, a farmers' association with 274 members, a liberation youth group with 150 members and a women's group. Ultimately, two-thirds of the population of the village, 2,000 people, were taking part in Party led activities.

The villagers were gradually persuaded to put their village into a state of defence. The report states that:

"The people each day were urged to oppose the Americans and Diem (then South Vietnamese Prime Minister) in order to keep their land and protect themselves."

They were told that unless they co-operated with the Viet Cong in constructing defences, the landlords would undoubtedly return and take away the land that had been distributed amongst them in plots by the Viet Cong.

Party cadres also instructed the villagers in how to carry out propaganda amongst the members of government forces whom they might encounter, and told them that if they themselves should ever allow themselves to be recruited into the government army they would certainly meet the same fate that they had seen befall government soldiers in their own locality.

Other captured documents have included a directive to officials of the Viet Cong's political arm 'The National Front For the Liberation of North Vietnam'. It stressed the importance of gaining influence over such classes of the population as proprietors of small shops, intellectuals, government employees, and army officers, and stated that suitable forms of organisation and activity should be arranged for them. Influence should also be brought to bear upon dignitaries of religious groups who were known to be anti-government, the most promising of them to be "educated" and used for its own purposes.

The 'National Liberation Front' has included in its organisation a 'Committee for National Autonomy' which carries out propaganda work amongst the primitive tribes of the High Plateau Area of South Vietnam, promising them an autonomous state after a Communist victory. Viet Cong cadres have also been giving the tribesmen training in guerilla tactics.

In the autumn of 1964 the 'National Liberation Front' had committees in eight Inter-Zones, more than 250 villages and 2,500 hamlets in South Vietnam. Its 'Commission for External Relations' had representatives in Havana, Prague, Algiers, Peking, Djakarta and Cairo where it had links with the Afro-Asian Solidarity Council. It also operated a news agency in East Berlin.

Teams of specially trained public speakers and entertainers under the Front's control travel the countryside of South Vietnam, with armed Viet Cong escorts, sometimes even penetrating into government-held areas and the cities. According to the Australian Communist journalist, Wilfred Burchett, one such propaganda 'Song and Dance Ensemble' actually gave a performance inside Saigon less than 500 yards from the American Embassy.

A report in the *Times* of 2 December, 1964, stated that one objective of the Viet Cong command has been to try and establish "safe zones" in Saigon in which arms could be stored and agents or even troops could be concentrated in secret in preparation for a full scale rising against the government.

Funds to support Viet Cong operations are raised partly by taxes imposed on the civil population and partly by extortion. Since 1963 the Viet Cong have operated a mandatory tax system in the areas they control, each year the amount of tax levied has been increased, sometimes by as much as 300 per cent. There are three basic taxes. These consist firstly of a tax on land fixed on a sliding scale according to acreage, a tax on crops determined by the probable total yield on each farm or small-holding, and thirdly a tax on the proportion of their crops that peasants and farmers actually sell as against keeping for their own use. The Viet Cong also levy taxes on market stalls and on poultry and livestock. Land and plantation owners have often been forced to pay tribute to the Viet Cong in order to escape having their lands devastated. Money has also been obtained from transport companies who have been forced to pay up under threat of having their vehicles or boats destroyed. Cases of kidnapping for ransom have also occurred.

Women and children are sometimes used in attempts to demoralise South Vietnamese forces. Incidents have occurred in which women, with children in arms, have appeared in front of Viet Cong held villages on which government units have been about to open fire, beseeching them not to do so and telling them that they will be killing their own people if they do. Wilfred Burchett has stated that:

"Every night, in some part of South Vietnam or another, wherever there are Saigon (Government) Posts . . . there are girls,

megaphones in hand, creeping around the posts. Whenever possible the girl . . . will have a relative inside . . . She will call her relative by name, 'Chanh . . . Chanh. Are you listening . . . your village has been liberated and a nice bit of paddy field along the river has been set aside for you . . . Chanh, give up this dishonourable life and come back to the village. Why get yourself killed for the Yankees?' ”¹

Women are also assigned to liaison duties and to such tasks as leading anti-government demonstrations. On occasions they have even been trained as guerilla fighters themselves. The 'Army of Liberation' as the Viet Cong like to be known has a woman second in command, Ngoyen Thi Dinh, often known as "The Third Sister". American intelligence officers believe that the Viet Cong maintain a special intelligence school in Binh Duong Province, 35 miles from Saigon, at which girls are trained as English speaking maids, secretaries or bar girls and are then infiltrated into Saigon to obtain employment in positions which are likely to bring them into contact with American servicemen and their families and so provide them with opportunities for obtaining information.

Terrorism has been used by the Viet Cong selectively but not infrequently, sometimes to compel peasants to act as porters or to undertake other work on their behalf; in one village in which 100 inhabitants were impressed into Viet Cong labour service 25 others who refused to work were shot. During 1964 no less than 436 South Vietnamese village headmen and other minor village officials were executed by the Viet Cong and over 1,300 kidnapped. By the end of 1965 it was estimated that in all since the campaign started some 25,000 civilians had been murdered or kidnapped by the Viet Cong not including battle casualties. There have been numerous attacks on buses in an attempt to disrupt the public transport system. Officials found travelling on buses are murdered on the spot as an example.

Since 1962 acts of terrorism and intimidation have been the task of a special force set up on the orders of Hanoi, and comprising three-man cells travelling through the countryside as directed. In Saigon itself a special Viet Cong terrorist organisation operates consisting of *Dac Cong* or "special action" squads, each including explosive, weapon training, liaison, and recruitment sections.

With the general stepping up of the tempo of the war acts of terrorism by the Viet Cong have increased. A particular target being the civilian workers of the Saigon Government's "Revolutionary Development Construction Programme". One hundred and sixty-five were murdered during the first four months of 1967 and another 300 wounded or kidnapped. Cases have been reported of the deliberate massacre of refugees and in one not untypical incident a villager who derided Viet Cong leaflets was found next morning disemboweled. There have also been reports of an increasing number of trials of "dissidents" or "counter-revolutionaries". These trials have been centred upon a

¹'Profile of the Viet Cong', *Newsweek*, 12 April, 1965.

"public confession" on the part of the victim followed usually by immediate public execution.

On occasion the Viet Cong have demonstrated a brutal ferocity in carrying out acts of intimidation reminiscent of some of the worst of the Mau Mau atrocities in Kenya. In one such incident when Viet Cong units re-entered a village which had been held by government forces for some time they arrested the village headman and his wife and children and he was forced to watch whilst his wife was disemboweled in front of him and his children's arms and legs were hacked off, finally he was emasculated. After the Viet Cong had attacked and captured the government post at Cai Be in July 1964 whilst part of the Civil Guard garrison was out on patrol they killed all the families of the Civil Guard soldiers who were living inside the post, 40 women and children all told. Other cases have occurred in which Civil Guards and their families have been shot after capture and left lying at the roadside as a warning.

Since 1965 the war seemed to be moving steadily into the third stage of Mao Tse-tung's doctrine of guerilla war, the stage of mass battles which finally becomes conventional war with large bodies of troops on both sides attacking and defending fixed positions. An important development was the growing involvement of regular units of the North Vietnamese army in the war in addition to the persistent infiltration of parties of reinforcements for the Viet Cong itself from across the border. For example out of 117 prisoners taken during the course of a US "search and destroy" operation that took place in November 1965, 106 were from North Vietnamese army units. By February 1966, at least nine North Vietnamese regiments had been identified as having moved South of the border, and the Viet Cong were making increasing use of heavy weapons, such as the 120 mm mortar.

At this time it was estimated that the Viet Cong regular force consisted of 15 regiments each of three battalions and organised into divisions each of three regiments. Total Viet Cong strength in the summer of 1966 was put at about 270,000.

By early 1967 this had risen to 280,000 and the Viet Cong's armoury had been augmented by supplies of Russian made 144 mm rockets, and Chinese made flame throwers. Proof was not lacking, however, that American air action and greater commitment of ground forces was having an increasing effect. 20,000 members of the Viet Cong defected between January and August, nearly double the monthly average for the previous year. Viet Cong battle casualties were thought to be averaging about 70,000 a year and it was believed that air attacks were taking a heavy toll of reinforcements moving down the 200 mile long "Ho Chi Minh Trail" along the border with Laos. A labour force of some 40,000 coolies was being employed to keep this route passable.

Until 1964 the Viet Cong was an entirely volunteer force, but its rising casualty rate has forced it to introduce a measure of conscription. Sometimes 14 and 15-year-old boys have been induced into its ranks as replacements. By the summer of 1967 one third of the officers of units

of its regular force at battalion level and above were drawn from North Vietnam.

Thailand

News reports from Bangkok towards the end of August 1965 spoke of Government forces embarking upon a drive against Communist guerillas in Nakhon Phanom province. Six clashes between government troops and guerillas had occurred within a fortnight. The guerillas were reported as being organised into small groups of between six and thirteen equipped with automatic weapons and hand grenades. Their total strength was estimated at being between 500 and 800.

Several abandoned guerilla camps had been discovered by security forces. Literature found included copies of the rule book of the Thai Communist Party and a song book entitled 'Songs for Opposing Government Officials'. Indications were that the guerillas intended to make the Na Khae district of Nakhon Phanom province their main base. This district lies only 20 miles from the Thai-Laos border across which arms and equipment are thought to be brought to the guerillas. Seventy-five villages out of 113 in the district were reported to be under Communist control, and empty weapon crates have been found indicating that over 2,000 carbines have been distributed in the area. It is known that there is constant coming and going of agents from Communist-held areas in Laos and that some specially selected inhabitants of Communist-controlled villages in the district have been taken to Laos and Southern China for training in guerilla warfare.

During the early months of 1966 there were signs that guerilla activity was increasing, possibly as a result of directives received from Peking where the Foreign Minister had said at the beginning of the year, "We hope to have a guerilla war in Thailand before the year is out".

This increased activity included an ominous stepping-up in the number of murders and kidnappings of anti-Communists in the area in conformity with the same pattern of events that preceded the launching of full-scale guerilla campaigns in Malaya, Indo-China and South Vietnam. In one incident in which a local teacher was shot the terrorists responsible afterwards gouged out his eyes and cut out his heart and left these stuck on sticks beside his body in an attempt to intimidate other local teachers. The Communist terrorist organisation has also publicised offers of large rewards for the murder of anti-Communist officials.

Although the number of guerillas active in the North-Eastern area was thought to be comparatively small, the situation is complicated by the presence in it of a large number of Vietnamese. These are estimated to total 40,000 to 60,000, they originally came into the country as refugees during the Indo-China war and the great majority of whom still support Ho Chi-minh. These immigrants form an obvious and readily accessible source of guerilla reinforcements. There have also been fears that threats may develop in other areas of the country,

principally in the four border provinces of the Kra Isthmus where Siam abuts on to Malaysia. These provinces, with their thick jungles, have for a long time been the refuge of the residue of the Malayan People's Liberation Army.

Sarawak

During the summer of 1965 reports began to appear that a pro-Chinese Communist guerilla organisation known to have existed in Sarawak for some time was preparing to become more active. One report put the number of persons involved in this organisation at 26,000 or more than 15 per cent of the adult population of Sarawak. Documents seized by the security forces have shown that the leader of this organisation has been making a close study of the Mao Tse-tung doctrine of guerilla warfare, and the movement was believed to have obtained almost complete control of the Chinese population in some areas of the state. About 1,500 members of this organisation are thought to have received training with the Indonesian forces during the days of confrontation.

In late August 1966 the Malaysian Government announced that security forces in Sarawak had seized documents giving details of Communist plans for the preparation of a guerilla campaign. Directives found ordered that there should be no large-scale campaign for the time being but that attacks should be made on specially chosen targets. Food, arms and equipment should also be accumulated and stored in preparation for larger scale operations. One paragraph of a directive read:

"The general policy today still takes underground activities as the principal work and racial work as the central task for preparation for the armed struggle."¹

It had been clear for some time previously that the exploitation of racial friction between Malays, Chinese and members of local indigenous tribes is likely to be a key factor in any Communist action in Sarawak.

Cuba

On 2 December, 1956, a band of sea-sick and dispirited revolutionaries landed in Cuba from the yacht *Grandma*. Two days later they were attacked from the air and dispersed, some being killed and others taken prisoner. Only 12 of them managed to escape to the tree-covered mountains of the Sierra Maestra. From this unpromising start grew the events that were to bring the world to the brink of nuclear war less than six years later, and which were to have a profound effect on the course of events throughout Latin America. The 12 survivors of the force included Fidel Castro, his brother Raoul Castro and Che Guevara.

To what extent Fidel Castro was a Communist at that time and what share Communists had in the early stages of the revolution will, no doubt, long be a matter of argument. Certainly from his university days

¹*Daily Telegraph*, 29 August, 1966.

onwards Castro had been drawn towards Marxism and consorted with Communists to an extent which would have earned him the name of a "fellow traveller" at the least in any country. After the revolution was over he was to say that he had been practically a "Marxist" by the time he had left university, but at that time he distrusted the Communists whom he regarded as "Sectarians". There is evidence that until late in the revolution they on their part distrusted him as being an adventurist and the Cuban Communist Party as such played only a small part in the revolution until its closing stages, when they started to infiltrate Castro's forces in increasing numbers.

More important than such ponderings is that whatever the truth about the political ideologies of its originators at its inception, the Cuban revolution has now become a model for the Communists as to how they should take over what was essentially a popular nationalist revolution against oppression.

Arms and equipment for Castro's invasion attempt together with the yacht *Grandma* had been bought with money raised by underground branches of 'The 26th of July Movement'. This had been formed by Castro in the United States, and named after a previous unsuccessful attempt to launch a revolution in Cuba, of which Castro had been the head in July 1953. The members of his small expeditionary force on this new occasion had been assembled on an estate some way from Mexico City, where they had undergone a course in guerilla warfare training under Colonel Bayo.

The plan which Castro had formed envisaged that risings would take place in several towns in Oriente Province at the same time as his force landed. In the event, however, bad weather threw this plan out of gear. The *Grandma* was three days late in reaching the Cuban Coast, and the risings that took place on 30 November, the day the landing was supposed to have taken place, were soon crushed.

The Sierra Maestra in which Castro and his 11 comrades took refuge, is an area of about 3,000 square miles of forests amid mountains with few inhabitants and few roads. In many ways it formed a perfect base area for guerillas. Such population as there was, consisted largely of poverty-stricken peasants farming on rented land, at the mercy of landlords and frequently suffering eviction.

There were also elements already on the wrong side of the law through growing marijuana or smuggling, and others who had taken refuge in this remote district after getting into trouble of one sort or another in the cities. It was from amongst all these groups, with the peasants predominating, that Castro now began to gather support. Che Guevara wrote later of this period:

"The first part of the country which the rebels occupied was inhabited by a class of peasants completely different both culturally and socially from those country dwellers who predominate in Cuba's extensive and semi-mechanised agriculture.

"The soldier who came from the first Guerilla Army came from

a class which is most aggressive in demonstrating its love for its own land, which is filled in classic fashion by a lower middle-class spirit: these peasants fight because they and their children own the land, because they cultivate it for themselves, sell it and want to enrich themselves through their work."¹

Accordingly, Castro's propaganda in those early days of the revolution was directed almost entirely towards the subject of land reform, the subject the population of the Sierra Maestra felt most strongly about. Not only words were used to gain their allegiance in this respect. In his characteristically blunt manner Castro described afterwards how one of his first acts on reaching the Sierra Maestra was to arrest a landlord who had made himself particularly unpopular with the peasants, try him and execute him so winning the sympathy of the peasants.

Reinforcements also began to join the revolutionary movement in the shape of recruits from amongst younger intellectuals, these becoming an important element; and unemployed from the city of Santiago on the edge of the Sierra Maestra. Possibly because Batista had been informed that Castro himself had been killed in the debacle after the landing, and that no serious threat to the regime existed, the government forces made no great effort to follow up their initial victory. The rebels were left virtually unmolested for some time. Time which they spent well in recruiting and re-organisation. They were, however, still desperately short of arms. According to Guevara, their total effective armoury at this time consisted of nine rifles, equipped with telescopic sights, five semi-automatic rifles, two sub-machine guns and a sporting rifle. It was becoming urgent that they should achieve some sort of success over the enemy, no matter how small, as soon as possible, both in order to increase their stock of weapons and to publicise the fact that the revolutionary movement was still in existence.

Their first opportunity to achieve these aims came in February 1957, when they won a skirmish with a small government patrol, following up this success with an attack, also successful, on a small barracks at the mouth of the Rio de la Plata. About this time a correspondent of the *New York Times*, whose reports were to be of great assistance to the guerillas' publicity campaign, first reached the Sierra Maestra. Not long after they began to receive additional supplies of arms.

As well as Castro's 'July 26th Movement' various other groups began to take armed and aggressive—if on the whole ineffective—action against the Batista regime. Chief among them were the Ortodoxos, the Autenticos, and the Directorio Revolucionario; it was not, however, until the summer of 1958 that unity was established in the form of a united front between these three organisations and the 'July 26th Movement'.

Gradually firm guerilla bases were established in the Sierra Maestra for Castro's forces. Small industries were established to make such items for the guerillas as boots and shoes, made from the hides of slaughtered animals. Bonds were printed for purchasing goods from outside the guerilla areas. Tobacco was also made into cigars and cigarettes. The

¹*Verde Olivo*, Havana, 9 April, 1961.

first permanent base that had been set up took on the appearance of a village, complete with plants and workshops, schools, hospitals, a radio station, and its own newspapers.

Each base had its own elected Commission of Internal Order. This was responsible for maintaining discipline within the base area, for the political education of recruits and for awarding decorations for brave conduct in the field. When one base had been set up and consolidated, a team would leave it to begin establishing a similar base in another area, the "bee-hive" action which forms one of the basic points of Guevara's doctrine on guerilla war.

An extensive resistance network was built up by the '26th of July Movement' in the cities and government-occupied areas of the countryside. This was first commanded from Castro's GHQ in the Sierra Maestra, and then later came under the orders of the various provincial base commanders. It was based on a cell system and included elements of all categories of the civil population. It was divided into three sections each with specific functions. These were a fund-raising section, a propaganda section and a supply section. These sections were divided into cells of approximately ten persons.

As well as this network in Cuba itself there was also an underground network on the American mainland. Its tasks were to obtain funds, supplies and information for the use of Castro's forces. Altogether it has been estimated that there were 62 centres of such activity in North and South America, particularly important centres being set up in Key West, Miami and Tampa. An agent was even placed in the Cuban Embassy in Washington. New recruits for the rebel army from countries outside Cuba received training on estates in Mexico. It was largely through this network that Castro received the greater part of his supply of arms and ammunition, supplies being purchased on the blackmarket and flown to Cuba from points on the American coast.

Terrorist and sabotage groups in Government-occupied territory operated under the command of the guerillas' civil administration headquarters. One such group was the 'Triple A' group in Havana. In 1957 this had a total of 18 members. For operations it was split into sections of three or four people, each with its own leader and each with its own special target. Throughout the course of the campaign, strikes and riots took place in cities and towns still controlled by the government. In one instance a women's demonstration planned by underground leaders was used to spark off a general strike. The strike weapon was used to paralyse cities and communications at particularly critical moments. Castro and his forces owed their victory as much to the subversion, corruption and demoralisation of the Batista regime and its armed forces as to their prowess at guerilla warfare. Fighting throughout the revolution was on a surprisingly small scale. The actual fighting in the whole course of the two-year campaign probably caused less than a thousand casualties, though many more people died as the result of reprisals.

Until the very last stages of the revolution in the winter of 1958, the size of the guerilla force also remained very small. Various estimates

have been made of its strength at different stages of the campaign, but in 1961 Castro himself claimed that in the spring and early summer of 1958 he had only 180 men under arms and that he achieved victory with a force no more than 500 strong.

Even though Fidel Castro may have been exaggerating the smallness of the size of the force at his disposal, it would seem to be generally agreed that it consisted of well under 1,000 men: victory at the end of December 1958 brought a flood of recruits pouring into the rebel army's ranks, all anxious to claim that they had shared in its success. By August 1958 when Castro began his final two-pronged offensive, headed by two columns neither above 200 strong, demoralisation of the Government forces had proceeded so far that his forces were able to advance virtually without meeting resistance. By December the Batista regime, already shaken to its foundations, was brought to a state of general collapse. The commander of the government forces garrisoning Santiago went over to the rebels and Castro entered the town. Other government leaders and commanders began to take part in conspiracies or attempts to enter negotiations. On the night of 31 December, 1958, Batista fled the island, Castro, from his headquarters in Santiago, called for a general strike which ensured the final success of the revolution.

The American journalist Robert Taber, a leading sympathiser of Castro's revolution, writing in the magazine *Revolution* has summarised the reasons for Castro's success and its possible meaning for the future as follows:

"The Fidelistas (Castroite forces) succeeded in Cuba, not because Fidel was a master of guerilla tactics—he was not—but because he understood what it was he had to do. His purpose, as we discussed it when we first met, at the very beginning of his campaign, was to create, in the capital, the climate of collapse.

"This meant, first of all, making it clear to the outside world that an active military rebel force existed, and was beyond the control of the Batista military.

"It meant, secondly, impairing the Cuban economy, and spreading disorder in the Cuban business community, so that foreign investors would begin to ask themselves whether there was not some better alternative to Batista.

"As banking and business credits became less available, and the bad publicity for the Batista regime mounted, the supporters of the regime, business men and high military officers, began to look about for alternatives, or began to plan their exit.

"In the Americas, there is no Latin American state (Paraguay may be an exception) which can long exist without credit from the United States. When the regime—as in the Cuban case—can no longer preserve the stability of the economy (in other words when foreign investment is threatened) it must fail, simply because it will no longer be in the interests of anyone who supports it."¹

¹Robert Taber. 'The Techniques of the Guerilla Fighter', *Revolution*, Vol. I, No. 6, 1963, pp. 96-109.

Venezuela

In Venezuela, Communist-led guerillas have been in arms since 1962. The decision of the Venezuelan Communist Party to resort to armed struggle was apparently based on the fear that the reformist policy of President Belancourt, whose Government they had first promised to support, was about to leave them with little hope of achieving power by constitutional means. Great encouragement for a revolt in Venezuela came from Cuba and the campaign has received the vocal backing of both Peking and Moscow. A Communist takeover in Venezuela would obviously provide a convenient bridge-head for further penetration of the Latin American mainland. Moreover with the Venezuelan oil industry in Communist hands the Soviet Union would be relieved of the tiresome burden of supplying Cuba with oil.

To further their struggle the Venezuelan Communists joined forces with an extremist left-wing organisation 'Movement of the Revolutionary Left' to form two bodies, one the guerilla and terrorist organisation itself 'The Armed Forces of National Liberation' (FALN) and the other the political arm 'The National Liberation Front' (FLN). FALN's campaign has had unusual features in that until comparatively recently much of its activities have been centred in the cities. To begin with these were not unsuccessful, FALN units achieved considerable publicity by "hi-jacking" the liner *Anzoategui* early in 1963, and delivering a series of attacks upon oil installations, American-owned properties, and members of the security forces. That phase of FALN's campaign came to a climax in the autumn of the same year with a determined effort to sabotage the general election and to prepare the ground for a *coup d'état*. In two days alone 20 people were killed in Caracas in November after a strike call issued by the FLN had met with little response.

In the end, the fighting in the towns ended with a severe reverse to the guerillas who completely failed in their main aim of preventing the holding of elections. This rebuff was followed by a pause in guerilla activity, and then its re-emergence during the spring and summer of 1964, but with the emphasis now switched to the establishment of guerilla bands in the mountains and other suitable areas. A drive was begun to win the support of the peasantry in readiness for a protracted campaign.

In December 1964 FALN claimed that five "guerilla fronts" had been established in different areas of the country. These were the Jose Antonio Paex Front, in the states of Portuguesa, Turjillo and Barinas, the Jose Leonardo Cirinos Front in Falcon state, the Simon Bolivar Front in Falcon state, the Ezequiel Zamara Front in the states of Miranda, Anzoategui and Guarico and the Manuel Ponte Rodriguez Front in the Eastern mountains of Venezuela. A report by the New China News Agency claimed that the Jose Antonio Paex Front had established "a government" to cover the states in which it operated. The statement added that in preparation for a long campaign a supply system and stores had been built up in the mountains. Close contact had been established

with the peasants whom the guerillas were said to be helping with their farm work and to whom they had been giving political education "explaining the domestic and internal situation to them." About 40 per cent of the guerillas themselves were said to have been recruited from amongst the younger peasants. One tactic adopted by the guerillas in order to gain support among the peasants is to buy food from them at two or three times the normal market price.

The September-October issue of *Revolution* carried an article by a "Major C" described as a Venezuelan guerilla detachment Commander in which he said:

"Our Authority, which the Peasants refer to as the Government of the Mountain, is recognised and constantly broadens itself to such a point that informers and various enemy agents take to the Maquis or leave after the forces of repression evacuate a village.

"The fight itself has led us to give the orders to transform the guerilla zone into the Revolutionary Operational Base and to transform the non-guerilla zones into guerilla zones. To attain these objectives, we are organising Committees for the National Front of Liberation . . . The Committees are in charge of local production, and even set up certain primary forms of co-operation without neglecting the support of the guerilla detachment. In a number of places we have taken the first step towards an agrarian reform."

Until the latter months of 1964 the guerillas confined their activities mainly to attacks on isolated villages and police posts. In October, however, bomb explosions began to occur again in Caracas, and on 9 October the Deputy Head of the United States Mission to the Venezuelan Air Force was kidnapped by a guerilla group. Threats were made to kill him if the execution of a captured Viet Cong terrorist in Saigon was not postponed. Although the group released their American prisoner unharmed a few days later, the incident serves to illustrate links between the FALN and the Viet Cong. Both maintain missions in Havana and have pledged mutual support.

The strength of the guerillas is believed to fluctuate greatly. During the summer months their ranks are temporarily swollen by large numbers of students and young workers who leave the cities to join them, bringing their total strength up to an estimated 2,000. At other times of the year their strength may sink to a hard core numbering only 200. The guerillas of the FALN organised into 'tactical combat units' were causing the deployment of some 9,000 government troops by the summer of 1965 and had spread their operations to eight of the country's 20 provinces. Their main diet consisted of rice and sardines; their main form of shelter nylon tents, and they were believed to have received considerable quantities of arms from Cuba.

As well as the guerilla force in the field there exists a Communist Party-controlled terrorist organisation which has been responsible for a

'Major C'. 'The People's War', *Revolution*, Vol. II, No. 1, September-October 1964, pp. 18-22.

number of acts of sabotage and bomb incidents in the capital, Caracas, since 1962. In October 1965 a secret arms factory which had apparently been engaged in providing equipment for this organisation, was discovered concealed on a chicken farm near Caracas. The plant had been set up in a specially constructed underground steel-walled vault to which access was through a concrete tunnel. Boxes with Chinese markings were discovered and police stated that enough explosives and small arms ammunition had been found to blow up the whole of the capital. Rifles, machine guns and booby traps were also found stored in the vault in which important political papers were also found.

Throughout 1965 rivalries and disputes which had always existed amongst the constituent organisations of the 'National Liberation Front' made themselves more manifest, and by the beginning of 1966 there was evidence that this constant bickering within the movement's command which basically centred round the correctness or incorrectness of carrying on with "armed struggle" or of seeking more peaceful means to power was having a serious effect on guerilla morale. There were a number of defections from their ranks including those of some important officers. One of these Antonio Ortiz, a former guerilla commander in Eastern Venezuela described the guerillas as a few bands of wanted men, badly led, practically dying of hunger for want of support and forced to live off the land.

An interesting point in this situation was the apparent intention of Moscow's *Radio Peace and Progress* to do everything possible to try and rally support for the FALN to keep the guerilla campaign going. For instance on 15 February, 1966, a broadcast denied a rumour that Venezuelan guerilla leaders were thinking of ending the campaign as a result of advice from Moscow. This rumour it was said was, "a clumsy lie", the broadcaster continued, "Soviet public opinion professes support for the guerillas' armed struggles, a thing we have said hundreds of times in our broadcasts".

On 8 May *Radio Peace and Progress* broadcast a statement that the Politburo of the Venezuelan Communist Party had circulated a letter to all Party members warning them to beware of "decadent trends" and not to allow defeatism and to maintain constant faith in their cause regardless of any eventuality. Party members and organisations must now "strengthen revolutionary morale, liquidate liberalism and temper every combatant". The subsequent decision of the Communist Party to defect from the guerilla movement, because of its continued lack of progress, has led to bitter recriminations between the Communist leaders and Fidel Castro whose support for the guerillas remains undiminished.

Colombia

In Colombia the guerilla movement which has received considerable verbal support from Peking, Moscow and Havana, had its origins in the

so-called 'peasants' self-defence groups', ostensibly formed to protect peasants' rights against the landlords and government authorities. The movement is allied to bandit groups. One headed by such figures as "Dead Shot" announced that, in fact, he was no bandit but a Communist guerilla fighting for the liberation of Colombia. The Colombian Communist Party itself was at first cautious in expressing support for these guerillas, but would seem to be being pushed gradually into more open commitment by the attacks of pro-Chinese line elements and the open approval granted the guerillas by countries of the Communist bloc. In October 1964, *Radio Havana* quoted a statement alleged to have been issued by the Party's youth movement to the effect that, Colombian youth should:

"Prepare for future battles in the towns and rural areas and to co-operate in the war that will lead to the final triumph of the agrarian and anti-imperialist revolution."

The guerilla movement is based upon about half a dozen so-called 'independent republics', in effect, small guerilla-controlled areas in remote areas of the country. The largest guerilla force headed by "Dead Shot" operated in the so-called 'Marquestila Republic'. On 27 November 1964 *Prensa Latina* reported that a 'Southern bloc guerilla conference' had been held somewhere in "liberated Colombia". An article in the pro-Peking Belgian Communist Party's organ, *La Voix du Peuple* of February 1964 described the guerillas as being organised into some 15 groups under the central command of the left-wing extremist movement MOEC and the youth wing of the 'Revolutionary Liberal Movement'. They were reported to be operating in at least six of the country's departments and to be "closely bound to the working class and dedicated to the revolution".

On 7 January, 1965, a new upsurge of guerilla activity was announced by their temporary occupation of the town of Simacota in the department of Santander. In April a clandestine paper printed by the 'Movement of Solidarity with the Armed Resistance of the Colombian Peasants' announced the opening of a new guerilla front in Santander. Towards the end of the same month President Valencia of Colombia stated that, "a plot of international nature", had chosen Colombia and Venezuela "as the scene of a Castro Communist revolution". Guerilla fronts also exist in the departments of El Pato, Guabero, Sumapex Marquetalia.

MOEC has established an office in Paris and the guerillas have received a large number of messages of support from Communist Parties and movements throughout the world.

Reports have spoken of the Colombian guerillas attempting to form liaison links with those in Venezuela. Colombian Army operations against the guerillas have lately met with a considerable measure of success, combining military action with welfare and relief work amongst the peasants.

Guatemala

Guatemala is the third of the Latin American countries which Fidel Castro has described as being particularly ripe for guerilla operations. Small-scale guerilla fighting began in the North-East of the country in 1962. During 1963 the guerillas came under the command of FAR, a movement comprising three previously independent groups, these being, the ultra left-wing 'November 13th Movement' led by Yob Sosa, an ardent admirer of Castro and supporter of the pro-Peking Communist line, 'The October 20th Column' and 'The April 13th Movement'. FAR is at present headed by Yob Sosa, a former army lieutenant and graduate of the United States Counter Insurgency School in Panama. The Guatemalan Communist Party has been attempting to take over control of the movement by forming a coalition known as the 'Frente Unido Revolucionaire' (FUR).

By early 1965 it was believed that about 500 guerillas were active in scattered areas of the country, using much the same tactics as the Venezuelan guerillas. These have sometimes extended to Guatemala City where they have carried out a number of assassinations and bomb outrages, the former Guatemalan Defence Minister being amongst their victims. In February guerilla operations had increased to an extent that the government was forced to suspend the constitution and declare a state of siege. In March, 1965, an article by prominent members of the Guatemalan Communist Party in the *World Marxist Review* described how the conditions in Guatemala "made the time ripe for armed struggle" and stated that "guerilla warfare is now the main force of democratic struggle". FAR has threatened that members of the government forces who have received special training in anti-guerilla operations will be special targets for attack.

Brazil

The army coup in the spring of 1964 would seem to have put paid to the threat of a large-scale Communist-directed revolt for the time being at least. The threat of violence, however, persists, primarily from the existence and continued subversive activities of the pro-Chinese Brazilian Communist Party the 'PC de B' and the 'Groups of 11'. These are small cells intended to form the nucleus of guerilla units in the event of an uprising and they are under the direction of the left-wing extremist Leonel Brizola, now living in exile in Uruguay.

In May, 1965, the New China News Agency issued a policy statement which it said had been issued by the PC de B the previous August, but had only just been received in China. This called on the people of Brazil to take up arms, to prepare for insurrection and to reject any idea of obtaining their goals by peaceful means. The peasants were to be regarded as the key element whose support must be gained to ensure the success of the revolution.

In the statement made during the previous autumn, Leonel Brizola said that the overthrow of the Brazilian Government could only be

accomplished by revolution. Documents discovered by the security forces of the new Brazilian Government during the summer had included notes on guerilla warfare issued for the use of members of the 'Group of 11' who were urged to collect weapons and study the tactics used in "popular revolutions" and "national liberation fronts" in other countries. The PC de B was said to be entirely on the side of the 'Groups of 11'. Other documents seized in November revealed that they had been planning to launch attacks on military installations in Brazil and that Leonel Brizola had planned to return to Brazil to lead a revolutionary movement. It is estimated that the total strength of all the 'Groups of 11' consists of less than 2,000 persons. Over 1,000 people have been tried for being active in such groups since the new government took over power.

Bolivia

In March 1967 President Barrientos of Bolivia declared a state of emergency to cover the South Eastern area of the country as the result of an outbreak of guerilla activity. Subsequent operations by the Bolivian Army in which it suffered a number of casualties resulted in the strength of the guerillas being put at 100-250. There were persistent rumours that the force included Cubans, even the missing 'Che' Guevara himself. These rumours were confirmed beyond doubt in October 1967 when the body of a guerilla killed by an army patrol was identified as being that of 'Che'. A diary of his complained of lack of peasant support for the movement.

Angola

So far no revolutionary guerilla movements openly and formally proclaiming themselves as Communists have appeared in Africa, probably largely because of the fact that few Communist Parties existed in Africa prior to 1960. However, several of the 'national liberation movements' on that continent, engaged in guerilla campaigns and to be largely basing their plans and tactics on Communist theories. Amongst them are the UPA and MPLA of Angola, the UPC of the Cameroons, the African National Congress of South Africa and *Conseil National de Liberation* of Congo (Brazzaville). Whilst at the same time large numbers of Africans are known to be receiving training in guerilla warfare in Communist bloc countries. The Rev. N. Sithole, former leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union of Rhodesia being one African Nationalist leader said to have inspected Africans undergoing such training in China.

Writing in the Peking-sponsored magazine *African Revolution*, Commander Benedito, a member of the MPLA a movement formed by Dr. Augustinbo Neto a member of both the underground Portuguese Communist Party and the French Communist Party in 1959, described life in the movement during the days of the revolt in Northern Angola

in 1961. It is interesting as describing the early days of a rising launched by movements with strong Communist affiliations. He wrote:

"One day I found under my door an MPLA tract which said 'Long Live Angola. Long live Quenn Jinga (heroine of Angolan resistance during the seventeenth century) Rise up Angolans'. I showed this tract to a friend of mine who I knew to have progressive opinions and who is now, by the way, in prison. He started my political education.

"I then returned to Nambuanguo where I began visiting the farms and telling the people they must organise themselves for the battle against Portuguese colonialism ; with the help of a few friends we held meetings that immediately gave good results . . .

"Since we had no arms we prepared catanas (big knives for cutting sugar cane), sticks, hunting weapons and canahangulosm (a sort of rudimentary hunting rifle made by the Angolans themselves and used by the guerillas). We made incendiary bombs out of bottles of palm-oil and petrol with short cotton wicks.

"On 4 February 1961, the militants of the MPLA attacked the prisons of the town in Luanda. It was the signal that we had all been waiting for ; by early March we had attacked military bases and military outposts, occupied trading posts, and fazendas (plantations) we beat the Portugese on all sides and freed more than 50 villages."

According to Commander Benedito inside 'liberated areas' the MPLA organised controlling committees consisting of a commander, an assistant commander and two secretaries. Important policy decisions were taken at special meetings in which all ranks of the guerilla force took part. The MPLA Committees organised the harvesting of crops and started to introduce rudimentary welfare services on the lines of those built up by the guerillas in Cuba and South-East Asia.

The Congo

The African guerilla movement most openly associated with Chinese Communist support to date has unquestionably been the savage left-wing rebel Congolese movement. Its campaign against the authority of President Tshombe with its horrific massacre of European hostages in Stanleyville and other centres made headlines in the world's Press throughout 1964.

One of the prime movers of this revolt was Pierre Mulelle, leader of the dissident *Jeuneuse* youth movement. Mulelle, former Minister in the first independent Congo Government under Lumumba, is known to have had Communist sympathies for a number of years. After the fall of the Lumumba Government, he joined the pro-Communist leader Antoine Gizenga in Stanleyville becoming Minister of Education in Gizenga's 'Government'. Subsequently, he travelled to Moscow and Peking. He stayed for more than a year in Peking studying guerilla

'Commander Benedito. 'Five Months of Independence in Angola', *Africa Revolution*, Vol. ?, No. 1, 1963, pp. 26-29.

tactics and associated subjects, and on his return to the Congo in 1963 set about establishing training camps for training members of the *Jeuneuse* in the arts of revolution in remote areas of the country.

The *Jeuneuse* commenced operations in the spring and summer of 1963. Mulelle and his officers promised the tribesmen that they recruited that bullets would not really harm them but only kill their earthly spirits for a while. The equipment of this force was rudimentary in the extreme; bows and arrows forming its main armoury. Little attempt was made to give its largely illiterate members any real political indoctrination, the movement's main rallying cry being land for its members. Before long the rebels were in control of a sizeable area of Kivu Province and were joined by Lumumba's former Minister of Information, Anicet Kashamura, who was known to be in Prague and East Berlin in 1960.

The Bapende and Babunda tribes from whom the majority of recruits for the rebel force were originally drawn have a long history of opposition to the provincial government of Kivu Province. A 'National Liberation Committee' under Mulelle was set up with a branch in Burundi. Aid to the committee, being channelled through the Chinese Embassy in Bujumbura in neighbouring Burundi. By the middle of 1964, the rebels had established a headquarters in a former Belgian-owned sugar-beet factory at Uvira on the shores of Lake Tanganyika. The staff of this headquarters was said to include two Chinese officers and a Czech who was believed to be acting as their interpreter.

In October, 1963, the 'National Liberation Committee' had been set up in Brazzaville under the direction of President Masambre-Debat, known to have pro-Chinese sympathies. Christopher Gybne, formerly a leading supporter of Lumumba's Government, was believed to represent the pro-Moscow Communist elements in the rebel forces. Other members were Adre Lubaya, an ex-Minister in Gizenga's Government, who had reputedly tried to obtain the position of President of Kasai Province by offering a bribe of £8,000 which he had obtained from the Chinese Embassy in Leopoldville, and Thomas Mukwidi who came to Brazzaville direct from Peking bringing with him various supplies for the rebel forces and the sum of £20,000 in cash.

A training camp for Mulelle's forces with Chinese instructors was established at Gambona. President Tshombe claimed that he had proof that the Chinese Government had paid the equivalent of £28,000 into the rebels' bank account, and on several occasions displayed equipment and supplies captured from the rebel forces giving evidence of material aid received by them from Communist countries.

After the rebel forces entered Stanleyville on 5 August, 1964, they announced the formation of a 'People's Republic of the Congo'. Reports of large-scale political intimidation and terrorism in rebel-controlled districts soon began to come in. In many areas they occupied the rebels made a clean sweep of all local political leaders and inhabitants with professional qualifications or administrative experience. It has been

estimated that perhaps as many as 4,000 Congolese were slaughtered in front of the Lumumba statue in Stanleyville alone during the period of its occupation by the rebels.

By the autumn of 1964 reports stated that there had been considerable improvement in the rebel organisation and skill in the use of their arms. Indications were received that they were beginning to form battalion type units and that automatic weapons from Communist countries were beginning to arrive. This was probably due to the arrival of Cuban experts who were negroid in appearance.

In November they were reported to be making use of camouflaged vehicles and to have adapted some lorries and vans for use as home-made armoured cars. They were also said to be making increasing use of ambush tactics. Political indoctrination amongst their ranks also appeared to be increasing, with particular emphasis being placed on instilling hatred of the Americans and their alleged invasion of the Congo.

By early 1965 it was estimated that the total rebel force numbered 30,000 guerilla troops or "Simbas", as they came to be known, armed mainly with spears and other primitive weapons, but including a hard core of approximately 10,000 under a General Olenga, who were equipped with modern arms. Less than half the members of this hard core were believed to be Congolese, the major portion being made up of Tutsi tribesmen from Rwanda, ex-Mau Mau terrorists from Kenya, and other volunteers, chiefly from Tanzania.

With the opening of the offensive by government forces headed by European mercenaries and the air-drop by Belgian parachute troops to rescue European hostages, the rebels were forced on to the defensive. By the late spring of 1965 they held only an area stretching between the upper end of Lake Tanganyika and the Lualaba River, and an area round the approaches to Stanleyville. Increasing supplies of modern weapons, including those of a quite sophisticated nature, such as Chinese made 12.7 mm anti-aircraft guns and Czechoslovakian recoilless rifles failed to save the rebels from further reverses. By the mid-summer of 1965 the revolt appeared to have been virtually crushed.

The exact extent of outside Communist planning and direction involved in the revolt has not yet been determined, neither has the extent to which the rebel command were, after the early stages, in effective command of the Simbas. It has been established beyond any reasonable doubt that the Chinese Embassies in Burundi and Brazzaville were deeply implicated in arranging assistance for the rebels. It is also known that large quantities of arms from the Chinese and East European sources were received by them in the closing stages. It seems possible that originally the Simbas were intended to fulfil the rôle of the regular guerilla troops in accordance with Mao's teaching on building an ideal three tier guerilla army, and that they were to move from area to area soliciting support and recruiting local tribesmen to form units of regional troop and militia. It is noteworthy that in the earlier stages of the revolt the Simbas behaved in a very much more humane and disciplined fashion

towards the local population than they did later on. It is thought that the wholesale massacres that marked its closing stages, were not just occasioned by indiscipline but by a considered policy on the part of commanders. The purpose being to create chaos over a wide area of the country and effect permanent damage to its economy and social structure in the event of this particular revolt failing. Some observers believe that Chinese advisors did have a large share of the planning of the revolt, but owing to personal rivalries between its African leaders were unable to exercise effective control once serious fighting developed.

Contrary to an often held belief, Soviet spokesmen have been scarcely less forthright in expressing support for the use of violence to achieve Communist ends than the Chinese Communists. Early in 1961 for instance Khrushchev was reported in the *World Marxist Review* as asking himself and answering the following questions regarding 'wars of liberation':

"Is there a likelihood of such wars recurring?

Yes, there is.

Are uprisings of this kind likely to recur?

Yes, they are, but wars of this kind are popular uprisings.

Is there the likelihood of conditions in other countries reaching the point where the cup of popular patience overflows and they take to arms?

Yes, there is such a likelihood.

What is the attitude of the Marxists to such uprisings?

A most favourable attitude . . . These uprisings are directed against the corrupt reactionary regimes, against the colonialists. The Communists support just wars of this kind wholeheartedly and without reservation."¹

¹*World Marxist Review*, January 1961.

CHAPTER XVII

Conclusions

IF the grand design of the Communist assault on the West is seen as one of a frontal assault, with the intention of overthrowing the governments of countries of the West either by military means or the conversion of their populations to the ideology of Communism then it must be counted as an almost total failure. Such an immense amount of time, effort, and money has been expended, and so little achieved. Since 1948 the Iron Curtain has not advanced one yard westward, the West has not even been dislodged from Berlin. Far from any Western countries switching to Communism of their own internal volition in the great majority of them, not only have the Communists failed to gain power but they do not seem to have even a fighting chance of doing so, whilst in most cases the numerical strength of their Parties is considerably below the peak reached in the immediate post-war years. Even direct Communist gains outside Europe since the end of the Civil War in China would seem to have been minimal. In 16 years only two countries have joined the Communist camp outright, North Vietnam and Cuba.

If, however, the strategy behind the Communist assault is seen as being the use of power politics designed to isolate the West ; outflank its alliances, destroy its influence amongst the developing nations, whilst at the same time causing confusion amongst Western public opinion and gradually lowering its morale and weakening its will to resist then a very different picture emerges.

Within the last ten years a firm Soviet presence has been established on the southern shore of the Mediterranean in the shape of strong economic and military missions in Egypt and Algeria backed up by a high degree of economic and cultural penetration of both countries, both of whose armed forces are now for all practical purposes largely dependent on the Soviet Union for munitions and supplies. A similar Soviet presence is being established on the Horn of Africa in Somalia, providing ready access to both the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. In Syria economic penetration seems to have been followed now by a considerable degree of success in political penetration and here again the country's armed forces are now almost entirely orientated towards the Soviet bloc. Useful Soviet footholds have been obtained in Tanzania, Mali and Guinea, whilst further South in Africa, Congo (Brazzaville) has become a focal point for Soviet operations in Central Africa. In

addition a Soviet-backed Communist take-over in Ghana was only narrowly averted and Soviet influence has become important in Afghanistan, Burma, Iraq and the Yemen.

It is true that the Soviet presence in the developing nations is often built upon precarious foundations and its fortunes in them can be drastically overturned almost literally overnight as in the case of the Congo, Ghana and Indonesia. It is also true that Soviet advances have sometimes met with firmer and humiliating rebuff as in Kenya. At the same time this massive Soviet bloc penetration of areas in which Western influence had been the dominating one for decades and in some cases centuries, has been accomplished without the loss of a single soldier, sailor or airman and all under the cloak of co-existence with the West. At the same time the Soviet have kept a firm hold on the countries of Eastern Europe. Their political influence has grown formidably while the West has declined correspondingly. The West has tended to regard the Cold War as being over and therefore not only does it have no will to win but it does not even have the will to defend its own vital interests.

The achievements of China, though on a lesser scale, are still impressive: she has reduced Tibet to colonial status; been instrumental in the expulsion of France from the East and become the dominant power of South-East Asia, and has engaged the West's leading champion in what amounts to a bitter war by proxy. But she has also emerged as a revolutionary world power, reaching out tentacles of subversion and intrigue to every continent. In the Western hemisphere, Cuba has become the focal point for practically all the dissident elements of Latin America and the Caribbean and is at the present time nurturing some half-dozen guerilla campaigns, which although small-scale and intermittently fought, could, given the appropriate conditions, at any time flare up to present the United States with a series of major crises on its own doorstep.

Some Western observers see the intense activity of the Communist countries towards the emerging nations merely as the result of an opportunist desire to fill a vacuum caused by the inevitable end of the Western colonial era, a passing phase in which Communism will in the end gain little and which need be of no undue concern to the West. There is, however, sufficient evidence to suggest that far from this being the case the Communist countries are steadily developing a strategy that goes back to the very roots of Communist foreign policy as formulated in the years that immediately followed the Communist revolution in Russia.

The first steps of this expansionist global policy stem from the Congress of Peoples of the East, held at Baku in 1920. Most of the schemes for aiding rebellion and subversion in the colonies and backward countries of Asia and Africa at that time came to nothing, largely because of the Soviet Union's inability to give them sufficient backing. However, valuable lessons were learnt from the failures that resulted. Not the least of these being the need to train carefully special cadres from such countries and perhaps above all the lesson that the Com-

munist cause was most likely to prosper not through efforts to start mass Communist Parties or openly Communist-led revolts in areas outside Europe but through a careful exploitation of existing nationalist and anti-colonial sentiment and through aiding nationalist leaders even of the most bourgeois type. The first stage was to be the removal of Western political, military and economic control from a given area. The second stage which is the actual overthrow of nationalist regimes and their replacement by Communist political administrations would come later.

Whether or not a drive to the Atlantic was ever a firm part of Soviet plans after the Second World War will probably remain a matter of conjecture for many years. Certainly given the West's first monopoly and then continuing lead in nuclear weapons, it would have seemed that any such Soviet attempt would have run counter to one of Lenin's basic teachings that for Communists to engage in battle at a time when their enemies held an obvious advantage over them would be a crime.

Although without the creation of the defensive shield of NATO the overwhelming numerical strength of the Soviet Army might have led adventurist elements in the Kremlin into such an attempt, a number of military commentators have voiced their opinion that the main reason for the presence of Soviet troops in great force in Eastern Europe has, in more recent years, been for the purposes of ensuring internal security, and for giving the various regimes tangible evidence of Soviet support than in active preparation for an armed onslaught westwards.

With the continuing stalemate in Europe it would be strange if added importance had not come to be attached to Stalin's words on the need to "revolutionise the enemy's rear", particularly as the new momentum gained by the anti-colonial movement during the war presented greater opportunities for exploitation than ever existed before.

Communism has not been the determining factor in bringing about the incredibly swift disintegration of most of Europe's colonial empires, but it has certainly been a contributing factor, and an important one. There has been no pretence that Communism sees colonial liberation as an end in itself. Its general place in the Communist scheme of things has been made clear in the official Moscow statement of 1957 which read:

"Communism recognises the objective advantage of the Afro-Asian movement for independence because, although the existence of new, independent states does not subjectively facilitate the victory of Communism, it objectively weakens imperialism".¹

In other words the achieving of independence by a former colonial state was to be welcomed even if the Government under which it was achieved was not a "socialist" one, because each time such an event occurs "imperialism", i.e., the West, is, in Communist eyes, weakened by deprivation of ready access to military and economic resources. Although it might well be thought that the virtual liquidation of colonialism as seen by the West has deprived Communism of much of its ammunition in this field, this is far from being the case for in Communist

¹*Pravda*, 22 January, 1957.

terminology colonialism with its cousin neo-colonialism is capable of meaning anything that Communist propagandists wish it to mean. Most countries of Latin America for instance are said to be suffering under "Yankee Colonialism". Countries which have, in fact, been independent for years are instantly dubbed as still having "colonialist type governments" or as "lackeys of the colonialists" should they in any way incur Communist displeasure. The term "neo-colonialist" is applied unhesitatingly to any country or government which engages in any type of collaboration with the West from the reception of a voluntary aid mission to the signing of a defence pact.

Whilst for a considerable period during the early 1960's a number of Western observers apparently genuinely thought that it would be possible to prevent the Cold War spreading to areas outside Europe as direct Western rule disappeared from them, the Communists never had any such beliefs. Idris Cox, for instance, one of the British Communist Party's leading authorities on Africa addressing a conference organised by the Committee of African Organisations in Britain in May 1962 expressed himself as follows:

"It is impossible for Africa to remain aloof. It cannot be immune from the spread of Communist ideas. The way to end the cold war is for Africa to join with the Communist and progressive forces in the world, to intensify the fight to end imperialism and colonialism and advance towards socialism. The balance of forces in the world today favours socialism and national liberation. Africa is a powerful factor in the changed situation".¹

That the Soviet Union has no intention of abandoning its drive into the world's developing areas can be shown by the words of Mr. Brezhnev speaking at the 23rd Congress of the CPSU in 1966:

"Comrades, the CPSU sees it as its international duty to continue to do its utmost to support the struggle of the peoples for final liberation from colonial and neo-colonial oppression. Our Party and the Soviet State will continue to render the utmost support to the peoples fighting for their liberation and to strive for the immediate granting of independence to all colonial countries and peoples; they will continue to develop co-operation in all ways with countries that have won national independence, and help them to develop their economy, train national personnel and struggle against neo-colonialism; they will continue to strengthen the CPSU's fraternal links with the Communist Parties and revolutionary democratic organisations in Asian, African and Latin American countries".²

The Cold War has not ended as some would have us believe, it has merely shifted its focal point from an unproductive confrontation in Europe to areas where Communism holds the advantage. Here lies the main challenge to the West in the continuing Communist assault.

¹*World News*, Vol. 9, No. 19, London, 12 May, 1962.

²L. Brezhnev, *Central Committee Report*, 1966.

Although the Western response to outright threats of Communist aggression has usually been prompt and resolute, its response to the more indirect methods now employed by the Communist powers in their drive to exclude Western influence from the developing nations has often been tardy and bedevilled by all sorts of doubts and hesitations.

In part this has been probably due to the fact that the opening of the Communist offensive in areas outside Europe coincided almost exactly in the middle of the 1950s with the commencement of Khrushchev's peaceful co-existence campaign. To a Western public opinion already wearied of seven or eight years of a contest which to a growing extent it had been taught to believe could only end in a devastating nuclear exchange, this first sign of an olive branch was something to be grasped at without too detailed examination. The fact that Soviet leaders had said that a direct nuclear war between East and West was no longer inevitable was held to be of such inestimable importance that the reality of peaceful co-existence was glossed over.

Most important and almost totally overlooked in a natural Western eagerness to ease tensions with the Soviet bloc were the Communist statements that invariably accompanied and still accompany all talk of co-existence with the West, to the effect that aid to the 'anti-colonial' movements and aid for 'wars of liberation' were to be expressly continued and even stepped up.

Although these qualifications on the theme of co-existence have indicated quite clearly the direction of the main thrust of the new Communist strategy, many in the West tended to discount them as being so much verbiage, largely meaningless and issued in order to reassure "hard line elements" in the Kremlin or Peking. Events have proved this to be otherwise. Khrushchev was no doubt sincere when he said that he had no wish to see everything that had been built up in his lifetime destroyed in the course of a few hours of nuclear war, but there is every reason to believe that he was being equally sincere when he said that he still wished to see the red flag waving all over the world.

By waving aloft the banner of co-existence with one hand whilst at the same time doing everything possible to wreck the West's position amongst the developing nations with the other, Khrushchev and his successors would seem to have found the answer to both questions, how to protect the home base—always a prime Communist objective—and how to so weaken the West's position as to achieve the ultimate goal of Communist world domination.

The West's inclination to believe only those parts of Soviet policy statements which it wanted to believe and which seemed to promise some hope of a *detente* and to ignore or play down those parts which seemed to indicate a continuing conflict has allowed Communism to an increasing extent to present with equal advantages two images. To the Western nations themselves it claims to be "mellowing" and wishes for nothing better than to "live and let live" and perhaps just engage in a friendly and sporting game of economic competition with them, so why should they bother to arm themselves and be suspicious? To the developing

nations, however, the impression is given of the resolute standard bearer of 'liberation' whose growing strength is reducing the 'imperialists' to impotence. The Communists present themselves as wishing to spare the world the horrors of a nuclear war and as determined to see that 'imperialist oppression' is ended for ever.

The increasing Western tendency to take Soviet protestations of its desire for co-existence at face value has, of course, been greatly heightened by the Sino-Soviet split and the enormous success of the Soviet propaganda machine in spreading abroad the simple but greatly distorted thesis that China is warlike and aggressive whilst the Soviet Union is peace-loving and non-aggressive. If comparatively little has been said in this study about the split between the two main protagonists of Communism this has not been because the subject is considered unimportant, but because at the time of writing little hard evidence had come to hand that it had yet caused any basic change in Communist tactics towards the West or has yet seriously disrupted the Communist political warfare offensive.

It is true that conferences organised by some of the international fronts have sometimes been the scene of noisy exchanges and Communist Parties outside the bloc have undoubtedly suffered serious disruption as the result of the split, notably in Latin America where it has caused a great deal of fragmentation. In a few instances such as that of the Australian, New Zealand and Thailand Parties allegiance has been switched altogether from Moscow to Peking, but in 1966 it began to appear that the momentum towards a total split between the Parties comprising the World Communist movement had been at least temporarily halted whilst the pro-Peking embryo parties that had been formed in a number of countries seemed to be making scanty progress. The disastrous fiasco of the attempted coup by the world's biggest Peking-orientated Party, the Communist Party of Indonesia, and the resultant fall in China's prestige has no doubt, in part at least, been the cause of the failure of the Peking factions to gain ground in recent years.

After Mao's death a 'revisionist' or pro-Moscow group may come to power in Peking and then the Sino-Soviet split could be ended.

For the West to base all its hopes upon the premise that the present Moscow-Peking split is predestined to steadily widen would be as dangerous as for it to base its policies upon the belief that a limited relaxation of some of the more blatant methods of totalitarian rule in Eastern Europe foreshadows the emergence of genuine liberty in the Soviet bloc. The dream of the Soviet Union uniting with the West to make a common stand against Chinese ambitions is certainly attractive, but it is as yet only a dream, and one which shows no sign of practical realisation. It is true that no Comintern or Cominform now centrally directs the activities of Communist Parties in the non-Communist world, but on the other hand the immense infra-structure of fronts and committees, intelligence services and propaganda organisations, and official and unofficial bodies of all types which have been built up by the countries of the Communist bloc during the last 20 years forms a

more efficient liaison than either of the two former directing organs of International Communism.

All the signs are that the Communist assault on the West in the shape of a sustained and resolute strategy of subversion and political warfare will continue and even increase in scope and intensity. Basically this strategy can be divided into three parts: Firstly, the propaganda offensive designed not so much to gain converts for Communism outright but to impress the uncommitted nations with the inevitability of the victory of 'Socialism', and to create an anti-Western climate of opinion amongst them. Secondly, operations conducted by all the means of political warfare, to undermine Western morale, confuse public opinion, and to induce a state of paralysis into the opponents of Communism and thirdly, operations of a military or para-military nature, including the supply of arms and the training of guerillas, the instigation of revolution and support for 'wars of liberation'.

In the face of this assault the West's response has been essentially defensive. Its policies being founded on the belief that if the nuclear "balance of terror" can be maintained, the Communist countries will come to see the errors of their ways and the Communist threat will die away of its own accord. This belief of the West that time is on its side is open to serious challenge. For whilst the West waits for the Communist countries to become "democratic" and peace loving the West's position and influence in many areas of the world is being steadily eroded as the direct result of the activities of the Communist political warfare offensive. There is at present a real danger that the vision that has come to some Chinese leaders of the West being gradually isolated and surrounded in the same manner that towns and cities are gradually invested in the course of a successful guerilla campaign could become a grim reality. Be this as it may, in any contest the side that allows itself to become imbued with an entirely defensive philosophy has its feet firmly planted on the road to eventual defeat.

How then can the present position be reversed? How can the West take the initiative and stop merely re-acting to Communist moves?

A pre-requisite to any such forward strategy must be to strive by all the means available to strip away the covering of respectability with which Communism has sought to clothe itself in recent years. The continuing murders along the Berlin Wall, the machine gunning of refugees fleeing from Cuba; the cold blooded and deliberate killing each year of thousands of helpless non-combatants by the Viet Cong must be publicised. The rule of terror meted out by the Chinese in Tibet; the political arrests, imprisonments without trial, and labour camps in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union must be made known to the people of the Western Alliance. All of these should be constantly held up before the world as examples of the inhumanity of Communism in practice. A determined effort by the West to expose the Communist record would not only do much to open the eyes of many in the nations of the West itself but would reveal to the ex-colonial states the continued Communist colonial record in such areas as the Baltic States.

Much could also be accomplished in the diplomatic field. It would be refreshing for instance, to see the United Nations, as the result of a Western initiative, debating the holding of the Tri-Continental Conference in Havana and the setting up of 'The Committee to aid the Liberation Movements' as the threat to peace they both constitute. The clandestine supply of arms to terrorist movements and the facilities provided by Communist countries for vigorous Western action in the Security Council or General Assembly. It is hard to see how the present Western passivity in the face of such actions can do anything but give the impression of conniving at the activities of the enemies of acceptable international behaviour.

In the field of action by individual Western countries something at least could also be done to help offset the effects of the Communist propaganda drive in the developing world by non-governmental bodies such as the trade unions, professional bodies, youth movements, and other similar organisations by their taking a closer interest in their counterparts in those countries and where possible in giving them practical assistance.

The threat of Communist subversion is a world-wide and continuing threat and can only be successfully met by collaboration on an international scale between all the nations opposed to it. It is a threat that calls for the utmost co-operation and mutual understanding between these nations and brooks no room for American distrust of the colonial record of some Western nations or distrust of American motives by the countries of Western Europe.

The Communists have an ideal (however unattractive it may appear to us) and they have a long term strategy culminating in the victory or triumph of their system over the whole globe. They are sustained by a belief in the historical inevitability of their cause. They have an extremely powerful sense of solidarity as a world movement which by definition rises above national boundaries or national self-interest.

The West on the other hand still tends to think in traditional terms of protecting or furthering the British or other purely national interest. There are regional alliances but there is no world-wide anti-, or even non-Communist, alliance. There is at present no strategic plan for preventing further Communist encroachments by subversive war, let alone any plan for securing the eventual adoption of democratic forms of government in the Communist countries themselves. Whilst Western liberal values are understood by the peoples of the West, it often seems that there is little zeal behind the effort to spread them in the developing nations. Hopes that these countries would adopt our Western virtues have been sadly disappointed. There is all too little solidarity amongst those who stand for the cause of human freedom, and their will to defend their vital interests, let alone the will to win, is by no means always evident.

For the moment the point of decision will continue to lie in Vietnam. An enforced American withdrawal or the signing of an agreement which is but a disguised capitulation to Communist aggression, could well have

such repercussions that the West's ability to contain Communist penetration anywhere within the developing nations could be fatally impaired and the whole outcome of the protracted East-West struggle thrown gravely into doubt. If, however, the Viet Cong can be defeated both politically and militarily and be seen to have failed in their objective the atmosphere of infallibility surrounding Communist theories of world conquest by subversion and 'wars of liberation' will have begun to be dispelled and a welcome breathing space for the West may ensue.

In the long run, however, it is doubtful that the present system of regional alliances will prove sufficient to meet and overcome decisively the persistent threat of Communist indirect aggression. There is an urgent need for a world-wide system linking nations opposed to the Communist threat and the setting up of some central co-ordinating organisation as has been urged by experts both in France and the United States with the necessary resources for a full-scale investigation into Communist methods of political warfare and subversion. The duties of such an organisation would include amassing information on a global scale on which to base appreciations concerning probable future Communist intentions; acting as an information centre by which the governments and peoples of the non-Communist world could be kept informed of shifts and turns in Communist tactics, carrying out investigations into effective means of meeting social problems on which Communism flourishes. In the field of practical action it could be given the initial task of working out and implementing plans by which non-Communist countries could together begin to shorten the present dangerous Communist lead in the fields of broadcasting and written propaganda and present Western views and values more efficaciously.

Ultimately there can be no lasting security for the non-Communist world until the present Communist regimes have been replaced by democratically elected governments. This being so, increasing encouragement of, and, when necessary, support should be given to those elements in the Communist countries which are even now seeking to bring about the downfall of regimes and the creation of genuinely liberal and multi-party democratic political administrations. Such a policy would be not just a moral obligation but an essential means of self-preservation for the West.

The most pressing task is to foster a greater sense of urgency and a new attitude of mind in the West in which the reality and danger of the overt threat to its existence in the shape of Communist subversion and political warfare is realised as clearly as was the overt threat of direct Communist military aggression after the Second World War. Once this has been achieved the necessary action to meet and overcome this peril can follow, but not before.

APPENDIX

EUROPE (non-Communist)

Communist Parties in 22 non-Communist European countries.

2,013,950 members

5 illegal Communist Parties

17 legal Communist Parties, of which 10 are represented in parliaments.

In these 22 European states there are about 82,000 pro-Chinese Communists.

EUROPE (Communist)

Nine Communist Parties in power with about 21,247,200 members (and candidates), about 53,000 of them pro-Chinese Communists.

ALL-EUROPE

Communist Parties in 31 countries with about 23,261,150 members.

EUROPE (non-Communist)

Austria

Communist Party of Austria

pro-Soviet

About 36,000 members

Legal

Secretary General: Friedl Fürnberg

Chairman: Franz Muhri

Organ: *Volksstimme*

Marxists-Leninists of Austria

pro-Chinese

Insignificant membership

Chairman: Franz Strobl

Organ: *Rote Fahne*

Belgium

Communist Party of Belgium

pro-Soviet

About 11,000 members

Legal

6 seats in Chamber of Deputies (May 1965)

Secretary General: Ernest Burnelle

Organs: *Le Drapeau Rouge*

De rode Vaan

Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist)

pro-Chinese

About 1,000 members

Legal

Secretary General: Jacques Grippa

The pro-Chinese Communist Party of Belgium (Marxist-Leninist) is split into the:

Communist Party of Brussels

Communist Party of Flanders

Communist Party of Walloon

Organs: *La voix du peuple**De Strijd* for Communist Party of Flanders**Cyprus***Progressive Workers' Party of Cyprus (AKEL)*

pro-Soviet

About 10,500 members

Legal

Secretary General: Ezekias Papaioannou

Organ: *Haravghi***Denmark***Communist Party of Denmark*

pro-Soviet

About 8,000 members

Legal

Chairman: Knud Jespersen

In the 1964 elections the Communist Party of Denmark got no seats (1957, 6 seats). The Socialist People's Party (SFP), founded in 1959 by former members of the Communist Party under Aksel Larsen, gained 10 seats

Organ: *Land og Folk**Communist Operating Circle*

pro-Chinese

Insignificant membership

Legal

Leaders: B. Scocozza and G. Appel

Organ: *Orientering***Federal Republic of Germany***Communist Party of Germany*

pro-Soviet

About 6,000-7,000 members

Illegal

Secretary General: Max Reimann

Organ: *Freies Volk*

Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany

pro-Chinese According to Communist statements founded
in March 1965
Organ: *Sozialistisches Deutschland*

West Berlin*Socialist Unity Party*

(SED) of Germany

pro-Soviet About 6,000 members
Legal
First Secretary: Gerhard Danelius
Organ: *Wahrheit*

Finland*Communist Party of Finland*

pro-Soviet About 46,000 members
Legal
42 seats in Parliament (March 1966) (1962, 47)
In the Popular Front Government of 1966 the
CP of Finland was given the First Ministry of
Transport, the First Ministry of Social Affairs
and the Second Ministry of Finances
Secretary General: Ville Pessi
Organ: *Kansan Uutiset*

Central Committee of the Communist Party Opposition

pro-Chinese Said to be founded in 1961

Foundation for Study of Socialism

pro-Chinese Organ: *Tilanne*
not thoroughly

France*Communist Party of France*

pro-Soviet About 265,000 members
Legal
73 seats in National Assembly (1967)
Secretary General: Waldeck Rochet
Organ: *l'Humanité*

Fédération des Cercles Marxistes-Léninistes

pro-Chinese Membership: See note
Leaders: Jacques Jurquet and Francois Marty
Organ: *l'Humanité nouvelle*

Centre Marxiste-Léniniste de France

pro-Chinese Membership: See note
 Secretary: P. Prado
 and other insignificant splinter groups
 Organ: *Bulletin d'Information Marxiste-Léniniste*
 Note: Both organisations have a total of 20,000 members

Great Britain*Communist Party of Great Britain*

pro-Soviet About 33,700 members
 Legal
 Secretary General: John Gollan
 Organ: *Morning Star*

Committee to Defeat Revisionism for Communist Unity

pro-Chinese Chairman: D. Volpe
 Organ: *Vanguard*

Action Center for Marxist-Leninist Unity

pro-Chinese Chairmen: Baker, Dix and Maureen Scott
 Organ: *Hammer and Anvil*

China Policy Study Group

pro-Chinese Organ: *The Broadsheet*
 left not purely
 Communist

Greece*Communist Party of Greece (KKE)*

pro-Soviet About 20,000 members
 Illegal
 Secretary General: Kostas Kolijannis
 Organ: *The New World*

The United Democratic Left (EDA)

pro-Soviet About 96,000 members
 Legal until 1967, focal point of the illegal KKE
 President: Passalidis
 Organ: *Avgi*

Union of the Friends of the New Countries

pro-Chinese Focal point of the pro-Chinese Communists
 with unimportant membership

Formerly called 'Union of the Friends of China'
 Organ: *Greco-Chinese Chronicles*

Iceland

Socialist Unity Party of Iceland

pro-Soviet About 1,000 members
 Legal
 19 seats in Parliament together with Left
 Socialists in 'Labor Alliance'
 Chairman: Einar Olgeirsson
 Organ: *Thjodviljinn*

Folkealliancen

not thoroughly Founded March 1966
 pro-Chinese Chairman: M. T. Olafsson

Ireland

Irish Workers' Party

pro-Soviet About 150 members
 Legal
 Secretary General: Michael O'Riordan
 Organ: *Irish Socialist*

Ireland (North)

Communist Party of North Ireland

pro-Soviet About 100 members
 Legal
 Secretary General: Hugh Moore

Italy

Communist Party of Italy

pro-Soviet About 1,512,500 members
 Legal
 166 seats in Chamber of Deputies (1963)
 Secretary General: Luigi Longo
 Organ: *Unita*

Foundation of the pro-Chinese Revolutionary Marxist-Leninist Party of Italy

in preparation out of groups like:
 National Society for Friendship between Italy and China with
 organ *Italia-China*
Viva il Leninismo—group in Padua
Campo Marzio—group in Rome
New Resistance in Rome

Movimento Marxista-Leninista etc.,

a total of about 55,000 pro-Chinese Communists,
main organ of the pro-Chinese Communists:
Nuova Unità in Milan

Luxembourg*Communist Party of Luxembourg*

pro-Soviet About 500 members
Legal
5 seats in Parliament (1964)
Chairman: Dominique Urbany
Organ: *Zeitung vom Letzeburger Vollek*

Luxembourg-China Society

pro-Chinese Insignificant membership
Chairman: Adolph Franck

Netherlands*Communist Party of the Netherlands*

pro-Soviet About 12,000 members
Legal
4 seats in Parliament (1963)
Chairman: Paul de Groot
Organ: *De Waarheid*

Marxist-Leninist Center of the Netherlands

pro-Chinese About 200 members
Chairman: Chris Petersen and Nico Schrevel
Organ: *De Rode Tribune*

There is also a non-organised pro-Chinese group under the direction of Chris Bischof.

Organ: *De rode Vlag*

Norway*Communist Party of Norway*

pro-Soviet About 4,500 members
Legal.
Won no seats in Parliament (Storting) in the
elections of 1961 and 1965 (1957, 1 seat)
Chairman: Reidar Larsen
Organ: *Friheten*

There is no organised pro-Chinese group in Norway, but there are pro-Chinese tendencies within the Communist Party of Norway.

Portugal*Communist Party of Portugal*

pro-Soviet About 2,000 members
 Illegal
 Secretary General: Alvaro Cunhal
 Organ: *Avante*

Marxist-Leninist Committee

pro-Chinese Insignificant membership
 Chairman: Francisco Martins Rodriguez
 (February 1966, jailed)
 Organ: *People's Revolution*

Popular Action Front

pro-Chinese Insignificant membership
 Chairman: Francisco Martins Rodriguez
 (February 1966, jailed)
 Organ: *Accio Popular*

San Marino*Communist Party of San Marino*

pro-Soviet About 1,500 members
 Legal
 10 seats in Congress
 Secretary General: Ermenegildo Gasperoni
 Organ: *La Scintilla*

Spain*Communist Party of Spain*

pro-Soviet About 5,000 members
 Illegal
 Secretary General: Santiago Carillo Morales
 Organ: *Mundo Obrero*

Revolutionary Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Spain

pro-Chinese About 2,100 members
 Leader: Paulino Garcia-Moya
 Organ: *Mundo Obrero Revolucionario*

Communist Party of Spain (Marxist-Leninist)

pro-Chinese **Organ: *Vanguardia Obrera***

Sweden*Communist Party of Sweden*

pro-Soviet About 25,000 members
 Legal
 2 seats in Upper Chamber

8 seats in Lower Chamber of the Reichstag
(1964)

Chairman: C. H. Hermansson

Organ: *Ny Dag*

Communist Workers' Association of Sweden

pro-Chinese

About 3,000 members

Chairman: Sven Eric Holmsten

Organ: *Revolt*

Action Group to Support the National Liberation Front South Vietnam

pro-Chinese

Chairman: Sköld Peter Matthis

Organ: *Vietnam*

Switzerland

Workers' Party

pro-Soviet

About 6,000 members

Legal

4 seats in National Council (1963)

Secretary General: Edgar Woog

Organs: *Vorwärts* and *Voix Ouvrière*

Communist Party of Switzerland

pro-Chinese

About 400 members

but no longer

Chairman: Gerard Bulliard

thoroughly

Organ: *L'Etincelle*

Lenin-Center

pro-Chinese

About 150 members

Chairman: Nils Andersson

Organ: *Octobre*

Turkey

Communist Party of Turkey

pro-Soviet

About 1,000 members

Illegal

Secretary General: Yacoub Demir

European Communist Parties in Power

Albania

Alban Workers' Party

pro-Chinese

About 53,000 members

Secretary General: Enver Hoxha

Organ: *Zeri i Popullit*

Bulgaria*Communist Party of Bulgaria*

pro-Soviet About 550,380 members
 Secretary General: Todor Zhivkov
 Organ: *Rabotnitchesko Delo*

Czechoslovakia*Communist Party of Czechoslovakia*

pro-Soviet About 1,700,000 members
 Secretary General: Antonin Novotny
 Organ: *Rudé Právo*

Soviet Zone of Germany*Socialist Unity Party of Germany*

pro-Soviet About 1,610,670 members
 Secretary General: Walter Ulbricht
 Organ: *Neues Deutschland*

Hungary*Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party*

pro-Soviet About 540,000 members
 Secretary General: János Kadar
 Organ: *Népszabadság*

Poland*Polish United Workers' Party*

pro-Soviet About 1,775,040 members
 Secretary General: Wladyslaw Gomulka
 Organ: *Trybuna Ludu*

Communist Party of Poland (Marxist-Leninist)

pro-Chinese Said to be founded illegally in early 1966

Rumania*Communist Party of Rumania*

pro-Soviet About 1,518,000 members
 Secretary General: Nicolae Ceausescu
 Organ: *Scinteia*

Soviet Union*Communist Party of the Soviet Union*

About 12,470,070 members

Secretary General: Leonid I. Brezhnev

Organ: *Pravda***Yugoslavia***League of Communists of Yugoslavia*

pro-Soviet

About 1,030,040 members

Secretary General: Josip Broz-Tito

Organ: *Komunist***MIDDLE EAST**

Communist Parties in 7 countries of the Middle East have about 24,250 members.

4 illegal Communist Parties

2 semi-legal Communist Parties

1 legal Communist Party which is represented in Parliament.

In these 7 countries about 23,350 Communists are pro-Soviet and 900 pro-Chinese.

MIDDLE EAST**Iran***Communist Party of Iran (Tudeh)*

pro-Soviet

About 1,500 members

Illegal

Secretary General: Dr. Reza Radmanesch

Organ: *Mardom**Revolutionary Peoples' Party of Iran*

pro-Chinese

Leader: A. Ghasemi

Iraq*Communist Party of Iraq*

pro-Soviet

About 12,500 members

Illegal

Secretary General: Nazim Ali

Organ: *Ittihad al-Shab*

Communist Party of Iraq (Marxist-Leninist)

pro-Chinese About 200 members
 Secretary General: Baha el-Din Nuri

Israel*Communist Party of Israel (Maki)*

pro-Soviet About 2,100 members
 Legal
 3 seats in Parliament (Knesset) (1965)
 Secretary General: Samuel Mikunis
 Organ: *Kol Haam*

Communist Party of Israel (RAKAH)

pro-Nasser, radical, pre- About 1,400 members
 dominantly Arab members 1 seat in Parliament (1965)
 not thoroughly pro-Soviet Secretary General: Meir Vilner
 Organ: *Mezpen*

Jordan*Communist Party of Jordan*

pro-Soviet About 500 members
 Illegal
 Secretary General: Fuad Nassar
 Organ: *Al-Muqua wama Al-Shabiya*

There are pro-Chinese tendencies within the Communist Party of Jordan, but no organisations of pro-Chinese Communists have as yet developed.

Kuwait*Communist Party of Kuwait*

pro-Soviet About 50 members
 Illegal

Lebanon*Communist Party of the Lebanon*

pro-Soviet About 1,700 members
 Semi-legal (as party officially not admitted,
 activity not obstructed)
 Secretary General: Mustafa Aris
 Organ: *An Nida*

Party of the Socialist Revolution

pro-Chinese About 700 members
 Secretary General: Fuad Awki (alias Mustafa Shaker)
 Organ: *Ila al Aman*

Syria*Communist Party of Syria*

pro-Soviet About 4,500 members
 Semi-legal (as party as yet not re-admitted, activity since 1966 no longer obstructed)
 Secretary General: Khaled Bagdache
 Organ: *Nida al Sha'ab*

Party of the Socialist Revolution

pro-Chinese Leader: Khaled Hakim

ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA

(non-Communist)

Communist Parties in 16 non-Communist countries of Asia and Australasia have about 466,000 members.

6 legal Communist Parties
 10 illegal Communist Parties
 3 Communist Parties represented in Parliament.

In these 16 countries 96,400 Communists are considered pro-Soviet and 370,200 pro-Chinese.

ASIA

(Communist)

Four Communist Parties are in power with about 19,917,000 members. In these countries there are 47,000 pro-Soviet and 19,870,000 pro-Chinese Communists.

ALL-ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA

Communist Parties in 20 countries with about 20,383,600 members.

Australia*Communist Party of Australia*

pro-Soviet About 5,000 members
 Legal
 Secretary General: Lawrence Louis Sharkey
 Organ: *Tribune*

Communist Party of Australia (Marxist-Leninist)

pro-Chinese About 100 members
 Chairman: Edward Fowler Hill
 Organ: *Vanguard*

Burma*Burma Communist Party (White Flag)*

not thoroughly About 1,000 members
 pro-Chinese Illegal
 Leader: Ba-Tin

Communist Party of Burma (Red Flag)

not thoroughly About 500 members
 pro-Chinese Illegal
 Leader: Thakin Soe

United Workers' Party of Burma (UWP)

not thoroughly pro-Chinese	About 4,000 members
Resolved in 1964 as only Burmese	Illegal
Communist Party to join the	Co-chairmen: Tschit Maung
Burmese legal "Party of the	and Bo Ohn Tin
Burmese Way to Socialism"	

Cambodia*Communist Party of Cambodia*

not thoroughly About 100 members
 pro-Chinese Illegal

Peoples' Revolutionary Party of Cambodia

not thoroughly About 1,000 members
 pro-Chinese Semi-legal
 Organ: *Pracheachon*

Ceylon*Communist Party of Ceylon*

pro-Soviet About 4,000 members
 Legal
 Secretary General: Pieter Keuneman
 Organ: *Forward*

Communist Party of Ceylon

pro-Chinese About 7,500 members
 Legal
 Secretary General: Premalal Kumarasiri
 Organ: *Kamkaruwa*

Both Communist Parties have a total of four seats in Parliament (1965)

Lanka Sama Samaja Party

Trotskyite

Lanka Sama Samaja Party (Revolutionary)

Trotskyite

pro-Chinese

Leader: E. Samarakoddy

Both parties have a total of ten seats in Parliament

India

Communist Party of India

pro-Soviet

About 77,000 members

Legal

Party Chairman: S. A. Dange

Organ: *New Age*

Communist Party of India

pro-Chinese

About 93,000 members

Legal

Secretary General: P. Sundaraya

Organ: *Peoples' Democracy*

Indonesia

Communist Party of Indonesia

pro-Chinese

About 100,000 members (at the end of 1965 over 2 millions)

Illegal

Japan

Communist Party of Japan

pro-Chinese, however

no longer completely

About 150,000 members

Legal

3 seats in Senate (1965)

4 seats in Chamber of Deputies (1963)

Secretary General: Kenji Miyamoto

Organ: *Akahata*

The Voice of Japan

pro-Soviet

About 3,000 members

Legal

1 seat in Senate (1965)

1 seat in Chamber of Deputies (1963)

Leader: Yoshio Shiga

Organ: *Nihon No Koe*

Laos*Laotian Peoples' Party (Neo Lao Hak Xat)*

not completely About 2,000 members
 pro-Chinese Legal
 Secretary General: Phoumi Vongvichit
 Organ: *Lao Hak Xat*

Malaysia*Communist Party of Malaysia*

pro-Chinese About 2,000 members
 Illegal
 Secretary General: Chen Ping

Nepal*Communist Party of Nepal*

About 4,000 members
 Illegal
 Pro-Soviet fraction under Raimajhi, and pro-
 Chinese group of about equal strength under
 Pusha Lal Shrestha
 Organ: *Sameeksha*

New Zealand*Communist Party of New Zealand*

pro-Chinese About 500 members
 Legal
 Secretary General: Victor Wilcox
 Organ: *People's Voice*

Communist Party of New Zealand

pro-Soviet Insignificant membership

Pakistan*Communist Party of Pakistan*

not completely About 2,500 members in East Pakistan
 pro-Soviet About 400 members in West Pakistan
 Illegal
 Organ of the Communist Party in East Pakistan:
 Shikha

Philippines*Communist Party of the Philippines*

not completely About 2,500 members
 pro-Soviet Illegal

Singapore*Communist Party of Singapore*

pro-Chinese About 500 members
 Illegal
 President: Chang Chi-Fa

Thailand*Communist Party of Thailand*

pro-Chinese, composed of About 4,000 members
 'Thai Communist Party' Illegal
 and 'Chinese Communist Chairman: Pridi Panomjong
 Party (Thailand)' Organ: *Rakchart*

South Vietnam*Workers' Party Dang Lao Dong Section South Vietnam*

not thoroughly About 2,000 members
 pro-Chinese, Illegal
 Organ: *Trung Lap*

ASIA**(Communist)****Mongolian People's Republic***Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party*

pro-Soviet About 47,000 members
 First Secretary: Umjagin Tsedenbal
 Organ: *Namyn Unen* (The Truth)

North Korea*Korean Workers' Party*

not completely About 1,300,000 members
 pro-Chinese Chairman: Kim Il-sung
 Organ: *Rodong Shinmun*

North Vietnam*Lao Dong Workers' Party of Vietnam*

not completely About 570,000 members
 pro-Chinese President: Ho Chi-minh
 Organ *Nhan Dan*

People's Republic of China*Communist Party of the People's Republic of China*

About 18,000,000 members

Chairman of the Politburo: Mao Tse-tung

Organ: *Jen Min Jih Pao* (People's Daily)**AFRICA**

Communist Parties in 14 African countries have about 28,950 members.

12 illegal Communist Parties

2 legal Communist Parties.

In these 14 countries 28,350 Communists are considered pro-Soviet and 600 pro-Chinese.

Algeria*Communist Party of Algeria*

pro-Soviet with About 5,000 members

pro-Chinese Illegal

tendencies Secretary General: Larbi Bouhali

Organ: *Al Hurriya***Angola***Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA)*Was represented by a delegate at the 23rd Congress of the CPSU,
spring 1966.

Leader: Antonio Agostinho Neto

Uniao dos Populacoes de Angola (UPA)

Leader: Roberto Alvaro Holden

Both these movements are Communist influenced although
membership is not purely Communist.**Basutoland (Lesotho)***Communist Party of Lesotho*

pro-Soviet About 600 members

Legal

Secretary General: Kena Morafisi

Organ: *Tokoloho* (Freedom)**Cameroon***Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC)*

pro-Soviet About 1,000 members

Illegal

Chairman: Ernest Ouandie

Organ: *La Voix du Cameroun*

Premier Groupe Communiste du Cameroun

pro-Chinese fraction of the UPC

Resolved to found a CP Marxist-Leninist of Cameroon at a general assembly, May 1966.

Organ: *Le Communiste*

Congo (Brazzaville)

The unity party *Mouvement National de la Révolution (MNR)* is pro-Communist.

1. Secretary: President Ambroise Noumazalay

Congo (Leopoldville)

The illegal *Conseil National de Libération du Congo (Léopoldville)* (CNL), founded in 1963, and the *Forces Armées Révolutionnaires* are Communist and supported mainly by the People's Republic of China. The *Conseil Suprême de la Révolution*, also Communist, was founded in 1965.

Dahomey

Parti de la Révolution Socialiste du Benin

Founded in 1959, insignificant Communist group

Ghana

The *Convention People's Party (CPP)*, Nkrumah's unity party, maintains close relations with the Communist Parties of the East Bloc countries. After Nkrumah's ouster on 24 February, 1966, members of the CPP founded a "Socialist Ghana Defence Committee" in London with about 200 members and a "Committee for the Defence of the Revolution" in Conakry/Guinea.

Guinea

Guinea's unity party, the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée (PDG)* maintains close contact with the Communist Parties of the Communist bloc countries.

Kenya

The *Kenya People's Union* under the leadership of Ajuma Oginga Odinga, former Vice-President of the Kenya African National Union (KANU), is not Communist, but shows very left-wing tendencies.

Madagascar*Communist Party of Madagascar*

pro-Chinese About 100 members
 Illegal
 Secretary General: René Anselme Randrianja

Parti Marxiste-Léniniste Malgache (PMLM)

pro-Soviet Insignificant membership

The legal opposition party *Parti du Congrès de l'Indépendance de Madagascar (AKFM)* is considerably influenced by Communists.

Secretary General: Richard Andriamananjato

Mali

The unity party *Union Soudanaise-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (US-RDA)* maintains close relations to Communist Parties in power, especially to the CPSU.

Party Leader: President Mobido Keita
 Organ: *L'Essor-Bamako*

Mauritius

The *Mauritius National Progressive Party* sent a delegate to the 6th Congress of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia, June 1966. The *Mauritius Labour Party* has a strong Communist wing.

Morocco*Communist Party of Morocco*

pro-Soviet About 1,000 members
 Illegal
 Secretary General: Ali Yata
 Organs: *Al-Moukafeh*, banned in 1961
 Al-Kifah Al-Watani, banned March 1965

The legal opposition party *Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP)*, founded by Medi Ben Barka, is Communist infiltrated.

Party Leader: Abdel-Rahim Bouabid

Mozambique*Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (FRELIMO)*

President: Dr. Eduardo C. Mondlane

Comitato Revolucionario de Mocambique (COREMO)

Secretary General: Paulo José Gumane

Both Communist influenced, although membership is not purely Communist.

Niger*Sawaba Party*

pro-Chinese About 500 members
 Illegal
 Leader: Djibo Bakary

Nigeria*Socialist Workers' and Farmers' Party of Nigeria (SWAFP)*

pro-Soviet About 10,000 members
 Illegal
 Secretary General: Dr. Tunji Otegbeye
 Organ: *Advance*

Nigerian Young Communist League

pro-Soviet Insignificant membership
 Secretary General: Wilfred Madu

Communist Party of Nigeria

pro-Soviet Insignificant membership
 Chairman and 1. Secretary: Chukwudolue
 Orhakamadu

Nigerian Labour Party (NLP)

leftist, pro-Chinese Insignificant membership
 tendencies, founded Leader: Michael Imoudu
 in 1964 by former Organ: *Labour Vanguard*
 members of the
 SWAFP

Marxist-Leninist Party of all Nigerian Toilers

pro-Chinese Insignificant membership
 founded August President: Michael Imoudu
 1964 in Ibadan

Portuguese Africa

The various nationalist movements are Communist infiltrated and supported by Communist countries. They are, however, not Communist organisations.

Portuguese Guinea*Partido Africano da Independencia da Guiné e do Cabo Verde (PAIGC)*

Secretary General: Amilcar Cabral

Reunion*Communist Party of Reunion*

pro-Soviet About 700 members
 Illegal
 Secretary General: Paul Verges
 Organ: *Témoignage*

Rhodesia*Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)*

Headquarters: Lusaka/Zambia

Secretary General: Robert Mugabe

and

Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)

Headquarters: Lusaka/Zambia

Chairman: Joshua Nkomo

Organ: *Zimbabwe News*

are radical nationalist parties, Communist infiltrated but not purely Communist.

Senegal*Parti Africain de l'Indépendance (PAI)*

The PAI has a pro- About 550 members

Chinese wing, can be Illegal

classified, however, as Secretary General: Mahjemout Diop

pro-Soviet Organ: *Momsarew*

The pro-Chinese Communists published a "Manifesto of the Communist Party of Senegal", May 1965, but a Communist Party was not founded.

Somali Republic*Somali Youth League (SYL)*

Government Party under Sheikh Mohammed Farah. Has strong pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese fractions and was represented by a delegate at the 6th Congress of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia, June 1966.

Somali Democratic Union (SDU)

Crypto-Communist Party Secretary General: Jussuf Osman
of radical groups with pro- Samantar
Soviet and pro-Chinese
members

South Africa*Communist Party of South Africa*

pro-Soviet About 1,000 members

Illegal

Chairman: Lebadi

Organ: *The African Communist*

The underground organisations *Umkonto We Sizwe* and *Pogo* are Communist-controlled combat organisations, but not purely Communist.

African National Congress (ANC)

Leader: Albert Luthuli

and

Pan African Congress (PAC) (splinter-Party of the ANC)

Leader: Robert Sobuwke

are Communist infiltrated. Both are illegal.

South West Africa

South-West African National Union (SWANU)

Communist
infiltrated,
radical

President: J. Kozonguizi

South-West African People's Organisation (SWAPO)

Not as radical as SWANU, but
also Communist infiltrated

Sudan

Communist Party of Sudan

pro-Soviet with
pro-Chinese
wing

About 6,000 members

Illegal

Secretary General: Abdel Khalek Mahjoub

Organ: *El Maidan*

Swaziland

Communist Party of Swaziland

pro-Soviet

Insignificant membership

Tanzania

The unity Parties

Tanganyika African National Union (TANU)

Party of the
mainland
and

Leader: President Julius Nyerere

Organ: *The Nationalist*

Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP)

Party of
Zanzibar and
Pemba, radical

Secretary General: Thabet Kombo

Organ: *Africa Kwetu*

They are Communist infiltrated and were represented by delegations at the 23rd Congress of the CPSU in Moscow, Spring 1966.

Tunisia*Communist Party of Tunisia*

pro-Soviet About 500 members
 Illegal
 Secretary General: Mohammed Ennafaa
 Organ: *Al-Talia*

United Arab Republic*Communist Party of Egypt*

pro-Soviet About 2,000 members
 Illegal, allegedly dissolved in 1965
 Secretary General: S. A. Schaffel
 Organ: *Ittihad Al Chaab*

Arab Communist Party

pro-Chinese Insignificant membership
 Leader: Mustapha Agha

Arab Socialist Union (ASU)

Unity Party of the UAR, by which the CP was allegedly absorbed in 1965. The ASU was represented by a delegate at the 23rd Congress of the CPSU in Moscow, Spring 1966.

Chairman: President Gamal Abdel Nasser

Zambia*United National Independence Party (UNIP)*

Government party under Premier Kenneth Kaunda, was represented by a delegate at the 6th Congress of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia, June 1966.

NORTH AMERICA

In 2 countries legal Communist Parties with a total of 16,000 pro-Soviet members.

Canada*Communist Party of Canada*

pro-Soviet About 3,500 members (including Communist Party of Quebec)
 Legal
 Secretary General: William Kashtan
 Organ: *Canadian Tribune*

Communist Party of Quebec

Legal
 President: Samuel M. Walsh

Progressive Workers' Movement (PWM)

pro-Chinese Insignificant membership
 Organ: *Progressive Worker*

USA*Communist Party of the USA*

pro-Soviet About 12,500 members
 Legal
 Secretary General: Gus Hall
 Organ: *Worker*

Progressive Labor Party (PLP)

pro-Chinese Insignificant membership
 Legal
 President: Milton Rosen
 Organ: *Progressive Labor*

LATIN AMERICA

Communist Parties in 22 non-Communist countries of Latin-America with about 221,500 members

7 legal Communist Parties
 15 illegal Communist Parties
 2 Communist Parties represented in Parliament.

In these 22 countries 212,400 Communists may be classified as pro-Soviet and 9,100 as pro-Chinese.

One Communist Party in power with about 50,000 members may be classified pro-Soviet.

Argentina*Communist Party of Argentina*

pro-Soviet About 70,000 members
 Illegal
 Chairman: Victorio Codovilla
 Organ: *Nuestra Palabra*

Vanguardia de Partido Comunista de Argentina

pro-Chinese Insignificant membership
 Illegal
 Leader: Elias Seman
 Organ: *No Transar*

Bolivia*Communist Party of Bolivia*

pro-Soviet About 4,000 members
 Legal
 Secretary General: Mario Monje Molina
 Organ: *Unidad*

The following Parties are united in the *National Liberation Front (FLIN)*:

Communist Party of Bolivia

Partido Revolucionario de la Izquierda Nacional (PRIN)

Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (PIR) (about 1,500 members)

Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR) (about 2,000 members)

Communist Party of Bolivia (Marxist-Leninist)

pro-Chinese About 1,000 members

Legal

1. Secretary: Oscar Zamora

Brazil

Brazilian Communist Party

pro-Soviet About 25,000 members

Illegal

Secretary General: Luis Carlos Prestes

Organ: *Novos Rumos*

Communist Party of Brazil

pro-Chinese About 1,000 members

Illegal

Secretary General: Joao Amazonas de Souza

Pedroso

Organ: *A Classe Operaria*

Chile

Communist Party of Chile

pro-Soviet About 40,000 members

Legal

5 seats in Senate

18 seats in Chamber of Deputies

Secretary General: Luis Corvalan Leppe

Organ: *El Siglo*

Partido Comunista Revolucionario (PCR)

pro-Chinese. In May 1966 founded of About 1,000 members

pro-Chinese splinter-groups (Grupos Legal

"Espartaco" and "Union Rebelde Organ: *Principios*

Comunista")

Colombia

Communist Party of Colombia

pro-Soviet About 10,000 members

Legal, barred from electoral participation in 1964

Secretary General: Gilberto Vieira

Organ: *Voz Proletaria*

Communist Party of Colombia (Marxist-Leninist)

pro-Chinese About 2,000 members
 Legal, barred from electoral participation in 1964
 Organs: *Tribuna* and *Revolución*

Costa Rica*Popular Vanguard Party of Costa Rica*

pro-Soviet About 600 members
 Illegal
 Secretary General: Manuel Mora Valverde
 Organ: *La Libertad*

Cuba*Communist Party of Cuba*

pro-Soviet About 50,000 members
 Party in power
 Secretary General: Fidel Castro
 Organ: *Granma*

Dominican Republic*Dominican Communist Party*

pro-Soviet About 1,000 members
 Illegal
 Chairman: Juan Ducoudray

Movimiento Popular Dominicano (MPD)

pro-Chinese About 800 members
 Illegal
 Secretary General: Maximo Lopez Molina
 Organs: *Libertad* and *Bandera Roja*

Movimiento 14 Juno (M 14 J)

Castroite Illegal
 Leader: Manuel Tavarez Kusto

Ecuador*Communist Party of Ecuador*

 Illegal
 Secretary General: Pedro Antonio Saad Niyaim
 Organ: *El Pueblo*

 pro-Soviet fraction: About 2,000 members
 pro-Chinese fraction: About 1,000 members

Castroite **Illegal**
Leader: Dr. Mario Castro Zeledon

pro-Chinese Insignificant membership
Organ: *GONG-Information*

pro-Chinese	Illegal
pro-Communist	Leader: Yon Sosa
	Organ: <i>Revolucion Socialista</i>

maintains close relations to Communist Parties in power.

pro-Soviet About 200 members
 Illegal
 Chairman: E. St. Armand

People's National Liberation Party (PPLN)

pro-Soviet About 100 members
 Illegal

Common organ of the PEP and the PPLN: *Haiti-Demain*.

Honduras*Communist Party of Honduras*

pro-Soviet About 1,200 members
 Illegal
 Organ: *Manana*

Honduran Revolutionary Party (PRH)

pro-Soviet About 500 members
 Illegal

Francisco Morazan Movement

Castroite

Jamaica*People's Freedom Movement*

Communist Organ: *Freedom News Letter*
 infiltrated

Martinique*Communist Party of Martinique*

pro-Soviet About 1,000 members
 Legal
 Secretary General: Armand Nicolas
 Organs: *Action and Justice*

Parti Progressiste Martiniquais (PPM)

pro-Communist Leader: Aimé Césaire

Parti Socialiste Unifié (PSU)

pro-Communist

Mexico*Communist Party of Mexico*

pro-Soviet About 5,000 members
 Legal
 1. Secretary: Arnoldo Martínez Verdugo
 Organ: *La Voz de Mexico*

Bolshevik Communist Party of Mexico (PCBM)

pro-Chinese About 300 members
 Legal
 Secretary General: Andreas García Saldano
 Organ: *El Machete*

Partido Popular Socialista (PPS)

and

Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (MLN)

are the most important Communist-infiltrated Parties of Mexico.

Nicaragua*Socialist Party of Nicaragua*

pro-Soviet

About 200 members

Illegal

Unofficial organ: *Orientacion Popular***Panama***People's Party of Panama*

pro-Soviet with

About 200 members

pro-Chinese wing

Illegal

Secretary General: Vicente Tello

Organ: *El Mazo**Socialist Party (PS)*

Communist

infiltrated

Paraguay*Communist Party of Paraguay*

pro-Soviet

About 4,500 members

Illegal

Leader: Commission for the Defense and
Reorganisation of the PCP under Obdulio
Barthe and Augusto CaneteOrgan: *Adelante**Partido Comunista Leninista Paraguayo*

pro-Chinese

Insignificant membership

Secretary General: Oscar Creydt

Peru*Communist Party of Peru*

pro-Soviet

About 7,000 members

Illegal

Secretary General: Victor Raul Acosta Salas

Organ: *Unidad**Communist Party of Peru*

pro-Chinese

About 2,000 members

Illegal

Secretary General: Saturnino Paredes

Organ: *Bandera Roja*

Puerto Rico*Communist Party of Puerto Rico*

pro-Soviet About 2,000 members
 Illegal
 Chairman: Juan Santos Rivera

Trinidad and Tobago*West Indian Independence Party*

Communist Insignificant membership
 Legal

Uruguay*Communist Party of Uruguay*

pro-Soviet About 10,000 members
 Legal
 3 seats in the Senate (represented by the Frente
 Izquierda de Liberación/FIDEL)
 3 seats in the Chamber of Deputies (represented
 by the Frente Izquierda de Liberación/FIDEL)
 Secretary General: Rodney Arismendi
 Organ: *El Popular*

Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario (MIR)

and

Movimiento de Accion Campesina (MAC)

are Communist-controlled radical organisations maintaining con-
 tacts with the People's Republic of China.

Venezuela*Communist Party of Venezuela*

pro-Soviet About 25,000 members
 Illegal
 Secretary General: Jesus Faria
 Organ: *Tribuna Popular*

The Communist *Partido Revolucionario de la Izquierda Nacional-ista (PRIN)*, founded in 1966, comprises:

*Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR)**Partido Revolucionario Nacionalista (PRN)**Vanguardia Popular Nacionalista (VPN)*

Secretary General: Dr. Domingo Alberto
 Rangel

The leftist terror organisation

Fuerzas Armadas de la Liberacion Nacional (FALN)

is pro-Chinese ; splitting tendencies reduce the organisation's effec-
 tiveness considerably.

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